Re: [tor-bugs] #20204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20204: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 I blindly applied the patches in,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=eb37fc7a210b86efd6a407b8527a41cb1330ebfb

 And built,
 https://paganini.erinn.org/~arlolra/tor-messenger/tor-messenger-0.2.0b2
 -osx-x86_64-59e68f.dmg

 which seems to fix the issue for us as well.  Thanks Kathy; thanks Mark.

 Awaiting review to consider the matter resolved though.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20267 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use -DOPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 on Windows

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20267: Use -DOPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 on Windows
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  regression, windows
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Tor fails to compile on Windows MinGW/msys with an error about X509_NAME
 being an integer literal.

 This is because OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 is not defined, but it should be.

 When we are on Win32, we should define this preprocessor directive.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20266 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide a shim for SSL_cipher_get_id in OpenSSL versions < 1.0.1

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20266: Provide a shim for SSL_cipher_get_id in OpenSSL versions < 1.0.1
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, openssl  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by teor):

 Discovered by Marsh Ray.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20266 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide a shim for SSL_cipher_get_id in OpenSSL versions < 1.0.1

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20266: Provide a shim for SSL_cipher_get_id in OpenSSL versions < 1.0.1
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  regression, openssl
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Tor fails to compile on OpenSSL 1.0.0, because we use SSL_cipher_get_id,
 which was introduced in OpenSSL 1.0.1.

 We can access the id member of the cipher object instead, like this:
 
https://github.com/SlimRoms/android_external_chromium/commit/731158395b8ae1105c69cc42dae6244385f6b4ff

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20204: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 gk: Monday is fine, or thereafter.  We were hoping to release later in the
 week;  still blocked on a few other things though.  Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20163 [Core Tor/Tor]: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20163: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This looks fine to merge, it needs a changes file that says something
 like:
 {{{
 Stop reordering IP addresses returned by the OS.
 This makes is more likely that Tor will guess the same relay IP address
 every time.
 Fixes issue 20163; bugfix on 0.2.7.1-alpha, ticket 17027.
 Reported by René Mayrhofer, patch by "cypherpunks".
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19167 [Core Tor/Tor]: torrc parsing b0rks on carriage-return

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19167: torrc parsing b0rks on carriage-return
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  windows crlf lorax easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #2628 [Core Tor/Tor]: Be smarter about launching connections to authorities to learn about clock skew

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#2628: Be smarter about launching connections to authorities to learn about 
clock
skew
-+--
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client SponsorZ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by nickm):

 This is probably fundable under some broader heading, like "getting time
 right" or "better supporting clients that don't have a good view of the
 current time." But this specific item is probably not fundable per se.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17070 [Core Tor/Tor]: ".local" is mDNS for the local network, but tor assumes localhost

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#17070: ".local" is mDNS for the local network, but tor assumes localhost
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security lorax doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  security lorax => security lorax doc


Comment:

 I think we can update the documentation (function header and perhaps man
 page) to say that tor doesn't connect to '.local' addresses, and call this
 closed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #4666 [Archived/Ponies]: Write proposal for proof-of-work service

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#4666: Write proposal for proof-of-work service
-+---
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/Ponies  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by nickm):

 I think this might fall under our `tor-dos` heading. If it's a good idea,
 we could look for funding for it!  I'm only about 50% sure it's a good
 idea though. We might want to mention this as a possible future avenue in
 anti-dos work, but we should think more before we commit to doing it
 specifically.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14881 [Core Tor/Tor]: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory footer

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#14881: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory
footer
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,   |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, tor-sponsorU-orphan, |
  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604, review-group-9   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Thanks for running the chutney tests.

 To write a unit test for `networkstatus_compute_bw_weights_v10`, you can
 add a function to `src/test/test_dir.c`, using the existing tests as an
 example.

 Write a tests to exercise each of the cases in that function, and check
 that the results are as expected. (It would also be nice to write a test
 for the current values in a recent consensus.)

 The tor unit tests are run using:
 {{{
 make test
 }}}
 Or, for individual unit tests:
 {{{
 make src/test/test && src/test/test 
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5992 [Core Tor/Tor]: Replace individual directory authorities with a safe alternative

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5992: Replace individual directory authorities with a safe alternative
-+-
 Reporter:  phobos   |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: very long term
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large tor-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I think this is superseded by proposal 257, described in tickets #18636
 and #18346 .  But those would be worth funding.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #2664 [Core Tor/Tor]: DoS and failure resistence improvements

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#2664: DoS and failure resistence improvements
-+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large tor-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by nickm):

 We've recently done lots of work here in the `tor-dos` keyword for
 SponsorU.  We could make more progress here with more funding, of course.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20163 [Core Tor/Tor]: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20163: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5190 [Core Tor/Tor]: Collect Rob's patch for throttling flows at guards

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5190: Collect Rob's patch for throttling flows at guards
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance scheduling SponsorZ  |  Actual Points:
  tor-relay  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 This could be quite valuable if we do it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds mocked functions

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16869: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds 
mocked
functions
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  unittests |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17070 [Core Tor/Tor]: ".local" is mDNS for the local network, but tor assumes localhost

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#17070: ".local" is mDNS for the local network, but tor assumes localhost
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security lorax  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * severity:  Blocker => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17070 [Core Tor/Tor]: ".local" is mDNS for the local network, but tor assumes localhost

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#17070: ".local" is mDNS for the local network, but tor assumes localhost
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security lorax  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 I think you may be right. There could be a documentation clarification fix
 to make here, I guess?  What do you think, teor?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Potential heap corruption in do_getpass in routerkeys.c

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19223: Potential heap corruption in do_getpass in routerkeys.c
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bug-bounty, 028-backport,|  Actual Points:
  isaremoved nickwants029|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 Hi! Ive marked this for review, and since it's small, I've marked it for
 potential inclusion in 0.2.9.

 For more information about tests, code review, submission, etc, look at
 the doc/HACKING subdirectory of the Tor source tree, especially
 doc/HACKING/GettingStarted.md

 Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20208 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Enabled holdByDefault

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20208: Enabled holdByDefault
+
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed in [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=a1020540940e2d2d086e7d944ec9534b3fe54339 a10205].

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20082 [Core Tor/Tor]: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20082: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services
-+-
 Reporter:  twim |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, research, proposal-needed?,  |  Actual Points:
  TorCoreTeam201609  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:20 twim]:
 > Replying to [comment:19 teor]:
 > > OK, can you test meek?
 > Sure.
 >
 > > Also, let's say we do set the delay to 3s:
 > > * how are you testing whether the descriptor has stabilised?
 > I look at the `is_dirty` dynamics. If it gets dirty after 3s then it is
 too low. For now it isn't.
 >
 > > * can you warn the user when the descriptor changes after this delay?
 (perhaps between delay and 2*delay?) That way, we'll get feedback if we've
 set the delay too low, and users will understand why their onion service
 is hard to reach. (This might not be possible or easy - if not, that's ok.
 I am also happy to help you write the patch if I know how you're testing
 it.)
 >
 > The user can be warned by a log message (easy) or by introducing a
 control event which is emitted when descriptor gets dirty after it was
 published (more code, bit complicated).

 A log message would be fine.

 > Do we have some statistics on intropoint circuit half-life? I think that
 this delay should be based on it. And learning this half-life is what
 we're effectively doing here.

 I don't think it's something we've ever measured -  it's hard to measure
 safely.
 We'll just have to guess for now, unfortunately. I'll see if we can
 measure it using a privacy-preserving method, but that will take time.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Potential heap corruption in do_getpass in routerkeys.c

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19223: Potential heap corruption in do_getpass in routerkeys.c
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bug-bounty, 028-backport,|  Actual Points:
  isaremoved nickwants029|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nherring):

 Have a suggested fix, but don't know the model for adding tests, code
 review, submission, etc. Ptr to FAQ/instructions appreciated.

 {{{
 $ git diff src/or/routerkeys.c
 diff --git a/src/or/routerkeys.c b/src/or/routerkeys.c
 index 060ffd8..d5e7051 100644
 --- a/src/or/routerkeys.c
 +++ b/src/or/routerkeys.c
 @@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ do_getpass(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t buflen,
  size_t p2len = strlen(prompt) + 1;
  if (p2len < sizeof(msg))
p2len = sizeof(msg);
 -prompt2 = tor_malloc(strlen(prompt)+1);
 -memset(prompt2, ' ', p2len);
 +prompt2 = tor_malloc(p2len);
 +memset(prompt2, ' ', p2len - sizeof(msg));
  memcpy(prompt2 + p2len - sizeof(msg), msg, sizeof(msg));

  buf2 = tor_malloc_zero(buflen);
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6042 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rate limit 'new identity' clicks?

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#6042: Rate limit 'new identity' clicks?
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-newnym, tor-  |  Actual Points:
  client, tbb-torbutton  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by lunar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The “New Identity” button in Tor Browser will give a popup asking if users
 want to actually close all their tabs and all, so in some ways this is
 already rate limiting, but more importantly, Tor Browser is not using
 `NEWNYM` anymore (instead its using SOCKS authentication) therefore its
 not limited anymore in how frequent an identity change can happen. So,
 closing.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20265 [User Experience/Translations]: Remove Tor Messenger resources from Transifex

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20265: Remove Tor Messenger resources from Transifex
--+---
 Reporter:  sukhbir   |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Description changed by sukhbir:

Old description:

> As discussed, it's better to remove the Tor Messenger resources from
> Transifex. Everything '''except''' the following resources:
>
> {{{
> auth.dtd
> auth.properties
> finger.dtd
> finger.properties
> otr.properties
> prefs.dtd
> priv.dtd
> priv.properties
> ui.properties
> }}}
>
> Please let me know if this is not clear.

New description:

 As discussed, it's better to remove the Tor Messenger resources from
 Transifex. Please remove everything '''except''' the following resources:

 {{{
 auth.dtd
 auth.properties
 finger.dtd
 finger.properties
 otr.properties
 prefs.dtd
 priv.dtd
 priv.properties
 ui.properties
 }}}

 Please let me know if this is not clear.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17070 [Core Tor/Tor]: ".local" is mDNS for the local network, but tor assumes localhost

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#17070: ".local" is mDNS for the local network, but tor assumes localhost
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Blocker | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security lorax  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nherring):

 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 The only caller appears to be in
 `connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach` in
 `src/or/connection_edge.c`. That said, I agree that the ".local" domain is
 context-specific and evaluating that in the context of the relay seems
 Bad™. I think "local" here is probably correct, it's just not localhost,
 but rather local-net. Is there anything to really do here?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20265 [User Experience/Translations]: Remove Tor Messenger resources from Transifex

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20265: Remove Tor Messenger resources from Transifex
--+---
 Reporter:  sukhbir   |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Description changed by sukhbir:

Old description:

> As discussed, it's better to remove the Tor Messenger resources from
> Transifex. Everything '''except''' the following resources:
>
> {{{
> auth.dtd  auth.properties  finger.dtd  finger.properties  otr.properties
> prefs.dtd  priv.dtd  priv.properties  ui.properties
> }}}
>
> Please let me know if this is not clear.

New description:

 As discussed, it's better to remove the Tor Messenger resources from
 Transifex. Everything '''except''' the following resources:

 {{{
 auth.dtd
 auth.properties
 finger.dtd
 finger.properties
 otr.properties
 prefs.dtd
 priv.dtd
 priv.properties
 ui.properties
 }}}

 Please let me know if this is not clear.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20265 [User Experience/Translations]: Remove Tor Messenger resources from Transifex

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20265: Remove Tor Messenger resources from Transifex
--+---
 Reporter:  sukhbir   |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Description changed by sukhbir:

Old description:

> As discussed, it's better to remove the Tor Messenger resources from
> Transifex. We would like to upload ctypes-otr translations but that will
> happen once we fix the other stuff.

New description:

 As discussed, it's better to remove the Tor Messenger resources from
 Transifex. Everything '''except''' the following resources:

 {{{
 auth.dtd  auth.properties  finger.dtd  finger.properties  otr.properties
 prefs.dtd  priv.dtd  priv.properties  ui.properties
 }}}

 Please let me know if this is not clear.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17584 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable bookmark backups (easy fix) (!)

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#17584: Disable bookmark backups (easy fix) (!)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-easy, tbb-torbutton   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I'm not convinced that disabling bookmark backups is a good idea, but it
 might make sense to reduce the number of backups that are kept by default.
 It is entirely possible that the SQLite database can get corrupted, and if
 you're not manually backing up your bookmarks, you'd lose of all of them.

 Tying this to private browsing mode doesn't make any sense to me, because
 bookmarks are kept regardless of this setting.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20210: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:10 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:7 mcs]:
 > > The file permission/mode problem may be related to #19410 (but I have
 no proof).
 >
 > Kathy and I have confirmed that file mode is lost inside dmg2mar during
 the 7z extraction step. Unless there is a 7z option to preserve this, it
 is probably a bug in 7z. In the short run, maybe we can:

 As part of the OS X signing process, we are creating `*-signed.tar.bz2`
 files containg the code signed OS X bundles, and we have a script that use
 them to create the .dmg files. Rather than using the dmg files (and 7z to
 extract them) as the source to create the code signed mar files, we should
 maybe use the `*-signed.tar.bz2` files instead.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6584 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Fuzz our automated, sanboxed testing framework

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#6584: Fuzz our automated, sanboxed testing framework
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #6585| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cass):

 * cc: cass (added)
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled four
 years ago. Is this still an open issue that needs funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6583 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a Tor Communications Bundle/Tor Platform

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#6583: Create a Tor Communications Bundle/Tor Platform
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large, needs-triage  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cass):

 * cc: cass (added)
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled two
 years ago. Is this still an open issue that needs funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6582 [Metrics/Torflow]: Adapt Exit Scanner to Firefox automation framework

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#6582: Adapt Exit Scanner to Firefox automation framework
-+
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  aagbsn
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #6585| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by cass):

 * cc: cass (added)
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled four
 years ago. Is this still an open issue that needs funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6581 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Sandbox our forensic automation framework

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#6581: Sandbox our forensic automation framework
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #6585| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cass):

 * cc: cass (added)
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled four
 years ago. Is this still an open issue that needs funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6549 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Implement "Do Not Track" as privacy-by-design

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#6549: Implement "Do Not Track" as privacy-by-design
---+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large, tbb-firefox-patch  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cass):

 * cc: cass (added)
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled a while
 ago and its path forward is unclear. Is this still an open issue? Do we
 still want to seek funding for it?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds mocked functions

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16869: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds 
mocked
functions
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  unittests |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nherring):

 You could theoretically do the same with `AM_CTAGSFLAGS`, but I didn't
 want to try and generate a configure flag to figure out whether Exuberant
 ctags has it (stock ctags for Mac OS X doesn't support the `-I` flag, for
 instance).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20258 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make the Tor archive on OS X reproducible as well

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20258: Make the Tor archive on OS X reproducible as well
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, GeorgKoppen201609,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Indeed, this is orthogonal to #20184, but this should make it easier to
 compare intermediate Tor archives. The patch looks good to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds mocked functions

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16869: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds 
mocked
functions
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  unittests |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nherring):

 Just set
 `AM_ETAGSFLAGS=--regex='{c}/MOCK_IMPL([^,]+,\W*\([a-zA-Z0-9_]+\)\W*,/\1/s'`
 in `Makefile.am`

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6149 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: "Censorship-timeline" for Tor

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#6149: "Censorship-timeline" for Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  dpi archive censorship block |  Actual Points:
  SponsorZ   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cass):

 * cc: cass (added)
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 It looks like the censorship wiki isn't being maintained (for a few years
 now) and the needs are now being addressed by OONI.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds mocked functions

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16869: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds 
mocked
functions
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  unittests |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds mocked functions

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16869: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds 
mocked
functions
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  unittests |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 This is really helpful.  I'd like a patch to add a target to the
 Makefile.am to do this correctly.  Is this the right way to do it?
 {{{
 TAGS:
 etags --regex='{c}/MOCK_IMPL([^,]+,\W*\([a-zA-Z0-9_]+\)\W*,/\1/s'
 src/or/*.[ch] src/common/*.[ch]
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6003 [Metrics/Analysis]: Quantitative user studies of how people use Tor

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#6003: Quantitative user studies of how people use Tor
--+-
 Reporter:  phobos|  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled four
 years ago and the path forward isn't clear. Is this still a thing for
 which we need funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6002 [Metrics/Analysis]: Metrics of protocol usage through Tor

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#6002: Metrics of protocol usage through Tor
--+-
 Reporter:  phobos|  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled four
 years ago. Is this still a thing for which we need funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Transport IP packets over Tor

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#6001: Transport IP packets over Tor
+--
 Reporter:  phobos  |  Owner:
 Type:  project | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  very long term
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ needs-proposal tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled two
 years ago. Is this still an active priority?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20163 [Core Tor/Tor]: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20163: Keep the interface address order returned by the OS
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Here is a patch that I believe should work, but I would appreciate some
 additional testing.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5999 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden services as a platform

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5999: Hidden services as a platform
-+---
 Reporter:  phobos   |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled a while
 ago. Is this still a thing that needs funding? Is the need being addressed
 under other tickets or work?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5994 [Archived/Ponies]: Acquire torproject.secure

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5994: Acquire torproject.secure
-+--
 Reporter:  phobos   |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/Ponies  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cass):

 * keywords:  SponsorZ =>
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 torproject.secure is now available (and unclaimed) for registration.
 However, this doesn't seem like something we'd seek specific funding for.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds mocked functions

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16869: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds 
mocked
functions
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  unittests |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nherring):

 For etags, it appears that
 `--regex='{c}/MOCK_IMPL([^,]+,\W*\([a-zA-Z0-9_]+\)\W*,/\1/s'` should work.
 It leaves `MOCK_IMPL` tags around, but adds additional tags for the real
 function.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5993 [Archived/operations]: accept direct donations via credit/debit card

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5993: accept direct donations via credit/debit card
-+
 Reporter:  phobos   |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  SponsorZ |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by cass):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I believe this is being addressed under the Blue Rabbit crowdfunding db
 project via Shari.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5992 [Core Tor/Tor]: Replace individual directory authorities with a safe alternative

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5992: Replace individual directory authorities with a safe alternative
-+-
 Reporter:  phobos   |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: very long term
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large tor-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled four
 years ago. Is this still a thing that needs funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5896 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser app for Blackberry

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5896: TorBrowser app for Blackberry
+--
 Reporter:  phobos  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ, needs-triage, mobile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like the need might have been
 addressed and/or disappeared. Is this still a thing that needs funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5700 [Metrics/Analysis]: Make/modify VoIP applications to work better on Tor

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5700: Make/modify VoIP applications to work better on Tor
--+--
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  project   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled a while
 ago. Is this still a thing that needs funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20265 [User Experience/Translations]: Remove Tor Messenger resources from Transifex

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20265: Remove Tor Messenger resources from Transifex
--+---
 Reporter:  sukhbir   |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 As discussed, it's better to remove the Tor Messenger resources from
 Transifex. We would like to upload ctypes-otr translations but that will
 happen once we fix the other stuff.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5618 [Applications/Tor bundles/installation]: Set up buildbots to create nightly builds for all our packages

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5618: Set up buildbots to create nightly builds for all our packages
---+---
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  erinn
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor bundles/installation  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ, needs-triage |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled two
 years ago---and possibly the need has been covered in other ways.

 Is this still a thing that needs funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18504 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Download snapshots from gitweb

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18504: Download snapshots from gitweb
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gitweb   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by anonymous69):

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5464 [Metrics/Torflow]: Decentralized measurement for network load balancing

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5464: Decentralized measurement for network load balancing
+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Torflow |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large performance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #5992   | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled two
 years ago. Is this still a thing that needs funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5456 [Core Tor/Tor]: Defend against path bias and tagging attacks

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5456: Defend against path bias and tagging attacks
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large needs-proposal tor-   |  Actual Points:
  client |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This parent ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress on most
 open children stalled over a year ago and the two more-recently improved
 tickets (9001, 7003) might be being addressed under other proposals and
 work.

 Should this still be an open SponsorZ ticket?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5190 [Core Tor/Tor]: Collect Rob's patch for throttling flows at guards

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5190: Collect Rob's patch for throttling flows at guards
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance scheduling SponsorZ  |  Actual Points:
  tor-relay  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled years
 ago. Is this still a thing that needs funding? Has the issue been
 addressed by other dev work?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #4666 [Archived/Ponies]: Write proposal for proof-of-work service

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#4666: Write proposal for proof-of-work service
-+---
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/Ponies  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like its path forward is
 unclear (and now it's in ponies). Do we still want to seek funding for it
 or can I clear it out of SponsorZ?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds mocked functions

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16869: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds 
mocked
functions
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  unittests |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nherring):

 * severity:  Blocker => Normal


Comment:

 I did not intend to set  `Severity` to `Blocker`. I blame Chrome.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds mocked functions

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16869: Consider changing MOCK_DECL and MOCK_IMPL so that ctags still finds 
mocked
functions
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  unittests |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nherring):

 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 I tried emulating this with
 `--regex-c='/MOCK_IMPL\([^,]+,\W*(\w+)\W*,/\1/f/'` but there's a
 limitation that ctags only looks at one line, and these definitions often
 wrap. If you use `-IMOCK_DECL -IMOCK_IMPL`, the tags will exist but as
 variables rather than functions. If you add this as a `.ctags` file in the
 root, it'll map to everything, and thus also hide the actual definitions
 of `MOCK_DECL` and `MOCK_IMPL` in `src/common/testsupport.h`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #2664 [Core Tor/Tor]: DoS and failure resistence improvements

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#2664: DoS and failure resistence improvements
-+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large tor-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This parent ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress on all
 open children stalled a while ago. Are there still parts that need
 funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #2628 [Core Tor/Tor]: Be smarter about launching connections to authorities to learn about clock skew

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#2628: Be smarter about launching connections to authorities to learn about 
clock
skew
-+--
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client SponsorZ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:  Blocker => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #2628 [Core Tor/Tor]: Be smarter about launching connections to authorities to learn about clock skew

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#2628: Be smarter about launching connections to authorities to learn about 
clock
skew
-+--
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client SponsorZ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled a while
 ago. Is this still a thing that needs funding? Is it being addressed under
 other tickets?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5707 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use end to end stream timing data to further prune circuits

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#5707: Use end to end stream timing data to further prune circuits
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ performance needs-research  |  Actual Points:
  tor-client mike-0.2.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cass):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This ticket is tagged SponsorZ, but it looks like progress stalled a while
 ago. Is this still a thing that needs funding?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18504 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Download snapshots from gitweb (was: Downloading snapshots from git)

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18504: Download snapshots from gitweb
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gitweb   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18504 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Downloading snapshots from git

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18504: Downloading snapshots from git
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gitweb   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  wontfix =>


Comment:

 > Probably requiring people to use git to clone development snapshots is
 not too much to ask. For released versions there are tarballs.

 Limited number of reps designed to be released as tarballs. Zillion
 informative reps wasn't designed to be released as tarballs. tor-spec,
 etc.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19167 [Core Tor/Tor]: torrc parsing b0rks on carriage-return

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19167: torrc parsing b0rks on carriage-return
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  windows crlf lorax easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20264 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reduce number of security slider states from 4 to 3 (proposed)

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20264: Reduce number of security slider states from 4 to 3 (proposed)
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: amoghbl1 (added)


Comment:

 Also, it might be good to figure this out soon given that Amogh is porting
 the security slider to Android.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20264 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reduce number of security slider states from 4 to 3 (proposed)

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20264: Reduce number of security slider states from 4 to 3 (proposed)
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-security-
  |  slider
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Something we talked about at the Seattle meeting is the possibility of
 having only 3 allowed security slider states: Low, Medium and High. We
 would migrate users at Medium-Low to Medium-High and rename the latter to
 Medium. It seems such a change would improve usability and security. Also
 I think the current Medium-High is probably the best compromise for most
 users who are sophisticated enough to adjust the security slider.

 Discuss! :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20261 [Core Tor]: tor_fragile_assert() when Unix domain socket is used

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20261: tor_fragile_assert() when Unix domain socket is used
---+
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 The assert still happens because we always compare addresses regardless of
 if IsolateClientAddr is set.

 This requires a few changes I think, after looking at it:

  * We need to disable `IsolateClientAddr` whne using AF_LOCAL sockets
 (Easy, done in my branch).
  * `tor_addr_compare_masked()` should probably handle AF_LOCAL sockets.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19661 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor refuses to use /dev/null as a config file

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19661: tor refuses to use /dev/null as a config file
+
 Reporter:  weasel  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy lorax integration  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10426 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "new identity" button causes in-progress downloads to be aborted

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#10426: "new identity" button causes in-progress downloads to be aborted
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-3.0, tbb-usability, tbb-newnym,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-easy, tbb-torbutton|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Would it be possible to reuse the warning prompt that Firefox already
 provides when you attempt to quit when a download is in progress?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19661 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor refuses to use /dev/null as a config file

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19661: tor refuses to use /dev/null as a config file
+
 Reporter:  weasel  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy lorax integration  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 It looks like this was actually failing because file_status does not
 currently support character special devices. The quickest fix was to just
 add support for this.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20204: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 arlolra: how fast do you need that get reviewed? Or are you just cherry-
 picking the patches? Would it be enough to have it done on Monday?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20204: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201609 =>
 ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201609R


Comment:

 I upgraded a MacBook Pro to Sierra. These patches seem to fix the window
 drsg problem.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20116 [Applications/GetTor]: Get @get_tor twitter account verified

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20116: Get @get_tor twitter account verified
-+---
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  mrphs
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by ilv):

 twitter just sent me an email (it's associated to the account) with this:

 "We reviewed the account, and unfortunately it is not eligible to be
 verified at this time. Please visit our Help Center for more information
 about the types of accounts we verify."

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20263 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Replace SAX Parser with something in pure js

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20263: Replace SAX Parser with something in pure js
+-
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 It's disingenuous to say all the transport protocols are in js w/ this
 hanging around,
 https://github.com/mozilla/releases-comm-
 central/blob/master/chat/protocols/xmpp/xmpp-xml.jsm#L314

 An option is,
 https://github.com/aredridel/html5/tree/master/lib/sax

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20204: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: sukhbir (added)


Comment:

 Kathy and I backported the three Mozilla patches from
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1070710. They did not apply
 cleanly due to other changes Mozilla has made since ESR 45, but the
 changes we had to make were not extensive.

 So far Kathy and I have only tested these patches with Tor Browser on OSX
 10.11.6 (we do not yet have access to a 10.12/Sierra system; Kathy and I
 will upgrade one of our computers soon). I am posting the patches now
 because the Tor Messenger team would like to include a fix for this ticket
 in their next release, which is imminent.

 Please take the most recent three bug20204-01 branch commits from brade's
 tor-browser repo. Via gitweb:
  https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug20204-01
 (all three commits have author Markus Stange).

 After we have tested on a Sierra system I will mark this ticket as ready
 for review.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  None
--+--

Comment (by jgrahamc):

 Just published our work on blinded tokens: https://github.com/cloudflare
 /challenge-bypass-specification

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20224 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Fix `BridgeDescriptorMappingsLimit` config option

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20224: Fix `BridgeDescriptorMappingsLimit` config option
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 I'd rather set the time explicitly in case of a too small value, i.e.

 {{{

SimpleDateFormat formatter = new SimpleDateFormat(
"-MM-dd HH:mm:ss");
formatter.setTimeZone(TimeZone.getTimeZone("UTC"));
long cutTime = System.currentTimeMillis() - 24L * 60L * 60L * 1000L
* limitBridgeSanitizingInterval);

if (cutTime > -Integer.MAX_VALUE)
  this.bridgeSanitizingCutOffTimestamp = formatter.format(cutTime);
} else {
  this.bridgeSanitizingCutOffTimestamp = "1999-12-31 23:59:59";
}
 }}}

 (Assuming 1999-12-31 23:59:59 is the smallest possible time stamp that
 makes sense.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20043 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SharedWorker uses catchall circuit

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20043: SharedWorker uses catchall circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Another thing: Are we sure the patch for
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268726 copes with the
 scenario in this bug?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20043 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SharedWorker uses catchall circuit

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20043: SharedWorker uses catchall circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Could you check the `rv` of `NS_NewURI()`? That would fit better in the
 code context. Not sure what we want to do if that call failed, though.
 Could/should we emit an error message visible in the console or in the
 terminal?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20260 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add mitigating action to window size warning

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20260: Add mitigating action to window size warning
--+--
 Reporter:  lunar |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-torbutton  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-usability, tbb-torbutton


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20184 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OS X builds are still not reproducible on some machines

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20184: OS X builds are still not reproducible on some machines
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, GeorgKoppen201609|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Oh, I have meanwhile seen this behavior on two different machines. One
 running Debian stable and the other one Ubuntu 14.04.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20234 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20234: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Great, rebased, squashed, pushed.  Thanks!

 I'll think more about possible representations in HTML, but if you or
 somebody else comes up with something first, please mention it here.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19755 [Metrics/CollecTor]: improve code quality of bridgedescs module

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19755: improve code quality of bridgedescs module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.2.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Great, thanks for the review and for the additional changes.  I made some
 whitespace fixes to your commit d37e400, removed some checkstyle warnings
 in other test sources, and added changelog entries.  All pushed to master,
 let me know if something needs more fixing.  Closing.  Thanks again!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10369 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Building the Utils component in OS X TBBs is broken with the new cross-compiler (was: Building the Tor component in OS X TBBs is broken with the new c

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#10369: Building the Utils component in OS X TBBs is broken with the new cross-
compiler
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gitian, tbb-3.0, tbb-gitian, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201506  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20184 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OS X builds are still not reproducible on some machines (was: OS X alpha builds are still not reproducible on some machines (as of 6.5a3))

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20184: OS X builds are still not reproducible on some machines
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, GeorgKoppen201609|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: boklm (added)
 * priority:  Medium => Very High
 * severity:  Normal => Major


Comment:

 Okay, here is the summary of what I have so far:

 1) This happens on my machine for stable builds as well, sometimes. So
 far, it seems I have been "lucky" in that I got always matching builds.

 2) This is probably not faketime/timestamp related.

 After quite some amount of testing and reverting
 da14737254245cfa6b849dc8ac94a52cb3d9a61d it turns out that there are still
 differences between executables. Sometimes `tor` being among them and
 sometimes not.

 Another interesting fact us that I don't get different hash values for the
 `tor` executable every time. In all of my tests there were only three
 possible values.

 Attached is a typical diff (in this case between two `test-ntor-cl`
 binaries).

 Exciting!

 My current guess is this is related to the old toolchain we use for
 `gitian-utils.yml` and `gitian-tor.yml` for OS X. Not sure why this was
 not visible earlier, though. Maybe switching to Debian made this more
 likely to happen?

 My current plan is to use our clang cross-compiler for `tor` and see
 whether that fixes those diffs. While I expect that to be much harder for
 the utils we need (see: #10369) we might get away with doing that just for
 `tor` for now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20258 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make the Tor archive on OS X reproducible as well

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20258: Make the Tor archive on OS X reproducible as well
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, GeorgKoppen201609,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-gitian, GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201609 => tbb-
 gitian, GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201609R


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > Let's wait a bit. We might not need this anymore when fixing #20184.

 I think this is orthogonal. Thus, back into the review queue.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20234 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20234: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 That looks all fine.  Thanks!

 Yes, some more compact notation an nicer notation would be good.
 It could be a volunteer task to think up a representation in html?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19755 [Metrics/CollecTor]: improve code quality of bridgedescs module

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19755: improve code quality of bridgedescs module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.2.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Thanks for all these tests!

 Now we have a basis for the refactoring of this module.

 It seemed shorter to write the code for the suggestions I had.
 Please, see the seven commits in
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git?h=task-19755-2 my
 branch] based on yours.

 Cobertura barks on binary literals, but doesn't fail, so I would prefer to
 use them.

 I tried to make the commits independent of each other.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20258 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make the Tor archive on OS X reproducible as well

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20258: Make the Tor archive on OS X reproducible as well
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, GeorgKoppen201609,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => new
 * keywords:  tbb-gitian, GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201609R => tbb-
 gitian, GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201609
 * component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing =>
 Applications/Tor Browser
 * owner:  cypherpunks => tbb-team


Comment:

 Let's wait a bit. We might not need this anymore when fixing #20184.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20224 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Fix `BridgeDescriptorMappingsLimit` config option

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20224: Fix `BridgeDescriptorMappingsLimit` config option
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Hmm, looks like I should have set this to needs_review before.  Doing that
 now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20234 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol

2016-09-30 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20234: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Please find [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 db.git/log/?h=task-20234 my task-20234 branch] with a few tweaks.  Other
 than that I hope that we can integrate this into `index.html` or at least
 find a more compact notation.  But let's merge this for now and make it
 better later.  Let me know if you agree with my edits or want to edit
 more.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs