[tor-bugs] #26029 [Core Tor/Tor]: onion_extend_cpath

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#26029: onion_extend_cpath
--+
 Reporter:  whiteshield   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-windows
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: !circuitbuild.c:2772: onion_extend_cpath: Non-
 fatal assertion info !|| client failed. (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc
 81d71f0d41adf0d8)
 Bug: Non-fatal assertion info !|| client failed in onion_extend_cpath at
 !circuitbuild.c:2772. (Stack trace not available) (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc
 81d71f0d41adf0d8)
 tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: !circuitbuild.c:2779: onion_extend_cpath: Non-
 fatal assertion info failed. (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc 81d71f0d41adf0d8)
 Bug: Non-fatal assertion info failed in onion_extend_cpath at
 !circuitbuild.c:2779. (Stack trace not available) (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc
 81d71f0d41adf0d8)

 tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: !circuitbuild.c:2390: onion_pick_cpath_exit:
 Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed. (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc
 81d71f0d41adf0d8)
 Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in
 onion_pick_cpath_exit at !circuitbuild.c:2390. (Stack trace not available)
 (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc 81d71f0d41adf0d8)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3982 [Core Tor/Tor]: MAPADDRESS for IP ranges (CIDR, etc)

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#3982: MAPADDRESS for IP ranges (CIDR, etc)
--+--
 Reporter:  grarpamp  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The less use mode you said about...

 Situacion 1:
 On internet, connect  is force override and no use domain layer at
 all. So nearest anlogue is new option 'DomainYieldToIPMap' for "regardles
 if domain mapped or not, if 'BEGIN domain' say back to us 'CONNECTED ip'
 then go check that ip exist in the ip MAP's, if so go rearrange redo the
 circuit underneath the scene to match ip map before pass stream data". The
 one more circuit making as needed is ok cost. Default: on.

 Situacion 2:
 The remaining one is simply to documen that BEGIN domain, just like tor
 RESOLVE domain, can backed by many ip's in dns but tor use only one, this
 leading to obvious of some CONNECTED ip's maybe not being in any ip map,
 so that split is ok thing to caveat note to the user.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some URLs are saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of the browsing history

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#22867: Some URLs are saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of
the browsing history
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:14 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:13 cypherpunks]:
 > > I always use HTTPS Everywhere with "Block all unencrypted traffic"
 > Could you reproduce that with HTTPSE disabled?
 Well you know this bug is difficult to reproduce, I just tried again with
 that same url with the same procedure and I couldn't reproduce it with
 HTTPSE enabled.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some URLs are saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of the browsing history

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#22867: Some URLs are saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of
the browsing history
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:13 cypherpunks]:
 > I always use HTTPS Everywhere with "Block all unencrypted traffic"
 Could you reproduce that with HTTPSE disabled?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #7501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit PDF.js

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#7501: Audit PDF.js
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, ff60-esr|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 It's official folks, Project Mortar *IS* DEAD
 https://wiki.mozilla.org/Mortar_Project

 > The Mortar experiment has concluded. Mozilla does not consider the PDF
 use case justifies the burden of implementing and maintaining PDFium and a
 Pepper API implementation in Gecko.

 So the `ff60-esr` keyword was justified after all.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25692 [Core Tor/Tor]: onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info || client failed.

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#25692: onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info || client failed.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must 033-backport regression |  Actual Points:
  chutney 034-included-20180403 033-maybe-must   |
Parent ID:  #25691   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, teor|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by franklin):

 Just ran into this in 0.3.3.5-rc


 {{{
 May 05 19:27:17 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Failed
 to find node for hop #1 of our path. Discarding this circuit.
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]:
 tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2772:
 onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info || client failed. (on Tor
 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 Non-fatal assertion info || client failed in onion_extend_cpath at
 ../src/or/circuitbuild.c:2772. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x43) [0x55f6533941f3] (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb9) [0x55f6533afa89] (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(circuit_establish_circuit+0x732) [0x55f6532e5362] (on Tor
 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(circuit_launch_by_extend_info+0x8c) [0x55f6532f84fc] (on Tor
 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(consider_testing_reachability+0x151) [0x55f6532a6571] (on Tor
 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(+0x514cc) [0x55f65325c4cc] (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(+0x71c90) [0x55f65327cc90] (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6(+0x22c05) [0x7f89e2b66c05] (on
 Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6(event_base_loop+0x5a7)
 [0x7f89e2b67537] (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x2b4) [0x55f6532605d4] (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1025) [0x55f653262aa5] (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x3a) [0x55f65325b06a] (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x55f65325adf9] (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xe7) [0x7f89e1118a87]
 (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )
 May 05 19:27:18 tor-exit.bynumlaw.net Tor-104.200.20.46_9001[8717]: Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x2a) [0x55f65325ae4a] (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc )

 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25692 [Core Tor/Tor]: onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info || client failed.

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#25692: onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info || client failed.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must 033-backport regression |  Actual Points:
  chutney 034-included-20180403 033-maybe-must   |
Parent ID:  #25691   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, teor|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by franklin):

 * cc: franklin (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3982 [Core Tor/Tor]: MAPADDRESS for IP ranges (CIDR, etc)

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#3982: MAPADDRESS for IP ranges (CIDR, etc)
--+--
 Reporter:  grarpamp  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * version:  Tor: 0.2.4.19 => Tor: 0.3.2.10
 * resolution:  wontfix =>


Comment:

 This would be good help as we want program certain exists around the
 world. We test security a lot. Is easiesy way to handled mixed mode
 webpages by mapping their domain and IPs too, an we often want to map only
 some IP's while leave rest of tor on autodefault for other things. All
 other ways are complex and weight problems to do, in controller is easier
 best, and fair match complement to work prior done with domains. Yes, for
 IPv6 too since those can exits. Most important use mode: This for direct
 connect like 'netcat ' tells BEGIN , says CONNECTED ,
 doman/dns is no part of that mode. Thx.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some URLs are saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of the browsing history

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#22867: Some URLs are saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of
the browsing history
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Got one today on aps.org, what's interesting is I always use HTTPS
 Everywhere with "Block all unencrypted traffic" and this url was saved in
 its http form, what I did was to click on the download link for some
 presentation then cancel it,

 `http://absuploads.aps.org/presentation/upload/***.pptx`

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26026 [Core Tor/Nyx]: ValueError: "blue" isn't a valid color - color_interface is not working

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#26026: ValueError: "blue" isn't a valid color - color_interface is not working
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  color blue|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks cypherpunks, great catch!
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/nyx.git/commit/?id=4e6ef1a Fixed]. You can
 sidestep this bug by providing a camelcase color name '**color_override
 Blue**').

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26027 [Applications]: Installation issues

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#26027: Installation issues
--+--
 Reporter:  lili  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Applications  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nyx installation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi lili. Alex maintains Nyx for ArchLinux (I don't know much about it),
 but I took a quick peek around. The AUR signature [1] is the same as the
 one I uploaded to PyPI. So it should be verifiable with my key [3].
 Trouble is that 888404C187F30690 looks to be the wrong key. On first
 glance not sure who's it is.

 [1] https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/nyx/
 [2] https://pypi.org/project/Nyx/
 [3] https://www.atagar.com/pgp.php

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25852 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETINFO exit-policy for tor client should return 551

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#25852: GETINFO exit-policy for tor client should return 551
+--
 Reporter:  dmr |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-client, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by rl1987):

 * https://github.com/rl1987/tor/compare/bug25852_take2
 * https://github.com/rl1987/torspec/compare/bug25852_take2

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26028 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HLS Player doesn't use the centralized Proxy Selector. (was: HLS Player bypasses proxy configuration)

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#26028: HLS Player doesn't use the centralized Proxy Selector.
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21863| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22079 [Community]: Community governance documents

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#22079: Community governance documents
---+
 Reporter:  alison |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:17 catalyst]:

 > I recommend not using the wording "preferred pronoun" when asking for
 someone's pronouns.  Perhaps "What pronouns should we use to refer to you
 when talking to others? (optional)"?  I also think it's really important
 to make this optional (while also encouraging cisgender people to state
 their pronouns to normalize the practice).

 Thanks for your suggestions, i agree with them, replaced the patch.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18935 [Applications/Tor Browser]: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#18935: MS bugs - Danger! Windows updates break everything on their way!
--+---
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Fucking Microsoft! It made Firefox more than 10x times slower with its
 recent messy patching efforts!
 Starting this year, you need 3rd-party support to figure out what the hell
 happens with Windows Updates, e.g.
 https://support.symantec.com/en_US/article.INFO4782.html
 Because doing nothing, you can end up with no updates at all! One of the
 official statements says: "In cases where customers can't install or run
 antivirus software, Microsoft recommends manually setting the registry key
 as described below in order to receive the latest Windows security
 updates."
 Every month brings new crappy updates to broader categories of systems
 https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-removes-
 antivirus-registry-key-check-for-windows-10-users/
 This makes determining when it will affect you almost impossible. But some
 reports appeared even before that hell, see
 https://www.dedoimedo.com/computers/firefox-emet-eaf-slowness-fix.html
 And this situation tends to be worse with no response from Microsoft!
 https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/security/en-US/ef778e3e-
 89f0-4127-aea8-cef59036c480/emet-552-windows-7-sp1-eaf-and-performance-
 degradation?forum=emet
 But the real hell will start sooner than later!
 https://www.heise.de/ct/artikel/Exclusive-Spectre-NG-Multiple-new-Intel-
 CPU-flaws-revealed-several-serious-4040648.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22079 [Community]: Community governance documents

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#22079: Community governance documents
---+
 Reporter:  alison |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by juga):

 * Attachment "0001-Add-pronouns-to-membership-questions.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26028 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HLS Player bypasses proxy configuration

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#26028: HLS Player bypasses proxy configuration
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21863| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by igt0:

Old description:

> GeckoHLSPlayer uses the DefaultHttpDataSource to create an Object
> represents a connection to the remote object referred to by the URL.
>
> And DefaultHttpDataSource doesn't respect Firefox proxy values, it uses
> the URL::openConnection (without Proxy) method provided by the Android
> SDK instead of the ProxySelector.

New description:

 GeckoHLSPlayer uses the DefaultHttpDataSource to create an Object
 represents a connection to the remote object referred to by the URL.

 And DefaultHttpDataSource doesn't respect proxy values, it uses the
 URL::openConnection (without Proxy) method provided by the Android SDK
 instead of the ProxySelector.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26028 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HLS Player bypasses proxy configuration

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#26028: HLS Player bypasses proxy configuration
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21863| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by igt0:

Old description:

> GeckoHLSPlayer uses the DefaultHttpDataSource to create an Object
> represents a connection to the remote object referred to by the URL.
>
> And DefaultHttpDataSource doesn't respect Firefox proxy values, it uses
> the URL::openConnection method provided by the Android SDK instead of the
> ProxySelector.

New description:

 GeckoHLSPlayer uses the DefaultHttpDataSource to create an Object
 represents a connection to the remote object referred to by the URL.

 And DefaultHttpDataSource doesn't respect Firefox proxy values, it uses
 the URL::openConnection (without Proxy) method provided by the Android SDK
 instead of the ProxySelector.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26007 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop logging stack contents when reading a zero-length bandwidth file

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#26007: Stop logging stack contents when reading a zero-length bandwidth file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-must-maybe security-low  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport 031-backport 029-backport fast-   |
  fix|
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by juga):

 Test only for this in my branch `ticket26007_01`.
 It's using the same approach as the test for `geoip`, which adds a new
 file to the filestystem.
 Nickm, would you have an idea on a different approach than adding a new
 file here?.
 Also, it's based on master and not 0.2.9 because is using `SRCDIR` was
 introduced by nickm for the `geoip` test.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25947 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create unit test for dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#25947: Create unit test for dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bwauth, test  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25925| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by juga):

 And https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/87, same but based on
 maint-0.2.9

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25947 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create unit test for dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#25947: Create unit test for dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bwauth, test  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25925| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by juga):

 > ~~make a commit with unit tests for the relay lines~~

 That's https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/77, i'll assume i should
 wait for the rest of changes to review

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #26028 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HLS Player bypasses proxy configuration

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#26028: HLS Player bypasses proxy configuration
--+
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21863
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 GeckoHLSPlayer uses the DefaultHttpDataSource to create an Object
 represents a connection to the remote object referred to by the URL.

 And DefaultHttpDataSource doesn't respect Firefox proxy values, it uses
 the URL::openConnection method provided by the Android SDK instead of the
 ProxySelector.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26004 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor to accept node_id at the end of a bandwidth file line

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#26004: Allow Tor to accept node_id at the end of a bandwidth file line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, 034-backport-maybe, 033|  Actual Points:
  -backport-maybe, 032-backport-maybe, 031   |
  -backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe, tor-  |
  dirauth|
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by juga):

 Changed what you suggested.
 Yes, i meant to based in maint-0.2.9, isn't based on?
 I haven't renamed the branch, since probably should create another
 squashing commits.
 Opened PR following the naming proposed in the wiki
 (org/process/TorOnTrac).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26004 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor to accept node_id at the end of a bandwidth file line

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#26004: Allow Tor to accept node_id at the end of a bandwidth file line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, 034-backport-maybe, 033|  Actual Points:
  -backport-maybe, 032-backport-maybe, 031   |
  -backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe, tor-  |
  dirauth|
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * keywords:
 fast-fix, 034-backport-maybe, 033-backport-maybe, 032-backport-maybe,
 031-backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe
 =>
 fast-fix, 034-backport-maybe, 033-backport-maybe, 032-backport-maybe,
 031-backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe, tor-dirauth
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15618 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending)

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#15618: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as
rendevous (pending)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs needs-insight needs-  |  Actual Points:
  diagnosis  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Concerned relay operator reporting this just now:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2018-May/015150.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25761 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Reload signal (HUP) doesn't remove a disabled service

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#25761: hs: Reload signal (HUP) doesn't remove a disabled service
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-backport, 033-backport, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 I spent an hour today doing some debugging here. The main issue that
 causes the bug here is that when we enter `rend_service_prune_list()`
 after the HUP,  to shutdown old services, we encounter
 `rend_service_staging_list` being `NULL` and we stop the pruning by
 hitting:
 {{{
   /* Don't try to prune anything if we have no staging list. */
   if (!rend_service_staging_list) {
 return;
   }
 }}}

 Seems like `rend_service_staging_list` gets `NULL`ed during the initial
 service configuration (before the HUP) in
 `rend_service_prune_list_impl_()` with:
 {{{
   /* Finally, nullify the staging list pointer as we don't need it anymore
* and it needs to be NULL before the next reload. */
   rend_service_staging_list = NULL;
 }}}
 and then nothing actually sets up the staging list after the HUP because
 we are not adding any services, so we skip the post-HUP pruning...

 I guess what we need to do is to setup the staging list even when we have
 0 services to configure? Or alternatively, don't check for
 `!rend_service_prune_list` when pruning? Need to dig more into this...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #26027 [Applications]: Installation issues

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#26027: Installation issues
--+--
 Reporter:  lili  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Applications  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:  nyx installation
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Installation of NYX (on Arch)
 % wget https://aur.archlinux.org/cgit/aur.git/snapshot/nyx.tar.gz
 % tar -xvf nyx.tar.gz
 % cd nyx; makepkg --install

 last step gives error:
 verifying source file signatures with gpg...
 nyx-2.0.4.tar.gz ... FAILED (unknown public key 888404C187F30690)
 ==> ERROR: One or more PGP signatures could not be verified!

 The same thing happens, during the same step (makepkg) if I use the source
 repository (tried both the one on your site and the arch aur one)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #26026 [Core Tor/Nyx]: ValueError: "blue" isn't a valid color - color_interface is not working

2018-05-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#26026: ValueError: "blue" isn't a valid color - color_interface is not working
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  color blue
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hi,

 I came across an error while editing my configuration file for nyx.
 When I choose the color "blue" as shown on the NYX-configuration page as
 an exsample, the error ""blue" isn't a valid color" is recived.

 In fact none of the colors for "color_interface" work.

 Configuration file /home//.nyx/config/nyxrc
 {{{
 graph_stat bandwidth
 graph_bound tight
 max_graph_width 200
 show_interpreter false
 connection_rate 10
 #acs_support true
 color_override blue
 #color_interface false
 }}}

 Error from python3
 {{{
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/usr/local/bin/nyx", line 11, in 
 load_entry_point('nyx==2.0.4.dev0', 'console_scripts', 'nyx')()
   File "/usr/local/lib/python3.5/dist-
 packages/nyx-2.0.4.dev0-py3.5.egg/nyx/__init__.py", line 176, in main
 nyx.starter.main()
   File "/usr/local/lib/python3.5/dist-
 packages/stem-1.6.0-py3.5.egg/stem/util/conf.py", line 289, in wrapped
 return func(*args, config = config, **kwargs)
   File "/usr/local/lib/python3.5/dist-
 packages/nyx-2.0.4.dev0-py3.5.egg/nyx/starter.py", line 75, in main
 config.load(args.config)
   File "/usr/local/lib/python3.5/dist-
 packages/stem-1.6.0-py3.5.egg/stem/util/conf.py", line 503, in load
 self.load(os.path.join(root, filename))
   File "/usr/local/lib/python3.5/dist-
 packages/stem-1.6.0-py3.5.egg/stem/util/conf.py", line 526, in load
 self.set(key, value.strip(), False)
   File "/usr/local/lib/python3.5/dist-
 packages/stem-1.6.0-py3.5.egg/stem/util/conf.py", line 654, in set
 listener(self, key)
   File "/usr/local/lib/python3.5/dist-
 packages/stem-1.6.0-py3.5.egg/stem/util/conf.py", line 190, in update
 interceptor_value = self.interceptor(key, new_value)
   File "/usr/local/lib/python3.5/dist-
 packages/nyx-2.0.4.dev0-py3.5.egg/nyx/curses.py", line 173, in
 conf_handler
 raise ValueError('"%s" isn\'t a valid color' % value)
 ValueError: "blue" isn't a valid color
 }}}


 Best regards and thanks for the good work.

 Stephan

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs