Re: [tor-bugs] #23822 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor router not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23822: tor router not working
--+
 Reporter:  y.net |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.12
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  not working   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by y.net):

 tor[[BR]]Oct 11 03:10:46.664 [notice] Tor v0.2.5.12 (git-6350e21f2de7272f)
 running on Linux with Libevent 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.1t and Zlib
 1.2.8.[[BR]]Oct 11 03:10:46.665 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it
 wrong! Learn how to be safe at
 !https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning [[BR]]Oct 11
 03:10:46.666 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".[[BR]]Oct
 11 03:10:46.684 [notice] You configured a non-loopback address
 '192.168.42.1:53' for DNSPort. This allows everybody on your local network
 to use your machine as a proxy. Make sure this is what you
 wanted.[[BR]]Oct 11 03:10:46.684 [notice] You configured a non-loopback
 address '192.168.42.1:9040' for !TransPort. This allows everybody on your
 local network to use your machine as a proxy. Make sure this is what you
 wanted.[[BR]]Oct 11 03:10:46.687 [notice] You configured a non-loopback
 address '192.168.42.1:53' for DNSPort. This allows everybody on your local
 network to use your machine as a proxy. Make sure this is what you
 wanted.[[BR]]Oct 11 03:10:46.687 [notice] You configured a non-loopback
 address '192.168.42.1:9040' for !TransPort. This allows everybody on your
 local network to use your machine as a proxy. Make sure this is what you
 wanted.[[BR]]Oct 11 03:10:46.688 [notice] Opening Socks listener on
 127.0.0.1:9050[[BR]]Oct 11 03:10:46.689 [warn] Could not bind to
 127.0.0.1:9050: Address already in use. Is Tor already running?[[BR]]Oct
 11 03:10:46.689 [notice] Opening DNS listener on 192.168.42.1:53[[BR]]Oct
 11 03:10:46.689 [warn] Could not bind to 192.168.42.1:53: Permission
 denied[[BR]]Oct 11 03:10:46.689 [notice] Opening Transparent pf/netfilter
 listener on 192.168.42.1:9040[[BR]]Oct 11 03:10:46.690 [warn] Could not
 bind to 192.168.42.1:9040: Address already in use. Is Tor already
 running?[[BR]]Oct 11 03:10:46.690 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config:
 Failed to bind one of the listener ports.[[BR]]Oct 11 03:10:46.690 [err]
 Reading config failed--see warnings above.[[BR]]pi@!Pi-do:/ $[[BR]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23812 [Applications/Tor Browser]: json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities of type specs.LinuxCapabilities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23812: json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities 
of
type specs.LinuxCapabilities
--+--
 Reporter:  kkuehl@…  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by kkuehl@…):

 $ ./rbm/rbm showconf tor var_p/runc_spec100

 $

 (No output)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20424 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove --enable-openbsd-malloc (Tor maxes CPU when --enable-openbsd-malloc is used)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20424: Remove --enable-openbsd-malloc (Tor maxes CPU when 
--enable-openbsd-malloc
is used)
+
 Reporter:  icanhasaccount  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by Hello71):

 gcc 7 simply deletes the functions, so --enable-openbsd-malloc now instead
 does nothing except slightly increase compilation resources and executable
 size.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23812 [Applications/Tor Browser]: json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities of type specs.LinuxCapabilities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23812: json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities 
of
type specs.LinuxCapabilities
--+--
 Reporter:  kkuehl@…  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 With the patch applied, what is the output of the command `./rbm/rbm
 showconf tor var_p/runc_spec100` ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23724 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript restartless update breaks Security Slider and its icon disappears

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23724: NoScript restartless update breaks Security Slider and its icon 
disappears
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by ma1):

 [https://noscript.net/getit#devel 5.1.2rc4]is out, is everything looks
 good I'm gonna turn it into a release ASAP.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23812 [Applications/Tor Browser]: json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities of type specs.LinuxCapabilities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23812: json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities 
of
type specs.LinuxCapabilities
--+--
 Reporter:  kkuehl@…  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by kkuehl@…):

 Patch applied as shown:
 ~/Downloads/tor-browser-build$ git diff rbm.conf
 diff --git a/rbm.conf b/rbm.conf
 index c433f00..a18f80c 100644
 --- a/rbm.conf
 +++ b/rbm.conf
 @@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ ENV:
# We will need to update this when there is a new spec version
 available
runc_spec100 => sub {
  my ($out) = capture_exec('sudo', 'runc', '--version');
 +return 1 if $out =~ m/^spec: 1\.0\.0$/;
  return $out =~ m/^runc version spec: 1\.0\.0$/;
},
  },

 Does not fix the issue.
 git submodule update --init
 ./rbm/rbm build release --target testbuild --target torbrowser-linux-
 x86_64
 Building project tor-browser - tor-browser-7.5a5-linux-x86_64-cb5c0b
 Building project container-image - container-image_wheezy-
 amd64-df3a332e7b34.tar.gz
 Building project debootstrap-image - container-image_wheezy-amd64.tar.gz
 Using file /home/kkuehl/Downloads/tor-browser-build/out/debootstrap-image
 /container-image_ubuntu-base-17.04-base-amd64.tar.gz
 Error: Error starting remote:

 json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities of
 type specs.LinuxCapabilities

 Makefile:69: recipe for target 'testbuild-linux-x86_64' failed
 make: *** [testbuild-linux-x86_64] Error 1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23812 [Applications/Tor Browser]: json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities of type specs.LinuxCapabilities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23812: json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities 
of
type specs.LinuxCapabilities
--+--
 Reporter:  kkuehl@…  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 The patch from #23585 has been merged to master, which is why it doesn't
 apply anymore.

 So it seems the patch from #23585 is fixing the problem with version
 1.0.0-rc2, but break it with 1.0.0-rc4.

 I see that your runc version prints its spec version with `spec: `, while
 other runc versions print it with `runc version spec: `, so we probably
 don't detect the spec version correctly.

 This patch should fix that:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_23812=d511fcb919b1cdf1f975f5923d45a1fb03c3086e

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23822 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor router not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23822: tor router not working
--+
 Reporter:  y.net |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.12
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  not working   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by y.net):

 * Attachment "debug.log" added.

 debug log

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[tor-bugs] #23821 [Webpages/Website]: The video on https://www.torproject.org/press/video.html.en is not loading on any browser I tried

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23821: The video on https://www.torproject.org/press/video.html.en is not 
loading
on any browser I tried
--+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The video on https://www.torproject.org/press/video.html.en is not loading
 on any browser I tried.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23373 [Webpages/Website]: Add new press clips to website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23373: Add new press clips to website
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23812 [Applications/Tor Browser]: json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities of type specs.LinuxCapabilities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23812: json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities 
of
type specs.LinuxCapabilities
--+--
 Reporter:  kkuehl@…  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: boklm (added)
 * keywords:   => tbb-rbm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23048 [Webpages/Website]: Update Debian and Ubuntu instructions for systemd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23048: Update Debian and Ubuntu instructions for systemd
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Applied and pushed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16546 [Webpages/Website]: Should we move anonbib to the Tor website?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16546: Should we move anonbib to the Tor website?
+-
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  defer-new-website, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by irl):

 How far off is the research portal? This isn't a decision that needs to be
 made immediately. Or is it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23807 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tab crashes every time when trying to play a youtube video on patreon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23807: Tab crashes every time when trying to play a youtube video on patreon
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > I wonder if that is my comment:7:ticket:23769. I guess we could find
 this out if you could try vanilla Firefox 52.4.0esr and 52.4.1esr: the
 video playing should crash in the former but not in the latter. Bundles
 are here: https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/52.4.0esr/ and
 here: https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/52.4.1esr/ Could you
 try those?
 The webpage crashes on 52.4.0 but it does not crash on 52.4.1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22427 [Webpages/Website]: Link to Linus's nightly builds from somewhere?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22427: Link to Linus's nightly builds from somewhere?
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by irl):

 I would just cron job an rsync at a sensible time. It's not as instant,
 but it'd be perhaps less prone to breakage.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23048 [Webpages/Website]: Update Debian and Ubuntu instructions for systemd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23048: Update Debian and Ubuntu instructions for systemd
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * owner:  (none) => hiro
 * status:  needs_review => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22427 [Webpages/Website]: Link to Linus's nightly builds from somewhere?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22427: Link to Linus's nightly builds from somewhere?
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by hiro):

 irl that would be the sysadmin team I suppose. Maybe we could also have a
 ci job that does that w/ the buids?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22487 [Webpages/Website]: Add https version of `deb.torproject.org` repository install instructions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22487: Add https version of `deb.torproject.org` repository install 
instructions
--+--
 Reporter:  anadahz   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  linda => hiro


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16546 [Webpages/Website]: Should we move anonbib to the Tor website?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16546: Should we move anonbib to the Tor website?
+-
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  defer-new-website, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by hiro):

 We can have it in the new website. I think there will be a research
 section. It maybe makes sense to add it there? Meanwhile we can move it to
 either github or oniongit, or leave it where it is.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21593 [Webpages/Website]: drop tor2web from the website lists

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21593: drop tor2web from the website lists
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Yes. This is actually solved.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23809 [Webpages/Website]: Add instructions for running a relay on a Raspberry Pi

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23809: Add instructions for running a relay on a Raspberry Pi
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => hiro


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23805 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable dom.enable_performance_navigation_timing in ESR 59

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23805: Disable dom.enable_performance_navigation_timing in ESR 59
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff59-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => ff59-esr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23724 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript restartless update breaks Security Slider and its icon disappears

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23724: NoScript restartless update breaks Security Slider and its icon 
disappears
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:21 ma1]:
 > Replying to [comment:20 gk]:
 >
 >
 >
 > > >
 > > 1) Extract a clean Tor Browser 7.5a5
 > > 2) Copy NoScript 5.1.2rc2 over the NoScript we ship
 > > 3) Start the browser, the icon is on the left side
 > > 4) Check for NoScript updates and 5.1.2r3 gets installed and the icon
 jumps to the right
 >
 > I suppose you're doing this, rather than updating directly from a non-
 restartless version (like the ones you currently ship) to check whether
 updating restartless to restartless makes the icon jump nevertheless.
 However, since rc2 interferes with the previous icon placement in a way
 rc3 doesn't, whether the effect is visible or not, I'd rather try to
 update from rc3 to rc4 (about to be released) to tell if the bug needs
 more work or not.

 Sounds good and, yes, that what was my intention behind the testing.

 >
 > > We have a bunch of
 > > {{{
 > > [10-09 15:36:27] Torbutton NOTE: Failed to update NoScript status for
 security setings: TypeError: win.noscriptOverlay is undefined
 > > }}}
 > > errors in the console as we call its `_syncUINOw()` once a NoScript
 pref gets changed (and that happens with the update apparently). But that
 does not seems to be a candidate for causing this issue to me. Hm
 >
 > I don't think it's a real problem, console noise aside, but if you want
 it to be fixed anyway you must do it on your side: on initialization
 NoScript might cause preference observers to be called at a moment when
 noscriptOverlay does not exist yet: this means you must check for
 win.noscriptOverlay existence before referencing it.

 Sure. I was just mentioning it as the other thing I saw on the browser
 console.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23807 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tab crashes every time when trying to play a youtube video on patreon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23807: Tab crashes every time when trying to play a youtube video on patreon
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-crash


Comment:

 I wonder if that is my comment:7:ticket:23769. I guess we could find this
 out if you could try vanilla Firefox 52.4.0esr and 52.4.1esr: the video
 playing should crash in the former but not in the latter. Bundles are
 here: https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/52.4.0esr/ and here:
 https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/52.4.1esr/ Could you try
 those?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by DeS):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by DeS):

 Long overdue update.
 The Problem disappeared in August. On on host there where view occations
 in September.
 What helped is:

 MaxMemInQueues 1650MB
 DisableAllSwap 1

 It did not resolve the problem bat made it much better. Later on maybe due
 to an update of tor it seems to have mostly stopped.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22719 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/common/compress.c:576: tor_compress_process:

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22719: Bug: src/common/compress.c:576: tor_compress_process:
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by weasel):

 We are hitting this in 0.3.1.7 on Debian.  cf.
 https://bugs.debian.org/878172

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23817 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor re-tries directory mirrors that it knows are missing microdescriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23817: Tor re-tries directory mirrors that it knows are missing 
microdescriptors
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #21969


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+---

Comment (by bmeson):

 Thanks @mrphs for helping us debug this further. This bug is biting us
 pretty bad, both because we depend on Authenticated Hidden Services for
 administrating servers but also regular Hidden Services to serve content.
 It may not be related but according to Metrics, it looks like Hidden
 Services are timing out more? I don't know if that is related but I added
 it to the ticket. For now, we are restarting Tor and hoping it comes back
 quickly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23820 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure v3 single onion services and v3 onion service clients only send IPv4 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23820: Make sure v3 single onion services and v3 onion service clients only 
send
IPv4 addresses
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => teor
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+---
Changes (by bmeson):

 * Attachment "OnionsTimeouts.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #23820 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure v3 single onion services and v3 onion service clients only send IPv4 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23820: Make sure v3 single onion services and v3 onion service clients only 
send
IPv4 addresses
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #23493
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 This fixes the bug warning in #23493, and allows our users to migrate to
 IPv4 v3 single onion services.

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[tor-bugs] #23819 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor doesn't bind to link-local (ipv6) addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23819: Tor doesn't bind to link-local (ipv6) addresses
--+-
 Reporter:  Zakhar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.11
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ipv6 link-local
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 This is either a '''bug''' or a '''documentation defect''' (didn't dive
 into the code yet).

 Standard routing with ipv6 happens with link-local as next hop.

 Hence, for the sake of making a transparent proxy for VMs, I am trying to
 specify a '''TransPort''' with the link-local of my bridge.

 The standard way of specifying that is: [fe80:::::%iface]

 Tor parses correctly this ipv6 address (removing iface) but fails to bind.

 To reproduce:

 `$cat /etc/tor/torrc:`
 (...)
 `TransPort fe80::1c9a:c3ff:fec8:7768%vnet0:9040`
 (...)

 `$ ifconfig vnet0`
 `vnet0 Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 1e:9a:c3:c8:77:68`

 `  inet6: fe80::1c9a:c3ff:fec8:7768/64 c9a:c3ff:fec8:7768/64 Scope:Link`

 As you can see, I have a vnet0. It has the link-local address that is
 specified as TransPort.
 Now let's start tor:

 `$ sudo tor`
 `Oct 10 21:34:28.384 [notice] Tor 0.2.9.11 (git-aa8950022562be76) running
 on Linux with Libevent 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2g and Zlib 1.2.8.`
 (...)
 `Oct 10 21:34:28.385 [notice] You configured a non-loopback address
 '[fe80::1c9a:c3ff:fec8:7768]:9040' for TransPort. This allows everybody on
 your local network to use your machine as a proxy. Make sure this is what
 you wanted.`
 (...)
 `Oct 10 21:34:28.386 [notice] Opening Transparent pf/netfilter listener on
 [fe80::1c9a:c3ff:fec8:7768]:9040`
 `Oct 10 21:34:28.386 [warn] Could not bind to
 fe80::1[c9a:c3ff:fec8:7768:9040 c9a:c3ff:fec8:7768:9040]: Invalid
 argument`

 As you can see, it is correctly striping the '''%vnet0''' and reading my
 link-local address from the /etc/tor/torrc

 It then tries to open the "pf/netfilter" and fails to bind, and says
 "invalid argument"!

 Indeed, binding a link-local ipv6 address needs one more argument in the
 syscall to bind: the interface!

 '''Other tests:'''

 Trying with fancy notations like

 TransPort [fe80::1c9a:c3ff:fec8:7768]%vnet0:9040

 fails at parsing.

 Trying with a global address (with ipV6 you can just add addresses to the
 interface) works but opens other headaches such as having to advertise a
 different router address to the clients.

 '''Conclusion''', this is either:

  * '''(bug)''' the implementation of the "interface" parameter when
 binding link-local addresses is missing or failing.
 or
  * '''(documentation)''' it works and it is a documentation defect since
 nowhere we can find how to bind a link-local ipv6 address or even a
 working example.


 '''Additional:''' there could be the exact same bug/missing documentation
 in other places where you can specify an ipv6 address.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23493 [Core Tor/Tor]: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23493: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6  |  Actual Points:  0.7
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 We will add v3 single onion IPv6-only support in a later release, none of
 our users need this right now, and if they want it, they should use v3
 hidden services (with IPv6 bridges or `ClientUseIPv4 0`).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+---
Changes (by mrphs):

 * cc: bmeson, mrphs (added)


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[tor-bugs] #23818 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make v3 single onion services retry failed connections with a 3-hop path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23818: Make v3 single onion services retry failed connections with a 3-hop path
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #23493
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 This makes single onion services connect vias an entry that it can reach
 when connections fail.

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[tor-bugs] #23817 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor re-tries directory mirrors that it knows are missing microdescriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23817: Tor re-tries directory mirrors that it knows are missing 
microdescriptors
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 When a microdescriptor for a relay changes, it takes a while to propagate
 to directory mirrors. In this time, a client can:
 1. Download a consensus that references the new microdescriptor
 2. Try a directory mirror that has an older consensus, and therefore
 doesn't have that microdescriptor
 3. Repeat 2

 This is a particular issue when:
 * the client first bootstraps, and the fallback or authority provides a
 newer consensus than any of its directory mirrors
 * the client has been asleep for a while, and its consensus has expired,
 so it fetches one straight away
 * only 1/3 of a client's directory guards has the new consensus

 We can fix this by:
 * making clients try the same directory mirror for their consensus and
 microdescriptors
 * making clients avoid directory mirrors with missing microdescriptors
 * making clients use a fallback when all of their directory mirrors don't
 have a microdescriptor

 This issue affects primary guards and v3 onion services.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23811 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate MinGW commit for create_locale thing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23811: Investigate MinGW commit for create_locale thing
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 However it doesn't seem to fix the `missing entry points for _vsnprintf_s
 in msvcrt.dll` issue from #9084 ? But maybe we don't care about Windows XP
 anymore if it's not supported in the next release.

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[tor-bugs] #23816 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use expontial backoff with jitter and/or tune its parameters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23816: Use expontial backoff with jitter and/or tune its parameters
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 See https://www.awsarchitectureblog.com/2015/03/backoff.html

 Taylor suggested this.

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[tor-bugs] #23815 [Core Tor/Tor]: routerstatus download status fields should be explicitly set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23815: routerstatus download status fields should be explicitly set
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 All the other zero-valued enums are correct, but we should still set them:
 {{{
 /* Use exponential-backoff scheduling when downloading microdescs */
 rs->dl_status.backoff = DL_SCHED_RANDOM_EXPONENTIAL;
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23814 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove non-exponential backoff directory download implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23814: Remove non-exponential backoff directory download implementation
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> We're not meant to use this code any more, but it was accidentally used
> for microdescs up to 0.3.2. Let's remove it.

New description:

 We're not meant to use this code any more~~, but it was accidentally used
 for microdescs up to 0.3.2.~~ Let's remove it.

--

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[tor-bugs] #23814 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove non-exponential backoff directory download implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23814: Remove non-exponential backoff directory download implementation
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We're not meant to use this code any more, but it was accidentally used
 for microdescs up to 0.3.2. Let's remove it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23813 [Core Tor/Tor]: router_reset_descriptor_download_failures() doesn't actually reset descriptor downloads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23813: router_reset_descriptor_download_failures() doesn't actually reset
descriptor downloads
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23813 [Core Tor/Tor]: router_reset_descriptor_download_failures() doesn't actually reset descriptor downloads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23813: router_reset_descriptor_download_failures() doesn't actually reset
descriptor downloads
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 See my branch bug23813, which fixes the function comment.

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[tor-bugs] #23813 [Core Tor/Tor]: router_reset_descriptor_download_failures() doesn't actually reset descriptor downloads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23813: router_reset_descriptor_download_failures() doesn't actually reset
descriptor downloads
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18329 [Core Tor/Tor]: Let bridges indicate when they don't want BridgeDB to distribute their address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18329: Let bridges indicate when they don't want BridgeDB to distribute their
address
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, stem  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .2 remaining
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Merged the spec patch, with an addendum about implementation status.
 Please let me know if it needs changes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * Attachment "info.log.tgz" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23712 [Core Tor/Tor]: sched: DESTROY cell on a circuit bypasses the scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23712: sched: DESTROY cell on a circuit bypasses the scheduler
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sched |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23712 [Core Tor/Tor]: sched: DESTROY cell on a circuit bypasses the scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23712: sched: DESTROY cell on a circuit bypasses the scheduler
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sched |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet


Comment:

 setting owner

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+---

Comment (by dgoulet):

 My v3 onion service got stuck for a while in this bug. Attached here are
 the info logs I have which could be useful.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23762 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Client request with missing dirinfo will always timeout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23762: hs-v3: Client request with missing dirinfo will always timeout
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23762 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Client request with missing dirinfo will always timeout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23762: hs-v3: Client request with missing dirinfo will always timeout
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


Comment:

 setting owner

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23757 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor's .gitlab-ci.yml doesn't have the same behaviour as our .travis.yml

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23757: tor's .gitlab-ci.yml doesn't have the same behaviour as our .travis.yml
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23755 [Core Tor/Tor]: don't unconditionally mirror in .gitlab-ci.yml

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23755: don't unconditionally mirror in .gitlab-ci.yml
---+---
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci continuous-integration  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20699 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Add control port events and commands

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20699: prop224: Add control port events and commands
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, needs-proposal,  |  Actual Points:
  prop224-extra, tor-control |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23811 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate MinGW commit for create_locale thing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23811: Investigate MinGW commit for create_locale thing
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Merging Jacek's patches for UCRT support
 > might improve the situation on Windows 7 or even XP without the spec
 file thing...

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[tor-bugs] #23812 [Applications/Tor Browser]: json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities of type specs.LinuxCapabilities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23812: json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities 
of
type specs.LinuxCapabilities
--+--
 Reporter:  kkuehl@…  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Similar to #23754 but the 23585.diff no longer applies cleanly.
 $ sudo runc --version
 runc version 1.0.0-rc4
 spec: 1.0.0

 make testbuild-linux-x86_64
 Using file /home/kkuehl/Downloads/tor-browser-build/out/debootstrap-image
 /container-image_ubuntu-base-17.04-base-amd64.tar.gz
 Error: Error starting remote:

 json: cannot unmarshal array into Go struct field Process.capabilities of
 type specs.LinuxCapabilities

 Makefile:69: recipe for target 'testbuild-linux-x86_64' failed
 make: *** [testbuild-linux-x86_64] Error 1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18329 [Core Tor/Tor]: Let bridges indicate when they don't want BridgeDB to distribute their address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18329: Let bridges indicate when they don't want BridgeDB to distribute their
address
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, stem  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .2 remaining
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23790 [Core Tor/Tor]: rend_service_prune_list_impl_() doesn't copy over desc_is_dirty when copying intro points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23790: rend_service_prune_list_impl_() doesn't copy over desc_is_dirty when
copying intro points
--+
 Reporter:  jl|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  031-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => 031-backport
 * cc: asn, dgoulet (added)
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #23811 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate MinGW commit for create_locale thing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23811: Investigate MinGW commit for create_locale thing
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This commit might improve the situation on Windows 7 or even XP without
 the spec file thing...

 
https://sourceforge.net/p/mingw-w64/mingw-w64/ci/87558c151f0a447d8f00af1a7d3a88a273aa8c23

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23724 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript restartless update breaks Security Slider and its icon disappears

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23724: NoScript restartless update breaks Security Slider and its icon 
disappears
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > On subsequent restarts I get
 {{{
 noscript-tbb not found!
 16:21:03.598 [Exception... "Failure"  nsresult: "0x80004005
 (NS_ERROR_FAILURE)"  location: "JS frame ::
 chrome://noscript/content/Restartless.jsm?0.5651077320914104.1507411556800
 :: loadIntoWindow :: line 193"  data: no] 1 (unknown)
 loadIntoWindow chrome://noscript/content/Restartless.jsm:193:5
 observe chrome://noscript/content/Restartless.jsm:218:11
 16:21:03.599 Could not overlay chrome://browser/content/browser.xul 1
 Restartless.jsm:224
 loadIntoWindow chrome://noscript/content/Restartless.jsm:224:5
 observe chrome://noscript/content/Restartless.jsm:218:11
 [10-10 16:21:04] Torbutton INFO: New window
 }}}
 because you try to do that before first window is created.

 Also [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22324#comment:4
 this]

 Also don't ignore
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed=~noscript
 this]

 It's better to release this with ESR52.4.1 in order to include into the
 next TBB update.

 gk:
 {{{
 15:29:21.053 Unchecked lastError value: Error: Invalid tab ID: 194 1
 ExtensionCommon.jsm:265
 withLastError resource://gre/modules/ExtensionCommon.jsm:265:9
 wrapPromise/< resource://gre/modules/ExtensionCommon.jsm:316:11
 torbutton_send_ctrl_cmd
 chrome://torbutton/content/torbutton.js:868:10
 torbutton_do_new_identity
 chrome://torbutton/content/torbutton.js:1223:10
 torbutton_new_identity
 chrome://torbutton/content/torbutton.js:961:9
 oncommand chrome://browser/content/browser.xul:1:1
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21177 [Core Tor/Stem]: Add support for parsing bridge-distribution-request lines in Stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21177: Add support for parsing bridge-distribution-request lines in Stem
---+-
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21177 [Core Tor/Stem]: Add support for parsing bridge-distribution-request lines in Stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21177: Add support for parsing bridge-distribution-request lines in Stem
---+--
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Stem support pushed...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=3eb5941

 No big rush but this will need to be followed up with the tor spec change
 otherwise I'll revert this in a future revision (I have a 'must be in the
 spec' policy because Stem's predecessor, TorCtl, accumulated support for
 fields that never existed which was confusing). Happy to make an exception
 here, just giving a head's up that this will need to be followed up with
 the addition on tor's side.

 Feel free to reopen if ya need anything else.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13605 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13605: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, review-group-18  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  medium
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by neel):

 I have a new version of this patch. The filename is 'tor-patch-
 ReducedExitPolicy-003.patch' (without the quotes).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13605 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13605: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, review-group-18  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  medium
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by neel):

 * Attachment "tor-patch-ReducedExitPolicy-003.patch" added.

 Version 3 of patch to add ReducedExitPolicy option

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21177 [Core Tor/Stem]: Add support for parsing bridge-distribution-request lines in Stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21177: Add support for parsing bridge-distribution-request lines in Stem
---+--
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Ha! So spec patch is awaiting tor which is awaiting bridgedb which is
 awaiting stem which is awaiting the spec. Thanks, you made me chuckle this
 morning. :P

 No problem, this is a trivial field to add.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23261 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: implement configuration portion of new Tor Launcher UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23261: implement configuration portion of new Tor Launcher UI
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201710  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21951 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: isabela, phoul (added)


Comment:

 We are going to make patches for this ticket and for #23262 available for
 review very soon. We do have a couple of questions for the UX team (these
 can be addressed with follow up patches):
 * Should the "For assistance" text that appears on the current setup
 wizard and Network Settings window be kept or removed? It is not included
 in the design. This may also be a question for our community people
 (Colin, I am looking at you)
 * How should we implement the bridges and proxy help? That is, what should
 happen when someone clicks the (?) icons? Currently, help is a separate
 panel so when you click the entire window contents are replaced with help
 text and there is an OK button that closes the help and returns the user
 to the configuration screen. We can keep that design or we could add some
 kind of popup that only covers part of the screen. We also need text for
 those two help panels or popups.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23479 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: ../src/or/config.c:785: get_options_mutable: Non-fatal assertion ! in_option_validation failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23479: Bug: ../src/or/config.c:785: get_options_mutable: Non-fatal assertion !
in_option_validation failed
+
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-config, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by nickm):

 Wow, that's bizarre.  What's calling get_options() [or its kin] from
 onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17521 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support capsicum(4) on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17521: Support capsicum(4) on FreeBSD
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:
 |  shawn.webb
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security, sandboxing, |  Actual Points:
  BSD, capsicum  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21952 [Webpages]: .Onion everywhere?: increasing the use of onion services through automatic redirects and aliasing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21952: .Onion everywhere?: increasing the use of onion services through 
automatic
redirects and aliasing
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Syverson here. (Gotta get myself a trac ID. Just noticed this ticket
 recently for the first time.)
 This proposal fits under some of the things that I spelled out at a high
 level in "The Once and Future Onion" https://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs
 /syverson-once-and-future-onion
 and that coincidentally has a section entitled "Onions Everywhere".
 Also Griffin and I discussed even earlier in "Bake in .onion for Tear-Free
 and Stronger Website Authentication"
 https://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/syverson-bake-onion-tear-free-and-
 stronger-website-authentication
 (though I think the subdomain onions and integration of onion and TLS keys
 as discussed in the later paper is generally more promising in the long
 run than the PGP approach).
 Short term (before getting fullblown subdomain onions going), I would like
 to get a few things going.
 1. For sites with registered domain names, e.g., foo.com, look at
 usability, etc. of having a subdomain onion.foo.com that redirects to
 foo.com's onion address. This will be more compatible in the long run with
 sites providing self-authenticated access for their users who are not
 coming in via the Tor network (cf. Once and Future Onion), but redirecting
 from foo.com.onion should also be considered. I expect this is best
 accomplished via HTTPS everywhere rulesets, but am open.
 2. For onionsites with or without associated RDN, look at integration of
 TLS with onionsite keys. This won't prevent unknown authority warnings for
 non EV-certified sites (that fix is planned but further down the road) but
 will at least allow familiar HTTPS lock icon interface with any onion
 address and avoid those sorts of warnings. Many pieces here, but will stop
 now to avoid even more of a data dump on people.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23806 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: libotr.so and libgcrypt.so are using RPATH

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23806: libotr.so and libgcrypt.so are using RPATH
+
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23800  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 LGTM, merged in https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=2e659c634527a8cd970eba670b4079d0fd91d345

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22242 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Selfrando embeds the RUNPATH in Linux binaries

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22242: Selfrando embeds the RUNPATH in Linux binaries
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23073| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * cc: arlolra (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22428 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add webstats module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22428: Add webstats module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.5.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2017   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Please review
 [​https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/?h=task-22428-4
 this task branch], which is based on the current master and already uses
 java 8 features and the latest metrics-lib.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17569: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser
+--
 Reporter:  kernelcorn  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Based on data obtained through the Pulse Test Pilot experiment,
 [https://medium.com/firefox-test-pilot/firefox-test-pilot-pulse-
 graduation-a3dc2212cce0 Mozilla's Test Pilot team concluded] that "**Ads
 hurt user sentiment**. One of the strongest effects on sentiment was our
 proxy for the number of ads: requests made by the page to hostnames on the
 Disconnect.me tracking protection list. This covaried with the overall
 number of requests, total page weight, and each of the timers, so it’s
 unclear if this effect is due to a specific aversion to ads, or to their
 consequences on performance."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22983 [Metrics/Library]: Add a Descriptor subinterface and implementation for Tor web server logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22983: Add a Descriptor subinterface and implementation for Tor web server logs
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 2.2.0
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2017 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:44 karsten]:
 > Alright, here's what I found:

 Thanks for the detailed review!

 >
 > Commit c6c805c looks trivially correct. It comes a bit out of nowhere,
 so may you could add a remark to the commit message of future commits like
 this saying why you're making this change now. Like, did it violate a
 checkstyle rule? And was this the only place that was lacking a space? In
 any case, ready to merge this one.

 The misterious space results from a rule we don't have for spaces between
 cast operator and variable.  I made the usage in this file consistent by
 adding the space as [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/metrics-
 
lib.git/tree/src/main/java/org/torproject/descriptor/impl/KeyValueMap.java?h=task-22983-3=6b8de66d171dd85d8244a7d326ca436ce68e0d78#n57
 the earlier cast] did have one.  But, we should add a checkstyle rule to
 make it consistent everywhere; I don't have a preference with or without
 space is fine.

 >
 > Commit 3b426bf contains a couple of code style violations: the summary
 fragment should describe the package and not be a warning; the summary
 fragment is not supposed to contain markup like ; there needs to be an
 empty line before the next ; and the line starting with
 "descriptors." is wrongly indented. I'm providing some tweaks in a
 fixup commit. Please review and tweak further as needed.

 These seem fine.  Thanks for fixing them and rewording the javadoc.

 >
 > Commit 7822a27 has several issues that require several fixup commits
 and/or discussion:
 >  - My commit e4d6e90 in my task-22983-4 branch contains a bunch of
 whitespace fixes and other trivial tweaks which I believe are mostly
 oversights. (Unless they are not, in which case see the next item.)

 I think the javadoc reformulations are fine.  Some tweaks are in my new
 branch.
 I also agree to the other few tweaks to the code or came up with something
 else, which I added in tiny fixup commits to make reviewing easier
 (hopefully)

 >  - My commit 664f540 is a mix of suggestions and tweaks. Some of the
 tweaks are an attempt to make your code fit better into existing code,
 which is either based on our style guide or on implicit conventions in
 existing code for which we don't have a written style guide yet. Please
 review that commit carefully. If you believe that some of these are non-
 issues, let's discuss that. I'm not saying that anything or anyone is
 wrong, I'm just trying to keep (heh, or make?) the overall code base as
 readable as possible and at the same time make future review processes
 even smoother.

 Ok, things should match the old code base, but at the same time evolve to
 the better, or be modernized.
 I admid that I have a knack for terse variable names (just two letters
 seem verbose sometimes ;-) but you're right in some cases, thanks for
 fixing.
 I'd say there are also very many non-issues here, which I know are
 different in the existing older code base, but seem to make the code less
 readable to me, when I started to become familiar with the old codebase.
 For example, there are almost line filling variable names (not in this
 patch) that differ only in one to five letters.  And there is the word
 'Descriptor' all over, which often feels like cluttering when reading the
 code for the first time.  The following is an example:
 (all following diffs are from the 664f540 commit)

 {{{
 -  public static List parse(byte[] raw, File file)
 ...
 +  public static List parse(byte[] rawDescriptorBytes,
 +  File descriptorFile) ...
 }}}

 Maybe, 'raw' alone is too terse, but 'rawBytes' seems fine whereas in
 'rawDescriptorBytes' the word part 'Descriptor' overwhelms the important
 information.  The method 'parse' receives raw bytes and tries to find a
 descriptor.

 Here some other examples from the current patch round (we could
 recycle them for the guide lines, so I try to be verbose):

 Renaming of isValid, here:
 {{{
 -public boolean isValid(String line);
 +public boolean validateLine(String line);
 }}}

 makes the code less readable.  For example:

 {{{
 -  -> null != line && !line.isEmpty() && !validator.isValid(line))
   ...
 +  -> null != line && !line.isEmpty() &&
 !validator.validateLine(line))
 }}}

 `validateLine` doesn't say that the result of the validation is returned
 (as a 

Re: [tor-bugs] #23810 [Webpages/Blog]: Blog internal server error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23810: Blog internal server error
---+--
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by steph):

 * Attachment "Screen Shot 2017-10-10 at 9.18.18 AM.png" added.

 error msg on archive page

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[tor-bugs] #23810 [Webpages/Blog]: Blog internal server error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23810: Blog internal server error
---+--
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 For a few minutes this morning, there was an internal server error for
 opening any individual blog post.

 It seems to be working now, but I am submitting a ticket in case it wasn't
 a fluke.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23798 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crash on update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23798: Tor Browser crash on update
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Thanks for providing the UpdateInfo files. I don't see any sign of an
 error in the log files though, so the failure did not log anything. As I
 said in comment:1, this seems like a "Firefox process took too long to
 exit" problem (although I do not know what caused it to be slow).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23809 [Webpages/Website]: Add instructions for running a relay on a Raspberry Pi

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23809: Add instructions for running a relay on a Raspberry Pi
--+
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by irl):

 Some discussion occured here:

 https://twitter.com/victorernest8/status/917553400027406336

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[tor-bugs] #23809 [Webpages/Website]: Add instructions for running a relay on a Raspberry Pi

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23809: Add instructions for running a relay on a Raspberry Pi
--+
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I know this is basically just Debian instructions, but framing this
 differently could really help for those that don't already know that
 Raspbian is essentially just Debian underneath.

 This could be deferred until after the big website changes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23784 [- Select a component]: Loading relay information failed (connection timeout - 109.163.234.9:443)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23784: Loading relay information failed (connection timeout - 
109.163.234.9:443)
--+--
 Reporter:  Nom   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Nom):

 You were right. I set network time to "on", as the clock would not be
 correct after changing the zone. Now TOR opens immediately.

 Thanks for your help.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23784 [- Select a component]: Loading relay information failed (connection timeout - 109.163.234.9:443)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23784: Loading relay information failed (connection timeout - 
109.163.234.9:443)
--+--
 Reporter:  Nom   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Nom):

 It does not explain why v6.5 connects and not later ones. I changed the
 time zone to the actual one which is dangerous, even though the clock is
 correct, but the results are the same:

 10/10/2017 23:04:24.200 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make
 or accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 10/10/2017 23:04:24.200 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make
 or accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 10/10/2017 23:04:24.200 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make
 or accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 10/10/2017 23:04:24.200 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 10/10/2017 23:04:25.600 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory
 server
 10/10/2017 23:04:25.600 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake
 with directory server
 10/10/2017 23:04:26.100 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 15%: Establishing an
 encrypted directory connection
 10/10/2017 23:04:26.100 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for
 networkstatus consensus
 10/10/2017 23:04:26.100 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 25%: Loading networkstatus
 consensus
 10/10/2017 23:04:27.400 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 45%: Asking for relay
 descriptors
 10/10/2017 23:04:27.400 [NOTICE] I learned some more directory
 information, but not enough to build a circuit: We need more
 microdescriptors: we have 2227/6627, and can only build 4% of likely
 paths. (We have 36% of guards bw, 35% of midpoint bw, and 36% of exit bw =
 4% of path bw.)
 10/10/2017 23:04:28.200 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 52%: Loading relay
 descriptors
 10/10/2017 23:04:29.100 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 59%: Loading relay
 descriptors
 10/10/2017 23:04:29.300 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 69%: Loading relay
 descriptors
 10/10/2017 23:04:29.500 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 76%: Loading relay
 descriptors
 10/10/2017 23:04:29.600 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor
 network
 10/10/2017 23:04:30.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:31.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:32.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:33.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:34.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:34.800 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake
 with first hop
 10/10/2017 23:04:35.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:36.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:37.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:38.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:39.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:40.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:41.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:42.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:43.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:44.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:45.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:46.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:47.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:48.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:49.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:50.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:51.000 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 10/10/2017 23:04:52.000 [WARN] 

Re: [tor-bugs] #21414 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Include currently running software versions in responses (collector.tp.o, onionoo.tp.o) and on the website (metrics.tp.o)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21414: Include currently running software versions in responses 
(collector.tp.o,
onionoo.tp.o) and on the website (metrics.tp.o)
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  metrics-2017   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 released and done, closing.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22428 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add webstats module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22428: Add webstats module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.5.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2017   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:  CollecTor 1.4.0 => CollecTor 1.5.0


Comment:

 Move to next version.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21414 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Include currently running software versions in responses (collector.tp.o, onionoo.tp.o) and on the website (metrics.tp.o)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21414: Include currently running software versions in responses 
(collector.tp.o,
onionoo.tp.o) and on the website (metrics.tp.o)
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2017   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 October 10

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[tor-bugs] #23808 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: new trick

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23808: new trick
-+-
 Reporter:  Reagan   |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.x-final
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:  Tor:
  Everywhere |  0.3.1.3-alpha
 Severity:  Trivial  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor2 |
-+-
 the new project as being made.

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