Re: [tor-bugs] #18120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: UI for ExitNode country selection for this site in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18120: UI for ExitNode country selection for this site in Torbutton
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-torbutton  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by f451022):

 Orbot have a country selection, its very util, I'll like see it in tor
 browser.

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[tor-bugs] #19859 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose stream isolation information to controllers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19859: Expose stream isolation information to controllers
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  needs-proposal hidden-services
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 See the discussion on the "How to integrate an external name resolver into
 Tor" thread on tor-dev; most notably
 http://archives.seul.org/tor/dev/Aug-2016/msg00019.html .

 Resolvers would like to know the isolation information of incoming streams
 so they know which streams need to be isolated from which other streams.

 Semantically, this is a little tricky.  The underlying rule that Tor
 implements is that each stream has a tuple of attributes (A_1, A_2...
 A_n), and a bit field (b_1, b_2... b_n).  Two streams S_a and S_b may
 share the same circuit iff, for every i such that the OR of their b_i
 values is true, they have the same A_i value.

 Note that this is not transitive: Stream S_a may be able to share a
 circuit with S_b or S_c, even if S_b cannot share with S_c.  Worse

 Should we (1) expose these attribute tuples and bitfields and require
 controllers to manipulate them correctly?  That seems obnoxious and error-
 prone.

 Or should we (2) allow controllers to ask questions like "may stream A
 share a circuit with stream B?" Or "what streams may A share a circuit
 with?"  This might lead to O(n) queries, and it will still be error-prone
 because of the non-transitivity issue.

 Or would it be better to (3) oversimplify the system above and provide
 each stream a 'cookie' such that any two streams with the same cookie may
 definitely share the same circuit?  But this is problematic, and will
 overestimate how much isolation we need.

 My current best idea is that (4) we should provide an operation of the
 form "make stream A have the same isolation properties as stream B".  And
 possibly "make circuit C have isolation properties as if it had been used
 by stream A".  So we don't expose isolation information, we just expose a
 way to manipulate it.

 Or maybe there's a further clever way I'm not even thinking about just
 now.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17238, #18571, #18572, #19024, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17238, #18571, #18572, #19024, #19205, #19642 by dgoulet:
keywords to TorCoreTeam201608

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: UI for ExitNode country selection for this site in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18120: UI for ExitNode country selection for this site in Torbutton
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-torbutton  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 See '''7.4 Let users specify their exit country''':
 https://www.torproject.org/press/presskit/2008-12-19-roadmap-full.pdf

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE in nsIMIMEService

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18554: NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE in nsIMIMEService
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Now (6.5a2) it is:
 {{{
 NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE: Component returned failure code: 0x80040111
 (NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE) [nsIHttpChannel.getResponseHeader] content-
 policy.js:67:0
 NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI: Component returned failure code: 0x804b000a
 (NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI) [nsIIOService.newURI] content-policy.js:68:0
 }}}
 Do you think that's all? No, sometimes when you open Media tab of View
 Page Info Torcrazybutton starts to populate the first error in console
 continuously reloading the favicon many times!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19273 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Write C++ patch to replace external applications helper dialog workaround

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19273: Write C++ patch to replace external applications helper dialog 
workaround
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201607R, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  usability, tbb-torbutton-conversion|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-

Comment (by bugzilla):

 #18778, #18090, #18554 should be child tickets. Also regression tests are
 highly needed for this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18778 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB hangs with 100% CPU when cancelling ftp download or http channel Listener OnDataAvailable contract violation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18778: TBB hangs with 100% CPU when cancelling ftp download or http channel
Listener OnDataAvailable contract violation
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 When cancelling Download in pdf.js (6.5a2)
 {{{
 NS_ERROR_FAILURE: Component returned failure code: 0x80004005
 (NS_ERROR_FAILURE) [nsIExternalHelperAppService.doContent]
 PdfStreamConverter.jsm:306:0
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15532 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 4.5 displays signature validation error during update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15532: Tor Browser 4.5 displays signature validation error during update
-+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch, ff38-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by sukhbir):

 I had the same error message with Tor Messenger's updater and I fixed it
 by copying the DER to both release_primary and release_secondary. (I
 actually did think there was an error in verifying the update and spent
 quite a while trying to figure out why.)

 IMO this would be the easiest way to fix it unless I am missing something
 else.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15532 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 4.5 displays signature validation error during update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15532: Tor Browser 4.5 displays signature validation error during update
-+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch, ff38-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: sukhbir (added)
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This will also affect Tor Messenger's updater.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18274 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 3DES_EDE_CBC cipher is weak in the current TBB configuration! (was: 3DES_EDE_CBC cipher is vulnerable in the current TBB configuration!)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18274: 3DES_EDE_CBC cipher is weak in the current TBB configuration!
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19358 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB can stop working on exit on Windows 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19358: TBB can stop working on exit on Windows 7
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Crash by timeout?
 {{{
 version: 45.3.0.0
 Fault offset: 01efb904
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable randomised Firefox HTTP cache decay user test groups

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13575: Disable randomised Firefox HTTP cache decay user test groups
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-pref, tbb-fingerprinting  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Mozilla continues its experiment, now with sub-hour resolution:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1098422

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[tor-bugs] #19858 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move guard state out of globals per new guard plan

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19858: Move guard state out of globals per new guard plan
--+
 Reporter:  andrea|  Owner:  andrea
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  3 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorU  |
--+
 New guard plan summarized here at https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail
 /tor-dev/2016-July/011234.html

 1) Create main guard selection state data structure (instead of using
 global variables)
  - Ideally there should be no global variables, so that in the future we
 can have multiple parallel guardsets (e.g. prop247)
  - Thoughtworks: guard_selection_t

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19255 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: move sandstorm to tpo infra

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19255: move sandstorm to tpo infra
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 bracteata.torproject.org is the host

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12595 [Core Tor/Tor]: Finalize design for improved guard-node behavior

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12595: Finalize design for improved guard-node behavior
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, TorCoreTeam201608,|  Actual Points:
  028-triaged, mike-can, prop259, tor-guards-|
  revamp |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:
 tor-guard, TorCoreTeam201606, 028-triaged, mike-can, prop259, tor-
 guards-revamp
 =>
 tor-guard, TorCoreTeam201608, 028-triaged, mike-can, prop259, tor-
 guards-revamp


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #13752, #17779, #19020, #19155, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #13752, #17779, #19020, #19155, #19156, #19157, #19158, 
#19159, #19160 by nickm:
keywords to TorCoreTeam201608

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15707 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Tonga isn't deduplicating bridge-server-descriptors anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15707: Tonga isn't deduplicating bridge-server-descriptors anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  not a
 Keywords:  bridgedb-parsers, bridge,|  bug
  TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 arma]:
 > isis, should we close this ticket?

 Yes.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #13752, #17779, #19020, #19155, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #13752, #17779, #19020, #19155, #19156, #19157, #19158, 
#19159, #19160 by nickm:


Action: reassign

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19534 [Core Tor/Tor]: Не могу зайти в ТОР

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19534: Не могу зайти в ТОР
-+-
 Reporter:  Lollypoper   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 Keywords:  bridgedb-reportbug,  |  disappeared
  TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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Re: [tor-bugs] #12804 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Setup separate BridgeDB staging/test server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12804: Setup separate BridgeDB staging/test server
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  project   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bridgedb-test, TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This was setup years ago with the `deploy-testing` script in the bridgedb-
 admin repo.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #19690, #12030, #12031, #12505, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #19690, #12030, #12031, #12505, #12506, #13589, #11966, 
#12804, #15522, #15707, #16650, #17193, #18076, #19534 by isis:
keywords to TorCoreTeam201608

Comment:
Adding to my august tickets.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19043 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19043: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
-+-
 Reporter:  alec.heif|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, |  Actual Points:
  0210-proposed, TorCoreTeam201608   |
Parent ID:  #17241   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, 0210-proposed => tor-hs, prop224,
 6.s194, 0210-proposed, TorCoreTeam201608


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:cache does not show anything in Tor Browser based on ESR 38

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16485: about:cache does not show anything in Tor Browser based on ESR 38
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 {{{ff45-esr-will-have}}}?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19794 [Community]: Tor Project Corporate Document FOI Request

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19794: Tor Project Corporate Document FOI Request
---+-
 Reporter:  grarpamp   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16487 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser has non private browsing mode related cache entries (was: Tor Browser based on ESR 38 has non private browsing mode related cache entries)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16487: Tor Browser has non private browsing mode related cache entries
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 status-esr45: affected

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16486 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:cache page (disk entry) is confusing in Tor Browser (was: about:cache page (disk entry) is confusing in Tor Browser based on ESR 38)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16486: about:cache page (disk entry) is confusing in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 status-esr45: affected

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9783 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New Identity does not always clear all OCSP/favicon related network activity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9783: New Identity does not always clear all OCSP/favicon related network
activity
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-newnym, |  Actual Points:
  interview, tbb-torbutton   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 {{{ff45-esr-will-have}}}?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15599 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Range requests used by pdfjs are not isolated to URL bar domain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15599: Range requests used by pdfjs are not isolated to URL bar domain
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 {{{ff45-esr-will-have}}}?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5816 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unintentional connections by TBB to Google and Yahoo servers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5816: Unintentional connections by TBB to Google and Yahoo servers
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch =>
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 {{{ff45-esr-will-have}}}?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18574 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox bug - uncaught exception: 2147942487 when clicking items in Library (was: uncaught exception: 2147942487 when clicking items in Library)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18574: Firefox bug - uncaught exception: 2147942487 when clicking items in 
Library
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * keywords:   => ff52-esr
 * sponsor:  None =>


Comment:

 Mozilla has a good progress in getting rid of uncaught exceptions in
 browser console, so it's worth checking in ff52-esr.
 So now it is:
 {{{
 NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE: Invalid arguments nsLivemarkService.js:299:0
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox bug - uncaught exception: 2147500033 when opening ip-check.info (was: uncaught exception: 2147500033 when opening ip-check.info)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18531: Firefox bug - uncaught exception: 2147500033 when opening ip-check.info
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * keywords:   => ff52-esr
 * sponsor:  None =>


Comment:

 Mozilla has a good progress in getting rid of uncaught exceptions in
 browser console, so it's worth checking in ff52-esr.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19838 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add dgoulet's obfs4 bridge to Tor Browser's default bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19838: Add dgoulet's obfs4 bridge to Tor Browser's default bridges
--+---
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:3 dgoulet]:
 > @dcf, should I attach the `diff` on this ticket or should I give it to
 the TBB team? Asking so I don't reveal the bridge before being merged and
 thus adding a chance to "break" your testing?

 Also, I'm not sure if TvdW emailed you, but I have details for a second
 bridge to go along with dgoulet's. Please tell me how/who to give it to,
 in keeping with the experiments.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19741 [Applications/Tor Browser]: favicon in searchbar popup uses catchall circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19741: favicon in searchbar popup uses catchall circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201608   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Congrats! You've rediscovered ticket:18937#comment:22!
 Also don't forget about it's OCSP request like in #19416.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9521 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "new identity" leaks memory in eventSuppressor.suppressEventHandling()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9521: "new identity" leaks memory in eventSuppressor.suppressEventHandling()
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-newnym, interview, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  torbutton, ff45-esr, tbb-performance-leaking   |
Parent ID:  #18047   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned
 * keywords:
 tbb-newnym, interview, tbb-torbutton, ff38-esr, tbb-performance-
 leaking
 =>
 tbb-newnym, interview, tbb-torbutton, ff45-esr, tbb-performance-
 leaking
 * owner:  mikeperry => tbb-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19405 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error when accessing mega.nz

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19405: Error when accessing mega.nz
--+---
 Reporter:  torbacchi |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-6.0-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by bugzilla):

 {{{user disappeared}}}?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19355 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox bug - Moving a mouse pointer over the TBB windows is CPU intensive on Windows XP (was: Moving a mouse pointer over the TBB windows is CPU inte

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19355: Firefox bug - Moving a mouse pointer over the TBB windows is CPU 
intensive
on Windows XP
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-6.0-issues, tbb-usability, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Also some remarks about scrolling by Yawning: ticket:19276#comment:8

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18090 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torcrazybutton eats all memory and crashes Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18090: Torcrazybutton eats all memory and crashes Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-performance-leaking,  |  duplicate
  tbb-oom, tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18047   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by bugzilla):

 It's no longer reproducible after switching to ff45esr. #19273 should be
 fixed (not closed as fixed)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19691 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: does not re-open logfiles properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19691: does not re-open logfiles properly
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bridgedb-0.3.7|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I had to make some changes to the above patch, they're in commit
 `e3267177` in the bridgedb-admin repo. This is now deployed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16633 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enable and isolate Firefox connection prediction

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16633: Enable and isolate Firefox connection prediction
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability-performance, performance => tbb-performance
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Ticket about improving the performance, wow!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19043 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19043: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
-+-
 Reporter:  alec.heif|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, |  Actual Points:
  0210-proposed  |
Parent ID:  #17241   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:13 asn]:
 >   b) Somehow refactor the current system so that we can do both old-
 style and prop224 mappings using the same data structure. For example, we
 could hash the old-style keys with sha256 and store them in a digest256
 map, and do the same for new style keys as well (or just store the keys
 intact since they are 32bytes).

 This is what I'd suggest.  I'd suggest an underlying data structure
 mapping a tagged structure to a circuit pointer.  If you use the handle
 and the ht code, it should actually be easy.

 Then you can define all the accessor functions, to actually make the code
 safer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19417 [Applications/Tor Browser]: asm.js files should not be cached to disk in Tor Browser and no linkability risk

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19417: asm.js files should not be cached to disk in Tor Browser and no 
linkability
risk
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-linkability,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201606, TorBrowserTeam201607|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Replying to [comment:19 gk]:
 > Let's leave `tbb-crash` for #19400. This ticket is concerned with the
 cache and linkability issue.
 Are you going to file another ticket for {{{tbb-newnym}}} issue?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19776 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Make minor improvements to scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19776: Make minor improvements to scheduler
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Added a patch for part4-single-run including a test; adapted coverage
 percentages.

 Please review
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/commit/?h=task-19776
 -run-once=688b6f1bb3c6a42bea0174f2f908525cf0176551 the change.]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19720 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19720: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:11 karsten]:
 > weasel notes on IRC that services that auto-check if their configuration
 files change are extremely suspicious.  He says that a service should
 require some signal to re-read its configuration file.
 >
 > Let's think again if we can implement something like that.  I briefly
 looked whether we can catch a SIGHUP signal, but that doesn't seem very
 platform independent.  Another way would be to touch a "reload-config"
 file of some sort and have the current thread check whether that exists.
 But there are probably better ways.  Hm.

 I didn't notice that before answering the previous comment. So:

 Well, how much of a 'service' the different modules in CollecTor
 constitute is surely debatable.

 Therefor two questions:
 * What is the use-case that justifies here when having to edit and then
 signal a change?
 * Isn't it worse in this particular case to forget the second step?

 Anyway, if we decide to have the two-level re-config, one can always use
 other Java ways of 'signalling' the application. But that will be a future
 release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19838 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add dgoulet's obfs4 bridge to Tor Browser's default bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19838: Add dgoulet's obfs4 bridge to Tor Browser's default bridges
--+---
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 @dcf, should I attach the `diff` on this ticket or should I give it to the
 TBB team? Asking so I don't reveal the bridge before being merged and thus
 adding a chance to "break" your testing?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16747 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor-browser downloads favicon twice (and over different circuits) on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16747: Tor-browser downloads favicon twice (and over different circuits) on
Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff45-esr-will-have  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Replying to [comment:24 gk]:
 > I bet this is happening in WindowsPreviewPerTab.jsm.
 It was mentioned in comment:19
 > If so, this is probably the windows per-tab taskbar preview ("Aero
 Peek") functionality which is turned off
 No, it's not turned off, just hidden.
 > but still doing network requests.
 No, it's not doing that, but that bug does
 > Mozilla hit this while trying to fix the issues mentioned in #18513.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19720 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19720: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:10 karsten]:
 > The impatient?  Nooo, not true.  The forgetful and easily confused!

 :-)

 >
 > Okay, one question and two suggestions:
 >  - What happens if the operator breaks the configuration file?  Will
 current module runs be affected, that is, will they be aborted together
 with the scheduler?  If not, will the scheduler make another attempt to
 re-read the configuration file 60 (or 5) seconds later?  And if so, will
 it warn every 60 (or 5) seconds that the configuration is broken?  Okay,
 that's more than one question, but these seem related.

 The design should be quite robust concerning editing errors.
 First, there are actually two categories of 'breaking' the configuration:
 1. syntactically: the properties syntax is wrong and the file cannot be
 read by `java.util.Properties`
 2. semantically: a valid property contains a bad value, e.g. a valid but
 wrong URL.

 Case 1: an
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/tree/src/main/java/org/torproject/collector/conf/Configuration.java?h=task-19720
 -reread-configuration=abedf087def7f66b3446f5b019cff5ff2202f9f0#n74
 error is logged] and the modules keep running with their working
 configuration, i.e. the modules don't hear about a new config.

 Case 2: All modules are informed and will use the new configuration with
 their next run. Depending on the 'wrongness' of the value supplied the
 module affected will in worst case throw an Exception. All modules with
 correct properties keep running fine.  The affected module will be
 rescheduled at the scheduled time from the start-up configuration.

 In both cases `Configuration` keeps checking the modified-time, no matter
 what the edit caused, but it won't re-read unless there was another
 change.  (Looking at the code after working on #19771 I'm going to change
 the
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/tree/src/main/java/org/torproject/collector/conf/Configuration.java?h=task-19720
 -reread-configuration=abedf087def7f66b3446f5b019cff5ff2202f9f0#n73
 catch clause] into catch-all, too.)

 >  - 10 or 15 seconds might work, too, if 5 is too small.  Just enough to
 save the file and `tail -f` the log file to see how the changes are
 processed.  So, I'd say anything between 5 and 15 would work, please pick
 your favorite.

 Fine.

 >  - The behavior of all this should be described at the top of
 `collector.properties`, so that operators know exactly what will happen
 when they edit the file while CollecTor is running rather than having to
 learn it from the logs after it has happened.

 This is a very important point!

 >
 > Sorry to make this more difficult, but I'm thinking of all the services
 I'm running and how to memorize how to do that, and I'm thinking of
 external folks running our services in the near future and making this as
 easy as possible for them.  Thanks!

 In the opposite, voicing all the questions and doubts is important!
 It surely takes less time to write about things beforehand than
 troubleshooting an externally running instance later and preparing bugfix-
 releases.

 Thanks!

 Are there any more questions/suggestions? Can I start with the proposed
 changes?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19043 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19043: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
-+-
 Reporter:  alec.heif|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, |  Actual Points:
  0210-proposed  |
Parent ID:  #17241   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:13 asn]:
 >   a) Just define two more global maps that will store the prop224 rend
 circuit information. This is the cheap approach, since it's quite easy to
 implement. FWIW, we need two maps: one to store intro point circuit info,
 and another to store the rend cookies.
 >
 >   The downside here is that we are then left with maintaining 4 of those
 maps (two for old system, two for new system) which might become hairy.
 >
 >   b) Somehow refactor the current system so that we can do both old-
 style and prop224 mappings using the same data structure. For example, we
 could hash the old-style keys with sha256 and store them in a digest256
 map, and do the same for new style keys as well (or just store the keys
 intact since they are 32bytes).
 >
 >   This seems like an approach that will be easier to maintain since we
 will only have two functions and data structures, instead of four.
 However, it's not a trivial refactoring. For example, we should be careful
 to not use new-style keys with clients trying to connect to old-style
 intro points.

 Hrm, I see `circuit_set_intro_point_digest` being called at only one place
 and `circuit_get_intro_point` two places. Very few call sites. I like the
 idea of using the same data structure and interface for this (with already
 working code). Refactoring to a `digest256map` with
 sha256(old_current_digest) and ed25519 keys sounds like a win. The only
 thing we would want I presume is a "flag" for the above function that is
 "Oh this is a old digest" or "New digest, do not hash".

 Heck, we could even "sha256(digest)" in `rend_mid_establish_intro()` and
 do directly the query with this instead of passing a flag. In that
 function, `pk_digest` is _only_ used for getting the intro points so we
 can just adapt it to a sha256 prior. Same goes for `rend_mid_introduce()`,
 hash and then call. Those functions will be deleted months/years after 224
 so adding code there is a better idea imo than adding code to the
 `circuit_` API that will actually be kept after.

 Another idea, we can add two functions that specifically only takes the
 old digest, sha256 it and then call the circuit interface
 (`circuit_set_intro_point_digest`). As long as those functions are "old
 HS" specific though and not making them part of the circuit API.

 >
 > Side question: Do we have a `digestmap_t` that can hold ed25519 keys?
 Can I just use `digest256map_t` for that since ed25519 keys are 32bytes
 anyway?

 Yes `digest256map_t` is what you want here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19720 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19720: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 weasel notes on IRC that services that auto-check if their configuration
 files change are extremely suspicious.  He says that a service should
 require some signal to re-read its configuration file.

 Let's think again if we can implement something like that.  I briefly
 looked whether we can catch a SIGHUP signal, but that doesn't seem very
 platform independent.  Another way would be to touch a "reload-config"
 file of some sort and have the current thread check whether that exists.
 But there are probably better ways.  Hm.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19720 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19720: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 The impatient?  Nooo, not true.  The forgetful and easily confused!

 Okay, one question and two suggestions:
  - What happens if the operator breaks the configuration file?  Will
 current module runs be affected, that is, will they be aborted together
 with the scheduler?  If not, will the scheduler make another attempt to
 re-read the configuration file 60 (or 5) seconds later?  And if so, will
 it warn every 60 (or 5) seconds that the configuration is broken?  Okay,
 that's more than one question, but these seem related.
  - 10 or 15 seconds might work, too, if 5 is too small.  Just enough to
 save the file and `tail -f` the log file to see how the changes are
 processed.  So, I'd say anything between 5 and 15 would work, please pick
 your favorite.
  - The behavior of all this should be described at the top of
 `collector.properties`, so that operators know exactly what will happen
 when they edit the file while CollecTor is running rather than having to
 learn it from the logs after it has happened.

 Sorry to make this more difficult, but I'm thinking of all the services
 I'm running and how to memorize how to do that, and I'm thinking of
 external folks running our services in the near future and making this as
 easy as possible for them.  Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19501 [User Experience/Website]: deprecate torproject's RPM repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19501: deprecate torproject's RPM repository
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 diffs:
 {{{
 diff --git a/tor-doc-unix.wml.orig b/tor-doc-unix.wml
 index c35ba8f..c543b53 100644
 --- a/tor-doc-unix.wml.orig
 +++ b/tor-doc-unix.wml
 @@ -30,8 +30,6 @@
  Red Hat, Gentoo, etc there too. If you're
  using Ubuntu, don't use the default packages: use our deb repository instead.
 -Similarly, CentOS / Fedora users should use our rpm repository instead.
  

  If you're building from source, first install 
  
 
  CentOS and Fedora
 -repository packages 
 +yum install tor / dnf install tor
   Linux/BSD/Unix 
  

 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19818 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The update_responses script should use a config.yml option for the releases directory path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19818: The update_responses script should use a config.yml option for the 
releases
directory path
---+---
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201608R, tbb-gitian  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19817 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by boklm):

 Yes, having the same version of the script in maint-6.0 and master could
 make merging future patches easier.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19857 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser hardened (6.5a2) crashes after update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19857: Tor Browser hardened (6.5a2) crashes after update
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-regression,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201608   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by gk:

Old description:

> STR:
>
> 1) Download 6.5a1-hardened
> 2) Download the corresponding debug files and move `Debug` to
> `Browser/.debug`
> 3) Start 6.5a1-hardened as usual and update
> 4) After restart the browser window is visible shortly but then Tor
> Browser crashes with
> {{
> ASAN:SIGSEGV
> =
> ==7246==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x
> (pc 0x7faa929b5d27 bp 0x7faa9bf89170 sp 0x7faa9bf89040 T4)
> SRAT init
> SRAT warning: cannot find Memory Layout File. Stack trace will be
> probably wrong.
> ASAN:SIGSEGV
> ==7246==AddressSanitizer: while reporting a bug found another one.
> Ignoring.
> }}}
>
> Starting again works and not moving the debug files into `Browser` +
> updating is fine, too.

New description:

 STR:

 1) Download 6.5a1-hardened
 2) Download the corresponding debug files and move `Debug` to
 `Browser/.debug`
 3) Start 6.5a1-hardened as usual and update
 4) After restart the browser window is visible shortly but then Tor
 Browser crashes with
 {{{
 ASAN:SIGSEGV
 =
 ==7246==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x
 (pc 0x7faa929b5d27 bp 0x7faa9bf89170 sp 0x7faa9bf89040 T4)
 SRAT init
 SRAT warning: cannot find Memory Layout File. Stack trace will be probably
 wrong.
 ASAN:SIGSEGV
 ==7246==AddressSanitizer: while reporting a bug found another one.
 Ignoring.
 }}}

 Starting again works and not moving the debug files into `Browser` +
 updating is fine, too.

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[tor-bugs] #19857 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser hardened (6.5a2) crashes after update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19857: Tor Browser hardened (6.5a2) crashes after update
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  regression, TorBrowserTeam201608
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 STR:

 1) Download 6.5a1-hardened
 2) Download the corresponding debug files and move `Debug` to
 `Browser/.debug`
 3) Start 6.5a1-hardened as usual and update
 4) After restart the browser window is visible shortly but then Tor
 Browser crashes with
 {{
 ASAN:SIGSEGV
 =
 ==7246==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x
 (pc 0x7faa929b5d27 bp 0x7faa9bf89170 sp 0x7faa9bf89040 T4)
 SRAT init
 SRAT warning: cannot find Memory Layout File. Stack trace will be probably
 wrong.
 ASAN:SIGSEGV
 ==7246==AddressSanitizer: while reporting a bug found another one.
 Ignoring.
 }}}

 Starting again works and not moving the debug files into `Browser` +
 updating is fine, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3123 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: contrib/torctl script sends SIGHUP without running tor --verify-config first

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3123: contrib/torctl script sends SIGHUP without running tor --verify-config
first
+-
 Reporter:  rransom |  Owner:  marlowe
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1260 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: Fedora tor RPM conflicts with distro pieces

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1260: Fedora tor RPM conflicts with distro pieces
+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:  marlowe
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:  0.2.1.22
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1129 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: fedora rpm refers to old tor.eff.org url

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1129: fedora rpm refers to old tor.eff.org url
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  marlowe
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:  0.2.1.19
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15297 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: add an additional check in MULTI_INSTANCE mode for a more obvious error message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15297: add an additional check in MULTI_INSTANCE mode for a more obvious error
message
+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  hiviah
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13915 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: Tor no longer requires openssl on el7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13915: Tor no longer requires openssl on el7
+-
 Reporter:  Pascal  |  Owner:  hiviah
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13553 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: CA pinning for the RPM repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13553: CA pinning for the RPM repo
+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  hiviah
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12871 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: RPM repo data is not signed and documentation misses repo_gpgcheck

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12871: RPM repo data is not signed and documentation misses repo_gpgcheck
+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  hiviah
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5205 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: rpm package building

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5205: rpm package building
+-
 Reporter:  ioerror |  Owner:  marlowe
 Type:  project | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #4658 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: suse and suse-experimental do not exist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4658: suse and suse-experimental do not exist
+-
 Reporter:  runa|  Owner:  hiviah
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19501 [User Experience/Website]: deprecate torproject's RPM repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19501: deprecate torproject's RPM repository
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:  hiviah => Sebastian
 * component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging => User Experience/Website


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Re: [tor-bugs] #4389 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: OpenSuse Tor RPMs?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4389: OpenSuse Tor RPMs?
+-
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  marlowe
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #4162 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: arm/torctl rpms for deb.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4162: arm/torctl rpms for deb.tpo
+-
 Reporter:  atagar  |  Owner:  marlowe
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #2694 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: Local privilege escalation vulnerability in our rpms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2694: Local privilege escalation vulnerability in our rpms
+-
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  marlowe
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1873 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: Automate RPM package builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1873: Automate RPM package builds
+--
 Reporter:  erinn   |  Owner:  erinn
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Deliverable-December2010
Component:  Core Tor/RPM|Version:
  packaging |
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal
 * parent:  #1869 =>


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1133 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: fedora rpm doesn't log by default?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1133: fedora rpm doesn't log by default?
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  hiviah
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:  0.2.1.19
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1131 [Core Tor/RPM packaging]: fedora rpm doesn't set ulimit -n, so you can't run a fast relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1131: fedora rpm doesn't set ulimit -n, so you can't run a fast relay
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  hiviah
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/RPM packaging  |Version:  0.2.1.19
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The torproject does not longer provide RPMs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16747 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor-browser downloads favicon twice (and over different circuits) on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16747: Tor-browser downloads favicon twice (and over different circuits) on
Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff45-esr-will-have  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-linkability => tbb-linkability, ff45-esr-will-have
 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed with the switch to 45.3.0esr.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19776 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Make minor improvements to scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19776: Make minor improvements to scheduler
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:5 karsten]:
 > I tried to tweak your branch by converting everything to milliseconds.
 Please take a look at [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 db.git/log/?h=task-19776 my branch task-19776].  Some initial tests looked
 promising, but I'm not sure if I overlooked something.  Please review
 carefully!

 Fine to have a more elaborate log message there.  I made the calculation
 testable and included a simple test.  Feel free to add some more values.
 This
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/commit/?h=task-19776=86124ddf1741232645cbbc968f6079fdb4f04ede
 branch] is based on yours.

 >
 > Your suggestion for part 4 sounds reasonable.

 Ok, I'll get to this next.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19856 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Gitian build for OS X is not matching on some machines (was: Gitian build on OS X is not matching on some machines)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19856: Gitian build for OS X is not matching on some machines
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19856 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Gitian build on OS X is not matching on some machines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19856: Gitian build on OS X is not matching on some machines
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW: I used KVM (using Debian Jessy) and testing with the LXC machine
 showed that the latter matched boklm's build.

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[tor-bugs] #19856 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Gitian build on OS X is not matching on some machines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19856: Gitian build on OS X is not matching on some machines
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-gitian,
 Severity:  Critical |  TorBrowserTeam201608
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 While building 6.5a2 I used a recently set up machine for building that
 showed differences on OpenSSL artifacts for OS X.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19491 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS-Everywhere vanished during update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19491: HTTPS-Everywhere vanished during update
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Here is another report (https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-
 browser-603-released#comment-196593) this time the issue happened with the
 updated HTTPS-Everywhere we shipped with 6.0.3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19043 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19043: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
-+-
 Reporter:  alec.heif|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, |  Actual Points:
  0210-proposed  |
Parent ID:  #17241   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 OK, code architecture question here:

 I'm working on the intro point code for ESTABLISH_INTRO. I'm now at the
 part where I need to connect intro circuits with auth keys. This is done
 so that when a client comes with an auth key, we can easily find the right
 circuit.

 This is currently done with functions `circuit_set_intro_point_digest()`
 and `circuit_clear_rend_token()` using the `digestmap_t`
 `intro_digest_map`.

 However, for prop224 I suspect it's bad form to use a SHA1 `digestmap_t`
 for storing ed25519 keys, so I'm trying to figure out what to do.

 Here are some approaches:

   a) Just define two more global maps that will store the prop224 rend
 circuit information. This is the cheap approach, since it's quite easy to
 implement. FWIW, we need two maps: one to store intro point circuit info,
 and another to store the rend cookies.

   The downside here is that we are then left with maintaining 4 of those
 maps (two for old system, two for new system) which might become hairy.

   b) Somehow refactor the current system so that we can do both old-style
 and prop224 mappings using the same data structure. For example, we could
 hash the old-style keys with sha256 and store them in a digest256 map, and
 do the same for new style keys as well (or just store the keys intact
 since they are 32bytes).

   This seems like an approach that will be easier to maintain since we
 will only have two functions and data structures, instead of four.
 However, it's not a trivial refactoring. For example, we should be careful
 to not use new-style keys with clients trying to connect to old-style
 intro points.

 Side question: Do we have a `digestmap_t` that can hold ed25519 keys? Can
 I just use `digest256map_t` for that since ed25519 keys are 32bytes
 anyway?

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[tor-bugs] #19855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Downloading a Tor Browser update via Torbutton menu does not show the "update ready" icon on the hamburger menu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19855: Downloading a Tor Browser update via Torbutton menu does not show the
"update ready" icon on the hamburger menu
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-torbutton
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 A user reported that the "update ready" icon is not directly shown after
 downloading the Tor Browser update via the option in the Torbutton menu:

 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-603-released#comment-196887

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16551 [Applications/GetTor]: Improve Latests TBB Format to be easily parsable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16551: Improve Latests TBB Format to be easily parsable
---+
 Reporter:  naif   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201509R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Ticket #19854 has been open for the fix of the download URLs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19854 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix URLs in the downloads.json file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19854: Fix URLs in the downloads.json file
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201608R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201608R


Comment:

 I attached a patch to fix that.

 Additionally, this should make updating the `config.yml` file for a new
 release a little easier, as there is no more a version to update in the
 `download_url` option.

 I checked on 6.5a2 that with `make update_responses-alpha` the xml files
 generated are the same with or without the patch, and the URLs in
 `downloads.json` are fixed.

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[tor-bugs] #19854 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix URLs in the downloads.json file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19854: Fix URLs in the downloads.json file
--+---
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Following changes from #19202, the URLs in the `downloads.json` file
 (added in #16551) are broken.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19818 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The update_responses script should use a config.yml option for the releases directory path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19818: The update_responses script should use a config.yml option for the 
releases
directory path
---+---
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201608R, tbb-gitian  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19817 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201608R => TorBrowserTeam201608R, tbb-gitian


Comment:

 Do we need that on maint-6.0 as well?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19720 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19720: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 First some inline answers and then a summary below.

 Replying to [comment:8 karsten]:
 > Okay, I agree with most design decisions here, except for one that might
 confuse operators more than necessary: the modified time of the
 configuration file should not be checked once per minute (or even more
 often) but rather at the start of a new module run.  Imagine a situation
 where the next execution is less than 1 minute away and the operator makes
 a quick change to the configuration file.  There's no way for them to find
 out whether that change will make it into the next run or not, because the
 thread might check in 1 second or in 59 seconds.

 The Operator can answer this question from the log:

 Edit collector.properties and save.  The next check runs and reports the
 change:
 {{{
 2016-08-08 09:15:56,948 INFO o.t.c.c.Configuration:63 Configuration file
 was changed.
 }}}

 Modules starting after that will receive the new configuration, which is
 explicitly reported.
 {{{
 2016-08-08 09:16:57,026 INFO o.t.c.c.CollecTorMain:45 Module updateindex
 received new configuration.
 2016-08-08 09:16:57,027 INFO o.t.c.c.CollecTorMain:53 Starting updateindex
 module of CollecTor.
 }}}

 Of course, at the moment there is a possible waiting time of 60sec. See
 summary below.


 > Can we change that by taking out the thread and having modules check
 whether the configuration has changed?

 The modified config file would be read by each module. A potential error
 will be noticed very late and all modules would have to deal with it. And,
 all modules now have to keep track of when the configuration changed.

 > Ideally, we'd have a shell script that we use to reload the
 configuration file and possibly to verify it without loading it.  But
 that's for later.
 >

 That would be two steps:
 1. Edit and save.
 2. Don't forget to inform the running application (not necessarily using a
 shell script, but it could be a wrapper for that).

 Step 2 is easily forgotten especially if there is a stressful situation
 requiring the change.


 === Summary
 Maybe the following changes will help:

 a) Keep the centralized modified-check.
 b) Decrease check interval < 5 sec (is this fine for the impatient?).
 c) Every module could also log that it received the notice about a config
 change (in the `update` method).  Currently it logs only that it received
 the changed configuration before the run that uses it.

 Using a) the config change can be detected centrally and a change will be
 effective when saved w/o additional steps for the operator.
 Part b) will make the application's response more immediate. Maybe even
 log the entire configuration file in TRACE level.
 Part c) also gives early feedback that the various modules will use the
 new configuration in their next run.

 In addition to the existing logging this should be sufficient feedback to
 the operator.
 Here an example of the planned log entries:

 Edit collector.properties and save; the resulting midified time of the
 properties file is 09:15:52.  The next check runs a few seconds later and
 reports the change:
 {{{
 2016-08-08 09:15:56,948 INFO o.t.c.c.Configuration:63 Configuration file
 was changed.
 2016-08-08 09:15:56,949 INFO o.t.c.c.Configuration:63 Module updateindex
 will use new configuration.
 2016-08-08 09:15:56,949 INFO o.t.c.c.Configuration:63 Module relaydescs
 will use new configuration.
 ...
 2016-08-08 09:16:57,026 INFO o.t.c.c.CollecTorMain:45 Module updateindex
 received new configuration.
 2016-08-08 09:16:57,027 INFO o.t.c.c.CollecTorMain:53 Starting updateindex
 module of CollecTor.
 ...
 2016-08-08 10:09:00,001 INFO o.t.c.c.CollecTorMain:45 Module relaydescs
 received new configuration.
 2016-08-08 10:09:00,002 INFO o.t.c.c.CollecTorMain:53 Starting relaydescs
 module of CollecTor.
 }}}


 What do you think?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19837 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audio/video player is blank in 6.5a2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19837: Audio/video player is blank in 6.5a2
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201608   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-regression, TorBrowserTeam201608


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18820, #13893, #18101, #19200, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18820, #13893, #18101, #19200, #12820, #15988, #17509, 
#18925, #19274 by gk:
keywords to GeorgKoppen201608

Comment:
Moving my tickets as well.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #14270, #14271, #14272, #14273, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #14270, #14271, #14272, #14273, #15852, #16622, #17334, 
#19459 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201608

Comment:
Getting important SponsorU things on our August radar.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #13017, #18820, #10281, #13893, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #13017, #18820, #10281, #13893, #18101, #19200, #12820, 
#15138, #15842, #15988, #16757, #17400, #17509, #17662, #17858, #18292, #18860, 
#18925, #19067, #19274, #19528, #19741 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201608

Comment:
Moving items to August 2016.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18022, #19481, #19706

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18022, #19481, #19706 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201608R 

Comment:
Old reviews for the "new" month.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8725 [Applications/Tor Browser]: resource:// URIs leak information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8725: resource:// URIs leak information
-+-
 Reporter:  holizz   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-rebase-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-testcase, tbb-firefox-patch,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201607R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19737 [Applications/Tor Browser]: gpg/gk.gpg and gpg/torbutton.gpg are expired since 2016-07-19

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19737: gpg/gk.gpg and gpg/torbutton.gpg are expired since 2016-07-19
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201607R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We used this for 6.0.3 and 6.5a2 + 6.5a2-hardened
 (adcf907e1d54de5b9fcca736ca28b69d70c738fbm
 7923b2184b46d4f9b861db256f28e00ee47d390d and
 c6458e49f9dd51708e22c84f26195c50d0ff2d0b).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19771 [Metrics/CollecTor]: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19771: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's
scheduler
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Well, I always let the tests run. But I understand your concern.

 The added test reproduces the problem and demonstrates that the solution
 works, but I don't
 expect it to reveal any other problems in future. But, other tests for the
 Scheduler might
 need similarly long.

 Thinking about it, it might be easy to change Scheduler a little in order
 to provide a fast
 way for testing by simply exposing a milisecond version of the scheduling
 method.

 So,  accept the test for now and have a new ticket for making this test
 and potentially others related to scheduling faster?
 That way the long test times will go away soon.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #19515, #18513

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #19515, #18513 by gk:


Action: resolve

Comment:
This got fixed by our switch to 45.3.0esr.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19804 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTML5 fingerprinting by battery status

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19804: HTML5 fingerprinting by battery status
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13018 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Math routines are OS fingerprintable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13018: Math routines are OS fingerprintable
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-os-version,   |  Actual Points:
  ff31-esr   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-os-version, tbb-easy, ff31-esr => tbb-
 fingerprinting-os-version, ff31-esr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19851 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hardened tor browser 6.5a2 fails to launch with AddressSanitizer CHECK failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19851: Hardened tor browser 6.5a2 fails to launch with AddressSanitizer CHECK
failed
-+-
 Reporter:  NextHendrix  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-hardened, TorBrowserTeam201608,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201608  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-hardened, TorBrowserTeam201608, GeorgKoppen201608
 * severity:  Critical => Normal


Comment:

 As far as I understand this is technically an ASan bug and there is
 supposed to be a patch ready that is fixing the problem. We could try that
 one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19852 [- Select a component]: none

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19852: none
--+-
 Reporter:  warlordzin|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19849 [Applications/Orbot]: orbot crash when receiving data through transproxy at boot time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19849: orbot crash when receiving data through transproxy at boot time
+---
 Reporter:  hgourvest   |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  orbot transproxy|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:   => n8fr8
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Orbot


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19771 [Metrics/CollecTor]: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19771: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's
scheduler
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Oh.  Then we should either make it much faster, not add it, or add a
 separate test target for tests taking longer than a few seconds.
 Otherwise we're not going to run tests very often.  What do you think?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19771 [Metrics/CollecTor]: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19771: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's
scheduler
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:3 karsten]:
 > Fix looks good, but test hangs here:
 >
 > {{{
 > [junit] Testcase: testUrlValueException took 0.001 sec
 > [junit] Testsuite: org.torproject.collector.cron.CollecTorMainTest
 > [junit] Tests run: 1, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, Time
 elapsed: 0.574 sec
 > [junit]
 > [junit] Testcase: testCheckAvailableSpace took 0.551 sec
 > [junit] Testsuite: org.torproject.collector.cron.SchedulerTest
 > }}}

 This test lasts a few minutes to give the Scheduler time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19771 [Metrics/CollecTor]: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19771: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's
scheduler
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Fix looks good, but test hangs here:

 {{{
 [junit] Testcase: testUrlValueException took 0.001 sec
 [junit] Testsuite: org.torproject.collector.cron.CollecTorMainTest
 [junit] Tests run: 1, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0, Time
 elapsed: 0.574 sec
 [junit]
 [junit] Testcase: testCheckAvailableSpace took 0.551 sec
 [junit] Testsuite: org.torproject.collector.cron.SchedulerTest
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19771 [Metrics/CollecTor]: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19771: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's
scheduler
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Added a test that reproduces the issue and a solution patch.
 The problem occurs when a `java.lang.Error` is thrown.  Now, `Throwable`
 is caught in `CollecTorMain.run` and the error is logged.

 Usually, `Error`s pose a serious problem; so there should be a note in the
 Operator guide about monitoring logs.  (added this to #18734)

 Please review the
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/commit/?h=task-19771=c8903b445e26f80cf3d2942ae3b28d1e8facb1c4
 patch branch].

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