date:20160902

Re: [tor-bugs] #9484 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow setting of window dimensions in TBB

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#9484: Allow setting of window dimensions in TBB
---+--
 Reporter:  tmpname0901|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * keywords:  needs-triage => tbb-fingerprinting-resolution
 * severity:   => Normal
 * milestone:  TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable =>


Comment:

 Permanent Responsive Design View (Ctrl+Shift+M)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20058 [Core Tor]: Tor executable opens console window on Windows

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#20058: Tor executable opens console window on Windows
--+---
 Reporter:  trodun|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 The change was intentional (people asked for it), and has nothing to do
 with stem either. See #13819.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #2129 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor client functionality even when we hibernate

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#2129: Allow Tor client functionality even when we hibernate
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Same issue: a bridge is a relay, and its downtime can be tracked, perhaps
 a little harder than other relays, but it's still possible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, |  Actual Points:  11.5
  TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-5, review- |
  group-7|
Parent ID:   | Points:  6.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Two more concerns that just occurred to me:

   1. Should the 'poisoning' feature work in both directions?  It seems to
 me that the damage from accidentally making an anonymous hidden service
 non-anonymous would be much much greater than the danger of accidentally
 anonymizing something that you didn't mean to anonymize.

   2. I anticipate that if all the options for making RSOS start with
 "OnionService" and all of the options for making anonymous onions services
 start with "HiddenService", then people will call RSOS "onion services"
 and continue to call anonymous onion services "hidden services." That's
 probably not what we had in mind.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19963 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Cannot login to trac through the onion service

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19963: Cannot login to trac through the onion service
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Trying to search with a custom query gives the same error message.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20059 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Duplicate call to circuit_mark_for_close

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#20059: Bug: Duplicate call to circuit_mark_for_close
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Sounds a bit like #7591 but with a different function. The 6 times within
 one second thing is the same though.

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[tor-bugs] #20059 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Duplicate call to circuit_mark_for_close

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#20059: Bug: Duplicate call to circuit_mark_for_close
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 I noticed an extreme increase of memory usage (increase by ~500MB compared
 to normal), after looking into the logs I stumbled upon:

 {{{
 circuit_mark_for_close_(): Bug: Duplicate call to circuit_mark_for_close
 at ../src/or/onion.c:182 (first at ../src/or/command.c:559) (on Tor
 0.2.8.6 )
 }}}
 (6 times within one second)

 also in the logs 10 seconds before the log entries above:
 {{{
 Removed 109202016 bytes by killing 2 circuits; 5252 circuits remain alive.
 Also killed 0 non-linked directory connections.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, |  Actual Points:  11.5
  TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-5, review- |
  group-7|
Parent ID:   | Points:  6.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I should also clarify some of my comments about what things seem "error-
 prone".  I'm (mostly) not suggesting that the code has errors now, but
 that I'm worried about whether we could introduce errors in the code down
 the line if we misunderstand what the code is supposed to mean. So the
 solution I'd hope for would be to try to make the code more idiot-proof.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13434 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: fails to load image under https addon enabled

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#13434: fails to load image under https addon enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  zyan
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by fuglede):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Looks like this one fixed itself. The images show up here. Closing as
 such.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, |  Actual Points:  11.5
  TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-5, review- |
  group-7|
Parent ID:   | Points:  6.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review


Comment:

 Actual-review-points += 0.5

 Pfew, that was complicated and a bit stressful to review!  (This is
 touching a lot of code where, if we mess up, the consequences are quite
 bad.)

 I've made comments on the gitlab page.  I think this isn't far from done.

 When you respond to the comments, please make changes as separate fixup!
 or squash! commits on this same branch, so that I don't have to re-review
 everything I already reviewed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7114 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: HTTPS Everywhere: microchip.com broken https support

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#7114: HTTPS Everywhere: microchip.com broken https support
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  pde
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by fuglede):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I can not reproduce that issue, so it is likely that that one took care of
 itself. If the issue does persist, feel free to reopen.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9019 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Https Everywhere breaks Firefox dev-tools.

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#9019: Https Everywhere breaks Firefox dev-tools.
-+-
 Reporter:  programmin   |  Owner:  pde
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by fuglede):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Looks like this one has fixed itself; at least, I can not reproduce the
 issue in recent versions of Firefox.

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[tor-bugs] #20058 [Core Tor]: Tor executable opens console window on Windows

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#20058: Tor executable opens console window on Windows
--+-
 Reporter:  trodun|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The latest Tor expert bundle builds are opening a console window, this was
 not the case with builds from a year ago and before.

 If this change was intentional, the issue could be filed under Stem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #2129 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor client functionality even when we hibernate

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#2129: Allow Tor client functionality even when we hibernate
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by ioneyes):

 > We no longer recommend that people run their Tor relay as a client. It
 makes it too easy for them to be de-anonymised. Much better if they run a
 separate Tor instance for the client and relay.

 Thanks for the prompt response.

 What about running a bridge and a client ?

 That is interesting advice. Thank you.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19369 [Applications/Tor Browser]: On the privacy pane "Never Remember History" can't get selected

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19369: On the privacy pane "Never Remember History" can't get selected
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-6.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-usability  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by bugzilla):

 #7463 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7463 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR Browser always reverts to 'use custom settings for history'

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#7463: TOR Browser always reverts to 'use custom settings for history'
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * component:  TorBrowserButton => Applications/Tor Browser
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Closed as a duplicate of #19369.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19665 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should *Port_set count sockets?

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19665: Should *Port_set count sockets?
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  030-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Agreed that we should refactor. I'd love to remove the count_sockets
 argument from count_real_listeners.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19920 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update audit notes to take preferences diff into account

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19920: Update audit notes to take preferences diff into account
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201608,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:  #19274   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! This is commit 82f9fc99651afc6450f300d1ca78c8ff4af28a0d on master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18055 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Exception needed for http://www.lenovo.com/lenovorecovery

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#18055: Exception needed for http://www.lenovo.com/lenovorecovery
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  httpse-ruleset-bug   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by fuglede):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 And that PR has been merged now. Closing this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16345 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: bad redirect for hr.buffalo.edu

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#16345: bad redirect for hr.buffalo.edu
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by fuglede):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 And that PR has now also been merged. Closing this as such.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17614 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Add ruleset for Flex Your Rights (flexyourrights.org)

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#17614: Add ruleset for Flex Your Rights (flexyourrights.org)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere | Resolution:
 Severity:  Normal   |  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by fuglede):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Closed by https://github.com/EFForg/https-everywhere/pull/6631.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17978 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Add mem.gfx.ms to gfx.ms ruleset

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#17978: Add mem.gfx.ms to gfx.ms ruleset
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by fuglede):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed by https://github.com/EFForg/https-everywhere/pull/6635.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13985 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Akamai ruleset breaks steamcommunity.com

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#13985: Akamai ruleset breaks steamcommunity.com
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by fuglede):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Looks like this one fixed itself. All of the examples work for me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15154 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: http://www.digitalattackmap.com/ doesn't load the content.

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#15154: http://www.digitalattackmap.com/ doesn't load the content.
-+-
 Reporter:  justaguy |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by fuglede):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Fixed in https://github.com/EFForg/https-
 everywhere/pull/6634#event-770051769.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16717 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: https://fr.msi.com/

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#16717: https://fr.msi.com/
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by fuglede):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Looks like this one fixed itself; the site works fine for me, and in fact
 http://fr.msi.com redirects to HTTPS on its own.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18324 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: https://www.hulu.com error while using SSL Everywhere 5.0.9, tor 0.2.7.6, Firefox 44.0.2

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#18324: https://www.hulu.com error while using SSL Everywhere 5.0.9, tor 
0.2.7.6,
Firefox 44.0.2
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by bugzilla):

 * version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18324 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: https://www.hulu.com error while using SSL Everywhere 5.0.9, tor 0.2.7.6, Firefox 44.0.2

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#18324: https://www.hulu.com error while using SSL Everywhere 5.0.9, tor 
0.2.7.6,
Firefox 44.0.2
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:  Tor:
  Everywhere |  0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by fuglede):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks like this one fixed itself; the site now serves a valid certificate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14271 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Torbutton work with Unix Domain Socket option

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#14271: Make Torbutton work with Unix Domain Socket option
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-security, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:  #14270   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:15 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:14 gk]:
 > > I think we should not set `m_tb_control_port` to `9151` now in the
 catch clause and open a new ticket for implementing a saner solution
 across all Torbutton code. We can discuss there what we want that solution
 to be.
 >
 > That sounds like a good plan. I opened #20057.
 > Here is a revised patch for this ticket:
 >
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug14271-02=abb01118a8445c541bb359d85fe9af941536b43a

 Sorry for the late review. This patch looks good to me -- nice work! I
 have a couple of minor stylistic suggestions that you may or may not want
 to adopt:
 {{{
 +// given socketFile or host and port.
 +io.asyncSocketStreams = function (socketFile, host, port) {
 +  let socketTransport;
 +  let sts = Cc["@mozilla.org/network/socket-transport-service;1"]
 +
 .getService(Components.interfaces.nsISocketTransportService),
 + UNBUFFERED = Ci.nsITransport.OPEN_UNBUFFERED;
 +
 +  // Create an instance of a socket transport.
 +  if (socketFile) {
 +socketTransport = sts.createUnixDomainTransport(socketFile);
 +  } else {
 +socketTransport = sts.createTransport(null, 0, host, port, null);
 +  }
 +
 }}}
 Maybe move `let socketTransport` down to after the comment `// Create an
 instance of a socket transport`? Also, in that file, I had used blank
 lines to separate functions, though that's probably a personal
 eccentricity...

 Also, a somewhat bigger suggestion that could be part of this patch or
 left for another time. In `torbutton.js`, we will now have
 {{{
  var m_tb_control_socket_file = null; // Set if using a UNIX domain
 socket.
  var m_tb_control_port = null;// Set if not using a socket.
  var m_tb_control_host = null;// Set if not using a socket.
  var m_tb_control_pass = null;
  var m_tb_control_desc = null;
 }}}
 I imagine it might be cleaner to collect these into a single data object
 like
 {{{
 var m_tb_control = { socket_file, host, port, password, descriptor }
 }}}
 Then we could factor out a single factory function from `torbutton_init()`
 that generates this object. And we could use this object as a single
 argument for functions in `tor-control-port.js` and `tor-circuit-
 display.js` as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19733 [Applications/Tor Browser]: GETINFO response parser doesn't handle AF_UNIX entries.

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19733: GETINFO response parser doesn't handle AF_UNIX entries.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sandbox, tbb-torbutton,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:  #14270   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:7 mcs]:
 > Here is a new patch:
 >
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug19733-02=f1932e73ee5199969f49ce595fb30ec14e76cb52
 Minor things:
 {{{
 + if (socksAddr && (socksAddr.substr(0, 5) == "file:")) {
 }}}
 Can this be `sockAddr.startsWith("file:")`?
 {{{
 + foundSocksListener = (socketPath == path);
 }}}
 {{{
 +  foundSocksListener = ((socksAddr == torSocksAddr) &&
 +(socksPort == torSocksPort));
 }}}
 I would suggest using `===` (triple equals) for safety.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14881 [Core Tor/Tor]: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory footer

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#14881: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory
footer
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,   |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, tor-sponsorU-orphan, |
  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #14881 [Core Tor/Tor]: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory footer

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#14881: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory
footer
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,   |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, tor-sponsorU-orphan, |
  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-

Comment (by pastly):

 I pushed a branch to my public tor repository on github. It's based on a
 slightly outdated release-0.2.8.

 https://github.com/pastly/public-tor/tree/ticket14881

 I will also upload yet another patch, if that's easier. (Please let me
 know either way for future reference).

 I decided to initialize to 1 instead of falling back on 1 based on teor's
 suggested `MIN_METHOD_FOR_INIT_BW_WEIGHTS_ONE` and despite mikeperry's
 concern about minor inaccuracy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19920 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update audit notes to take preferences diff into account

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19920: Update audit notes to take preferences diff into account
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201608,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:  #19274   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Looks good to me. In the commit message "fell" should be "have fallen".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19894 [Metrics/CollecTor]: print message when no module is activated

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19894: print message when no module is activated
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged together with #19895.  Closing.  Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14271 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Torbutton work with Unix Domain Socket option

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#14271: Make Torbutton work with Unix Domain Socket option
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-security, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:  #14270   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201609 => tbb-
 torbutton, tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201609R


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:14 gk]:
 > I think we should not set `m_tb_control_port` to `9151` now in the catch
 clause and open a new ticket for implementing a saner solution across all
 Torbutton code. We can discuss there what we want that solution to be.

 That sounds like a good plan. I opened #20057.
 Here is a revised patch for this ticket:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug14271-02=abb01118a8445c541bb359d85fe9af941536b43a

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18935 [Applications/Tor Browser]: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#18935: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!
--+---
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Mitigation caveat:
 > EAF mitigation should not be applied to: programs and libraries
 protected that use packers or compressors, DRM or software with anti-
 debugging code, debuggers, and security software such as antivirus,
 sandbox, firewalls, etc.

 EMET.dll (EMET SHIM) is added to every process even when EMET service is
 not started.
 And similar startup crash:
 {{{
 Faulting application name: firefox.exe, version: 45.3.0.0, time stamp:
 0x
 Faulting module name: kernel32.dll, version: 6.1.7601.23392, time stamp:
 0x56eb2fb8
 Exception code: 0x8004
 Fault offset: 0x0004c4d3
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #20057 [Applications/Tor Browser]: inconsistent Torbutton behavior when control port config is missing

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#20057: inconsistent Torbutton behavior when control port config is missing
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,tbb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  usability,TorBrowserTeam201609
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Torbutton is inconsistent in how it handles missing control port
 configuration. Some code disables features if one or more pieces of
 information needed to access the control port are missing (e.g., New
 Identity is disabled if there is no control port socket or TCP port). In
 other cases, defaults are used (e.g., the circuit display uses a default
 port of 9151). We should decide what behavior we want and modify the code
 to be consistent with it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19895 [Metrics/CollecTor]: make CollecTor stop after RunOnce

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19895: make CollecTor stop after RunOnce
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Rebased to master, tweaked some trivial whitespace issues, tested locally,
 and pushed to master.  Closing, together with #19894.  Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #2866 [Metrics/Analysis]: Analyze bridges in the "reserved" bucket

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#2866: Analyze bridges in the "reserved" bucket
--+-
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I just stumbled across this ticket while looking for something else.  We
 [https://collector.torproject.org/archive/bridge-pool-assignments/ stopped
 collecting bridge pool assignments in January 2015], so there's no point
 in doing this analysis anymore.  Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20037 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add support for Bifroest's bridge descriptor tarballs

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#20037: Add support for Bifroest's bridge descriptor tarballs
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged, closing.  Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19690 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Tonga (Bridge Authority) Permanent Shutdown Notice

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19690: Tonga (Bridge Authority) Permanent Shutdown Notice
---+
 Reporter:  shamrock   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by shamrock):

 As previously announced Tonga will be decommissioned today, probably
 within the hour. You may wish to disable Tonga's ssh key on
 bridges.torproject.org and enable any IP-based ssh restrictions. This also
 is the kickoff for major scheduled maintenance on the underlying server
 hardware. Consequently, I will not receive email sent to the
 cypherpunks.to domain or be able to read IRC. If someone needs to get in
 touch with me, find me on other IM channels. I expect any non-Tor related
 services running on the same physical server, such as my email, to be back
 up by no later than Monday. Hopefully much sooner if all goes well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14881 [Core Tor/Tor]: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory footer

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#14881: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory
footer
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,   |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, tor-sponsorU-orphan, |
  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_revision => assigned
 * owner:  robgjansen => pastly


Comment:

 I'll take a look at this today/this weekend.

 wrt to initializing to 1 vs. falling back to 1 (Rob's initial patch vs.
 mikeperry's initial patch): I'm guessing both will not be necessary.
 Before I actually really look at the code, I'm thinking the new consensus
 method should only fall back to 1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19396 [HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere: Chrome]: getbootstrap.com rule causes infinite loop on themes.getbootstrap.com

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19396: getbootstrap.com rule causes infinite loop on themes.getbootstrap.com
-+-
 Reporter:  bardi.harborow   |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere:   |Version:
  Chrome |
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  httpse-ruleset-bug   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by galeksandrp):

 https://github.com/EFForg/https-everywhere/pull/6731

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19963 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Cannot login to trac through the onion service

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19963: Cannot login to trac through the onion service
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Using the timeline with non-default settings is not remembered/stored
 because it also depends on cookies that don't work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18342 [Metrics/Onionoo]: onionoo has poor reverse DNS results

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#18342: onionoo has poor reverse DNS results
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Here's how we're currently resolving addresses to domain names:

 {{{
   String result = InetAddress.getByName(this.address).getHostName();
 }}}

 Are there better ways to do this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19690 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Tonga (Bridge Authority) Permanent Shutdown Notice

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19690: Tonga (Bridge Authority) Permanent Shutdown Notice
---+
 Reporter:  shamrock   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by karsten):

 I don't see anything in the suggestions above that would help move
 hundreds of bridges from Tonga to Bifroest in the next 24 hours.  But
 that's okay, we already have plenty of bridges on Bifroest, and we have
 the bridges that come bundled with Tor Browser.  Here's a
 [https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/running-
 bridges-2016-09-02.png new graph].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20049 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Adapt legacy module to accept bridge network statuses from two authorities

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#20049: Adapt legacy module to accept bridge network statuses from two 
authorities
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I think you mean #20053, not #20059.  Looks good, thanks!  Closing.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #16211, #17546, #17767, #18093, ...

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

Batch modification to #16211, #17546, #17767, #18093, #17904 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201609
sponsor to SponsorU

Comment:
Getting this on our radar for September.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #13017, #18820, #10281, #13893, ...

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

Batch modification to #13017, #18820, #10281, #13893, #14270, #18101, #19200, 
#19410, #19851, #19857, #12820, #15138, #15988, #16622, #16757, #17334, #17509, 
#17662, #18292, #18860, #18925, #19067, #19274, #19646, #19741, #20018 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201609

Comment:
Tickets for September.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18820, #13893, #18101, #19200, ...

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

Batch modification to #18820, #13893, #18101, #19200, #19851, #12820, #15988, 
#17509, #18925, #19274 by gk:
keywords to GeorgKoppen201609

Comment:
Moving my tickets

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #19856, #18022, #19481, #19528, ...

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

Batch modification to #19856, #18022, #19481, #19528, #19920, #19733 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201609R 

Comment:
Moving review tickets to September

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14271 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Torbutton work with Unix Domain Socket option

2016-09-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#14271: Make Torbutton work with Unix Domain Socket option
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-security, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609   |
Parent ID:  #14270   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:12 gk]:
 > > 3) Checking whether we should call `torbutton_local_tor_check()`
 should check for
 > > `m_tb_control_socket_file` as well (not only for `m_tb_control_port`)
 I guess?
 >
 > We did add that check, although if you look at the patch with git's
 default of three lines of context it is not so obvious.

 Hm. No, it is even obvious then. Must have been a different kind of code-
 blindness, my bad.

 >
 > > 4) I am not so sure about
 > > {{{
 > > +} catch(e) {
 > > +  m_tb_control_port = 9151;
 > > +}
 > > }}}
 > > What was your rationale for adding that now (given you omitted it
 earlier)? For one, the logs might be misleading showing a probably wrong
 port (I mean the setup is seriously troubling if we need to assign `9151`
 in the catch clause at all) in an error with respect to the control
 connection. On the other hand, we might want to show that something is
 wrong with the help of `torbutton_do_tor_check()` which would update the
 toolbar button in this case (if we get that far at all with a broken setup
 like the one in question).
 >
 > Kathy and I added the 9151 default to be consistent with how
 m_tb_control_host is handled (it was already defaulting to 127.0.0.1).
 Thinking about this some more and looking at the existing Torbutton code,
 it seems like there is some effort to disable features (e.g., New
 Identity, the local Tor check) when the port is missing. So maybe we
 should put things back how there were and make sure we consistently check
 for port, password, etc. before trying to do things in Torbutton that
 require authenticated control port access?
 >
 > The circuit display code also includes code that defaults the port to
 9151, so if we decide to continue with the concept that a lack of port can
 be used to disable code, we should remove the `|| 9151` from this line in
 tor-circuit-display.js:
 > `myController = controller(socketFile, host, port || 9151, password,`
 > We can also add a check to skip the call to createTorCircuitDisplay() if
 port, password, etc. are missing (the existing code will log an error if
 initialization fails).
 >
 > What do you think?

 I think we should not set `m_tb_control_port` to `9151` now in the catch
 clause and open a new ticket for implementing a saner solution across all
 Torbutton code. We can discuss there what we want that solution to be.

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