Re: [tor-bugs] #18935 [Applications/Tor Browser]: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18935: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Security suite intercepts at "random" situations xul.dll calls to physical
 memory (WHY IS IT DOING IT?!!) and if denied:
 {{{
 Faulting application name: firefox.exe, version: 45.1.0.0, time stamp:
 0x
 Faulting module name: xul.dll, version: 45.1.0.0, time stamp: 0x
 Exception code: 0xc0fd
 Fault offset: 0x0258b0b2
 }}}
 or
 {{{
 Faulting application name: firefox.exe, version: 38.7.1.0, time stamp:
 0x
 Faulting module name: xul.dll, version: 38.7.1.0, time stamp: 0x
 Exception code: 0xc005
 Fault offset: 0x00041416
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18935 [Applications/Tor Browser]: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18935: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Check Server/Errors in Browser Console and
 {{{
 Faulting application name: firefox.exe, version: 45.1.0.0, time stamp:
 0x
 Faulting module name: WINMM.DLL, version: 6.1.7601.17514, time stamp:
 0x4ce7ba42
 Exception code: 0xc0fd
 Fault offset: 0x3276
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18935 [Applications/Tor Browser]: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18935: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 There are so many crashes in 6.0a5 and all this MS crap that this ticket
 becomes recycle bin for crash reports - pick any to a separate ticket if
 you like :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18937 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18937: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 As in previous versions:
 {{{
 no element found data::1:1
 1461993988200   addons.productaddonsERROR   Request failed certificate
 checks: [Exception... "SSL is required and URI scheme is not https."
 nsresult: "0x8000 (NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED)"  location: "JS frame ::
 resource://gre/modules/CertUtils.jsm :: checkCert :: line 145"  data: no]
 Log.jsm:751:0
 1461993988200   Toolkit.GMP ERROR
 GMPInstallManager.simpleCheckAndInstall Could not check for addons:
 [Exception... "SSL is required and URI scheme is not https."  nsresult:
 "0x8000 (NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED)"  location: "JS frame ::
 resource://gre/modules/CertUtils.jsm :: checkCert :: line 145"  data: no]
 Stack trace: checkCert()@resource://gre/modules/CertUtils.jsm:145 <
 
downloadXML/https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18937#comment:7>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18937 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18937: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 On Win 7:
 {{{
 1461992177300   addons.xpi  ERROR   Failed to clean updated system
 add-ons directories.: Win error 2 during operation
 DirectoryIterator.prototype.next on file C:\%REMOVED%\Tor
 Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Browser\profile.default\features (The
 system cannot find the file specified.) ((unknown module)) No traceback
 available1 Log.jsm:751:0
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18937 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18937: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Old bugs:
 {{{
 Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS isolation catchall:
 https://www.torproject.org/images/favicon.ico via --unknown--:0
 Torbutton INFO: Component returned failure code: 0x80070057
 (NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE) [mozIThirdPartyUtil.getFirstPartyURIFromChannel]
 Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS isolation catchall: https://ocsp.digicert.com/
 via --unknown--:0
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18886 [Applications/Tor Browser]: consider removing Pocket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18886: consider removing Pocket
+--
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Medium  | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|  needs_information
 Severity:  Normal  |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201604  |Version:
Parent ID:  | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  |  Actual Points:
| Points:
|Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Oh shi*! What's wrong with you, guys?
 Mark, you are too shy with your "consider removing". Use "remove that crap
 to hell" instead!
 Mozilla violated a lot of principles when integrated Pocket into Firefox,
 and then
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1172126 became the 2nd most
 voted bug in history of Firefox!
 Link in the description has everything you need to properly remove that
 crap from the codebase.
 Just do it!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18290 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Windows toolchain to work with Firefox 45 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18290: Update Windows toolchain to work with Firefox 45 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  task |  team
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:  closed
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff45-esr,| Resolution:  fixed
  TorBrowserTeam201604, GeorgKoppen201604|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18226   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Replying to [comment:9 gk]:
 > Thanks for the pointer, but, no, not necessarily.
 Of course, not. There was a different problem in #10761. But trying to
 solve problems by disabling dllimport attribute of functions Jacek is
 going the wrong way.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10089 [Applications/Tor Browser]: middlemouse.contentLoadURL is set to true by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10089: middlemouse.contentLoadURL is set to true by default
-+-
 Reporter:  WDXfjqDN4QKGYrlY |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  enhancement  |  team
 Priority:  Very Low | Status:  new
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  middlemouse, privacy, tbb-firefox-   | Resolution:
  patch  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by martingale):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I found this ticket after accidentally middle-click navigating to a URL
 that would uniquely identify me. Please set middlemouse.contentLoadURL =
 false by default, at the very least in the hardened bundle.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18934 [Core Tor/Tor]: test suite failures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18934: test suite failures
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => 029-proposed


Comment:

 Hm.  Those tests shouldn't be getting built with those flags: they're
 specifically invoking bugs, to make sure our bug-finding code can find
 them.  Looks like there's another tweak to be made here.

 Is this new in 0.2.9?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18778 [Applications/Tor Browser]: http channel Listener OnDataAvailable contract violation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18778: http channel Listener OnDataAvailable contract violation
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 Thanks, cpunks. Even with STR Georg thinks bugzilla is wrong again...

 gk: Is everything else with the webpage correct for you?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16747 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor-browser downloads favicon twice (and over different circuits) on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16747: Tor-browser downloads favicon twice (and over different circuits) on
Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  defect   |  team
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  assigned
 Severity:  Major|  Milestone:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, |Version:
  TorBrowserTeam201603   | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by bugzilla):

 As #17761 was strangely closed:
 >browser.chrome.site_icons set to false until fixed.
 And why have you left this bug in TorBrowserTeam201603?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18937 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18937: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Replying to [ticket:18937 bugzilla]:
 Cause it's the first What's new ticket, issues from previous versions are
 allowed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18483 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clients should always tunnel connections, and never fall back to a DirPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18483: Clients should always tunnel connections, and never fall back to a 
DirPort
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,  |Version:
  CoreTorTeam201605  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  #18809   |  Actual Points:  2 hours
 Reviewer:   | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:  None
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Added further commits to this branch as part of #18929, including a unit
 test from isis.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18929 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix selection of directories with non-preferred address families

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18929: Fix selection of directories with non-preferred address families
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,  |Version:  Tor:
  CoreTorTeam201605  |  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:  #18483   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  isis |  Actual Points:  2 hours
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 isis]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > > See commit
 > > e6f859c Make directory node selection for IPv4 bridge clients more
 reliable
 > > in my branch feature18483 on ​https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git
 >
 > `router_has_non_preferred_address()` will return true if the
 `routerstatus_t` has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address… regardless of
 whether IPv4 or IPv6 is preferred.  This might still mess up the
 `n_non_preferred` count?

 That's the intended behaviour - we want to know if there's any point in
 trying the non-preferred IP family. So we count the number of relays we
 might choose if we don't get any reachable relays from our preferred IP
 family.
 To do that, we look for a valid address from the non-preferred family.
 If it has an IPv4 and IPv6 address, it definitely has an address from the
 non-preferred family.

 But there's a bug, it's not checking node-specific preferences, which
 matter for bridge clients:
 f48abb6 Use bridge client node-specific IPv6 preferences where available

 > If that's the right behaviour, then there's a unittest for you, for
 `router_has_non_preferred_address()`, in my `bug18929`
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/log/?h=bug18929 branch]
 (based on your `feature18483`). Otherwise we should make the unittest do
 the intended thing and then revise.

 Thanks for the unit test.

 Cherry picked your bug18929 branch as:
 2695ace Add unittest for router_has_non_preferred_address().

 I changed the function name in f48abb6, so I needed to change it in the
 unit test as well:
 c198259 Tweak unit test so it tests router_has_non_preferred_address_rs

 That should be it!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18937 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18937: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 During Win 7 restart:

 [[Image(Win7Restart.png)]]
 Applicable for all TBB versions.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18937 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18937: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Also 5.5.4 -> 5.5.5 on Win XP ended with
 [[Image( safemode.PNG)]]
 Applicable for all TBB versions.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18937 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18937: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Instead of thousands words...
 [[Image( Upd6a4-5win7.png)]]
 [[Image( ContinueWFailedUpd.png)]]
 If "Restart Later" is pressed... (then only kill process helps)

 6.0a4 -> 6.0a5 on Win 7 (so don't forget about #18935)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18938 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should reject non-ASCII content in ExtraInfo descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18938: Authorities should reject non-ASCII content in ExtraInfo descriptors
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18656| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Thanks for filing this teor!

 > If it is, I'd recommend we make them all ASCII for consistency

 For what it's worth I'd love for the contact and platform lines to be
 ASCII. Having them be the one and only 'special snowflakes' in this regard
 is unnecessary and a pita for parsers.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18656 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relay publishing malformed 'dirreq-v3-reqs' line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18656: Relay publishing malformed 'dirreq-v3-reqs' line
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.???
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  029-proposed memory-corruption   |  0.2.7.6
  TorCoreTeam201605  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => 029-proposed memory-corruption TorCoreTeam201605
 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.7.6
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.???


Comment:

 There seem to be two issues here:
 * the relay consistently produces non-ascii extrainfo content, and
 * the authorities accept non-ascii extrainfo descriptors.

 I've split the validation issue into #18938 - Authorities should reject
 non-ASCII content in ExtraInfo descriptors.

 Let's try to track down the data structure corruption in this task.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18938 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should reject non-ASCII content in ExtraInfo descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18938: Authorities should reject non-ASCII content in ExtraInfo descriptors
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18656| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Tor authorities, relays, and onion services should validate directory
 documents before uploading them as well.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #18938 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should reject non-ASCII content in ExtraInfo descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18938: Authorities should reject non-ASCII content in ExtraInfo descriptors
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  029-proposed
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #18656
   Points:  small |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In #18656, we discovered that authorities don't validate that ExtraInfo
 descriptors are printable ASCII before accepting them.

 Authorities (and HSDirs) should check every directory document they
 receive consists only of "printing ASCII", as defined in torspec:
 {{{
 NL = The ascii LF character (hex value 0x0a).
 KeywordChar ::= 'A' ... 'Z' | 'a' ... 'z' | '0' ... '9' | '-'
 ArgumentChar ::= any printing ASCII character except NL.
 WS = (SP | TAB)+
 }}}

 I've heard others say that the following lines allow non-ASCII content,
 but I'm not sure if that's actually the case, and if it is, how many
 relays this would affect:
 * the "platform" line in relay descriptors, which is a "human-readable
 string",
 * the contact "info" line in relay descriptors, which has an undefined
 format.

 If it is, I'd recommend we make them all ASCII for consistency, and update
 torspec to clarify, and include it as a "major" change in an 0.2.x tor
 release.

 (This means that some users will be unable to spell their names correctly.
 But there was never any guarantee that 8-bit characters in "info" would be
 interpreted as users intended. I think security is more important here.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18881 [Core Tor/Stem]: speed up is_match() of stem/exit_policy.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18881: speed up is_match() of stem/exit_policy.py
---+
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 Hmmm. Those checks aren't purely input validation. If they were then
 adding a 'bypass validation' argument makes sense for such a performance
 boon. But if you drop this whole block you'll get the wrong answer when
 matching IPv4 exit policies with IPv6 addresses and vice versa (that's
 what most of the code does).

 Per chance do you know what it is in here that's slow? If a single call
 (like is_valid_ipv4_address()) is the bottleneck then improving that might
 be a better route forward.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #18937 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18937: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This is a META bug.
 All discussion in comments.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18936 [Core Tor/Stem]: Update pycurl example

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18936: Update pycurl example
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * keywords:  website easy => website, easy


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #18936 [Core Tor/Stem]: Update pycurl example

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18936: Update pycurl example
---+--
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  |   Keywords:  website easy
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 Wild (on irc) suggested revising our
 [https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials/to_russia_with_love.html#using-
 pycurl PycURL example] with lessons learned on
 [http://tech.michaelaltfield.net/2015/02/22/pycurl-through-tor-without-
 leaking-dns-lookups/ this article].

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18935 [Applications/Tor Browser]: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18935: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Tor Browser hangs even when EMET service is disabled and in "Audit only"
 mode (log only), despite that M$ claims that this mode doesn't interfere
 with apps!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18545 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review Firefox Developer Docs and Undocumented bugs since FF38esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18545: Review Firefox Developer Docs and Undocumented bugs since FF38esr
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Critical| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201604  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorU
+--

Comment (by brade):

 Kathy and I reviewed all of the release notes and developer docs for
 Firefox 39-45. We have not yet looked at the complete bug lists
 (comment:17). Here are some things that might be worth another look (some
 of these may have been looked at in more detail by gk already):

 CacheStorage. It seems that this can be used by Web Workers and regular JS
 code (not just by Service Workers).
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/CacheStorage

 Server logging. This is kind of a strange feature: server applications can
 return an X- HTTP header to cause items to be logged to the developer
 console. Maybe it is only done when the console is open and the user is
 monitoring network requests (I am not sure). Kathy and I do not like the
 idea that this is enabled, but it may be harmless.
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/docs/Tools/Web_Console/Console_messages#Server

 window.screen.orientation. This is possibly a fingerprinting vector unless
 it always returns "landscape-primary" on desktop Firefox (it may still be
 an issue for Orfox). Or did we decide that applications can derive this
 kind of info from the window size/aspect ratio anyway?
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Screen/orientation

 Navigator.onLine. This can be used to monitor the connected state of a
 user's computer. We can disable it by setting network.manage-offline-
 status = false.
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/NavigatorOnLine/onLine

 Enable H.264 if system decoder is available (Linux). Kathy and I do not
 know enough about the world of video decoders to know if this could be a
 significant fingerprinting vector.
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1213499

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18935 [Applications/Tor Browser]: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18935: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 New versions show new crashes:
 {{{
 Faulting application name: firefox.exe, version: 38.8.0.0, time stamp:
 0x
 Faulting module name: ntdll.dll, version: 6.1.7601.19160, time stamp:
 0x56bcd4d2
 Exception code: 0xc0fd
 Fault offset: 0x0005d2fd
 }}}
 and
 {{{
 Faulting application name: firefox.exe, version: 45.1.0.0, time stamp:
 0x
 Faulting module name: kernel32.dll, version: 6.1.7601.19135, time stamp:
 0x56a1c67f
 Exception code: 0xc0fd
 Fault offset: 0x0004cf52
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18935 [Applications/Tor Browser]: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18935: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 {{{
 Faulting application name: firefox.exe, version: 38.7.1.0
 Faulting module name: ntdll.dll, version: 6.1.7601.19160
 Exception code: 0x8004
 Fault offset: 0x0005aec5
 }}}
 Also with IE:
 {{{
 Faulting application name: iexplore.exe, version: 11.0.9600.18231, time
 stamp: 0x56b8edd6
 Faulting module name: ntdll.dll, version: 6.1.7601.19160, time stamp:
 0x56bcd4d2
 Exception code: 0x8004
 Fault offset: 0x0005aec5
 }}}
 and
 {{{
 Faulting application name: iexplore.exe, version: 11.0.9600.18231, time
 stamp: 0x56b8edd6
 Faulting module name: KERNELBASE.dll, version: 6.1.7601.19135, time stamp:
 0x56a1c680
 Exception code: 0x8004
 Fault offset: 0x75fd
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #18935 [Applications/Tor Browser]: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18935: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!
--+---
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  |   Keywords:  tbb-crash
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 READ THIS BEFORE USING TOR BROWSER ON WINDOWS!

 With the April's 2016 patch Tuesday Microsoft has shown to everybody what
 grade of software it's going to supply from now on:

 [https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3147071 KB3147071] - Welcome new
 "fast-ring"/"pre-beta" quality (see #18171), now for production servers ;)
 Discussion: https://www.dslreports.com/forum/r30702359-MS-patch-
 installing-old-vulnerable-version-of-ntdll-dll Proof from MS filelist:
 {{{
 x64 Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2
 File name,File version,File size,Date,Time,Platform,Service branch,
 Ntdll.dll,"6.3.9600.18194","1,737,080","13-Jan-2016","21:26","x64","Not
 applicable",
 }}}
 And together with the

 [https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3146706 KB3146706] - Welcome BSOD
 0x006B (http://www.windowsnewscenter.com/2016/04/26/is-microsoft-
 using-security-patch-kb-3146706-to-break-pirate-copies-of/)
 they present you:

 Problem with application hangs due to EMET 5.5 EAF mitigation after
 Windows 7 April 2016 updates
 https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/7a681da9-d1d3-4566-a13d-
 55af0de0f2a5/problem-with-application-hangs-due-to-emet-55-eaf-mitigation-
 after-windows-7-april-2016-updates?forum=emet

 [https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3149090 KB3149090] - can be PITA
 too
 
(https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/4ewule/windows_32bit_emet_kb3146706_issue/)

 [https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3145739 KB3145739] - can prevent
 you from installing all the April's crap until you install it manually.

 And even Windows Update can daunt you to stop installing April's crap by
 going to very long several days checking for it with full CPU load... (can
 be fixed as the previous item)

 Hangs and crashes of Tor Browser that are probably related to this crap
 are listed in comments:

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18929 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix selection of directories with non-preferred address families

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18929: Fix selection of directories with non-preferred address families
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_revision
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,  |Version:  Tor:
  CoreTorTeam201605  |  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:  #18483   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  isis |  Actual Points:  2 hours
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > See commit
 > e6f859c Make directory node selection for IPv4 bridge clients more
 reliable
 > in my branch feature18483 on ​https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

 `router_has_non_preferred_address()` will return true if the
 `routerstatus_t` has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address… regardless of
 whether IPv4 or IPv6 is preferred.  This might still mess up the
 `n_non_preferred` count?

 If that's the right behaviour, then there's a unittest for you, for
 `router_has_non_preferred_address()`, in my `bug18929`
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/log/?h=bug18929 branch]
 (based on your `feature18483`). Otherwise we should make the unittest do
 the intended thing and then revise.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18793 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add checkstyle task

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18793: add checkstyle task
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Thanks!
 All done, closing.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18929 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix selection of directories with non-preferred address families

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18929: Fix selection of directories with non-preferred address families
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,  |Version:  Tor:
  CoreTorTeam201605  |  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:  #18483   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  isis |  Actual Points:  2 hours
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 This ticket is just for fixing the counting problem, right?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18929 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix selection of directories with non-preferred address families

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18929: Fix selection of directories with non-preferred address families
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,  |Version:  Tor:
  CoreTorTeam201605  |  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:  #18483   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  isis |  Actual Points:  2 hours
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => isis


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18656 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relay publishing malformed 'dirreq-v3-reqs' line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18656: Relay publishing malformed 'dirreq-v3-reqs' line
--+-
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by atagar):

 newton (the relay publishing these extrainfo descriptors) is back in the
 consensus. You can currently run the aforementioned curl command to see
 it.

 > Very odd. Is it running an unusual version of Tor or something?

 [https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/C871C91489886D5E2E94C13EA1A5FDC4B6DC5204
 According to Atlas] it's running Tor 0.2.7.6 on Linux.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #18934 [Core Tor/Tor]: test suite failures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18934: test suite failures
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Building master [fb9c9e04f002fbbd9745911a17481b49ed66c9f4] with --enable-
 gcc-warnings --disable-silent-rules --enable-expensive-hardening,

 {{{
 16:59:04 =
 16:59:04tor 0.2.9.0-alpha-dev: ./test-suite.log
 16:59:04 =
 16:59:04
 16:59:04 # TOTAL: 9
 16:59:04 # PASS:  6
 16:59:04 # SKIP:  1
 16:59:04 # XFAIL: 0
 16:59:04 # FAIL:  2
 16:59:04 # XPASS: 0
 16:59:04 # ERROR: 0
 16:59:04
 16:59:04 .. contents:: :depth: 2
 16:59:04
 16:59:04 FAIL: src/test/test-memwipe
 16:59:04 ===
 16:59:04
 16:59:04 =
 16:59:04 ==28523==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on
 address 0x7ffec6e913d0 at pc 0x7fc25b0fdb29 bp 0x7ffec6e90f60 sp
 0x7ffec6e90f58
 16:59:04 READ of size 1 at 0x7ffec6e913d0 thread T0
 16:59:04 #0 0x7fc25b0fdb28 in vmemeq ../src/test/test-memwipe.c:66
 16:59:04 #1 0x7fc25b0fdb28 in check_a_buffer ../src/test/test-
 memwipe.c:88
 16:59:04 #2 0x7fc25b0fc0c0 in main ../src/test/test-memwipe.c:180
 16:59:04 #3 0x7fc257a66b44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b44)
 16:59:04 #4 0x7fc25b0fd5ea (/srv/jenkins-workspace/workspace/tor-ci-
 linux-master/ARCHITECTURE/amd64/SUITE/jessie/build-tree-tor/src/test/test-
 memwipe+0x1545ea)
 16:59:04
 16:59:04 Address 0x7ffec6e913d0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset
 1056 in frame
 16:59:04 #0 0x7fc25b0fd8af in check_a_buffer ../src/test/test-
 memwipe.c:74
 16:59:04
 16:59:04   This frame has 1 object(s):
 16:59:04 [32, 1056) 'buf' <== Memory access at offset 1056 overflows
 this variable
 16:59:04 HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some
 custom stack unwind mechanism or swapcontext
 16:59:04   (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
 16:59:04 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow ../src/test
 /test-memwipe.c:66 vmemeq
 16:59:04 Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
 16:59:04   0x100058dca220: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 16:59:04   0x100058dca230: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 16:59:04   0x100058dca240: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 16:59:04   0x100058dca250: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 16:59:04   0x100058dca260: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 16:59:04 =>0x100058dca270: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[f3]f3 f3 f3 00 00
 16:59:04   0x100058dca280: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1
 16:59:04   0x100058dca290: f1 f1 00 00 00 f4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 16:59:04   0x100058dca2a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 16:59:04   0x100058dca2b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 16:59:04   0x100058dca2c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 16:59:04 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application
 bytes):
 16:59:04   Addressable:   00
 16:59:04   Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
 16:59:04   Heap left redzone:   fa
 16:59:04   Heap right redzone:  fb
 16:59:04   Freed heap region:   fd
 16:59:04   Stack left redzone:  f1
 16:59:04   Stack mid redzone:   f2
 16:59:04   Stack right redzone: f3
 16:59:04   Stack partial redzone:   f4
 16:59:04   Stack after return:  f5
 16:59:04   Stack use after scope:   f8
 16:59:04   Global redzone:  f9
 16:59:04   Global init order:   f6
 16:59:04   Poisoned by user:f7
 16:59:04   Contiguous container OOB:fc
 16:59:04   ASan internal:   fe
 16:59:04 ==28523==ABORTING
 16:59:04
 16:59:04 SKIP: src/test/test_switch_id.sh
 16:59:04 
 16:59:04
 16:59:04 This test only works when run as root. Skipping.
 16:59:04
 16:59:04 FAIL: src/test/test_bt.sh
 16:59:04 =
 16:59:04
 16:59:04 OK
 16:59:04 ../src/test/test_bt_cl.c:39:24: runtime error: store to null
 pointer of type 'volatile int'
 16:59:04 ASAN:SIGSEGV
 16:59:04 =
 16:59:04 ==28713==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address
 0x (pc 0x7f9c360d73b4 sp 0x7fff3cd6cd20 bp 0x7fff3cd6cd40 T0)
 16:59:04 #0 0x7f9c360d73b3 in crash ../src/test/test_bt_cl.c:39
 16:59:04 #1 0x7f9c360d73f0 in oh_what ../src/test/test_bt_cl.c:58
 16:59:04 #2 0x7f9c360d7441 in a_tangled_web
 ../src/test/test_bt_cl.c:64
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #18365 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fined-grain timer implementation to support per-connection or per-circuit timers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18365: Fined-grain timer implementation to support per-connection or 
per-circuit
timers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  performance, backend,|Version:
  TorCoreTeam201604  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   | Points:  medium
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by andrea):

 Changes in timeouts_v2 look fine to me; I am wholeheartedly in favor of
 using a better monotonic time source where available and doing so
 consistently throughout the codebase.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18933 [Core Tor/Tor]: Several problems with test-network Makefile target

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18933: Several problems with test-network Makefile target
---+
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  small
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorS
---+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:4 isis]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > > The second problem is addressed in #18737 but is waiting for #18240 to
 be merged. Depending on whether coverage is enabled, the *-cov binaries
 may or may not be available. After the merge of #18240 i plan on adding a
 fixup patch that adds a variable for tor-gencert (like
 `TESTING_TOR_BINARY`) so the dependencies of the test-network target are
 dynamic. I'm waiting for the merge because the changes are overlapping and
 would lead to merge conflicts.
 >
 > Great! That fixes all of it except for the `$(EXEEXT)` problem for the
 `tor-[cov-]gencert` binary.
 I can think of only one clean way to communicate the `$(EXEEXT)` to the
 script and that is with parameters (similar to Stem's `run-tests.py` (see
 test-stem target)). The added benefit would be that it simplifies test-
 network.sh because it would just use the binaries as is which obsoletes
 the tor-path and coverage options.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18921 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix IPv6 bridge client directory address selection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18921: Fix IPv6 bridge client directory address selection
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  merge_ready
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc   |Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201604  |  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:  #18483   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  isis |  Actual Points:  1 hour
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 teor]:
 > Oh, hang on, we're getting the primary address because we want to put it
 in an extend_info when creating a circuit to the third hop. So that's OK,
 but I obviously need a better comment there.
 >
 > 7e5f0bb fixup! Choose the correct address for one-hop connection
 > on my branch feature18483.
 >
 > And we don't have a node, so the node_get_prim_orport() function is out.

 Oh, because an extend is happening.  This makes more sense now.

 Alright, everything looks good to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18933 [Core Tor/Tor]: Several problems with test-network Makefile target

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18933: Several problems with test-network Makefile target
---+
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  small
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorS
---+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > The second problem is addressed in #18737 but is waiting for #18240 to
 be merged. Depending on whether coverage is enabled, the *-cov binaries
 may or may not be available. After the merge of #18240 i plan on adding a
 fixup patch that adds a variable for tor-gencert (like
 `TESTING_TOR_BINARY`) so the dependencies of the test-network target are
 dynamic. I'm waiting for the merge because the changes are overlapping and
 would lead to merge conflicts.

 Great! That fixes all of it except for the `$(EXEEXT)` problem for the
 `tor-[cov-]gencert` binary.

 Please see my `bug18933`
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/log/?h=bug18933 branch]
 (which is based on nickm's `bug18240` branch).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use coverage-enabled tor-gencert when using coverage option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18737: Use coverage-enabled tor-gencert when using coverage option
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.3-rc
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 In #18933 isis noted that test-network.sh should also take into account
 `$(EXEEXT)`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18928 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mac OS: alpha channel upgrade is not smooth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18928: Mac OS: alpha channel upgrade is not smooth
+--
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201604  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by boklm):

 I updated the TB 6.0a5 blog post to mention this bug in the list of known
 issues.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18933 [Core Tor/Tor]: Several problems with test-network Makefile target

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18933: Several problems with test-network Makefile target
---+
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  small
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorS
---+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The second problem is addressed in #18737 but is waiting for #18240 to be
 merged. Depending on whether coverage is enabled, the *-cov binaries may
 or may not be available. After the merge of #18240 i plan on adding a
 fixup patch that adds a variable for tor-gencert (like
 `TESTING_TOR_BINARY`) so the dependencies of the test-network target are
 dynamic. I'm waiting for the merge because the changes are overlapping and
 would lead to merge conflicts.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18928 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mac OS: alpha channel upgrade is not smooth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18928: Mac OS: alpha channel upgrade is not smooth
+--
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201604  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by brade):

 * cc: boklm (added)
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201604 => ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201604


Comment:

 Before restart, XRE_PROFILE_PATH is set to the profile path. See:
 http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 esr45/source/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp#4419

 This causes the SelectProfile() function to use that profile (and
 therefore our migration code never gets a chance to run). See:
 http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 esr45/source/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp#2333

 The right fix is probably to ignore the XRE_PROFILE_PATH env variable if
 it contains the path of the old default profile location
 (.../TorBrowser.app/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default).

 gk or boklm: We should add something to the TB 6.0a5 blog post to let
 people know to expect this problem (they should quit and start TB again to
 fix things).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18933 [Core Tor/Tor]: Several problems with test-network Makefile target

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18933: Several problems with test-network Makefile target
---+
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  small
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorS
---+

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > Replying to [ticket:18933 isis]:
 > > In #18240, cypherpunks pointed out that we should use the same
 `$(EXEEXT)` syntax for finding the appropriate `tor-gencert` and `tor-cov-
 gencert` in the `test-network` target.
 > >
 > > There's a couple other problems with that target:
 > >
 > >  * `NETWORK_FLAVOUR=${NETWORK_FLAVOUR:-"bridges+hs"}`: the
 "bridges+hs" network template doesn't exist anymore.
 >
 > It does in the latest version of chutney - do you have an older version?
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/chutney.git/tree/networks

 Oops, heh. There it is now. One problem down.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18933 [Core Tor/Tor]: Several problems with test-network Makefile target

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18933: Several problems with test-network Makefile target
---+
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  small
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorS
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [ticket:18933 isis]:
 > In #18240, cypherpunks pointed out that we should use the same
 `$(EXEEXT)` syntax for finding the appropriate `tor-gencert` and `tor-cov-
 gencert` in the `test-network` target.
 >
 > There's a couple other problems with that target:
 >
 >  * `NETWORK_FLAVOUR=${NETWORK_FLAVOUR:-"bridges+hs"}`: the "bridges+hs"
 network template doesn't exist anymore.

 It does in the latest version of chutney - do you have an older version?
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/chutney.git/tree/networks

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18240 [Core Tor/Tor]: 'make test-stem' yields No rule to make target '"./src/or/tor"'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18240: 'make test-stem' yields No rule to make target '"./src/or/tor"'
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  merge_ready
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201604, tor-tests-|Version:  Tor:
  integration, tor-tests-stem|  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  isis |  Actual Points:
 | Points:  small-
 |  remaining
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:23 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:21 isis]:
 > > Replying to [comment:17 cypherpunks]:
 > > > Replying to [comment:15 nickm]:
 > > > Note that this dependency currently only works because the test-
 network script does not use tor-cov-gencert binary when in coverage mode
 (see #18737).
 > >
 > > AFAICT, the stem integration tests don't use the `tor-gencert` or
 `tor-cov-gencert` binaries.
 > >
 > The test-network script uses Chutney which needs tor(-cov)-gencert for
 configuring its relays.

 Okay, good point. That (and some other problems preventing running that
 target) are now #18933.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #18933 [Core Tor/Tor]: Several problems with test-network Makefile target

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18933: Several problems with test-network Makefile target
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  small |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorS  |
--+
 In #18240, cypherpunks pointed out that we should use the same `$(EXEEXT)`
 syntax for finding the appropriate `tor-gencert` and `tor-cov-gencert` in
 the `test-network` target.

 There's a couple other problems with that target:

  * `NETWORK_FLAVOUR=${NETWORK_FLAVOUR:-"bridges+hs"}`: the "bridges+hs"
 network template doesn't exist anymore.
  * If `$use_coverage_binary` is set when `src/test/test-network.sh` is
 called, then chutney will still try to use `tor-gencert` instead of `tor-
 cov-gencert`. (Also the filename extension problem mentioned above applies
 here also.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18921 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix IPv6 bridge client directory address selection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18921: Fix IPv6 bridge client directory address selection
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc   |Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201604  |  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:  #18483   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  isis |  Actual Points:  1 hour
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Oh, hang on, we're getting the primary address because we want to put it
 in an extend_info when creating a circuit to the third hop. So that's OK,
 but I obviously need a better comment there.

 7e5f0bb fixup! Choose the correct address for one-hop connection
 on my branch feature18483.

 And we don't have a node, so the node_get_prim_orport() function is out.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18921 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix IPv6 bridge client directory address selection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18921: Fix IPv6 bridge client directory address selection
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_revision
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc   |Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201604  |  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:  #18483   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  isis |  Actual Points:  1 hour
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 isis correctly points out that I have DIRIND_ANONYMOUS connections always
 using IPv4 addresses. This won't work for IPv6 bridges.

 I should use node_get_pref_orport() to get the canonical address of the
 node that we'll use to connect to it as a guard. This correctly uses IPv6
 when it's available and preferred (including when bridge clients only have
 an IPv6 address), and IPv4 otherwise.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18902 [Core Tor/Tor]: Avoid variable shadowing in Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18902: Avoid variable shadowing in Tor
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 FWIW GCC and clang both have `-Wshadow` which detect these cases.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18240 [Core Tor/Tor]: 'make test-stem' yields No rule to make target '"./src/or/tor"'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18240: 'make test-stem' yields No rule to make target '"./src/or/tor"'
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  merge_ready
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201604, tor-tests-|Version:  Tor:
  integration, tor-tests-stem|  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  isis |  Actual Points:
 | Points:  small-
 |  remaining
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:21 isis]:
 > Replying to [comment:17 cypherpunks]:
 > > Replying to [comment:15 nickm]:
 > > Note that this dependency currently only works because the test-
 network script does not use tor-cov-gencert binary when in coverage mode
 (see #18737).
 >
 > AFAICT, the stem integration tests don't use the `tor-gencert` or `tor-
 cov-gencert` binaries.
 >
 The test-network script uses Chutney which needs tor(-cov)-gencert for
 configuring its relays.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18916 [- Select a component]: Have questions need help.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18916: Have questions need help.
--+---
 Reporter:  Swoopswag |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #18917.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18930 [Core Tor/Tor]: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18930: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes
-+-
 Reporter:  juha |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Critical |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  tor2web crash CoreTorTeam201605  |  0.2.7.1-alpha
  must-fix-before-028-rc | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Another question: 605ae665009853bd isn't a version of Tor that's in our
 repository, as far as I know.  Where did you get your Tor?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18793 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add checkstyle task

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18793: add checkstyle task
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Great, pushed that last commit to master.  I'll start working on #18931
 soon.  Feel free to close this ticket unless anything remains to be done.
 Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18930 [Core Tor/Tor]: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18930: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes
-+-
 Reporter:  juha |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Critical |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  tor2web crash CoreTorTeam201605  |  0.2.7.1-alpha
  must-fix-before-028-rc | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor2web crash CoreTorTeam201605 => tor2web crash
 CoreTorTeam201605 must-fix-before-028-rc


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18930 [Core Tor/Tor]: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18930: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes
-+-
 Reporter:  juha |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Critical |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  tor2web crash CoreTorTeam201605  |  0.2.7.1-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor2web crash => tor2web crash CoreTorTeam201605


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15937 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clients fail on the 7th rapid SOCKS request to the same HS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15937: Clients fail on the 7th rapid SOCKS request to the same HS
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small/medium
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
--+

Comment (by teor):

 (This bug was likely introduced in commit 59f8dced in 0.2.7.1-alpha.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18930 [Core Tor/Tor]: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18930: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes
---+
 Reporter:  juha   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.1-alpha
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor2web crash  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  small
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6 => Tor: 0.2.7.1-alpha


Comment:

 This bug was likely introduced in commit 59f8dced in 0.2.7.1-alpha.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18930 [Core Tor/Tor]: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18930: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes
---+
 Reporter:  juha   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor2web crash  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  small
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: dgoulet (added)
 * keywords:  tor2web => tor2web crash
 * points:   => small
 * severity:  Normal => Critical
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.8.x-final


Comment:

 '''Further Information'''

 The line numbers in your backtrace don't seem to be the same as the line
 numbers I have for 0.2.7.6. I'm going to assume they're wrong, and work
 off the code listings.

 It might help to provide the last few entries from an info-level or debug-
 level log.

 `query=0x568ea1f0 "oahmssjdnck7ntzx") at src/or/rendclient.c:1217`
 The hidden service in question is oahmssjdnck7ntzx.onion, it appears to be
 down.
 (I've attached a stem script to fetch its descriptor, it says:
 `stem.DescriptorUnavailable: No running hidden service at
 oahmssjdnck7ntzx.onion`.)

 Can you tell us if it's always the same hidden service causing the crash?

 '''Analysis'''

 The calls in this backtrace were removed in 0.2.8.2-alpha by dgoulet to
 fix #15937, a bug where tor over-enthusiastically cancelled connections if
 too many requests happened for the same hidden services in a short period
 of time.

 This bug could cause all sorts of problems for busy tor2web instances
 connecting to busy hidden services. I can't see any obvious issues in the
 code, but I'd like others to have a look at:
 * rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc (0.2.7.6)
 * rend_client_desc_trynow
 * rend_cache_lookup_entry
 * I wouldn't bother looking in detail at
 rend_client_any_intro_points_usable, as it crashes on the first line that
 tries to use a corrupt or NULL entry.

 I wonder if you've found a race condition or something?

 '''Suggested Solutions'''

 You could try applying that patch from #15937 and see if it fixes your
 issue.
 You could also try running 0.2.8.2-alpha, it should work for Tor2web, but
 it's still a little unstable.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18886 [Applications/Tor Browser]: consider removing Pocket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18886: consider removing Pocket
+--
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Medium  | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|  needs_information
 Severity:  Normal  |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201604  |Version:
Parent ID:  | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  |  Actual Points:
| Points:
|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => needs_information
 * keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201604R => ff45-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201604


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18886 [Applications/Tor Browser]: consider removing Pocket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18886: consider removing Pocket
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:  reopened
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201604R  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Hrm. I still seem to have a "View Pocket List" item visible after clicking
 on the hamburger menu and "Bookmarks". Arthur, is that taken care by your
 patch, too? (I just flipped the prefs and restarted to test it)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #18932 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Re-launching chutney with cached descriptors sometimes fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18932: Re-launching chutney with cached descriptors sometimes fails
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 A user reports that chutney sometimes fails when relaunched with a
 previous configuration and cached descriptors.

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-April/010854.html

 Typically, chutney is run on a newly-configured directory every time, so
 we don't run into this bug very often.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18919 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove swig and unused PGP keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18919: Remove swig and unused PGP keys
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201604R, tbb-gitian  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201604R => TorBrowserTeam201604R, tbb-gitian
 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for catching this. I added the bug number to the commits and pushed
 them to master (commit 124cfb4ed86f38ddbcab81722f76a4bb4eed3424,
 4f80e41c593e5680bfe31fcb421d04fc7d875c89).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18793 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add checkstyle task

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18793: add checkstyle task
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #18931 [Metrics/CollecTor]: coding style polishing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18931: coding style polishing
---+
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  ctip
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 Remove most checkstyle complaints:

 Priority wishlist:
 1. Each variable declaration must be in its own statement.
 [MultipleVariableDeclarations], b/c this really enhances readability and
 could trip some IDEs when refactoring variable names.
 1. '' should be on a new line. [OperatorWrap]
 1. Missing a Javadoc comment. [JavadocMethod]
 1. others

 It still needs to be verified, if our exceptions from Google-style are
 reflected in the checks. If not, metrics_checks.xml has to be changed
 accordingly.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18793 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add checkstyle task

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18793: add checkstyle task
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Good to use more specific .gitignore patterns!
 All looks fine!

 Regarding the style corrections:
 It would be great if you could make the bulk corrections!
 I though about tackling style issues when touching the code anyway;
 like with the additional renaming patch in this issue.

 I'll add a coding style polishing issue with a "nice to have soon list".


 Anyway, for not having used any coding metrics before in this project and
 also considering that many checkstyle complaints are due to the old style,
 this code base is in pretty good shape checkstyle-wise.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18886 [Applications/Tor Browser]: consider removing Pocket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18886: consider removing Pocket
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:  closed
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201604R  | Resolution:  fixed
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed with commit d592a0e41881c06e6d93c4f272ea7e4f3ea6e9bb on tor-
 browser-45.1.0esr-6.0-1, thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18903 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Regression tests for canvas image extraction prompt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18903: Regression tests for canvas image extraction prompt
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18914 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider removing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18914: Consider removing 
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


Comment:

 I am a bit worried as Ehsan about possible breakage. I wonder whether we
 could write a patch instead and wait what Mozilla is doing/finding out?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18923 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add a script in tor-browser.git to run all of our TBB-specific regression tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18923: Add a script in tor-browser.git to run all of our TBB-specific 
regression
tests
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18930 [Core Tor/Tor]: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18930: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes
--+--
 Reporter:  juha  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor2web   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18113 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Dynamically allocate clients to default Tor Browser bridges of a certain type

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18113: Dynamically allocate clients to default Tor Browser bridges of a certain
type
---+---
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
 Priority:  Medium |  needs_revision
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal |Version:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam201604  | Resolution:
Parent ID: |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer: | Points:
   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 Ok, this ticket came a long way since I last noticed it.

 I agree with what Yawning said way up at the top -- this is best fixed
 inside Tor.

 Tor already has the mechanism for figuring out which bridges work, and
 also the mechanism for keeping state about which one it picked to be its
 "first" bridge (they go into the state file and are treated just like
 guards).

 So all Tor needs to do is shuffle its bridge list every time it reads it
 from torrc, and I think everything else we need will follow.

 (Except the bandwidth weighting stuff -- either Tor chooses from all of
 them equally because it doesn't have any descriptors at the time it
 chooses which one will go into the state file first, or it does have the
 descriptors so it weights by the self-advertised bandwidths in the
 descriptors. I'd have to check, but my guess would be the former. Still, I
 think that is better solved inside Tor, where Tor Browser's job would be
 to add a weight to the bridge line.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs