Re: [tor-bugs] #23699 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor exit node clashes with duckduckgo connectivity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23699: Tor exit node clashes with duckduckgo connectivity
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * Attachment "dodo2.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23699 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor exit node clashes with duckduckgo connectivity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23699: Tor exit node clashes with duckduckgo connectivity
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * Attachment "dodo1.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #23699 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor exit node clashes with duckduckgo connectivity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23699: Tor exit node clashes with duckduckgo connectivity
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 duckduckgo showing this message i dunno is it Tor exit node problem or
 duckduckgo problem:-

 "We've detected that you have connected over Tor. There appears to be an
 issue with the Tor Exit Node you are currently using. Please recreate your
 Tor circuit or restart your Tor browser in order to fix this. If this
 error persists, please let us know: error-lite-...@duckduckgo.com"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23698 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB has defualt cache , wouldnt that be risky ?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23698: TBB has defualt cache , wouldnt that be risky ?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * Attachment "totoupload3.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23698 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB has defualt cache , wouldnt that be risky ?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23698: TBB has defualt cache , wouldnt that be risky ?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * Attachment "totoupload1.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23698 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB has defualt cache , wouldnt that be risky ?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23698: TBB has defualt cache , wouldnt that be risky ?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * Attachment "totoupload2.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #23698 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB has defualt cache , wouldnt that be risky ?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23698: TBB has defualt cache , wouldnt that be risky ?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 if u search about:cache it will show u always that u have cache even if u
 just started TBB without searching for anything.

 check the photos for more details.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23697 [Webpages/Website]: List frontdesk, not execdir, on the contact page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23697: List frontdesk, not execdir, on the contact page
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Also notice that I'm shifting it away from helpdesk and towards frontdesk.
 The text on the page already says (and should continue to say) "Please
 don't use these contact addresses for helpdesk or user requests".

 Of course there will be people who misuse the address, but hopefully the
 rate shouldn't skyrocket, and once the support portal is up, maybe the
 rate will improve -- or in any case, maybe there will be an easy response
 to support questions of "there is a support portal, go there". :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23697 [Webpages/Website]: List frontdesk, not execdir, on the contact page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23697: List frontdesk, not execdir, on the contact page
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Here is my first iteration:
 {{{
 -  exec...@torproject.org is for questions and comments
 about
 -  Tor the non-profit corporation: trademark questions, affiliation
 -  and coordination, major gifts, contract inquiries, licensing and
 -  certification, etc.
 +  frontd...@rt.torproject.org is for questions and
 +  comments about Tor the non-profit organization: trademark
 questions,
 +  affiliation and coordination, major gifts, contract inquiries, etc.
 +  Please note that email is not a great approach for safe
 +  communication, so if you need privacy consider reaching us some
 +  other way. Also note that the frontdesk is currently handled by
 +  volunteers, so please be patient.
 +  
 }}}

 When we're done with this ticket, I think I will propose removing the
 donations@ address from this page next. :)

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[tor-bugs] #23697 [Webpages/Website]: List frontdesk, not execdir, on the contact page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23697: List frontdesk, not execdir, on the contact page
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The current situation, which we inherited slowly over time, is that
 https://www.torproject.org/about/contact#email lists only donations@ and
 execdir@ as contact addresses. The result is that execdir gets 5-10 new
 mails each day from people who are trying to get support or otherwise
 trying to reach a real human. I have no idea what donations@ gets, but
 probably at least that many since it's listed first.

 At the same time, we quietly created frontdesk@, with the goal of shifting
 traffic to it once the new support site is ready. Colin and Alison stepped
 in to be interim frontdesk people. For the past year or so I have been
 bouncing mails from execdir to frontdesk when I get around to doing it.
 But I haven't done that since July now, which means 300+ sad people who
 never even got an acknowledgement to their mail that they sent to (to be
 fair, from our perspective) the wrong place.

 But why wait for the support page to be ready? I think we should list
 frontdesk on the contact page now. Shari also pointed out that we could
 remove execdir, and then the frontdesk folks could fwd mail that the
 execdir folks should see -- rather than the current backwards approach.

 Now, another reason we had been delaying re-starting something like a
 helpdesk was because we had some psychotic behavior in the past where
 various people thought we needed to not purge incoming mails regularly. We
 still need to come up with a good data retention (well, more like enforced
 data deletion) policy, e.g. we scrub tickets after they've been in the
 system for 30 days. And we need to think through the safety aspects for
 our users of whether we have, or cause to exist, interesting metadata like
 network traces of people sending us email. Our reasoning so far has been
 "Well, we didn't encourage them to mail us, so it's not really our fault
 if they do. We hope they've thought it through", and I think we can do
 better.

 But in the mean time, I think we should be able to get started by putting
 a nice clear warning next to the frontdesk address on the contact page,
 telling people that it's not for support, and if they need good privacy
 they should contact us some other way (should we give some suggestions?
 maybe not?), and whatever else we want to warn them about before they
 decide to send the mail. Then the mails will go directly to the people who
 volunteered to read and handle them. And then we can work to make that
 frontdesk experience a more sustainable one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23696 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: scheduler_kist.c:520: kist_scheduler_schedule: Non-fatal assertion !((diff < 0)) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23696: Bug: scheduler_kist.c:520: kist_scheduler_schedule: Non-fatal assertion
!((diff < 0)) failed.
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arma):

 * cc: pastly (added)


Comment:

 Question for pastly:

 A) This is on Windows -- is the kist scheduler supposed to be picked here?
 Is it supposed to be kistlite or something? (I still haven't read all the
 code.)

 Question for network team person:

 B) Is the monotonic time thing supposed to work on Windows too?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23696 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: scheduler_kist.c:520: kist_scheduler_schedule: Non-fatal assertion !((diff < 0)) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23696: Bug: scheduler_kist.c:520: kist_scheduler_schedule: Non-fatal assertion
!((diff < 0)) failed.
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arma):

 * version:   => Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha


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[tor-bugs] #23696 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: scheduler_kist.c:520: kist_scheduler_schedule: Non-fatal assertion !((diff < 0)) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23696: Bug: scheduler_kist.c:520: kist_scheduler_schedule: Non-fatal assertion
!((diff < 0)) failed.
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-client
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Just upgraded to TBB 7.5a5 on Windows 10 and at startup:
 {{{
 Tor WARN: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: scheduler_kist.c:520:
 kist_scheduler_schedule: Non-fatal assertion !((diff < 0)) failed. (Future
 instances of this warning will be silenced.) (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha )
 Tor WARN: Bug: Non-fatal assertion !((diff < 0)) failed in
 kist_scheduler_schedule at scheduler_kist.c:520. (Stack trace not
 available) (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha )
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23692 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: tabs crash in Sandboxed Tor Browser with Tor Browser 7.5.a5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23692: tabs crash in Sandboxed Tor Browser with Tor Browser 7.5.a5
--+-
 Reporter:  pege  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser/sandboxed-tor-
 browser.git/commit/?id=f670368e5c12ad18fc7383fbbd8c75dfaa5ee768

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23692 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: tabs crash in Sandboxed Tor Browser with Tor Browser 7.5.a5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23692: tabs crash in Sandboxed Tor Browser with Tor Browser 7.5.a5
--+-
 Reporter:  pege  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by yawning):

 Looks like the system calls that firefox requires changed, so I need to
 figure out what more it wants and adjust the filter.  Not sure when I'll
 get to it, just use the stable release for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23695 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add resource on writing Rust FFI to doc/HACKING/GettingStartedRust.md

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23695: Add resource on writing Rust FFI to doc/HACKING/GettingStartedRust.md
-+
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust-pilot, tor-doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by isis):

 * keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must, rust-pilot, tor-doc => rust-pilot, tor-doc
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * version:   => Tor: 0.3.1.4-alpha
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 Tiny, 2-line doc patch in my `bug23695`
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/log/?h=bug23695 branch].
 (I assume this doesn't need a changes entry.)

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[tor-bugs] #23695 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add resource on writing Rust FFI to doc/HACKING/GettingStartedRust.md

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23695: Add resource on writing Rust FFI to doc/HACKING/GettingStartedRust.md
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must, rust-pilot,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tor-doc
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I forgot to put this in!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23493 [Core Tor/Tor]: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23493: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6  |  Actual Points:  0.7
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Thanks for these reviews, I won't be able to do any revisions for about a
 week.
 Let's work through it in Montreal.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13605 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13605: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, review-group-18  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  medium
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Looks great, but needs some more documentation.

 The man page should talk about ReducedExitPolicy under ExitPolicy:
 {{{
 If you want to use a reduced exit policy rather than the default exit
 policy, set "ReducedExitPolicy 1". If you want to _replace_ the default
 exit policy with your custom exit policy, end your exit policy with either
 a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you’re _augmenting_ (prepending
 to) the default or reduced exit policy.
 }}}


 The man page should document exactly what the reduced exit policy is.

 For example, here is the man page entry for the default exit policy:
 {{{
 The default exit policy is:

 reject *:25
 reject *:119
 reject *:135-139
 reject *:445
 reject *:563
 reject *:1214
 reject *:4661-4666
 reject *:6346-6429
 reject *:6699
 reject *:6881-6999
 accept *:*

 Since the default exit policy uses accept/reject *, it applies to both
 IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23694 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Updating the detailsURL in update responses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23694: Updating the detailsURL in update responses
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 I regenerated the update-responses xml files for alpha and release after
 updating `detailsURL` in `tools/update-responses/config.yml`, so the
 problem should be fixed.

 As it is quite late now I will post the patches for doing that tomorrow.

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[tor-bugs] #23694 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Updating the detailsURL in update responses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23694: Updating the detailsURL in update responses
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Some users reported on the blog that the link giving more details about
 the 7.0.6 update is broken: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-
 browser-706-released

 The `/blog` part needs to be removed to make the URL work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work (was: 0.3.1.7 daemon fails)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
--+
 Reporter:  alif  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7 daemon fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23693: 0.3.1.7 daemon fails
--+
 Reporter:  alif  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Can you paste your torrc file? It looks like you modified it from the
 original.

 Also, is this the Tor deb? Or did you install Tor from some other way?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7 daemon fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23693: 0.3.1.7 daemon fails
--+
 Reporter:  alif  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Is this repeatable?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7 daemon fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23693: 0.3.1.7 daemon fails
--+
 Reporter:  alif  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by arma:

Old description:

> On Ubuntu 14.04 I installed Tor version 0.3.1.7 (git-5fa14939bca67c23)
>
> Upon starting tor as a service, it soon crashes. The following are the
> log entries:
>
> Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [notice] Tor 0.3.1.7 (git-5fa14939bca67c23) opening
> log file.
> Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file
> /usr/share/tor/geoip.
> Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file
> /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
> Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [warn] Could not open "/usr/share/doc/tor/tor-exit-
> notice.html": Permission denied
> Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [warn] DirPortFrontPage file '/usr/share/doc/tor/tor-
> exit-notice.html' not found. Continuing anyway.
> Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
> Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
> Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Opening Socks listener on /var/run/tor/socks
> Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Opening Control listener on
> /var/run/tor/control
> Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory
> server
> Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with
> directory server
> Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 15%: Establishing an encrypted
> directory connection
> Sep 29 02:26:05.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus
> consensus
> Sep 29 02:26:05.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 25%: Loading networkstatus
> consensus
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug:
> ../src/or/cpuworker.c:499: cpuworker_queue_work: Assertion threadpool
> failed; aborting. (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: Assertion threadpool failed in
> cpuworker_queue_work at ../src/or/cpuworker.c:499. Stack trace: (on Tor
> 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
> [0x5624134a32b2] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug:
> /usr/bin/tor(tor_assertion_failed_+0x94) [0x5624134bb904] (on Tor 0.3.1.7
> )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug:
> /usr/bin/tor(cpuworker_queue_work+0x65) [0x56241345f395] (on Tor 0.3.1.7
> )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug:
> /usr/bin/tor(consdiffmgr_add_consensus+0x2f3) [0x562413450fe3] (on Tor
> 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug:
> /usr/bin/tor(networkstatus_set_current_consensus+0x9f1) [0x562413395971]
> (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug:
> /usr/bin/tor(connection_dir_reached_eof+0xc09) [0x5624134678d9] (on Tor
> 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x105e6b)
> [0x562413440e6b] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x4e921)
> [0x562413389921] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
> gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x754) [0x7eff0e3a9f24] (on Tor
> 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x24d)
> [0x56241338aa4d] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x1c35)
> [0x56241338e215] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19)
> [0x5624133863c9] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
> gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5) [0x7eff0d556f45] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
> Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x4b41b)
> [0x56241338641b] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )__

New description:

 On Ubuntu 14.04 I installed Tor version 0.3.1.7 (git-5fa14939bca67c23)

 Upon starting tor as a service, it soon crashes. The following are the log
 entries:

 {{{
 Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [notice] Tor 0.3.1.7 (git-5fa14939bca67c23) opening
 log file.
 Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
 Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file
 /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
 Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [warn] Could not open "/usr/share/doc/tor/tor-exit-
 notice.html": Permission denied
 Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [warn] DirPortFrontPage file '/usr/share/doc/tor/tor-
 exit-notice.html' not found. Continuing anyway.
 Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
 Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
 Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Opening Socks listener on /var/run/tor/socks
 Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Opening Control listener on
 /var/run/tor/control
 Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory
 server
 Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with
 directory server
 Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] 

Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7 daemon fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23693: 0.3.1.7 daemon fails
--+
 Reporter:  alif  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arma):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #23693 [- Select a component]: 0.3.1.7 daemon fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23693: 0.3.1.7 daemon fails
--+--
 Reporter:  alif  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 On Ubuntu 14.04 I installed Tor version 0.3.1.7 (git-5fa14939bca67c23)

 Upon starting tor as a service, it soon crashes. The following are the log
 entries:

 Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [notice] Tor 0.3.1.7 (git-5fa14939bca67c23) opening
 log file.
 Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
 Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file
 /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
 Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [warn] Could not open "/usr/share/doc/tor/tor-exit-
 notice.html": Permission denied
 Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [warn] DirPortFrontPage file '/usr/share/doc/tor/tor-
 exit-notice.html' not found. Continuing anyway.
 Sep 29 02:26:03.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
 Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
 Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Opening Socks listener on /var/run/tor/socks
 Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Opening Control listener on
 /var/run/tor/control
 Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory
 server
 Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with
 directory server
 Sep 29 02:26:04.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 15%: Establishing an encrypted
 directory connection
 Sep 29 02:26:05.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus
 consensus
 Sep 29 02:26:05.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 25%: Loading networkstatus
 consensus
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug:
 ../src/or/cpuworker.c:499: cpuworker_queue_work: Assertion threadpool
 failed; aborting. (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: Assertion threadpool failed in
 cpuworker_queue_work at ../src/or/cpuworker.c:499. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
 [0x5624134a32b2] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_assertion_failed_+0x94) [0x5624134bb904] (on Tor 0.3.1.7
 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(cpuworker_queue_work+0x65)
 [0x56241345f395] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(consdiffmgr_add_consensus+0x2f3) [0x562413450fe3] (on Tor
 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(networkstatus_set_current_consensus+0x9f1) [0x562413395971]
 (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(connection_dir_reached_eof+0xc09) [0x5624134678d9] (on Tor
 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x105e6b)
 [0x562413440e6b] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x4e921) [0x562413389921]
 (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x754) [0x7eff0e3a9f24] (on Tor
 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x24d)
 [0x56241338aa4d] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x1c35)
 [0x56241338e215] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19)
 [0x5624133863c9] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5) [0x7eff0d556f45] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Sep 29 02:26:08.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x4b41b) [0x56241338641b]
 (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )__

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23688 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add GitLab CI script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23688: Add GitLab CI script
--+---
 Reporter:  krichter  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Some comments and questions about this patch:

 - the `before_script` is downloading some deb file and installing them
 without checking their checksum, so we don't really know what we are
 installing.
 - where is this gitlab-ci file going to be used? I think doing a full
 rebuild of `tor-browser-bundle.git` on each commit is going to use a lot
 of resources.
 - why is the script first starting a build with LXC, and after doing that
 starting an other one in the vagrant directory?
 - if I understand correctly, the `image: ubuntu:zesty` line means that the
 script is run inside a docker container. Does creating LXC containers or
 Virtualbox VMs with vagrant work inside a docker container?
 - starting with version 7.5a5, we are now using `rbm` and `tor-browser-
 build.git` rather than `gitian` and `tor-browser-bundle.git` for new
 development.

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[tor-bugs] #23692 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: tabs crash in Sandboxed Tor Browser with Tor Browser 7.5.a5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23692: tabs crash in Sandboxed Tor Browser with Tor Browser 7.5.a5
--+-
 Reporter:  pege  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 After being updated to 7.5a5 tabs in Sandboxed Tor Browser (0.0.14-dev
 (35d5080)) keep crashing.

 Reproduce:
 • update to Tor Browser 7.5a5
 • open new tab
 • enter any address
 • tab crashes

 debug output:
 {{{
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11: New connection: 5
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Protocol 11.0
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Auth: 18 | 2 | 16 | 0
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#1): QueryExtension: 'BIG-
 REQUESTS'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#5): QueryExtension:
 'XKEYBOARD'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#00041): QueryExtension: 'RANDR'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#00042): QueryExtension: 'Generic
 Event Extension'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#00073): QueryExtension: 'XFIXES'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#00075): QueryExtension:
 'Composite'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#00077): QueryExtension: 'DAMAGE'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#00079): QueryExtension: 'SHAPE'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#00091): QueryExtension: 'SYNC'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#00093): QueryExtension: 'SYNC'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#00094): QueryExtension: 'MIT-
 SHM'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Scheduling QueryExtension for
 rejection: 'MIT-SHM'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Rep(#00094): Rewriting reply:
 QueryExtension rejection: MIT-SHM
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#00095): QueryExtension:
 'XInputExtension'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#00096): QueryExtension:
 'XInputExtension'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(5): Req(#00098): QueryExtension:
 'XInputExtension'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11: New connection: 6
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(6): Protocol 11.0
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(6): Auth: 18 | 2 | 16 | 0
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(6): Req(#1): QueryExtension: 'BIG-
 REQUESTS'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 sandbox: X11(6): Req(#5): QueryExtension:
 'XKEYBOARD'
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 firefox: Sandbox: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) failed:
 Function not implemented
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 firefox: [Parent 3] WARNING: pipe error (64):
 Connection reset by peer: file /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 0a9793458e9d/ipc/chromium/src/chrome/common/ipc_channel_posix.cc, line 322
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 firefox: [Parent 3] WARNING: pipe error (66):
 Connection reset by peer: file /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 0a9793458e9d/ipc/chromium/src/chrome/common/ipc_channel_posix.cc, line 322
 2017/09/29 02:01:22 firefox: ###!!! [Parent][MessageChannel] Error:
 (msgtype=0x2C0086,name=PBrowser::Msg_Destroy) Channel error: cannot
 send/recv
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23079 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support 80-bit Onion Model In Perpetuity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23079: Support 80-bit Onion Model In Perpetuity
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 saw this on one of the forums, adding my voice since i use it to get onto
 the ipv6 net. i wouldn't mind if i had to explicitly enable the v2 client
 option via torrc, or load it via a compiled module, but would mind if it
 went away completely, at least until an ipv6 interface can be done with
 v3. that way, if it's a concern, vanilla users will only see and use the
 standard v3 client. obviously the v2 hsdir subsystem must still run by
 default. thanks for your consideration.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, cpu, tor-sched, 0.3.2.2  |  Actual Points:
  -alpha-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pastly):

 > I encourage somebody -- maybe pastly? -- to !fixup that into pastly's
 ce363803 commit, so we can erase the history of this buglet.

 Done.

 Running on a relay.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, cpu, tor-sched, 0.3.2.2  |  Actual Points:
  -alpha-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 {{{
 diff --git a/src/or/scheduler_kist.c b/src/or/scheduler_kist.c
 index 7b53f08..7f5a720 100644
 --- a/src/or/scheduler_kist.c
 +++ b/src/or/scheduler_kist.c
 @@ -417,12 +417,12 @@ update_socket_written(socket_table_t *table,
 channel_t *c
 han, size_t bytes)
   * have to, and we now do this in more than once place in
 kist_scheduler_run.
   */
  static void
 -add_chan_to_readd_list(smartlist_t *to_readd, channel_t *chan)
 +add_chan_to_readd_list(smartlist_t **to_readd, channel_t *chan)
  {
 -if (!to_readd) {
 -  to_readd = smartlist_new();
 +if (!*to_readd) {
 +  *to_readd = smartlist_new();
  }
 -smartlist_add(to_readd, chan);
 +smartlist_add(*to_readd, chan);
  }

  /*
 @@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ kist_scheduler_run(void)
   "likely the issue) and stop scheduling it this round.",
   channel_state_to_string(chan->state));
  chan->scheduler_state = SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE;
 -add_chan_to_readd_list(to_readd, chan);
 +add_chan_to_readd_list(_readd, chan);
  continue;
}
  }
 @@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ kist_scheduler_run(void)
 * in the next scheduling round.
 */
chan->scheduler_state = SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE;
 -  add_chan_to_readd_list(to_readd, chan);
 +  add_chan_to_readd_list(_readd, chan);
log_debug(LD_SCHED, "chan=%" PRIu64 " now waiting_to_write",
  chan->global_identifier);
  } else {
 }}}

 is now the patch I am running on moria1. :)

 I encourage somebody -- maybe pastly? -- to !fixup that into pastly's
 ce363803 commit, so we can erase the history of this buglet.

 David, I wonder if this fix helps in your crazy debugging stuff too?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, cpu, tor-sched, 0.3.2.2  |  Actual Points:
  -alpha-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:7 pastly]:
 > If you're picky like arma, and thus want the new function in one commit
 and the bugfix in another, you will enjoy `bug23676_032_02`.

 Ok, back we all go to remedial pointer school. What's wrong with this
 function:
 {{{
 +static void
 +add_chan_to_readd_list(smartlist_t *to_readd, channel_t *chan)
 +{
 +if (!to_readd) {
 +  to_readd = smartlist_new();
 +}
 +smartlist_add(to_readd, chan);
 +}
 }}}

 Hint: what happens when the to_readd argument is NULL? We make a
 smartlist_new, and assign it to this local variable, and then add
 something to it, and then... we return?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23691 [Core Tor/Tor]: leak in test_util_decompress_dos_impl()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23691: leak in test_util_decompress_dos_impl()
+
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 ok; merging!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23691 [Core Tor/Tor]: leak in test_util_decompress_dos_impl()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23691: leak in test_util_decompress_dos_impl()
+
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 The patch looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23691 [Core Tor/Tor]: leak in test_util_decompress_dos_impl()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23691: leak in test_util_decompress_dos_impl()
+
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by isis):

 * keywords:   => 0.3.2.2-alpha-must


Comment:

 Not really a "must" per se, but I'm nominating for 0.3.2.2-alpha inclusion
 since it's small and "make check" shouldn't ever be broken for
 release/maint or an alpha, imho.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23691 [Core Tor/Tor]: leak in test_util_decompress_dos_impl()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23691: leak in test_util_decompress_dos_impl()
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Patch in https://oniongit.eu/catalyst/tor/merge_requests/7

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23551 [Core Tor/Tor]: src/common/compress.c:576: tor_compress_process: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23551: src/common/compress.c:576: tor_compress_process: Non-fatal assertion
+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.5-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis|Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23551 [Core Tor/Tor]: src/common/compress.c:576: tor_compress_process: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23551: src/common/compress.c:576: tor_compress_process: Non-fatal assertion
+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.5-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis|Sponsor:
+

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay. Merged to maint-0.3.1 and master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23691 [Core Tor/Tor]: leak in test_util_decompress_dos_impl()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23691: leak in test_util_decompress_dos_impl()
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #23691 [- Select a component]: leak in test_util_decompress_dos_impl()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23691: leak in test_util_decompress_dos_impl()
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 On master, `make check` results in multiple errors of the form
 {{{
 =
 ==52419==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

 Direct leak of 3145728 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
 #0 0x7f4b123de602 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libasan.so.2+0x98602)
 #1 0x55a23af687ea in tor_malloc_ src/common/util.c:150
 #2 0x55a23af68891 in tor_malloc_zero_ src/common/util.c:178
 #3 0x55a23aa4a70a in test_util_decompress_dos_impl
 src/test/test_util.c:2555
 #4 0x55a23aa4a70a in test_util_decompress_dos
 src/test/test_util.c:2597
 #5 0x55a23aaa7468 in testcase_run_bare_ src/ext/tinytest.c:106
 #6 0x55a23aaa78a0 in testcase_run_one src/ext/tinytest.c:253
 #7 0x55a23aaa8dd3 in tinytest_main src/ext/tinytest.c:435
 #8 0x55a23a69ed98 in main src/test/testing_common.c:319
 #9 0x7f4b1003a82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)

 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 3145728 byte(s) leaked in 3 allocation(s).
 FAIL src/test/test (exit status: 23)
 }}}

 It looks like a simple case of failing to free `input`; I'll write up a
 patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23688 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add GitLab CI script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23688: Add GitLab CI script
--+--
 Reporter:  krichter  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by krichter):

 another attempt to send the patch as attachement (which clearly isn't spam
 as trac can see from the form of it) - maybe I can post another link:
 https://gitlab.com/krichter/tor-browser-bundle/merge_requests/1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23690 [Core Tor/Tor]: [err] buffers.c:651: buf_flush_to_socket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23690: [err] buffers.c:651: buf_flush_to_socket
+
 Reporter:  Felixix |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by arma):

 I suspect #23149.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23690 [Core Tor/Tor]: [err] buffers.c:651: buf_flush_to_socket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23690: [err] buffers.c:651: buf_flush_to_socket
+
 Reporter:  Felixix |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Description changed by arma:

Old description:

> Up with Tor 321a since 4 days 19 hours ( before Tor 315a ) like 2 sister
> relays. On FreeBSD. Lost all circuits and files on error:
>

> Sep 26 18:59:37.000 [err]
> tor_assertion_failed_: Bug: src/common/buffers.c:651:
> buf_flush_to_socket: Assertion *buf_flushlen <= buf->datalen failed;
> aborting.
>
> Sep 26 18:59:37.000 [err] Bug:
> Assertion *buf_flushlen <= buf->datalen failed in
> buf_flush_to_socket at src/common/buffers.c:651. Stack trace:
> 0x11a2bf8  at /usr/local/bin/tor
> 0x11bd6f7  at /usr/local/bin/tor
> 0x11a421a  at /usr/local/bin/tor
> 0x10774eb  at /usr/local/bin/tor
> 0x801b37d3e  at
> /usr/local/lib/libevent-2.1.so.6
> 0x801b33cfe  at /usr/local/lib/libevent-2.1.so.6
> 0x1072d15  at /usr/local/bin/tor
> 0x1075119  at /usr/local/bin/tor
> 0x1070b69  at /usr/local/bin/tor
> 0x1070a61 <_start+0x1a1> at /usr/local/bin/tor
>

> 2017-09-26_18-59-00, time of error:
>   load averages:  1.03,  0.94,  0.78... 4 cores
>   NMBC: 2959/42587/45546/2035262 mbuf clusters in use
> (current/cache/total/max)
>   Mem: 2236M Active, 1269M Inact, 7162M Wired, 61M Cache, 21G Free
>   Swap: 4096M Total, 4096M Free
>
> [1] Attachment buf_flush_to_socket_Assertion_failed.tar.gz
>
> [2] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
> relays/2017-September/013082.html and following.
>
> Cheers!

New description:

 Up with Tor 321a since 4 days 19 hours ( before Tor 315a ) like 2 sister
 relays. On FreeBSD. Lost all circuits and files on error:

 {{{
 Sep 26 18:59:37.000 [err]
 tor_assertion_failed_: Bug: src/common/buffers.c:651:
 buf_flush_to_socket: Assertion *buf_flushlen <= buf->datalen failed;
 aborting.
 }}}
 {{{
 Sep 26 18:59:37.000 [err] Bug:
 Assertion *buf_flushlen <= buf->datalen failed in
 buf_flush_to_socket at src/common/buffers.c:651. Stack trace:
 0x11a2bf8  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x11bd6f7  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x11a421a  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x10774eb  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x801b37d3e  at
 /usr/local/lib/libevent-2.1.so.6
 0x801b33cfe  at /usr/local/lib/libevent-2.1.so.6
 0x1072d15  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x1075119  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x1070b69  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x1070a61 <_start+0x1a1> at /usr/local/bin/tor
 }}}
 {{{
 2017-09-26_18-59-00, time of error:
   load averages:  1.03,  0.94,  0.78... 4 cores
   NMBC: 2959/42587/45546/2035262 mbuf clusters in use
 (current/cache/total/max)
   Mem: 2236M Active, 1269M Inact, 7162M Wired, 61M Cache, 21G Free
   Swap: 4096M Total, 4096M Free
 }}}

 [1] Attachment buf_flush_to_socket_Assertion_failed.tar.gz

 [2] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2017-September/013082.html and following.

 Cheers!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23690 [Core Tor/Tor]: [err] buffers.c:651: buf_flush_to_socket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23690: [err] buffers.c:651: buf_flush_to_socket
+
 Reporter:  Felixix |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by arma):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23690 [- Select a component]: [err] buffers.c:651: buf_flush_to_socket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23690: [err] buffers.c:651: buf_flush_to_socket
--+
 Reporter:  Felixix   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * cc: ahf (added)
 * keywords:   => 0.3.2.2-alpha-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23688 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add GitLab CI script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23688: Add GitLab CI script
--+--
 Reporter:  krichter  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by krichter):

 now I am... that's great and not frustrating - as is getting all these
 email for you...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23688 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add GitLab CI script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23688: Add GitLab CI script
--+--
 Reporter:  krichter  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by krichter):

 So, after I posted a link, I'm not allow to comment and upload

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23690 [- Select a component]: [err] buffers.c:651: buf_flush_to_socket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23690: [err] buffers.c:651: buf_flush_to_socket
--+
 Reporter:  Felixix   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Felixix):

 * Attachment "buf_flush_to_socket_Assertion_failed.tar.gz" added.


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[tor-bugs] #23690 [- Select a component]: [err] buffers.c:651: buf_flush_to_socket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23690: [err] buffers.c:651: buf_flush_to_socket
--+
 Reporter:  Felixix   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Up with Tor 321a since 4 days 19 hours ( before Tor 315a ) like 2 sister
 relays. On FreeBSD. Lost all circuits and files on error:


 Sep 26 18:59:37.000 [err]
 tor_assertion_failed_: Bug: src/common/buffers.c:651:
 buf_flush_to_socket: Assertion *buf_flushlen <= buf->datalen failed;
 aborting.

 Sep 26 18:59:37.000 [err] Bug:
 Assertion *buf_flushlen <= buf->datalen failed in
 buf_flush_to_socket at src/common/buffers.c:651. Stack trace:
 0x11a2bf8  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x11bd6f7  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x11a421a  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x10774eb  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x801b37d3e  at
 /usr/local/lib/libevent-2.1.so.6
 0x801b33cfe  at /usr/local/lib/libevent-2.1.so.6
 0x1072d15  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x1075119  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x1070b69  at /usr/local/bin/tor
 0x1070a61 <_start+0x1a1> at /usr/local/bin/tor


 2017-09-26_18-59-00, time of error:
   load averages:  1.03,  0.94,  0.78... 4 cores
   NMBC: 2959/42587/45546/2035262 mbuf clusters in use
 (current/cache/total/max)
   Mem: 2236M Active, 1269M Inact, 7162M Wired, 61M Cache, 21G Free
   Swap: 4096M Total, 4096M Free

 [1] Attachment buf_flush_to_socket_Assertion_failed.tar.gz

 [2] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2017-September/013082.html and following.

 Cheers!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23689 [- Select a component]: Add GitLab CI script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23689: Add GitLab CI script
--+-
 Reporter:  krichter  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by krichter):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 The form allows to post an infinite number of duplicates of the same issue
 after failing the captcha 10 times which seems to fail permanently.

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[tor-bugs] #23689 [- Select a component]: Add GitLab CI script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23689: Add GitLab CI script
--+
 Reporter:  krichter  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 As [suggested and merged for
 tor](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22891) I'd like to
 propose a GitLab CI script for Tor Browser. My intention to be able to
 build `tor-browser-bundle` locally which I tried for some time and failed
 because of error which I hope will be brought to the attention of devs
 automatically rather than after painful reports.

 The script currently uses Ubuntu 17.04 only, but since GitLab CI is based
 on Docker images, the number of possible OS to test on is basically
 infinite.

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[tor-bugs] #23688 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add GitLab CI script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23688: Add GitLab CI script
--+--
 Reporter:  krichter  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 As [suggested and merged for
 tor](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22891) I'd like to
 propose a GitLab CI script for Tor Browser. My intention to be able to
 build `tor-browser-bundle` locally which I tried for some time and failed
 because of error which I hope will be brought to the attention of devs
 automatically rather than after painful reports.

 The script currently uses Ubuntu 17.04 only, but since GitLab CI is based
 on Docker images, the number of possible OS to test on is basically
 infinite.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS Everywhere randomly disappears from the mobile browser UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: HTTPS Everywhere randomly disappears from the mobile browser UI
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:28 dmeek94@…]:
 > Ok thank you very much for your help its greatly appreciated.
 > Just as a last note ive had this a few times also, is it ok to ask
 advice for this or would i have to open a new ticket?
 > We've detected that you have connected over Tor. There appears to be an
 issue with the Tor Exit Node you are currently using. Please recreate your
 Tor circuit or restart your Tor browser in order to fix this. If this
 error persists, please let us know: error-lite-...@duckduckgo.com

 It's an issue with DuckDuckGo so it isn't fit for the Tor Project's bug
 tracker :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:14 dcf]:
 > Trac puts a little icon in front of external links, and the icon is
 actually a `span` element that contains a zero-width space

 Try pasting the highlighted stuff into the tor browser window directly. If
 it's a real http url, it will try to load. If it is not, it will do
 nothing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 I would guess that this is partially a Trac issue. It's what arma said in
 comment:12. Trac puts a little icon in front of external links, and the
 icon is actually a `span` element that contains a zero-width space
 ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-width_space U+200B]). It's the
 presence of this invisible character that makes the browser go to a search
 engine.

 If you copy the link and are very careful not to include the icon when you
 highlight, then it will work and not go to a search engine. Also if you
 right-click and Copy Link Location.

 Try copying a link and pasting it into a Vim buffer. Vim will make the
 zero-width space visible and color it blue:
 {{{#!html
 200bhttp://ozmh2zkwx5cjuzopui64csb5ertcooi5vya6c2gm4e3vcvf2c2qvjiyd.onion
 }}}

 The same thing happens with non-onion links, like the one Dbryrtfbcbhgf
 posted in comment:13.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23551 [Core Tor/Tor]: src/common/compress.c:576: tor_compress_process: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23551: src/common/compress.c:576: tor_compress_process: Non-fatal assertion
+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.5-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis|Sponsor:
+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 ahf]:
 > I have a proposed fix for this issue. It can be found in the following
 branches:
 >
 > - for tor.git's master branch:
 https://gitlab.com/ahf/tor/merge_requests/19
 > - for tor.git's maint-0.3.1 branch:
 https://gitlab.com/ahf/tor/merge_requests/20

 - `c2fac2c6` LGTM (yay test driven dev)
 - `44dc4b73` LGTM
 - `c3b7f9d7` LGTM
 - `a196fdb6` LGTM

 FWIW this didn't require any libzstd knowledge to review, so I feel
 comfortable that my assessment is correct. If someone else still wants to
 also review, though, please feel free.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS Everywhere randomly disappears from the mobile browser UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: HTTPS Everywhere randomly disappears from the mobile browser UI
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dmeek94@…):

 Ok thank you very much for your help its greatly appreciated.
 Just as a last note ive had this a few times also, is it ok to ask advice
 for this or would i have to open a new ticket?
 We've detected that you have connected over Tor. There appears to be an
 issue with the Tor Exit Node you are currently using. Please recreate your
 Tor circuit or restart your Tor browser in order to fix this. If this
 error persists, please let us know: error-lite-...@duckduckgo.com

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16553 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Add support for searching by host name

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16553: Add support for searching by host name
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I would find this useful to have for https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetRadar
 but it somewhat depends on proper reverse DNS data (currently onionoo does
 not provide raw PTR data, see #18342).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22891 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add GitLab CI configs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22891: Add GitLab CI configs
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ci, continuous-integration,  |  implemented
  testing, best-practice, unit-testing, new- |  Actual Points:
  developers, review-group-22, review-group-23   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf, dgoulet |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Yay! Thank you, hiro!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:12 arma]:
 > Next thought, I wonder if what you are pasting has some letters at the
 front, before the http://.
 In the video I made it shows that there is no space nor no extra
 characters before HTTP
 https://www.expirebox.com/download/d9d3fe690a576051e0694686b46f8dc6.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Next thought, I wonder if what you are pasting has some letters at the
 front, before the http://.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:10 cypherpunks]:
 > Oh right I only understood the issue now, it's not about providing
 search suggestions but it would go to the DuckDuckGo search engine
 directly. Nice catch! (BTW it happened for me sometimes when selecting
 some links and taking them to a new tab, a DDG search would happen despite
 the URL having `https://`)
 Great thanks for the confirmation that your were also able to reproduce
 the bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Oh right I only understood the issue now, it's not about providing search
 suggestions but it would go to the DuckDuckGo search engine directly. Nice
 catch! (BTW it happened for me sometimes when selecting some links and
 taking them to a new tab, a DDG search would happen despite the URL having
 `https://`)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 I can Confirm that that option is disabled and I was able to capture
 another video reproducing the bug and I capture my old Tor Browser data
 file. Here it is
 https://www.expirebox.com/download/d9d3fe690a576051e0694686b46f8dc6.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:7 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > Enabling "Provide search Suggestions" does cause the bug to occur but I
 did not manually enable them after the fresh install.

 So it's enabled in `about:preferences#search` for your fresh install?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > I'm pretty sure you modified the option for search suggestions in
 `about:preferences#search`.
 I just downloaded Tor Browser form
 https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/7.5a5/
 Then I opened it and changed the security settings to high, I then opened
 when to https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/NextGenOnions
 in Safari and copied
 ​http://ozmh2zkwx5cjuzopui64csb5ertcooi5vya6c2gm4e3vcvf2c2qvjiyd.onion
 and pasted it into Tor Browser 7.5a5 and then I recorded the bug and
 reported it. I did not change anything else before the recording.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I'm pretty sure you modified the option for search suggestions in
 `about:preferences#search`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS Everywhere randomly disappears from the mobile browser UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: HTTPS Everywhere randomly disappears from the mobile browser UI
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Well yes seems there's no issue :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 in the first part of the video when I paste the link into the url bar
 there is a popup right under the url bar that says the link url and --
 Search with duckduckgo. This occurs on 00:01 in the video.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 This was a fresh install of 7.5a5 and I set the security settings to high
 then all I do it copy
 ​http://ozmh2zkwx5cjuzopui64csb5ertcooi5vya6c2gm4e3vcvf2c2qvjiyd.onion
 and paste it into the url bar, and it searches it with my default search
 engine.
 After another fresh install the bug is not occurring, But I got a screen
 recording while it was occurring the first time.
 Here is the screen recording
 https://www.expirebox.com/download/530f37ff9425617b71855c6e6e3f428d.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20375 [Applications/Tor Browser]: warn users when entering fullscreen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20375: warn users when entering fullscreen
-+-
 Reporter:  fem  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201708R, tbb- |
  backported |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > Rhe warning popup is Immediately dismissed when I lick on a link and a
 new page loads.
 :-))) Don't lick the links :-)))
 > example,
 > open tor browser and then right as it pops up click on "Test tor network
 settings" and then maximize tor, the page takes around 5 seconds to load
 so the full screen warning pops up and then is Immediately dismissed when
 the page loads.
 It warned you, but you loaded a new page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23207 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Registration on trac seems to be counterintuitive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23207: Registration on trac seems to be counterintuitive
--+--
 Reporter:  mail@…|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by qbi):

 Thanks for your comment.
 After playing around I found out that it depends on the length of the
 username. So if a username is up to 4 characters long, trac doesn't do the
 EMail oder RegexCheck. In this case one has to solve a CAPTCHA and that's
 it. If the username is longer than 4 characters, trac requires an `@` in
 the username and accepts this as a email address.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS Everywhere randomly disappears from the mobile browser UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: HTTPS Everywhere randomly disappears from the mobile browser UI
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dmeek94@…):

 So no https isnt really the problem anymore, but the insecure website is.
 Does that mean i have to close this support?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use. (was: Wh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23685 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Could gitweb.tpo send Content-Type text/html for some files?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23685: Could gitweb.tpo send Content-Type text/html for some files?
-+
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by ln5):

 Woha, that was fast! Thanks Sebastian, thanks weasel.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo or any default search engine you use.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Does it happen in stable (7.0.6) too?

 Did you change anything in your 7.5a5?

 Are you sure you're putting it into the url bar?

 This sounds like a "surely that behavior doesn't actually happen"
 situation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS Everywhere randomly disappears from the mobile browser UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: HTTPS Everywhere randomly disappears from the mobile browser UI
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dmeek94@…):

 It was an issue,  but last day and half it stopped disappearing, not long
 after i opened this ticket ( typical )
 Your dead on about the certificate thing, ive just come across something
 about an ssl certificate in an app i was running by chance. I have no idea
 how to fix that.
 There are loads of sites that the insecure website error on eg.
 /hiddenwikitor.com/ also guardianhometechnologies.com/home-automation.html
 but many more, i also come across one on the guarian project website with
 a cross through it saying something about images but for life of me i cant
 find it again to show you

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23685 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Could gitweb.tpo send Content-Type text/html for some files?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23685: Could gitweb.tpo send Content-Type text/html for some files?
-+
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by Sebastian):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 thanks

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23684 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make it easier for mobile app developers to embed tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23684: Make it easier for mobile app developers to embed tor
--+
 Reporter:  hellais   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, cpu, tor-sched, 0.3.2.2  |  Actual Points:
  -alpha-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:13 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:12 dgoulet]:
 > > The offending party is the `circuitmux_append_destroy_cell()` which
 basically creates one DESTROY cell, push it on the cmux queue and then
 flushes it with `channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit()`. That function
 does MANY thins and among those, it writes the cell directly to the outbuf
 if the `outgoing_queue` of the channel is empty (which turns out to be
 ALWAYS empty...).
 >
 > Does that mean the destroy cell is going out before the other cells,
 with the new kist scheduler?

 I don't think so because at that point, the circuit cell queue is empty.
 The destroy cell is only flushed if the outbuf of the connection is empty.

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[tor-bugs] #23687 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist: Channel in waiting_to_write goes missing until a destroy cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23687: kist: Channel in waiting_to_write goes missing until a destroy cell
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-sched, kist
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Here is the gist with some logs I added to tor:

 {{{
 Sep 28 20:03:09.472 [info] kist_scheduler_run(): Case 4: channel 471. Out
 queue len: 0, in queue len: 0, cmux queue len: 15. Is there more to flush:
 yes. Channel state 'open' (sched: 3)
 Sep 28 20:03:09.472 [info] channel_write_cell_queue_entry(): Channel 471
 cell sent. cmux queue len: 15
 Sep 28 20:03:09.483 [info] kist_scheduler_run(): Case 3: channel 471. Out
 queue len: 0, in queue len: 0, cmux queue len: 14. Is there more to flush:
 yes. Channel state 'open' (sched: 2)
 Sep 28 20:03:09.484 [info] channel_write_to_kernel(): Writing 0 bytes to
 kernel for chan 471
 [...]
 Sep 28 20:04:13.738 [info] circuitmux_append_destroy_cell(): Destroy cell
 on channel 471
 Sep 28 20:04:13.738 [info] channel_write_cell_queue_entry(): Channel 471
 cell sent. cmux queue len: 0
 }}}

 Notice the 60+ seconds gap from the channel going to
 `SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE` (sched: 2) and then nothing until a destroy
 cell happens. Then suddenly at that point, no more cells in the cmux queue
 nor any calls to the flush function.

 So questions are:

 1. Why the channel in waiting_to_write never got scheduled again?

 2. Where are those cells from the cmux queue? Is something else in tor
 moving those to the outbuf?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23685 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Could gitweb.tpo send Content-Type text/html for some files?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23685: Could gitweb.tpo send Content-Type text/html for some files?
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Sebastian):

 * owner:  tor-gitadm => tpa
 * component:  Internal Services/Service - git => Internal Services/Tor
 Sysadmin Team


Comment:

 Please add the line

 {{{
 enable-html-serving=1
 }}}

  to /etc/cgitrc on vineale

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, cpu, tor-sched, 0.3.2.2  |  Actual Points:
  -alpha-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:12 dgoulet]:
 > The offending party is the `circuitmux_append_destroy_cell()` which
 basically creates one DESTROY cell, push it on the cmux queue and then
 flushes it with `channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit()`. That function
 does MANY thins and among those, it writes the cell directly to the outbuf
 if the `outgoing_queue` of the channel is empty (which turns out to be
 ALWAYS empty...).

 Does that mean the destroy cell is going out before the other cells, with
 the new kist scheduler?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 When I changed my default search engine to twitter under preferences , it
 will send twitter the V3 unencrypted link!
 
https://twitter.com/search?q=%E2%80%8Bhttp%3A%2F%2Fozmh2zkwx5cjuzopui64csb5ertcooi5vya6c2gm4e3vcvf2c2qvjiyd.onion=Firefox
 =desktop-search.

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[tor-bugs] #23686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When "http://" is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the text after "http://" on duckduckgo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23686: When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the 
text
after "http://; on duckduckgo
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When "http://; is in front of a V3 link, Tor browser will search the
 entire link on duckduckgo,
 ​copy and paste the link below straight into the Tor browser URL field and
 click GO.
 If the user is trying to keep their hidden service secret, this bug will
 cause duckduckgo to see the unencrypted link, allowing attackers to easily
 find their hidden service if DuckDuckGo is compromised.
 http://ozmh2zkwx5cjuzopui64csb5ertcooi5vya6c2gm4e3vcvf2c2qvjiyd.onion

 Tor Browser 7.5a5

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23685 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Could gitweb.tpo send Content-Type text/html for some files?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23685: Could gitweb.tpo send Content-Type text/html for some files?
-+
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by ln5):

 I've figured out that we run cgit https://git.zx2c4.com/cgit/about/ and
 that cgitrc according to its man page has both enable-html-serving and
 repo.enable-html-serving which looks promising.

 One question is if we want mimetype handling, based on "file type" I
 assume. For my neads, something like Githubs README.md would work equally
 well. Haven't checked if that's a thing in cgit yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, cpu, tor-sched, 0.3.2.2  |  Actual Points:
  -alpha-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 I've been debugging this one for a while and I think we have more problems
 then just this. However, I can explain how we get in this situation where
 we have a channel scheduled with *no* cells to flush.

 The offending party is the `circuitmux_append_destroy_cell()` which
 basically creates one DESTROY cell, push it on the cmux queue and then
 flushes it with `channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit()`. That function
 does MANY thins and among those, it writes the cell directly to the outbuf
 if the `outgoing_queue` of the channel is empty (which turns out to be
 ALWAYS empty...).

 So then `scheduler_channel_wants_writes()` is called by the libevent write
 of the connection `connection_handle_write_impl()` which schedule the
 empty channel for a write to kernel but that has already been done by that
 function...

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[tor-bugs] #23685 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Could gitweb.tpo send Content-Type text/html for some files?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23685: Could gitweb.tpo send Content-Type text/html for some files?
-+
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/company/policies.git/plain/corpdocs/index.html
 used to be served as text/html but is now text/plain. Used to as in March
 or April 2017.

 Whatever changed, can we change it back?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20375 [Applications/Tor Browser]: warn users when entering fullscreen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20375: warn users when entering fullscreen
-+-
 Reporter:  fem  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201708R, tbb- |
  backported |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Rhe warning popup is Immediately dismissed when I lick on a link and a new
 page loads.
 example,
 open tor browser and then right as it pops up click on "Test tor network
 settings" and then maximize tor, the page takes around 5 seconds to load
 so the full screen warning pops up and then is Immediately dismissed when
 the page loads.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21414 [Metrics]: Include currently running software versions in responses (collector.tp.o, onionoo.tp.o) and on the website (metrics.tp.o)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21414: Include currently running software versions in responses 
(collector.tp.o,
onionoo.tp.o) and on the website (metrics.tp.o)
--+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2017  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by karsten):

 iwakeh, maybe this is obvious, but I don‘t see it: what‘s the best way to
 access an implementation version string, that is generated during build
 time, at runtime? I guess we‘ll write it somewhere during the build
 process. But how do we learn about that when writing actual index.json
 files or query responses? I‘d want to avoid coming up with a hack here, so
 maybe there‘s a clean way to do it? Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201709   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-22501-Requests-via-javascript-violate-FPI.patch"
 added.

 Properly formatted patch with a real commit message and everything

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23207 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Registration on trac seems to be counterintuitive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23207: Registration on trac seems to be counterintuitive
--+--
 Reporter:  mail@…|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 qbi]:
 > What error message do you see? Could you provide a screenshot?

 I don't know why you can't reproduce it, but anyways:

 First message immediately after registering,

 {{{
 Submission rejected as potential spam

 Account registration failed (EmailCheck: You must specify a valid
 email address., RegExpCheck: The email address specified appears to be
 invalid. Please specify a valid email address.)
 }}}

 After solving the captcha the same message still appears.

 Trying to log into that account,

 {{{
 Error

 Invalid username or password
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23207 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Registration on trac seems to be counterintuitive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23207: Registration on trac seems to be counterintuitive
--+--
 Reporter:  mail@…|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by qbi):

 What error message do you see? Could you provide a screenshot?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23551 [Core Tor/Tor]: src/common/compress.c:576: tor_compress_process: Non-fatal assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23551: src/common/compress.c:576: tor_compress_process: Non-fatal assertion
+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.5-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis|Sponsor:
+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 I have a proposed fix for this issue. It can be found in the following
 branches:

 - for tor.git's master branch:
 https://gitlab.com/ahf/tor/merge_requests/19
 - for tor.git's maint-0.3.1 branch:
 https://gitlab.com/ahf/tor/merge_requests/20

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS Everywhere randomly disappears from the mobile browser UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: HTTPS Everywhere randomly disappears from the mobile browser UI
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:23 dmeek94@…]:
 > Https everywhere seems to be behaving at the min, didnt disapper
 yesterday or today at all.

 Ok, so this isn't an issue then right? :)

 > The insecure websites are a real pain though.

 Which insecure websites? Can add more details? By the way it may be due to
 HTTPS Everywhere forcing you to land on an https of a  website when it
 certificate expired for example, that's why you need to give all the
 details so that I can investigate it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23521 [Core Tor/Tor]: detect if clock skew is probably really time zone misconfiguration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23521: detect if clock skew is probably really time zone misconfiguration
-+
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap clock-skew ux  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by catalyst):

 At least a few instances of this have shown up on IRC where the user had
 their time zone set to UTC but the clock set to their local time.
 Multiple consistent clock skew indications that are a round number of
 hours or half hours combined with a time zone that appears to be UTC
 should be a strong hint that the time zone is misconfigured.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23207 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Registration on trac seems to be counterintuitive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23207: Registration on trac seems to be counterintuitive
--+--
 Reporter:  mail@…|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 It still doesn't work, put in the username `throwaway999310` and some
 random password and click on continue, it will show you an error.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23016 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23016: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-e10s   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 So those repro steps result in successful printing for me
 * Debian Unstable VM (1 core CPU, 4 gigs of RAM, 8 GB disk)
 * latest Tor-Browser (version 7.0.5)
 * browser.tabs.remote.autostart.2 = true
 * printing various pages (about:config, slashdot, reddit, etc)

 gk: could you perhaps post Tor Browser's debug log output on a failed
 print?

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