Re: [tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20250: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues
-+-
 Reporter:  tordevSZ0|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,  |  Actual Points:
  sierra, macOS  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Does it fail if you disable the Firefox TLS camouflage? I suggest that
 because it is slightly tricky and involved subprocesses. Find your torrc-
 defaults file: it may be under "$HOME/Library/Application Support" or it
 might be in a directory next to TorBrowser.app called TorBrowser-data.

 Change this line:
 {{{
 ClientTransportPlugin meek exec PluggableTransports/meek-client-torbrowser
 -- PluggableTransports/meek-client
 }}}
 to this:
 {{{
 ClientTransportPlugin meek exec PluggableTransports/meek-client
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20251 [Obfuscation]: Mac Sierra Rend stream

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20251: Mac Sierra Rend stream
-+-
 Reporter:  metabaron|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Mac Sierra   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by metabaron):

 Small update once I tried to reload the site when I waited for like 5
 minutes:
 27/9/16, 2:31:32.500 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 109.105.109.165:10527 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:31:32.500 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 192.99.11.54:443 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:31:32.500 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 154.35.22.9:80 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:31:40.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:33:32.600 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 109.105.109.147:13764 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:33:32.600 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 83.212.101.3:5 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:33:32.600 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 198.245.60.50:443 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:33:32.600 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 154.35.22.11:443 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:33:32.600 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 154.35.22.12:1894 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:33:32.600 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 154.35.22.13:443 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:35:32.700 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 109.105.109.165:10527 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:35:32.700 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 192.99.11.54:443 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:35:32.700 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 154.35.22.10:80 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:35:32.700 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 154.35.22.9:80 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 27/9/16, 2:35:32.900 [NOTICE] Delaying directory fetches: No running
 bridges
 27/9/16, 2:37:32.700 [WARN] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 154.35.22.12:1894 ("general SOCKS server failure")

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[tor-bugs] #20251 [Obfuscation]: Mac Sierra Rend stream

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#20251: Mac Sierra Rend stream
-+
 Reporter:  metabaron|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  Mac Sierra
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Fresh install of Tor Browser following the download of the latest version
 of Tor Browser from the official website (with signature confirmed).
 Removed ALL previous directory related to Tor so this really is a fresh
 start as much fresh as "find" command cannot find any mention of
 TorBrowser on the hard drive.

 PS: same behaviour with latest version of Tor Browser following the
 upgrade to Mac Sierra (hence the reason I think this is a problem on Mac
 Sierra and not Tor itself).

 Install tor and configure obfuscation 4
 Start tor
 (so far so good most of the time)
 Try to access ANY tor website
 Browse it for a while.
 Suddenly, no more connection at all
 Need to stop Tor Browser and start a new Tor Browser (from scratch, not a
 new window) to retrieve some connection.
 Repeat
 Cry

 Here is a log:
 27/9/16, 2:15:16.000 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 27/9/16, 2:15:16.000 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 27/9/16, 2:15:17.600 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory
 server
 27/9/16, 2:15:17.600 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with
 directory server
 27/9/16, 2:15:18.900 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 15%: Establishing an encrypted
 directory connection
 27/9/16, 2:15:19.100 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus
 consensus
 27/9/16, 2:15:19.500 [NOTICE] new bridge descriptor 'X' (fresh):
 XX at XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX
 27/9/16, 2:15:19.500 [NOTICE] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no usable consensus.
 27/9/16, 2:15:20.100 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 25%: Loading networkstatus
 consensus
 27/9/16, 2:15:25.100 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor
 network
 27/9/16, 2:15:25.900 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit
 27/9/16, 2:15:26.900 [NOTICE] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks
 like client functionality is working.
 27/9/16, 2:15:26.900 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 100%: Done
 27/9/16, 2:15:28.100 [NOTICE] New control connection opened from
 127.0.0.1.
 27/9/16, 2:15:28.300 [NOTICE] New control connection opened from
 127.0.0.1.
 27/9/16, 2:19:34.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:19:34.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:19:34.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:19:34.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:19:34.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:19:34.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:21:27.900 [NOTICE] Tried for 120 seconds to get a connection to
 [scrubbed]:443. Giving up. (waiting for circuit)
 27/9/16, 2:21:35.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:21:35.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:21:35.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:21:35.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:21:35.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:21:35.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:23:36.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:23:36.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:23:36.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:23:36.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:23:36.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.
 27/9/16, 2:23:36.900 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up
 on address '[scrubbed].onion'.

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[tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20250: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:  dcf
  tordevSZ0  |
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
  Obfuscation/meek   |   Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,
 Severity:  Major|  sierra, macOS
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Having issues using the meek pluggable transports on macOS 10.12
 installation with a fresh install of TorBrowser.

 On the same machine running 10.11.6 before upgrade, TorBrowser with both
 of the meek transports worked fine.

 With 10.12, (tested with admin and standard accounts), the initial tor
 connection UI completes, the browser opens and the initial meek connection
 is established. However, briefly after the browser window has opened with
 the successful about:tor page it is clear something is wrong. Monitoring
 internet traffic with a network monitor it is clear that the traffic to
 the meek server stops almost immediately after the browser has opened.

 Having read some of the control port issues for other 10.12 users, I
 tested this issue with the extensions.torlauncher.control_port_use_socket
 pref set to false in prefs.js and without it, but it had no effect either
 way.


 Attached are the tor, meek-client and meek-client-torbrowser logs. Really
 hope someone can help with this since meek is the only way to use tor in
 my country without having the police banging down the door.

 Tor Log:

 AUTHENTICATE 
 250 OK
 SETEVENTS STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE WARN ERR
 250 OK
 650 NOTICE Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory server
 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=5 TAG=conn_dir
 SUMMARY="Connecting to directory server"
 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with directory server
 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=10 TAG=handshake_dir
 SUMMARY="Finishing handshake with directory server"
 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 15%: Establishing an encrypted directory
 connection
 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=15 TAG=onehop_create
 SUMMARY="Establishing an encrypted directory connection"
 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus consensus
 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=20 TAG=requesting_status
 SUMMARY="Asking for networkstatus consensus"
 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 25%: Loading networkstatus consensus
 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=25 TAG=loading_status
 SUMMARY="Loading networkstatus consensus"
 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE CONSENSUS_ARRIVED
 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE ENOUGH_DIR_INFO
 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network
 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=80 TAG=conn_or
 SUMMARY="Connecting to the Tor network"
 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit
 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=90 TAG=circuit_create
 SUMMARY="Establishing a Tor circuit"
 650 NOTICE Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client
 functionality is working.
 650 NOTICE Bootstrapped 100%: Done
 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=100 TAG=done SUMMARY="Done"
 650 STATUS_CLIENT NOTICE CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED
 650 NOTICE New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1.
 650 NOTICE New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1.

 #NOTICE THE LINE BELOW:

 650 WARN The connection to the SOCKS4 proxy server at 127.0.0.1:57343 just
 failed. Make sure that the proxy server is up and running.


 650 NOTICE Delaying directory fetches: No running bridges
 650 NOTICE Tried for 120 seconds to get a connection to [scrubbed]:443.
 Giving up. (waiting for circuit)



 meek-client log:

 0:05 using helper on 127.0.0.1:49193
 0:05 listening on 127.0.0.1:49196
 0:33 using helper on 127.0.0.1:49199
 0:33 listening on 127.0.0.1:49202


 meek-client-torbrowser log:

 0:00 running firefox command
 ["/Applications/TorBrowser.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox" "--invisible" "-no-
 remote" "-profile" "/Applications/TorBrowser-
 Data/Tor/PluggableTransports/profile.meek-http-helper"]
 0:00 firefox started with pid 3644
 0:01 running meek-client command ["PluggableTransports/meek-client" "--
 log" "meek-client.txt" "--helper" "127.0.0.1:49193"]
 0:01 meek-client started with pid 3646
 0:27 sig terminated
 0:27 sending signal terminated to PID 3646
 0:27 killing PID 3646
 0:27 killing PID 3644
 0:32 running firefox command
 ["/Applications/TorBrowser.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox" "--invisible" "-no-
 remote" "-profile" "/Applications/TorBrowser-
 Data/Tor/PluggableTransports/profile.meek-http-helper"]
 0:32 firefox started with pid 3660
 0:33 running meek-client command ["PluggableTransports/meek-client" "--
 log" "meek-client.txt" "--helper" 

Re: [tor-bugs] #20206 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: TorMessenger.app needs to download the font “Osaka”.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20206: TorMessenger.app needs to download the font “Osaka”.
+
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed by https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=5acd02b204c9c0a3ad24668e37c1f70501eac72c

 Thanks for the pointer, yawning!

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[tor-bugs] #20249 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Captcha not displaying on hidden service mirror of bridges.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20249: Captcha not displaying on hidden service mirror of 
bridges.torproject.org
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  bridgedb-reportbug
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hidden service mirror bridges.torproject.org
 (http://z5tfsnikzulwicxs.onion)
 fails to display captcha for all bridge types (fte,obfs*,scramblesuit) on
 tor browser 6.0.5, running tails 2.6 on x64.
 Screenshots:
 
http://matrixtxri745dfw.onion/neo/uploads/160926/MATRIXtxri745dfwONION_233544UUF_issue0.png
 
http://matrixtxri745dfw.onion/neo/uploads/160926/MATRIXtxri745dfwONION_233841AdL_issue1.png

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20210: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by rdump):

 I am also able to reproduce the problem in Tor Browser 6.0.5 when a
 separate alpha series is upgraded to 6.5a3, or is freshly installed, on
 the same machine.

 Updating an alpha series Tor Browser from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 causes a
 previously updated stable series Tor Browser 6.0.5, when launched
 subsequently on the same Mac OS X/macOS system, to show the same control
 port failure symptom.  Ditto a freshly installed 6.0.5.  This behavior was
 noted on 3 separate Mac OS X systems (2x 10.11.6, 1x 10.12).

 On the affected machines, the prefs.js edit to add
 'user_pref("extensions.torlauncher.control_port_use_socket", false);'
 allows 6.0.5 and 6.5a3 versions to both connect again.

 This suggests the cause is coupled to the changes made in shared resources
 at "~/Library/Application Support/TorBrowser-Data/Browser/..." by the
 6.5a3 upgrade.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20214 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ultrasound Cross Device Tracking techniques could be used to launch deanonymization attacks against some users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20214: Ultrasound Cross Device Tracking techniques could be used to launch
deanonymization attacks against some users
--+--
 Reporter:  VasiliosMavroudis |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by VasiliosMavroudis):

 > Why wouldn't this work with audible sound? Audible sound ranges have
 been shown to be able to covertly issue voice commands to nearby mobile
 devices
 
(​!https://www.georgetown.edu/sites/www/files/Hidden%20Voice%20Commands%20full%20paper.pdf).
 The core issue is not addressed by filtering out non-audible sound.



 It can absolutely work in the audible spectrum, and indeed there is one
 framework doing so already.

 However, our argument is not that ultrasounds are a plausible convert
 channel. Instead, we argue that the audio channel is already being used by
 frameworks embedded in apps, and that they are gaining traction in the
 market.

 Two examples of such frameworks:

 Inaudible: Silverpush
 (!http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/11/16/silverpush-
 ultrasonic-tracking/#7b5f70824024)

 Audible: Intrasonics (http://www.intrasonics.com/technology-faqs/)


 > If a user is presented with a choice to play the media file or not and
 if they *believe* that they want to play it, they will play it. The prompt
 would only serve as an annoyance that the user would learn to ignore. If
 your attack involves tricking a user to visit a website, tricking a user
 to view or allow the media on the website to play would not be
 significantly more difficult.



 Absolutely. There are many possible ways to go about it. A prompt/popup
 comes with the advantage of actually educating the user, but indeed the
 user may get "blind" after a while. Same holds for all major browsers that
 use prompts to ask the user if access to a given resource should be
 permitted.

 > The security slider at 'High' already makes video/audio content click-
 to-play, with the current exception of !MediaSource video (see: !#19200).


 We totally agree with this choice. I'm not very familiar with the
 rationale behind each setting on the security slider. However, our
 suggestion would be to extend this feature to the low-default security
 setting (this may not be technically straightforward though, if you want
 to keep JS). Of course, from a usability perspective this is not very good
 for the user, but with such frameworks gaining traction it seems a
 reasonable reaction.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20151: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pingl):

 Changed `max_bits` to `max_prefix_bits` and set the maximum prefix length
 to /104

 https://github.com/aigna/tor/tree/defect20151

 Still need to fix the manpage :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19167 [Core Tor/Tor]: torrc parsing b0rks on carriage-return

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19167: torrc parsing b0rks on carriage-return
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  windows crlf lorax easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by pingl):

 I've added a check in `parse_config_line_from_str_verbose`: if `\r` is
 followed by `\n` then `++line` is applied before checking if the newline
 is reached. This seems to fix the reported bug:

 `$ printf "SocksPort 54321\nDataDirectory \"/tmp/datadir\"\r\n" >
 /tmp/conf`
 `$ ./tor -f /tmp/conf`
 `Sep 26 23:34:16.578 [notice] Tor 0.2.9.3-alpha-dev (git-b5b8d620a2e04498)
 running on Darwin with Libevent 2.0.22-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2h and Zlib
 1.2.5.`
 `Sep 26 23:34:16.578 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong!
 Learn how to be safe at
 https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning`
 `Sep 26 23:34:16.578 [notice] This version is not a stable Tor release.
 Expect more bugs than usual.`
 `Sep 26 23:34:16.579 [notice] Read configuration file "/tmp/conf".`
 `Sep 26 23:34:16.582 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:54321`
 `Sep 26 23:34:16.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting`
 `Sep 26 23:34:17.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory
 server`
 `Sep 26 23:34:17.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with
 directory server`
 `Sep 26 23:34:17.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 15%: Establishing an encrypted
 directory connection`
 `Sep 26 23:34:17.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus
 consensus`
 `Sep 26 23:34:17.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 25%: Loading networkstatus
 consensus`
 `Sep 26 23:34:18.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no usable consensus.`
 `Sep 26 23:34:19.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 40%: Loading authority key
 certs`
 `Sep 26 23:34:19.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 45%: Asking for relay
 descriptors`


 Here it is the commit link

 https://github.com/aigna/tor/tree/bug19167

 I'm quite new to tor, is there some documentation about how the code is
 structured or at least the philosophy behind the code structure? It would
 be very helpful in order to learn how everything is implemented.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17592 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean up connection timeout logic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17592: Clean up connection timeout logic
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604,|  Actual Points:
  nickm-deferred-20160905, review-group-9| Points:  see-
Parent ID:  #16861   |  parent
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17604 [Core Tor/Tor]: Try to use only one canonical connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17604: Try to use only one canonical connection
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604,|  Actual Points:
  nickm-deferred-20160905, review-group-9| Points:  see-
Parent ID:  #16861   |  parent
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16861 [Core Tor/Tor]: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16861: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  028-triage, 028-triaged, |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, 201511-deferred, |
  201512-deferred, tor-guard, TorCoreTeam-   |
  postponed-201604, nickm-deferred-20160905, |
  review-group-9 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Ok, I commented to everything on that gitlab link and posted links to
 commits.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19953 [Core Tor]: DataDirectoryGroupReadable does not take effect when relay enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19953: DataDirectoryGroupReadable does not take effect when relay enabled
--+
 Reporter:  redfish   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 This looks like it should be correct.  I'll need a changes file and a
 unified diff in order to merge it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20176 [Core Tor/Tor]: current_consensus is an unmarked hazard

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20176: current_consensus is an unmarked hazard
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20191| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20176 [Core Tor/Tor]: current_consensus is an unmarked hazard

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20176: current_consensus is an unmarked hazard
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20191| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => accepted
 * owner:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19858 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move guard state out of globals per new guard plan

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19858: Move guard state out of globals per new guard plan
--+
 Reporter:  andrea|  Owner:  andrea
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  6
Parent ID:  #19877| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorU-must
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I noted a couple of small revisions on the gitlab link.  Should be pretty
 quick. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20248 [User Experience/Website]: Add GetTor Twitter account information to the projects page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20248: Add GetTor Twitter account information to the projects page
-+-
 Reporter:  sukhbir  |  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mrphs):

 * status:  new => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me!

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[tor-bugs] #20248 [User Experience/Website]: Add GetTor Twitter account information to the projects page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20248: Add GetTor Twitter account information to the projects page
-+---
 Reporter:  sukhbir  |  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+---
 The attached patch adds the Twitter account information to the projects
 page. This is also helpful in getting the account verified by Twitter. See
 #20116.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20230 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Problem with Tor Messenger tree

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20230: Problem with Tor Messenger tree
+--
 Reporter:  PZajda  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20199 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: auto-joining password-protected XMPP group chats does not work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20199: auto-joining password-protected XMPP group chats does not work
+---
 Reporter:  Digitalcourage  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  messenger,xmpp  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 > Any chance to make this more user-friendly?

 I spoke to the Instantbird folks and they agreed that password management
 in general needs to be improved, but there're no immediate plans.  We want
 this too, but have to weigh it against all the other wants.

 Thanks for adding your +1 here, and I'm glad it's working for you now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20030 [Obfuscation/meek]: meek-http-helper doesn't shutdown cleanly in 6.5a1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20030: meek-http-helper doesn't shutdown cleanly in 6.5a1
--+--
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 > arlolra, if you want to test this, you can just go build in the meek-
 client-torbrowser subdirectory, then copy meek-client-torbrowser into your
 bundle directory.

 Yup, seems to work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19858 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move guard state out of globals per new guard plan

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19858: Move guard state out of globals per new guard plan
--+
 Reporter:  andrea|  Owner:  andrea
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  6
Parent ID:  #19877| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorU-must
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 https://gitlab.com/nickm_tor/tor/merge_requests/9 is the gitlab link

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify our #if{n}def by commenting what they are at the #elif/#else/#endif

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20168: Clarify our #if{n}def by commenting what they are at the 
#elif/#else/#endif
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  cjb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, lorax   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify our #if{n}def by commenting what they are at the #elif/#else/#endif

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20168: Clarify our #if{n}def by commenting what they are at the 
#elif/#else/#endif
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  cjb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, lorax   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 This seems worth doing.  I think we should use the script to regenerate
 this closer to our 0.2.9 release, though, so we can minimize conflicts.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20247 [Core Tor/Tor]: crash after closing and opening ipv6 DirPort + OrPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20247: crash after closing and opening ipv6 DirPort + OrPort
--+--
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by toralf):

 And disabling Sandbox yields into a different issue:
 {{{
 Sep 26 20:02:25.000 [notice] Received reload signal (hup). Reloading
 config and resetting internal state.
 Sep 26 20:02:25.000 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
 Sep 26 20:02:25.000 [notice] Closing no-longer-configured Directory
 listener on 2a01:4f8:190:514a::2:80
 Sep 26 20:02:25.000 [notice] Closing no-longer-configured OR listener on
 2a01:4f8:190:514a::2:443
 Sep 26 20:02:25.000 [notice] Tor 0.2.8.8 opening log file.
 Sep 26 20:02:25.000 [notice] Closing old Directory listener on
 2a01:4f8:190:514a::2:80
 Sep 26 20:02:25.000 [notice] Closing old OR listener on
 2a01:4f8:190:514a::2:443
 Sep 26 20:02:25.000 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is
 'zwiebeltoralf BE2FA9FCB6242567B93ED99FEC5543FC517C9276'
 Sep 26 20:02:26.000 [notice] Received reload signal (hup). Reloading
 config and resetting internal state.
 Sep 26 20:02:26.000 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
 Sep 26 20:02:26.000 [notice] Opening Directory listener on
 [2a01:4f8:190:514a::2]:80
 Sep 26 20:02:26.000 [warn] Could not bind to 2a01:4f8:190:514a::2:80:
 Permission denied
 Sep 26 20:02:26.000 [notice] Opening OR listener on
 [2a01:4f8:190:514a::2]:443
 Sep 26 20:02:26.000 [warn] Could not bind to 2a01:4f8:190:514a::2:443:
 Permission denied
 Sep 26 20:02:26.000 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to bind
 one of the listener ports.
 Sep 26 20:02:26.000 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above. For
 usage, try -h.
 Sep 26 20:02:26.000 [warn] Restart failed (config error?). Exiting.
 }}}

 FWIW this is a stable hardened Gentoo Linux with latest kernel and
 libressl.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20001: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merging, now that #19958 is in.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19958 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19958: Implement proposal 264 (protocol versioning)
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
   |  implemented
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608, review-group-9  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #15055 | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Squashing and merging.

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[tor-bugs] #20247 [Core Tor/Tor]: crash after closing and opening ipv6 DirPort + OrPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20247: crash after closing and opening ipv6 DirPort + OrPort
--+--
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.8
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 run this :
 {{{
 /etc/init.d/tor status 2>/dev/null
 if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
   sed -i -e 's/^DirPort *\[/#DirPort [/' -e 's/^ORPort *\[/#ORPort [/'
 /etc/tor/torrc
   /etc/init.d/tor reload
 fi

 # renew cert
 #
 /usr/bin/certbot renew --standalone --non-interactive --text --renew-hook
 RestartJabber --disable-hook-validation &>$log

 # reopen Tor ports
 #
 sed -i -e 's/^#DirPort *\[/DirPort [/' -e 's/^#ORPort *\[/ORPort [/'
 /etc/tor/torrc
 /etc/init.d/tor status 2>/dev/null
 if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then
   /etc/init.d/tor reload
 fi
 }}}
 to get this:

 {{{
  T= 1474911552
 (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall setsockopt)
 /usr/bin/tor(+0x15dbc8)[0x1ac72c9bc8]
 /lib64/libc.so.6(setsockopt+0xa)[0x30a1fef1a2a]
 /lib64/libc.so.6(setsockopt+0xa)[0x30a1fef1a2a]
 /usr/bin/tor(+0xee289)[0x1ac725a289]
 /usr/bin/tor(retry_all_listeners+0x322)[0x1ac725bb12]
 /usr/bin/tor(set_options+0xa7d)[0x1ac724e58d]
 /usr/bin/tor(options_init_from_string+0x32e)[0x1ac725020e]
 /usr/bin/tor(options_init_from_torrc+0x1e2)[0x1ac7250562]
 /usr/bin/tor(+0x425c9)[0x1ac71ae5c9]
 /usr/lib64/libevent-2.1.so.5(+0x2443b)[0x30a20e8043b]
 /usr/lib64/libevent-2.1.so.5(event_base_loop+0x56f)[0x30a20e812cf]
 /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x235)[0x1ac71acdd5]
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x1bad)[0x1ac71b04cd]
 /usr/bin/tor(main+0x2b)[0x1ac71a83ab]
 /lib64/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x114)[0x30a1fe1b734]
 /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x29)[0x1ac71a83f9]
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20222 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Fork of & push access for webml repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20222: Fork of & push access for webml repo
-+
 Reporter:  saint|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by saint):

 * cc: saint (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20220: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 They were installed to new directories.

 Is there any way to run it with debugging statements or find out more
 information than connection refused?

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[tor-bugs] #20246 [Core Tor/Stem]: Add torrc options to tor-prompt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20246: Add torrc options to tor-prompt
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 Normally I run tor like this:
 {{{
 src/or/tor HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1 HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1
 ControlPort 2000
 }}}
 Then I run tor-prompt with 2000 as the control port.

 Sometimes torrc command-line options are shell-quoted:
 {{{
 src/or/tor SocksPort "5000 IPv6Traffic"
 }}}

 They can optionally have a double-dash before the option name.

 It would be great to be able to pass torrc options to tor-prompt for the
 tor instance that it starts. In particular, I want to be able to:
 {{{
 stem/tor-prompt --tor src/or/tor SocksPort "5000 IPv6Traffic"
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20245 [Core Tor/Stem]: Integ tests for non-anonymous hidden services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20245: Integ tests for non-anonymous hidden services
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  testing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 (The ReachableAddresses test makes sure we fixed #19973.)

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[tor-bugs] #20245 [Core Tor/Stem]: Integ tests for non-anonymous hidden services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20245: Integ tests for non-anonymous hidden services
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  testing
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 SETCONF for options that can only be set at startup:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/config.c#n4336

 Reject hidden service creation via ADD_ONION if NonAnonymous flag does not
 match HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode (just with
 HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 0)

 Make sure that hidden services have a 3 or 4-hop path length for HSDir,
 Intro, and Rend connections (the only connections that should be one-hop
 are directory document downloads)

 Check that it's not possible to start up tor with mismatching
 HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode and HiddenServiceSingleHopMode (both ways)

 Set ReachableAddresses to the address and ORPort of a guard, issue a
 NEWNYM and make sure that guard is the one all circuits go through

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[tor-bugs] #20244 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move privacy checkboxes to about:preferences#privacy (proposed)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20244: Move privacy checkboxes to about:preferences#privacy (proposed)
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I would like to propose moving the Privacy Settings checkboxes to the
 about:preferences#privacy page. That means removing them from torbutton
 and adding them to tor-browser.git

 Here is my reasoning:

 1. The security slider can be separated from the privacy settings. The
 privacy checkboxes are dangerous, because the default (all checked) offers
 maximum privacy, and unchecking any of the checkboxes substantially
 reduces privacy. Whereas the security slider has low security by default,
 and moving the slider always increases security. So I think it's better to
 encourage use of the security slider and discourage use of the privacy
 checkboxes.

 2. We unify the privacy user interface, which hopefully simplifies it for
 users. There are already privacy settings for Firefox on the
 about:preferences#privacy page, so it seems natural to move them there.
 Also the "Always Use Private Browsing Mode" checkbox on that page is more
 or less equivalent to torbutton's "Don't record browsing history"
 checkbox. And then we don't have to duplicate the "restart" prompt
 associated with that checkbox.

 3. Hopefully we can uplift to mainline Firefox, one of our SponsorU goals,
 thereby exposing our great privacy features (first party isolation,
 fingerprinting resistance, etc.) to Firefox users in the privacy UI.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20123 [Applications/Tor Browser]: consider blocking remote jar files at Low Security

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20123: consider blocking remote jar files at Low Security
---+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-security-slider  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here are patches for review for torbutton and tor-browser.git:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/20123
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/20123

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19838 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add dgoulet's obfs4 bridge to Tor Browser's default bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19838: Add dgoulet's obfs4 bridge to Tor Browser's default bridges
+--
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam201609R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by dcf):

 It's good from my point of view too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19838 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add dgoulet's obfs4 bridge to Tor Browser's default bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19838: Add dgoulet's obfs4 bridge to Tor Browser's default bridges
+--
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam201609R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by lynntsai):

 Yep! We're good to go -- NX01 has started working :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20181 [Applications/Tor Browser]: PK11_DigestFinal crash in Tor Browser on OSX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20181: PK11_DigestFinal crash in Tor Browser on OSX
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 This is from the newest version, in the crash dump. The description was
 incorrect.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20199 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: auto-joining password-protected XMPP group chats does not work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20199: auto-joining password-protected XMPP group chats does not work
+-
 Reporter:  Digitalcourage  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  messenger,xmpp  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by Digitalcourage):

 Amazingly, this trick works – with immediate effect. Any chance to make
 this more user-friendly?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17904 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use sufficient window dimensions in Privacy and Security Settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17904: Use sufficient window dimensions in Privacy and Security Settings
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Applied to master (commit b1adcba17a96a925345001d4da69cb71b469e3ed),
 thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19838 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add dgoulet's obfs4 bridge to Tor Browser's default bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19838: Add dgoulet's obfs4 bridge to Tor Browser's default bridges
+--
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam201609R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 The patch looks good to me. Are we good to get this landed?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17546 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Explain privacy settings on Privacy and Security Settings dialog in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17546: Explain privacy settings on Privacy and Security Settings dialog in Tor
Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-security-slider,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, merged to master (commit
 c8a04a79d7371b30622c727366ba5584569d4ffb).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15852 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove/synchronize Torbutton SOCKS pref logic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15852: Remove/synchronize Torbutton SOCKS pref logic
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-4.5-regression, tbb-torbutton-   |  Actual Points:
  conversion, TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good and got applied to master (commit
 0a5e21b00533960317352ac27db996258544eac6) and hardened-builds (commit
 36842fddafcf79bab6911def2ec4133826bc28f9).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20204: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability => ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-
 usability, TorBrowserTeam201609


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20234 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol 1.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20234: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol 1.0
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:   => iwakeh


Comment:

 I will start writing version 0.9 in order to reserve 1.0 for the change in
 #20228.
 As #18910 depends heavily on this protocol I'm setting prio to high.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20030 [Obfuscation/meek]: meek-http-helper doesn't shutdown cleanly in 6.5a1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20030: meek-http-helper doesn't shutdown cleanly in 6.5a1
--+--
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by yawning):

 You can and should do better on Linux, than just ignoring SIGPIPE (which
 is necessary for OSX).

 {{{
 cmd = exec.Command(absFirefoxPath, "--invisible", "-no-remote",
 "-profile", profilePath)
 cmd.SysProcAttr = { Pdeathsig: syscall.SIGTERM}
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18847 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get our patches for cross-compiling ICU on Windows upstreamed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18847: Get our patches for cross-compiling ICU on Windows upstreamed
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 The patch for ICU got upstreamed. We need to rewrite the ICU one, though,
 I guess.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hardened browser should have a way to disable ASan

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20238: Hardened browser should have a way to disable ASan
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-gitian


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