Re: [tor-bugs] #19072 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19072: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19072 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19072: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Whoops. Duplicate of #19073.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19073 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19073: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19073 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19073: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * severity:  Normal => Minor


Comment:

 My branch `bug19073` has a fix for possible merge onto 0.2.8.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19073 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19073: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.2.7.3-rc: "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17150: Tor 0.2.7.3-rc: "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from 
routerdesc"
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  027-backport  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 (I created the ticket above as #19073)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18809 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle linked connections better during bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18809: Handle linked connections better during bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_revision
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,  |Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201605, review-group-1,   must- |  0.2.8.1-alpha
  fix-before-0283| Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:  medium
 Reviewer:  andrea   | Points:  3
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc, TorCoreTeam201605, review-group-1 =>
 must-fix-before-028-rc, TorCoreTeam201605, review-group-1,
 must-fix-before-0283


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[tor-bugs] #19074 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mark fallback directories down when their key is wrong

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19074: Mark fallback directories down when their key is wrong
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  must-fix-before-0283, must-fix-
 Severity:  Normal   |  before-028-rc
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #18809
   Points:  0.5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 arma says that we will happily retry fallback directories with the wrong
 key fingerprint. We can do two things to fix this:
 * mark fallback directories as down when their key fingerprint is wrong
 * cancel all pending connections to a fallback with the wrong key (perhaps
 in #18809) - this should be unlikely with 100 fallbacks

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[tor-bugs] #19073 [- Select a component]: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19073: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Related to my fix for #17150.  This makes sense to do in 0.2.8 and forward
 only.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19073 [- Select a component]: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19073: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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[tor-bugs] #19072 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19072: Remove duplicate signing_cert field from extrainfo and routerinfo.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Related to my fix for #17150.  This makes sense to do in 0.2.8 and forward
 only.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19071 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check existing fallback fingerprints, IPs, and ports before 0.2.8-rc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19071: Check existing fallback fingerprints, IPs, and ports before 0.2.8-rc
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,  |  0.2.8.2-alpha
  TorCoreTeam201606  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:  0.5
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * points:   => 0.5


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[tor-bugs] #19071 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check existing fallback fingerprints, IPs, and ports before 0.2.8-rc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19071: Check existing fallback fingerprints, IPs, and ports before 0.2.8-rc
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
 Priority:  Medium   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
Component:  Core |   Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,
  Tor/Tor|  TorCoreTeam201606
 Severity:  Normal   |  Parent ID:
Actual Points:   |   Reviewer:
   Points:   |
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I want to run the standard checks on the 100 fallback directories from
 April 2016 before we put them in a June? 2016 release candidate.

 I bet at least one has changed its fingerprint, IP, or ports, and will
 need to be removed.

 I wonder if we should regenerate the list at that point, or just remove
 (or update) the broken fallbacks?

 I'll decide at the time based on how many are broken.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.2.7.3-rc: "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17150: Tor 0.2.7.3-rc: "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from 
routerdesc"
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  027-backport  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc 027-backport => 027-backport
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final => Tor: 0.2.7.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.2.8 and forward.  Calling this a no-backport for 027.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18930 [Core Tor/Tor]: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18930: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes
---+---
 Reporter:  juha   |  Owner:  andrea
 Type:  defect | Status:
 Priority:  Medium |  needs_information
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  tor2web, crash, TorCoreTeam201605  |Version:  Tor:
Parent ID: |  0.2.7.1-alpha
 Reviewer:  dgoulet| Resolution:
   |  Actual Points:
   | Points:  1
   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor2web, crash, must-fix-before-028-rc, TorCoreTeam201605 =>
 tor2web, crash, TorCoreTeam201605


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18809 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle linked connections better during bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18809: Handle linked connections better during bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  assigned
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,  |Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201605, review-group-1  |  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  andrea   |  Actual Points:  medium
 | Points:  3
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  arma => teor
 * status:  needs_revision => assigned


Comment:

 For the record, I will finish the rest of this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18809 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle linked connections better during bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18809: Handle linked connections better during bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_revision
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,  |Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201605, review-group-1  |  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  andrea   |  Actual Points:  medium
 | Points:  3
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18481 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow the fallback directory schedules to be changed outside a test network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18481: Allow the fallback directory schedules to be changed outside a test 
network
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  reopened
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,  |Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201604  |  0.2.8.1-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 arma didn't fix TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries in #18809

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18795 [Core Tor/Tor]: diversity weighting system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18795: diversity weighting system
+
 Reporter:  tscpd   |  Owner:
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-research  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => needs-research
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * type:  enhancement => task


Comment:

 "relay diversity" isn't clearly defined, and needs more research to work
 out the impact of favouring relays which have rare properties (and which
 properties those should be).

 It's also not clear if there is a kind of diversity that would be good for
 all or most users, or if the kind of diversity users need depends on their
 individual threat models.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16943 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement prop250 (Random Number Generation During Tor Voting)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16943: Implement prop250 (Random Number Generation During Tor Voting)
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal |Version:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201605  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  #8244  |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  | Points:  6
   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 T9: The unit test fixes in `ticket16943_029_02` have a bug on platforms
 where time_t is 32 bit.

 When running `src/test/test --debug shared-random/state_load_from_disk` on
 32 bit OS X, I see:
 {{{
 [warn] tor_timegm: Bug: Result does not fit in tor_timegm (on Tor 0.2.9.0
 -alpha-dev )
 [warn] SR: Reading state error: Invalid time '2666-04-19 07:16:00' for
 keyword 'ValidAfter'
 }}}

 This was introduced with the unit tests in commit e931fef2, let's use 2037
 instead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.2.7.3-rc: "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17150: Tor 0.2.7.3-rc: "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from 
routerdesc"
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  merge_ready
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc 027-backport  |Version:  Tor:
Parent ID:   |  0.2.7
 Reviewer:   | Resolution:
 |  Actual Points:  0.3
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 The code in both of these branches looks good.
 `bug17150_027_extra` passes the unit tests and make test-network-all.

 Just one more thing that needs to be done:
 "I should open another ticket about removing the field from routerinfo_t
 and extrainfo_t later on."

 While I can see why we'd want to backport this to 0.2.7, is it a security
 bug?
 Will weasel take it in the tor debian package?
 If not, it's only worth backporting to 0.2.8.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19006 [Core Tor/Tor]: Pointer corruption and other failures in master and maint-0.2.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19006: Pointer corruption and other failures in master and maint-0.2.8
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16943| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This was fixed a few days ago in the srv-testing branch and now in
 ticket16943_029_02.
 The unit tests continue to fail.
 The chutney tests succeed.

 Calling this fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19069 [Core Tor/Tor]: When DisableNetwork is 1 but !circuit_enough_testing_circs(), we can still launch circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19069: When DisableNetwork is 1 but !circuit_enough_testing_circs(), we can 
still
launch circuits
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 The final case could be the source of warnings users have reported about
 connection attempts while DisableNetwork is set.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19006 [Core Tor/Tor]: Pointer corruption and other failures in master and maint-0.2.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19006: Pointer corruption and other failures in master and maint-0.2.8
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16943| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * sponsor:   => SponsorR-must


Comment:

 Latest branch of `ticket16943_029_02` passes the test. Can you confirm on
 OS X maybe?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17868 [Core Tor/Tor]: base64_decode_nopad() destination buffer length problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17868: base64_decode_nopad() destination buffer length problem
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  nikkolasg
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16943| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet
 * points:  medium => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19059 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Request for gsoc-admin@ list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19059: Request for gsoc-admin@ list
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Sorry, you were right. I forgot to change the alias. It's done now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19056 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Write, review, deploy the basket2 pluggable transport.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19056: Write, review, deploy the basket2 pluggable transport.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorS-
 |  must
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * keywords:   => TorCoreTeam201605
 * sponsor:   => SponsorS-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19047 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable Heartbeat prompts in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19047: Disable Heartbeat prompts in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  task |  team
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:  closed
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, | Resolution:  fixed
  tbb-6.0-must   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, commit 0651282ea94c4dddcec724f0ea6c21aecfd6b942 on tor-
 browser-45.1.0esr-6.0-1 has the fix applied.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19065 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser icon not visible anymore in upper left corner on Linux since 05/13

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19065: Tor Browser icon not visible anymore in upper left corner on Linux since
05/13
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-regression, GeorgKoppen201605, | Points:
  tbb-6.0-must   |Sponsor:
Parent ID:   |
 Reviewer:   |
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 No worries. Applied this master (091cb50929055718277fcede5f61c61504ab8b87)
 and hardened-builds (48055f68ba9954c402760b91a5096f98d6720665).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17799 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hash All PRNG output before use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17799: Hash All PRNG output before use
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_revision
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605, TorCoreTeam-  |Version:  Tor:
  postponed-201604, review-group-1   |  unspecified
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  asn  |  Actual Points:
 | Points:  2
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Hello,

 I did another review of this branch (minus the threading code as suggested
 by comment:45). I didn't find anything major, but here are some comments:

 - I get the following double init warning message when I start tor with
 this branch:
 {{{
 [warn] crypto_init_shake_prng(): Bug: Attempt to double-initialize the
 RNG! (on Tor 0.2.8.0-alpha-dev 3413cff1c862248d)
 }}}
   Here are some backtraces:
 {{{
 (gdb) bt
 #0  crypto_init_shake_prng () at src/common/crypto_rng.c:300
 #1  0x556a5ef3 in crypto_seed_rng () at src/common/crypto.c:2702
 #2  0x556a6071 in crypto_early_init () at src/common/crypto.c:315
 #3  0x556a6161 in crypto_early_init () at src/common/crypto.c:324
 #4  0x55592858 in tor_init (argc=argc@entry=3,
 argv=argv@entry=0x7fffe4e8) at src/or/main.c:2912
 #5  0x55593e05 in tor_main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffe4e8) at
 src/or/main.c:3576
 #6  0x5558dfe9 in main (argc=, argv=) at src/or/tor_main.c:30
 }}}
 {{{
 (gdb) bt
 #0  crypto_init_shake_prng () at src/common/crypto_rng.c:300
 #1  0x556a5ef3 in crypto_seed_rng () at src/common/crypto.c:2702
 #2  0x5558f099 in add_entropy_callback (now=,
 options=) at src/or/main.c:1634
 #3  0x555a75b8 in periodic_event_dispatch (fd=fd@entry=-1,
 what=what@entry=1, data=data@entry=0x559851e0 )
 at src/or/periodic.c:46
 #4  0x555a7861 in periodic_event_launch
 (event=event@entry=0x559851e0 ) at
 src/or/periodic.c:108
 #5  0x5558e97c in initialize_periodic_events_cb (fd=, events=, data=) at src/or/main.c:1351
 #6  0x7768a584 in ?? () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5
 #7  0x776883dc in event_base_loop () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5
 #8  0x555922fc in run_main_loop_once () at src/or/main.c:2510
 #9  run_main_loop_until_done () at src/or/main.c:2556
 #10 do_main_loop () at src/or/main.c:2482
 #11 0x55595805 in tor_main (argc=, argv=) at src/or/main.c:3599
 }}}

 - I see this pattern everytime we call `shake_prng_getbytes_raw()` in
 `crypto_rng.c`:
 {{{
   tor_mutex_acquire(_mutex);
   shake_prng_getbytes_raw(prng, buf, sizeof(buf));
   tor_mutex_release(_mutex);
 }}}
   Maybe we can move the mutex acquisition to `shake_prng_getbytes_raw()`,
 instead of assuming that the caller will do it? Or maybe we can assert
 that the mutex is acquired inside that function?

 - I feel that the code can be almost unittestable with some mocking. For
 example, we could call `shake_prng_getbytes_raw()` and then make sure that
 the `shake_prng_t` elements/pointers are as expected. I think bugs like
 the one from comment:31 could be detected with a test like this. The
 integration tests are also very useful, so maybe unittests can be
 delayed?...

 Marking ticket as `needs_revision` since the first comment should be
 addressed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18930 [Core Tor/Tor]: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18930: Segmentation fault: entry->parsed->intro_nodes
-+-
 Reporter:  juha |  Owner:  andrea
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_information
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  tor2web, crash, must-fix-|Version:  Tor:
  before-028-rc, TorCoreTeam201605   |  0.2.7.1-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |  Actual Points:
 | Points:  1
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: dgoulet (removed)
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet
 * status:  assigned => needs_information
 * severity:  Critical => Normal


Comment:

 We are still waiting on more information from juha here.

 The `i = 32767` value is super high... There is no chance we have that
 amount of usable intro points so probably that
 `entry->parsed->intro_nodes` has never been cleaned or a crazy amount of
 nodes have been added.

 {{{
   i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_nodes));
   intro = smartlist_get(usable_nodes, i);
 }}}

 Also this: `intro = 0x1` is simply not possible... So I think we don't
 have an accurate backtrace here.
 This tor version is not from the tor repository thus no way I can confirm
 anything... Putting this one in `needs_information`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18885 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable logging of TLS/SSL key material by default in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18885: Disable logging of TLS/SSL key material by default in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, | Resolution:
  GeorgKoppen201605, tbb-6.0-must|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605, GeorgKoppen201605,
 tbb-6.0-must => ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, GeorgKoppen201605,
 tbb-6.0-must
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 bug_18885 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_18885) has a possible backport for us up for
 review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19047 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable Heartbeat prompts in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19047: Disable Heartbeat prompts in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  task |  team
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_review
 Severity:  Normal   |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, |Version:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19065 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser icon not visible anymore in upper left corner on Linux since 05/13

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19065: Tor Browser icon not visible anymore in upper left corner on Linux since
05/13
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, | Resolution:
  tbb-regression, GeorgKoppen201605, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Points:
Parent ID:   |Sponsor:
 Reviewer:   |
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > It seems we have been a bit overzealous in our fix for #18915 by
 deleting the whole `chrome` folder. bug_19065
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_19065) in my tor-browser-bundle repo is
 correcting this mistake.

 r=brade, r=mcs
 Your fix looks fine. It looks like Mac and Windows do not have such a
 directory.

 And I am sorry for suggesting that you add 'rm -rf chrome'. Maybe in the
 long run we should unzip into a temporary directory to avoid this kind of
 collision.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19047 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable Heartbeat prompts in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19047: Disable Heartbeat prompts in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  task |  team
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_review
 Severity:  Normal   |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, |Version:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605, tbb-6.0-must => ff45-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201605R, tbb-6.0-must


Comment:

 The sites that have permission to invoke the UITour functionality are
 listed in browser/app/permissions.

 Here is a patch that disables the UITour backend and also sets
 browser.selfsupport.url to "" for good measure:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug19047-01=0651282ea94c4dddcec724f0ea6c21aecfd6b942

 Please review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19017 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19017: Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 (#17150 now has a fix for review.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.2.7.3-rc: "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17150: Tor 0.2.7.3-rc: "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from 
routerdesc"
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc 027-backport  |Version:  Tor:
Parent ID:   |  0.2.7
 Reviewer:   | Resolution:
 |  Actual Points:  0.3
 | Points:  small
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc => must-fix-before-028-rc 027-backport
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please see my branch `bug17150_027` for a possible fix (against 0.2.7) and
 an explanation of the bug.

 My branch `bug17150_027_extra` has an extra fix on top of that branch
 which makes this error non-repeatable.  I suggest that we don't take that
 extra fix into 0.2.7 (if we backport).

 Note that in one of the commits (8acfac7375e7a0692193434704984d7eb507faf1)
 I chose to duplicate a field instead of moving it, to avoid conflicts with
 numerous dirauth fixes in 0.2.8 and beyond.  The commit message discusses
 more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.2.7.3-rc: "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17150: Tor 0.2.7.3-rc: "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from 
routerdesc"
+
 Reporter:  toralf  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  | Points:  small
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => must-fix-before-028-rc
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
 * actualpoints:   => 0.3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19017 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19017: Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc =>
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * actualpoints:  0.2 =>


Comment:

 Closing this as a duplicate of #17150, moving that one back.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19017 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19017: Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc
+
 Reporter:  toralf  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  | Points:  small
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #16861

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #16861 by isabela:
points to 2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19017 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19017: Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc
+
 Reporter:  toralf  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  small
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 Analyzing the log and the source: these seem to be extrainfos that we are
 downloading at startup.  This is indeed 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev.  For whatever
 reason, we are hitting this message mostly:
"Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc"
 and occasionally this one:
"Extrainfo signing key cert didn't match routerinfo"
 but never this one:
"Neither digest256 or digest matched digest from routerdesc";

 Nearly every id that appears, appears once.  Only a few seem to appear
 twice.

 In every case, the ri id matches the ei id.

 Ah, I think I see the problem.  Hang on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.2.7.3-rc: "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17150: Tor 0.2.7.3-rc: "Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from 
routerdesc"
--+--
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 #19017 is a duplicate, and suggests that this is not as fixed as we might
 hope.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19047 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable Heartbeat prompts in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19047: Disable Heartbeat prompts in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  task |  team
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_information
 Severity:  Normal   |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605,  |Version:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:3 mcs]:
 > We already set browser.selfsupport.enabled = false in
 browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js, and Kathy and I believe that is
 enough to disable the Heartbeat feature for both regular and private
 windows. If we want to be doubly sure we could also set
 browser.selfsupport.url to an empty string.
 >
 > Kathy and I definitely believe that we should also set
 browser.uitour.enabled = false. Doing so will disable a bunch of code that
 allows remote pages to manipulate the browser UI (in a limited way,
 assuming no bugs). Maybe that deserves its own ticket. But in
 ticket:18886#comment:16, Arthur wrote:
 > > I haven't modified the UITour code as we are already suppressing the
 UITour itself.
 >
 > Arthur, how are we suppressing the UITour?

 In our torbutton patch for #18905 we remove the "[BrowserName] Tour" menu
 item from the help menu. But I agree we should also set
 "browser.uitour.enabled" to false.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19017 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19017: Extrainfo digest did not match digest256 from routerdesc
+
 Reporter:  toralf  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  small
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by nickm):

 Probably a duplicate of #17150, where apparently the loglevel wasn't as
 fixed as we had thought.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18963 [Core Tor/Tor]: Download authority certificates even under blackholed authorities or fallbacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18963: Download authority certificates even under blackholed authorities or
fallbacks
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  028-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:  arma  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final => Tor: 0.2.8.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.2.9; leaving for consideration for 0.2.8 backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18963 [Core Tor/Tor]: Download authority certificates even under blackholed authorities or fallbacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18963: Download authority certificates even under blackholed authorities or
fallbacks
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  028-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:  arma  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 must-fix-before-028-rc, 029-proposed, review-group-1, 029-nickm-
 unsure, 029-teor-yes, 028-teor-unsure
 => 028-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 Calling this in for 0.2.9, and not essential (but possibly backportable)
 to 0.2.8.

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[tor-bugs] #19070 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Batch-modify notifications don't seem very useful

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19070: Batch-modify notifications don't seem very useful
--+-
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 It would be great if the batch modification emails to tor-bugs had a
 little more information in them, so you could guess which tickets were
 being changed.

 For example, instead of saying:
 {{{
 Subject: [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18240, #17158, #18808

 Batch modification to #18240, #17158, #18808 by isabela:
 points to 0.4
 }}}

 How about if it said something like this?

 {{{
 Subject: [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18240, #17158, #18808

 Batch modification by isabela to these tickets:
   #18240 'make test-stem' yields No rule to make target '"./src/or/tor"'
  https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18240
   #17158 Run an opt-in process for fallback directories
  https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17158
   #18808 Check if connection is excess in connection_dir_finished_flushing
  https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18808

 Modification:
   points to 0.4

 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18616 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make begindir advertise checks consistent with DirPort checks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18616: Make begindir advertise checks consistent with DirPort checks
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  regression, must-fix-before-028-rc,  |  0.2.8.1-alpha
  TorCoreTeam201605, TorCoreTeam-| Resolution:  fixed
  postponed-201604, review-group-1   |  Actual Points:  25
Parent ID:   |  hours
 Reviewer:  arma,teor| Points:  3
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:33 teor]:
 > Yes, if a relay operator sets DisableNetwork while the user updates the
 config, we shouldn't be testing ORPort reachability. I think it was still
 possible to do that.

 For posterity, I found another edge case like this one while working on
 this patch, and filed it under #19069.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18312

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18312 by isabela:
points to 0.1

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18943, #17905

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18943, #17905 by isabela:
points to 0.4

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18240, #17158, #18808

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18240, #17158, #18808 by isabela:
points to 0.4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19059 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Request for gsoc-admin@ list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19059: Request for gsoc-admin@ list
---+--
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Thanks qbi! List configured. Sorry about reopening - just want to double
 check, has gsoc2016@ been updated to point to this list?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19047 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable Heartbeat prompts in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19047: Disable Heartbeat prompts in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  task |  team
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_information
 Severity:  Normal   |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605,  |Version:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 We already set browser.selfsupport.enabled = false in
 browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js, and Kathy and I believe that is
 enough to disable the Heartbeat feature for both regular and private
 windows. If we want to be doubly sure we could also set
 browser.selfsupport.url to an empty string.

 Kathy and I definitely believe that we should also set
 browser.uitour.enabled = false. Doing so will disable a bunch of code that
 allows remote pages to manipulate the browser UI (in a limited way,
 assuming no bugs). Maybe that deserves its own ticket. But in
 ticket:18886#comment:16, Arthur wrote:
 > I haven't modified the UITour code as we are already suppressing the
 UITour itself.

 Arthur, how are we suppressing the UITour?

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #19044

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #19044 by isabela:
points to 0.1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Directory mirrors should check accounting usage more frequently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18852: Directory mirrors should check accounting usage more frequently
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 I'm removing the parent so #18616 can get closed when it's ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Directory mirrors should check accounting usage more frequently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18852: Directory mirrors should check accounting usage more frequently
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * parent:  #18616 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18616 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make begindir advertise checks consistent with DirPort checks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18616: Make begindir advertise checks consistent with DirPort checks
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  regression, must-fix-before-028-rc,  |  0.2.8.1-alpha
  TorCoreTeam201605, TorCoreTeam-| Resolution:  fixed
  postponed-201604, review-group-1   |  Actual Points:  25
Parent ID:   |  hours
 Reviewer:  arma,teor| Points:  3
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay, merged.  Thanks!

 (Closing, and removing #18852 as a child ticket.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18616 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make begindir advertise checks consistent with DirPort checks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18616: Make begindir advertise checks consistent with DirPort checks
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  regression, must-fix-before-028-rc,  |Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201605, TorCoreTeam-|  0.2.8.1-alpha
  postponed-201604, review-group-1   | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:  25
 Reviewer:  arma,teor|  hours
 | Points:  3
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Looks like we just added (options) to both of these lines. Looks fine to
 me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18616 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make begindir advertise checks consistent with DirPort checks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18616: Make begindir advertise checks consistent with DirPort checks
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  regression, must-fix-before-028-rc,  |Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201605, TorCoreTeam-|  0.2.8.1-alpha
  postponed-201604, review-group-1   | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:  25
 Reviewer:  arma,teor|  hours
 | Points:  3
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review
 * reviewer:  arma => arma,teor


Comment:

 There is a merge conflict in router.c between this code and code that was
 introduced in b8b5bccfd9f350c for #19003.

 Before I push this, I'd like one of you to review my merge commit in
 branch "bug18616-v4-merged_028" to make sure that I resolved the conflict
 correctly, and that we won't be creating more problems here.

 I have confirmed that it compiles and the unit tests still pass. Beyond
 that, who can say.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17790 [Applications/Tor Browser]: unit tests for keyboard defenses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17790: unit tests for keyboard defenses
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201605R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I finally got to look at the tests again. I cherry-picked both commits to
 tor-browser-45.1.0esr-6.0-1 (commit
 b815400e8aae371dcc55141d202ae96155c4c78d and
 de5346adae7452c79820958873cf6eca473f537f), thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19059 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Request for gsoc-admin@ list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19059: Request for gsoc-admin@ list
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I created the list for you. Please configure it to your needs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19007 [User Experience/Website]: Create job posting for core OONI developer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19007: Create job posting for core OONI developer
-+
 Reporter:  hellais  |  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by hellais):

 Updated the patch to include also a deadline for submissions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make zip and tar helpers generate reproducible archives without relying on libfaketime

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18845: Make zip and tar helpers generate reproducible archives without relying 
on
libfaketime
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium|  needs_revision
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal|Version:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201605  | Resolution:
Parent ID:|  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:| Points:
  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201605R => tbb-gitian,
 TorBrowserTeam201605
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I think we should rip out the faktetime parts we don't need anymore due to
 these changes and then retest in order to make sure we did not overlook
 something. E.g. in gitian-utils.yml for Linux the faketime part for the
 zipping can go and in gitian-tor.yml + the PT descriptor for Linux all
 libfaketime related instructions can get ripped out. I guess the
 preloading libfaketime after the packaging step in gitian-firefox.yml can
 go now as well (the remaining bits would be part of #18291). Could be
 interesting to see whether the libfaketime usage can get ripped out of the
 bundle step, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19007 [User Experience/Website]: Create job posting for core OONI developer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19007: Create job posting for core OONI developer
-+
 Reporter:  hellais  |  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by hellais):

 Replying to [comment:8 arma]:
 > I just updated the post with a new last paragraph, and also a contact
 address that's specific to this job opening.

 Could you also update the job posting with the extra details provided in
 patch "0001-Update-OONI-job-posting.patch​". It's adding details about the
 fact that it's a full-time position and information about salary.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18886 [Applications/Tor Browser]: consider removing Pocket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18886: consider removing Pocket
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:  closed
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, | Resolution:  fixed
  tbb-6.0-must   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:19 gk]:
 > Fine with me (although we probably will need at least the UITour code
 path patched as well when upstreaming this fix which we should try as the
 current behavior is weird). Commit
 320de5db6d53f53aadfad785ce31826b3080e890 on tor-browser-45.1.0esr-6.0-1
 has the fix.

 Ah, no, the code got pulled out into an own extension. Not sure if we want
 to upstream the changes into that system extension.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18886 [Applications/Tor Browser]: consider removing Pocket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18886: consider removing Pocket
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:  closed
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, | Resolution:  fixed
  tbb-6.0-must   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fine with me (although we probably will need at least the UITour code path
 patched as well when upstreaming this fix which we should try as the
 current behavior is weird). Commit
 320de5db6d53f53aadfad785ce31826b3080e890 on tor-browser-45.1.0esr-6.0-1
 has the fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18619 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB/ESR45 reports "InvalidStateError" in browser console

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18619: TBB/ESR45 reports "InvalidStateError" in browser console
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  defect   |  team
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:  closed
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, | Resolution:  fixed
  tbb-6.0-must   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Applied to tor-browser-45.1.0esr-6.0-1 (commit
 847b5368b573508a66c7ba38a2148fe36289fe23).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18945 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable monitoring the connected state of Tor Browser users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18945: Disable monitoring the connected state of Tor Browser users
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Points:
Parent ID:   |Sponsor:
 Reviewer:   |
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. This got applied to tor-browser-45.1.0esr-6.0-1 as commit
 d7657bf45be5e942a6d522c118d0b2e55c483ad6.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add-on directory clean-up error after update check

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18855: Add-on directory clean-up error after update check
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Points:
Parent ID:   |Sponsor:
 Reviewer:   |
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Applied to tor-browser-45.1.0esr-6.0-1 (commit
 ecf19e655e6f6b94c311f3c69e56fea31bdb4185), thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18886 [Applications/Tor Browser]: consider removing Pocket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18886: consider removing Pocket
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_review
 Severity:  Normal   |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, |Version:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605, tbb-6.0-must => ff45-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201605R, tbb-6.0-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18947 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 6.0a5 is not starting on OS X if put into /Applications

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18947: 6.0a5 is not starting on OS X if put into /Applications
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201605R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Commit 7ee11f5d012773445cc21a86bb1e8d423b15093d on master has
 the fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19065 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser icon not visible anymore in upper left corner on Linux since 05/13

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19065: Tor Browser icon not visible anymore in upper left corner on Linux since
05/13
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, | Resolution:
  tbb-regression, GeorgKoppen201605, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Points:
Parent ID:   |Sponsor:
 Reviewer:   |
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605, tbb-regression, GeorgKoppen201605,
 tbb-6.0-must
 =>
 ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, tbb-regression, GeorgKoppen201605,
 tbb-6.0-must
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 It seems we have been a bit overzealous in our fix for #18915 by deleting
 the whole `chrome` folder. bug_19065
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_19065) in my tor-browser-bundle repo is
 correcting this mistake.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  None
--+--

Comment (by paradox):

 Even without Tor. "Cloudflare is ruining the internet for me".
 http://www.slashgeek.net/2016/05/17/cloudflare-is-ruining-the-internet-
 for-me/

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