Re: [tor-bugs] #20414 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Donation banner on about:tor page for 2016 campaign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20414: Donation banner on about:tor page for 2016 campaign
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201611R, crowdfunding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20413   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20414 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Donation banner on about:tor page for 2016 campaign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20414: Donation banner on about:tor page for 2016 campaign
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201611R, crowdfunding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20413   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 I just discovered that the right arrow on the donate button that I just
 added is failing to render on OS X. Very sorry about this last minute
 discovery! Here's a patch to fix it:

 ​https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/20414+14

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20220: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows 10
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 It was the same directory every time where I install tor browser. I always
 move the current tor browser out of the way first too.

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[tor-bugs] #20666 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Change Tor 0.2.?? to Tor 0.3.??

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20666: Change Tor 0.2.?? to Tor 0.3.??
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Since 0.2.9 is our last Tor 0.2.?? release, there's no point in putting
 any more tickets in "Tor 0.2.??". So I've changed the milestone name to
 "Tor 0.3.??".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20666 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Change Tor 0.2.?? to Tor 0.3.??

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20666: Change Tor 0.2.?? to Tor 0.3.??
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20495 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Unexplained drop in meek users, 2016-10-19 to 2016-11-10 (was: China blocking of meek, 2016-10-19)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20495: Unexplained drop in meek users, 2016-10-19 to 2016-11-10
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  cn us ru de gb meek  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:  censorship block cn meek => cn us ru de gb meek


Comment:

 Since 2016-11-10, the count of meek users has mysteriously returned to
 previous levels, not only in China but in the other places mentioned in
 comment:5.

 This no longer looks like a censorship event to me, though I don't know
 what it could be.

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-cn-2016-07-30-2016-11-15.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 country.html?start=2016-07-30=cn link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-cn-2016-07-30-2016-11-15.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 combined.html?start=2016-07-30=2016-11-15=cn link]

 [[Image(meek-by-country-20161114.png)]]

 One possible clue is that
 [https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/F4AD82B2032EDEF6C02C5A529C42CFAFE516564D
 TorLandMeek], the meek-amazon bridge, currently has a last restarted date
 of 2016-11-09 22:11:20, which is close to when the numbers returned to
 normal. However, TorLandMeek doesn't show a decrease in users during this
 time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20635 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Compiling Go 1.7.3 is randomly segfaulting targeting 32bit Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20635: Compiling Go 1.7.3 is randomly segfaulting targeting 32bit Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 I haven't been able to reproduce this myself yet. If it doesn't happen
 every time, it seems it must have to do with available memory or
 something.

 I searched for the error message and found a couple of links that might be
 interesting.
   https://groups.google.com/d/topic/golang-nuts/iaRU2yM0yCw
   I have been trying to build golang 1.5.0 with golang 1.4.2 bootstrap
 binaries. My build host is centos5 and build is yocto build. But I always
 get below compilation issue.
   {{{
 # Building Go bootstrap tool.
 | cmd/dist
 | go build _/local/jenkins/ws/CB/160921103249-broadcom-
 ns2-emgw-3.10-1.4/i686/build-project/tmp/work/aarch64-montavista-
 linux/golang/1.5-r0/go/src/cmd/dist: /local/jenkins/ws/CB/160921103249
 -broadcom-ns2-emgw-3.10-1.4/i686/build-project/tmp/work/aarch64
 -montavista-linux/golang/1.5-r0/go1.4.2/go/pkg/tool/linux_386/8g: signal:
 segmentation fault
 | ERROR: build failed
 }}}
 The reply says that cause is a too-old kernel (CentOS 5). This one is
 recent, 1.5 months ago.

 An old, closed ticket from 2010:
   https://github.com/golang/go/issues/869
 This one seems to have been caused by linking with a specific version of
 gold, which I don't think applies to us.o

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20665 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20665: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual
--+--
 Reporter:  phoul |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19043 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implementation of ESTABLISH_INTRO cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19043: prop224: Implementation of ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
-+-
 Reporter:  alec.heif|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, |  Actual Points:
  TorCoreTeam201611, review-group-12 |
Parent ID:  #17241   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:36 chelseakomlo]:
 > All of the new modules look great!
 >
 > A couple minor points, feel free to take/leave any:
 >

 Thanks for the review. I force pushed the fixes to the same branch.

 > - There are some magic numbers in encode_establish_intro_cell_legacy-
 some of these could be extracted into defines

 Hmm, that function is (very) old code. I tried to leave it alone as much
 as possible.

 I'm inclined to suggest that any improvements to that old code should be
 done on a new ticket, so that reviewers of this ticket have to worry as
 little as possible about regressions.

 > - the_hs_circuitmap might be renamed for specificity- the_ is a bit
 unclear.

 Hmm, I could rename that to `global_hs_circuitmap` or something.

 That said, this silly `the_` prefix is used in multiple places in our
 codebase to name big file-level singletons (e.g. `the_nodelist`,
 `the_evdns_base`, etc.).

 Please let me know if you still feel like `global_hs_circuitmap` or
 something like that would be better, and I will just rename it.

 > - In the comment for hs_circuits_have_same_token we use introduction and
 rendezvous tokens, but in the function we use first_token and
 second_token. Maybe introduction/rendezvous naming can be consistently
 used.

 Hmm, that function is abstract on purpose. The HS circuitmap can carry
 both introduction and rendezvous tokens, but that function actually does
 not care about the token type. Do you think the function should be split
 into two functions handling each case separately or something?

 > - In commit f4db1ab5fcf3e48c6b4011e9f1cbae6db1aa8c5b it says that
 hs_received_establish_intro is the new entry point, but I think this is
 meant to be hs_intro_received_establish_intro

 Oops. Fixed that commit msg and force-pushed to the same branch name
 (naughty I know).

 > - In general, it can be useful to write multiple unit tests per function
 under test if there are branches in the code. For example, it looks like
 we just test one path for generate_establish_intro_cell, but it might be
 worth writing additional unit test to cover error cases.

 I wrote a unittest for one error case of that function and pushed it to
 the top of the branch. It even found a bug! Please check the top commit
 and if you like it I will squash it along with the rest of the branch so
 that it's clean for Nick's review.

 So the bug was there because I was not checking the retval of
 `crypto_hmac_sha3_256()` correctly... Not sure why we have `1` being the
 error retval in `crypto.c` instead of `-1`, perhaps I should address this
 in `crypto_hmac_sha3_256()`?

 > - encode_establish_intro_cell_legacy might be able to be unit tested
 directly. It looks like it is tested indirectly but we could have several
 unit tests to test the different branches of this directly.

 I think that old function is more unittestable now indeed. However, I'd
 suggest we make a new ticket for unittesting that legacy function.

 Putting this in `needs_review`, please let me know if it needs any other
 changes!!!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20663 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: New image for Security Slider window in Tor Browser manual (alpha)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20663: New image for Security Slider window in Tor Browser manual (alpha)
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * owner:   => phoul
 * component:  Community => Community/Tor Browser Manual


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20023 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Go to 1.7.3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20023: Upgrade Go to 1.7.3
--+
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian TorBrowserTeam201611R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:14 dcf]:
 > Replying to [comment:12 gk]:
 > > At least the stable build is busted now (I expect the alpha builds as
 well):
 >
 > That's surprising. Sorry about that. I'm going to start a build now from
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/log/?h=maint-6.0=tbb-6.0.6-build3 tbb-6.0.6-build3] and try
 to reproduce.

 FWIW, my fresh build of 6.0.6-build3 succeeded for all platforms.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20665 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20665: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual
--+--
 Reporter:  phoul |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by phoul):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20665 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20665: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual
--+--
 Reporter:  phoul |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by phoul):

 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20664 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Enable Tor Browser Manual translations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20664: Enable Tor Browser Manual translations
--+--
 Reporter:  phoul |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by phoul):

 * status:  new => accepted


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[tor-bugs] #20665 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20665: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual
--+---
 Reporter:  phoul |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 We should have an "alpha" version of the manual that tracks the alpha Tor
 Browser, and is eventually frozen and turned into the stable manual.

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[tor-bugs] #20664 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Enable Tor Browser Manual translations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20664: Enable Tor Browser Manual translations
--+---
 Reporter:  phoul |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Strings for the manual need to be added to Transifex.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:35 cypherpunks]:
 > > It sounds like kzblocked has actually gotten it to happen, maybe on a
 slow link.
 >
 > This is something about conn.Conn.Write(frameBuf.Bytes()), if frameBuf
 is too long (say 4-7 frames) then everything broken. Can't reproduce short
 write exactly, as log and tcpdump show everything goes to wire, but server
 dislikes result anyway. If to conn.Conn.Write every frame separately then
 server dislike data anyway, but if to delay every conn.Conn.Write then
 everything works ok. I'm lost

 It might be a race condition... Can you try compiling the obfs4proxy code
 with the race detector?
   https://blog.golang.org/race-detector
   https://golang.org/doc/articles/race_detector.html
 I think you can just do `go build -race` in the obfs4proxy directory. Then
 export the environment variable
 `GORACE='log_path=/tmp/obfs4proxyrace.txt'` before you run anything.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > tcpdump show

 Didn't count bytes actually. Logging for written len and possible err show
 nothing wrong.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > It sounds like kzblocked has actually gotten it to happen, maybe on a
 slow link.

 This is something about conn.Conn.Write(frameBuf.Bytes()), if frameBuf is
 too long (say 4-7 frames) then everything broken. Can't reproduce short
 write exactly, as log and tcpdump show everything goes to wire, but server
 dislikes result anyway. If to conn.Conn.Write every frame separately then
 server dislike data anyway, but if to delay every conn.Conn.Write then
 everything works ok. I'm lost

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20662 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Add a Component for the Tor Browser manual

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20662: Add a Component for the Tor Browser manual
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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[tor-bugs] #20663 [Community]: New image for Security Slider window in Tor Browser manual (alpha)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20663: New image for Security Slider window in Tor Browser manual (alpha)
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 For the alpha version of the Tor Browser manual, I would like to suggest a
 new image and some revisions to the Security Slider page.

 * The menu item name has been changed to "Security Settings...". Here's a
 new image:

 [[Image(security_settings_menu.png)]]

 * The window now looks like this:

 [[Image(security_settings_window.png)]]

 And there are only three levels. Medium-Low was removed and Medium-High
 has been renamed to Medium.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20661 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: please close j...@lists.tp.o list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20661: please close j...@lists.tp.o list
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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[tor-bugs] #20662 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Add a Component for the Tor Browser manual

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20662: Add a Component for the Tor Browser manual
--+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 We have a great Tor Browser Manual here:
 https://tb-manual.torproject.org/

 Would it be possible to have a trac Component for this so we can suggest
 revisions/propose patches? Perhaps under Community.

 Thanks in advance!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20658 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add hiro as a sandstorm admin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20658: Add hiro as a sandstorm admin
-+
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  sandstorm|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by isis):

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16622 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Spoof Timezone from Firefox patch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16622: Spoof Timezone from Firefox patch
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton-conversion,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201611R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton-conversion, TorBrowserTeam201611 => tbb-
 torbutton-conversion, TorBrowserTeam201611R
 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16622 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Spoof Timezone from Firefox patch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16622: Spoof Timezone from Firefox patch
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton-conversion,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201611   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Here's a branch that provides a static pref for timezone spoofing. I also
 tried to implement an alternative "live" pref, but the problem is rather
 complex and I don't want to delay further. I figure it's good to have a
 working patch now and we can revisit it during uplift.

 There are two patches (pref implemented, and pref set):
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commits/16622+3

 Here's a patch that removes the functionality from torbutton:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/16622

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[tor-bugs] #20661 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: please close j...@lists.tp.o list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20661: please close j...@lists.tp.o list
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 Once upon a time, we made a mailman list called 'jobs', and subscribed
 anybody who volunteered, and that's how we handled incoming applications
 for job spots.

 That was never a great strategy, but it was the best we could do at the
 time, but in any case that time is now thankfully past.

 Now the jobs list is just a spam target. Let us please remove it.

 I believe it has no archives, and there is nothing that needs to be
 salvaged from it.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20658 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add hiro as a sandstorm admin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20658: Add hiro as a sandstorm admin
-+
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  sandstorm|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20659 [Applications/GetTor]: Parse mail subject in the email autoresponder

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20659: Parse mail subject in the email autoresponder
-+-
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [ticket:20659 ilv]:
 > I think it might be useful to parse the mail subject because:
 >
 >* Usability. dcf1 once told me that people trying the bridgedb email
 autoresponder first tried sending the request on the subject. It might
 also be the case for gettor.

 It's maybe different for GetTor, but for what it's worth, for BridgeDB,
 the emails with commands in the subject lines are overwhelmingly bots with
 `Subject: get bridges`, which is why BridgeDB ignores the subject line.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:1 dcf]:
 >  * A first segment of 1­–15 bytes doesn't work.
 >  * A first segment of 16 bytes works.
 >  * A first segment of 16 bytes works also for unobfuscated Tor TLS.
 >  * A first segment of 17 bytes works.
 >  * A first segment of 32 bytes works.
 >  * A first segment of 64 bytes is inconclusive (see comment:8)
 >  * A first segment of 128 bytes doesn't work.

 On 2016-11-11 kzblocked reported that something had changed on at least
 some of the DPI boxes in Kazakhstan. A first segment of 16 to 32 bytes
 doesn't work anymore. The detection seems to happen more often now,
 sometimes even before a Tor circuit is built.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06 (was: Cyberoam assists dictatorship regimes with murders)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  user disappeared =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Cyberoam assists dictatorship regimes with murders

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Cyberoam assists dictatorship regimes with murders
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 kzblocked investigated obfs4proxy and found some potential explanations
 for how obfs4 is being blocked. I'll try to summarize what I read on IRC.

 As we've seen above, some kind of DPI is blocking obfs4. The blocking
 seems probabilistic, not total, and default bridges are more likely to be
 blocked than custom bridges. kzblocked suspects that the DPI is reading
 about 50 KB of data and then building a timing signature of about 6 data
 points: 2 from the obfs4 handshake and 4 from the TLS handshake. Each data
 point is a sequence of segments terminated by one with the PSH flag set.

 A potential problem is that obfs4proxy implements timing obfuscation by
 doing a sleep ''after'' each write:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/obfs4.git/tree/transports/obfs4/obfs4.go?id=df6aeeca8cc8e953284ce1cb8a0910500579dfaf#n559
 {{{
 // Write then sleep.
 _, err = conn.Conn.Write(iatFrame[:iatWrLen])
 if err != nil {
 return 0, err
 }
 time.Sleep(iatDelta * time.Microsecond)
 }}}
 The delay can be up to 10 ms. Why this may be a problem is the sleep
 happens during thr round trip between client and server. If the round-trip
 time is greater than the delay, then it is as if there was no delay.
 Delays happen only once per write (i.e. obfs4 doesn't split up writes to
 insert delays). So the timing obfuscation may be less effective during the
 handshake phase than during the steady state, which can have consecutive
 writes not bound by latency.

 Another potential problem is that the obfs4 code dies on short writes.
 This is actually documented:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/obfs4.git/tree/transports/obfs4/obfs4.go?id=df6aeeca8cc8e953284ce1cb8a0910500579dfaf#n512
 {{{
 // Write the pending data onto the network.  Partial writes are fatal,
 // because the frame encoder state is advanced, and the code doesn't keep
 // frameBuf around.  In theory, write timeouts and whatnot could be
 // supported if this wasn't the case, but that complicates the code.
 }}}
 It sounds like kzblocked has actually gotten it to happen, maybe on a slow
 link. They were going to find out what `err` is when a short write
 happens.

 kzblocked believes that the firewall hardware is Sophos Cyberoam devices.
 I don't know of any evidence for that fact, except that the blocking of
 obfs4 is consistent with a past report (May 2016) about Cyberoam devices:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2016-May/040898.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19043 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implementation of ESTABLISH_INTRO cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19043: prop224: Implementation of ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
-+-
 Reporter:  alec.heif|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, |  Actual Points:
  TorCoreTeam201611, review-group-12 |
Parent ID:  #17241   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19043 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implementation of ESTABLISH_INTRO cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19043: prop224: Implementation of ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
-+-
 Reporter:  alec.heif|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, |  Actual Points:
  TorCoreTeam201611, review-group-12 |
Parent ID:  #17241   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-

Comment (by chelseakomlo):

 All of the new modules look great!

 A couple minor points, feel free to take/leave any:

 - There are some magic numbers in encode_establish_intro_cell_legacy- some
 of these could be extracted into defines
 - the_hs_circuitmap might be renamed for specificity- the_ is a bit
 unclear.
 - In the comment for hs_circuits_have_same_token we use introduction and
 rendezvous tokens, but in the function we use first_token and
 second_token. Maybe introduction/rendezvous naming can be consistently
 used.
 - In commit f4db1ab5fcf3e48c6b4011e9f1cbae6db1aa8c5b it says that
 hs_received_establish_intro is the new entry point, but I think this is
 meant to be hs_intro_received_establish_intro
 - In general, it can be useful to write multiple unit tests per function
 under test if there are branches in the code. For example, it looks like
 we just test one path for generate_establish_intro_cell, but it might be
 worth writing additional unit test to cover error cases.
 - encode_establish_intro_cell_legacy might be able to be unit tested
 directly. It looks like it is tested indirectly but we could have several
 unit tests to test the different branches of this directly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20660 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The update_responses script should use mar-tools from the release`s directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20660: The update_responses script should use mar-tools from the release`s
directory
--+---
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201611  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by boklm):

 The branch `bug_20660` has a patch for that:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_20660

 I did not test it completely yet. I will do it after we finish releasing
 6.0.6 and 6.5a4.

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[tor-bugs] #20660 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The update_responses script should use mar-tools from the release`s directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20660: The update_responses script should use mar-tools from the release`s
directory
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201611
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The current version of the `update_responses` script is using the mar-
 tools from the path `../../../gitian-builder/inputs/mar-tools-
 linux64.zip`.

 This works fine when a build with the correct version has been done before
 from this directory, but this is not always the case.

 Instead, it should be using the `mar-tools-linux64.zip` from the release`s
 directory.

 This should also help for #17381.

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[tor-bugs] #20659 [Applications/GetTor]: Parse mail subject in the email autoresponder

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20659: Parse mail subject in the email autoresponder
-+-
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor|   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I think it might be useful to parse the mail subject because:

* Usability. dcf1 once told me that people trying the bridgedb email
 autoresponder first tried sending the request on the subject. It might
 also be the case for gettor.
* This #20618 (although unlikely to happen again?).
* It's easy to implement.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20564 [Metrics]: Add Jenkins configuration for running metrics-lib's unit tests and producing a .jar file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20564: Add Jenkins configuration for running metrics-lib's unit tests and
producing a .jar file
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by hiro):

 Also one more thing that we can consider is to include the system java
 path in the build.xml file.
 Something like:
 {{{
   

 }}}
 In which case we might not need the lib folder at all.
 The problem I see with this is that we might lose in compatibility with
 different sys setups. I do not think it might be a big issue, but if we
 move in this direction we should definitely mention this is the
 installation instructions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20618 [Applications/GetTor]: GetTor does not return download links when using Protonmail.com

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20618: GetTor does not return download links when using Protonmail.com
+--
 Reporter:  gaj |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  not a
|  bug
 Keywords:  GetTor, download links, protonmail  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by ilv):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 In deed, gettor doesn't handle mails with encrypted content. In the past,
 people have mentioned that it could be useful to parse the mail subject as
 well, which could help in cases like these. Anyways, the solution here is
 to avoid sending encrypted mails to gettor (I haven't used protonmail, may
 be it does if by default?).

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[tor-bugs] #20658 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add hiro as a sandstorm admin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20658: Add hiro as a sandstorm admin
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin   |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  sandstorm
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Please add hiro to the `storm` group on brachteata!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20630 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_fragile_assert hit in connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20630: tor_fragile_assert hit in connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-12  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Patch seems to work!

 I looked over the rest of f3e158ed and didn't see any more gotchas.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20029 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implementation of INTRODUCE1 and INTRODUCE_ACK cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20029: prop224: Implementation of INTRODUCE1 and INTRODUCE_ACK cells
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, TorCoreTeam201611  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17241  | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  SponsorR-must
+--

Comment (by asn):

 Hmm, nice! This part was not '''that''' hard after all.

 I did an initial review on gitlab to move this forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20571 [Core Tor/Tor]: When we are really satisfied that it is right, tell protover.c about prop224 HSDir support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20571: When we are really satisfied that it is right, tell protover.c about
prop224 HSDir support
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, TorCoreTeam201611 => tor-hs, prop224
 * points:   => 0.2
 * parent:   => #12424


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8244 [Core Tor/Tor]: The HSDirs for a hidden service should not be predictable indefinitely into the future

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8244: The HSDirs for a hidden service should not be predictable indefinitely 
into
the future
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
--+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Design and implementation is done through #16943 that is the shared
 randomness. With #20657, service will start using it to choose where to
 publish their descriptor. So, by design, with proposal 224, this feature
 will be implemented.

 I'm closing this one as we don't need it anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17957 [Core Tor/Tor]: Detect stolen onion service key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17957: Detect stolen onion service key
-+-
 Reporter:  ess2 |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  key-observatory, tor-hs, needs-  |  Actual Points:
  proposal   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  hs key-observatory tor-hs => key-observatory, tor-hs, needs-
 proposal
 * points:  medium => 6
 * parent:  #17242 =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Unparenting as this is more of a research and needs-proposal change then a
 "must have feature" for proposal 224.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20028 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix typos in tor-spec.txt [circID -> CircID]

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20028: Fix typos in tor-spec.txt [circID -> CircID]
--+
 Reporter:  twim  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  review-group-11 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18054 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Decide how to proceed with torrc options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18054: prop224: Decide how to proceed with torrc options
-+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20657   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * points:  small/medium => 3
 * parent:  #12424 => #20657


Comment:

 Attaching this to the service implementation ticket as we'll need some for
 the service primarily.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18098 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement tor-genkey tool for at least offline HS key creation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18098: Implement tor-genkey tool for at least offline HS key creation
-+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop244, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20657   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  prop-244, tor-hs => prop244, tor-hs
 * points:  medium => 3
 * parent:  #17242 => #20657


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[tor-bugs] #20657 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement service support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20657: prop224: Implement service support.
---+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #12424
   Points:  parent |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-must  |
---+-
 This ticket is the parent one for anything related to service
 implementation for proposal 224.

 As we break down functionalities and needed features, we'll add more child
 tickets.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14828 [Core Tor/Tor]: Multiple hidden services can share a pk_digest/service_id.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14828: Multiple hidden services can share a pk_digest/service_id.
---+---
 Reporter:  yawning|  Owner:  twim
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, tor-hs, review-group-12  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  easy, tor-hs, review-group-11 => easy, tor-hs, review-group-12


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #19043, #20241, #20168, #20082, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #19043, #20241, #20168, #20082, #20269, #20284, #17975 by 
nickm:
keywords to review-group-11

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17242 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement client support (was: prop224: Implement client and service support)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17242: prop224: Implement client support
-+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+---
Description changed by dgoulet:

Old description:

> Only client and service support for next generation hidden service. Be
> able to post/get descriptor, establish IP and RP, etc... This also should
> also include all control port support on both client and service side.
>
> I'm imagining this ticket will have *many* child tickets in the future.

New description:

 This ticket is the parent one for anything related to client
 implementation for proposal 224.

 As we break down functionalities and needed features, we'll add more child
 tickets.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19043 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implementation of ESTABLISH_INTRO cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19043: prop224: Implementation of ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
-+-
 Reporter:  alec.heif|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, |  Actual Points:
  TorCoreTeam201611, review-group-12 |
Parent ID:  #17241   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, TorCoreTeam201611, review-group-11 =>
 tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, TorCoreTeam201611, review-group-12


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #15056, #16861, #17592, #20569, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #15056, #16861, #17592, #20569, #17604, #17847, #17868, 
#18329, #20484, #20530, #20558, #20559, #20568, #20630, #20646, #20650, #20400 
by nickm:
keywords to review-group-12

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20509 [Core Tor/Tor]: Directory authorities should take away Guard flag from relays with #20499 bug

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20509: Directory authorities should take away Guard flag from relays with 
#20499
bug
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  028-backport, easy,  |  Actual Points:
  TorCoreTeam201611  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor, arma   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I am +1 on waiting a couple of days till we are really sure that the bug
 is gone now.  Doing this once is annoying enough; doing it twice would be
 way yuckier.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20637 [Core Tor/Tor]: Grammar issue in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20637: Grammar issue in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode documentation
--+
 Reporter:  fk|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.5-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 applied!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17242 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement client and service support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17242: prop224: Implement client and service support
-+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-hs => tor-hs, prop224
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final => Tor: 0.2.???


Comment:

 Aiming for this in 0.3.1+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18278 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Make hidden service load/create needed key materials

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18278: prop224: Make hidden service load/create needed key materials
-+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * parent:  #17242 =>


Comment:

 Hrm, this is part of the service implementation of "must have" anyway so
 it's kind of not useful to have this in a ticket. Unparenting and closing
 this as invalid.

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[tor-bugs] #20656 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Tell protover about relay intro cells support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20656: prop224: Tell protover about relay intro cells support
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #17241
   Points:  0.2|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-must  |
---+
 For relay support in #17241 (parent ticket), we'll need to add version 4
 to protover `HSIntro` so client/service can know which relay they can pick
 for introduction.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20640 [- Select a component]: PROBLÈME CONNEXION

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20640: PROBLÈME CONNEXION
--+-
 Reporter:  jamesr10100   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20540 [Metrics]: define log-levels for all java metrics-products

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20540: define log-levels for all java metrics-products
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:1 iwakeh]:
 > A summary of what is in place or known already:
 >
 > * java projects should use slf4j (our default implementation is logback,
 but that is less important)

 Yep.

 > * errors are possibly mailed by logging frameworks (in their default
 settings). So error level should be important (an 'action item') for
 operation.
 > * info-level should give an indication that all things are running as
 expected.

 Agreed about those two, but we'll have to decide when to use the other
 three levels in slf4j.  Here's a suggestion:

  - trace: I suggest disregarding this level, because the slf4j developers
 themselves only added it to "bow to popular demand".  It seems we can
 easily get away by just using debug instead.
  - debug: Let's use this for detailed messages to debug a problem, under
 the assumption that these logs are typically disabled in production and
 only enabled when debugging a problem.
  - info: It seems useful to log whenever a process or major step starts or
 ends, but under the assumption that these logs will only be written to
 files and not mailed out to operators.  It might be a good requirement to
 write info-level logs in a way that operators can understand them without
 having to read any code.  One example where info might be too high is
 where metrics-lib informs us which `DescriptorCollector` implementation
 it's serving us, because that's something the operator wouldn't normally
 care about.
  - warn: We could use warn to inform the operator of a problem that we
 were able to recover from but that they should be aware of.  The warning
 should be written in a way that the operator understands, and it should be
 something that the operator can do something against.  Stated differently,
 we should expect to be contacted by operators who are unclear what to do
 about a given warning.  And if they cannot do anything against it, maybe
 it should be an info message rather than a warning.  We might want to
 recommend that operators include warnings in any automated notifications
 they receive from their service instance.
  - error: We should use error for problems that we cannot recover from.
 Otherwise they're similar to warnings.

 > * maybe, log statistics to separate log files (as in Onionoo).

 Are there log domains of some sort?  It seems that we should leave the
 decision of log files to the operator, but could say that these log
 messages go into a "statistics" log domain that the operator may log to
 the same or a different file.  By the way, we'd probably want to log these
 messages on info level.

 > * what else?

 Maybe one thing:

  * Log levels used by metrics-lib, where a problem with parsing a
 descriptor can have different consequences depending on the application.
 In other words, if we log a warning or even error, we should give the
 application the opportunity to tone down that warning, or ignore it,
 because it doesn't care as much.  What we could do is use a log domain
 "parsing", or we could let applications define logging by logger name and
 tone down `org.torproject.descriptor.*` loggers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20655 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Run the chutney "mixed" network tests in multiple ways

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20655: Run the chutney "mixed" network tests in multiple ways
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 You might enjoy (or be horrified by) the hs-min-mixed and basic-min-mixed
 networks, which randomise the mix.

 And yes, there is definitely scope for a mixed network that keeps the
 authorities new, but the clients and relays old.

 I'm not sure what you mean by "multiple times, with multiple older Tor
 instances".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20630 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_fragile_assert hit in connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20630: tor_fragile_assert hit in connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch `bug20630` in my public repository has a minimal fix here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20242 [Core Tor/Tor]: update changelog to say how many fallbacks we removed and how many remain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20242: update changelog to say how many fallbacks we removed and how many 
remain
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201611  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:9 nickm]:
 > Sure you don't want to backport it to 0.2.9 ?  Otherwise it won't appear
 in changelogs that come out for future 0.2.9 versions?

 I'd be happy for an 0.2.9 backport (the fallback feature itself was
 introduced in 0.2.8, not sure if we want to backport the relevant parts of
 the changelog that far back).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20655 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Run the chutney "mixed" network tests in multiple ways

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20655: Run the chutney "mixed" network tests in multiple ways
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => teor
 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Core Tor/Chutney
 * type:  defect => enhancement


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[tor-bugs] #20655 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run the chutney "mixed" network tests in multiple ways

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20655: Run the chutney "mixed" network tests in multiple ways
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 While working on ed25519 handshake thigns, I found that the "mixed"
 chutney network test was often inadequate for my needs:

* I wanted to try testing with clients and relays that are very old,
 while keeping the authorities up-to-date.
* I wanted `make test-network-all` to run the "mixed" test multiple
 times, with multiple older Tor instances.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20340 [Core Tor/Tor]: nice to have: test torrc for incompatible transistions of config values

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20340: nice to have: test torrc for incompatible transistions of config values
--+--
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.8
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 I think a pure command-line solution will only work in the case where no
 options have changed in Tor due to SETCONF etc.  If some options have
 changed their values, then we won't be able to tell whether the transition
 is allowed using only the commandline and the two torrc files.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20423 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clock jumps on FreeBSD relay due to hostname lookup timeouts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20423: Clock jumps on FreeBSD relay due to hostname lookup timeouts
+
 Reporter:  Felixix |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.9
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression freebsd  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:28 teor]:
 > We could improve this issue by avoiding calling getaddrinfo() or
 gethostbyname() so often (although it's only being called once per hour,
 which is probably the right frequency), or by somehow putting a lower
 timeout on it, or by calling it asynchronously.

 I think that "calling it asynchronously" is the right answer. We could do
 that either from a job that we pass to a worker thread, or using
 libevent's evdns resolver.  (I believe that might not initialize the
 libevent evdns resolver very well, though, so the "use a worker" thing
 might be a better option)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20564 [Metrics]: Add Jenkins configuration for running metrics-lib's unit tests and producing a .jar file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20564: Add Jenkins configuration for running metrics-lib's unit tests and
producing a .jar file
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by hiro):

 Iwakeh: sounds cool. I have updated the pull request to use links instead
 of copies (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/hiro/jenkins-
 tools.git/diff/?h=metrics-lib-jobs). Let me know how we move from here.

 Talk soon

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20242 [Core Tor/Tor]: update changelog to say how many fallbacks we removed and how many remain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20242: update changelog to say how many fallbacks we removed and how many 
remain
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201611  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  implemented =>


Comment:

 Sure you don't want to backport it to 0.2.9 ?  Otherwise it won't appear
 in changelogs that come out for future 0.2.9 versions?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7483 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update default torrc with new entries

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7483: Update default torrc with new entries
-+--
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by nickm):

 This ticket should close; the items enumerated in this ticket should
 either go into torrc.sample.in, or torrc.minimal.in-staging, or both.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19420 [Metrics/Onionoo]: No AS data for some relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19420: No AS data for some relays
-+---
 Reporter:  twim |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo 3.1-1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  as, asn, geoip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:  Onionoo 3.1-1.0.0 => Onionoo 3.1-1.1.0


Comment:

 This implementation will need more time. Adding it to the next milestone.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20566 [Metrics/Onionoo]: example page should have links for the mirror it is on

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20566: example page should have links for the mirror it is on
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo 3.1-1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please, see
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/onionoo.git?h=task-20566 my
 branch] with a suggestion in the top commit; the commit before that tweaks
 build.xml.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20647 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run chutney tests in Jenkins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20647: Run chutney tests in Jenkins
--+--
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  test  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  weasel|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => test
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.???


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20653 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test targets should gracefully handle missing dependencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20653: Test targets should gracefully handle missing dependencies
--+--
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  test  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => test
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.???


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20650 [Core Tor/Tor]: confusing "I need to load the permanent master identity key" line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20650: confusing "I need to load the permanent master identity key" line
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  s7r
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.3-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  backport => 029-backport
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


Comment:

 Worth fixing in 030. Let's consider this as well for 029 as we are still
 in alpha but after that we are stable so not sure this one qualifies as
 valid for stable backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20646 [Core Tor/Tor]: finish_writing_to_file_impl() should remove temporary file if replacing an existing one failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20646: finish_writing_to_file_impl() should remove temporary file if replacing 
an
existing one failed
--+
 Reporter:  fk|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.5-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20640 [- Select a component]: PROBLÈME CONNEXION

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20640: PROBLÈME CONNEXION
--+-
 Reporter:  jamesr10100   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by madystar):

 Bonjour,

 Essayez de ré-installer le Tor Browser Bundle en,

 (1) Supprimant, d'abord, le dossier contenant le Tor Browser Bundle,

 (2) Téléchargeant et installant le Tor Browser Bundle à ce lien
 https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en

 J'espère que cela va régler votre problème.

 Bonne journée!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14826 [Metrics/Onionoo]: backend: hourly update without crontab or the like

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14826: backend: hourly update without crontab or the like
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo 3.1-1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * severity:   => Normal
 * milestone:   => Onionoo 3.1-1.0.0


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19265 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Start hourly updater using a start/stop script rather than crontab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19265: Start hourly updater using a start/stop script rather than crontab
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo 3.1-1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Actually, this task is obsolete as Onionoo has an hourly scheduler build-
 in, cf. #14826.

 There are now examples for start-stop-scripts in the
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/doc/CollecTor/Operation
 mirror section] of Metrics' wiki.

 Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Cyberoam assists dictatorship regimes with murders

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Cyberoam assists dictatorship regimes with murders
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam Technologies, a Sophos Company

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Cyberoam assists dictatorship regimes with murders

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Cyberoam assists dictatorship regimes with murders
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Dox them!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Cyberoam assists dictatorship regimes with murders

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Cyberoam assists dictatorship regimes with murders
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 We can't fight directly with dictators, but we can to fight with humans
 (?) who assist dictators directly or indirectly. Humans (?) who lives in
 peaceful and free states yet and helps to oppress, to censor, to kill
 people in KZ, etc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Cyberoam assists dictatorship regimes with murders (was: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Cyberoam assists dictatorship regimes with murders
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Cyberoam developers are bloody butchers. Dox them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor, 2016-06
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


Comment:

 It's broken. Nobody want to hear about total brokeness of censorship
 resistance. obfs4proxy broken.  Cyberoam et al sells hardware to
 dictatorship state. Good luck.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20652 [Applications/Orbot]: need help getting obot to work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20652: need help getting obot to work
+---
 Reporter:  clumsy7521  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by arma):

 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Orbot


Comment:

 (Putting in Orbot component for posterity)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20652 [- Select a component]: need help getting obot to work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20652: need help getting obot to work
--+---
 Reporter:  clumsy7521|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 I'm afraid this site (trac) is for development, not for user support.

 It looks like the Orbot site has some options for support:
 https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot/

 All of that said, and though I'm not an Orbot user, that log you pasted
 looks fine to me -- that is, there is nothing in the log to indicate that
 anything is wrong.

 Good luck!

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