Re: [tor-bugs] #3782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add native chroot support to Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3782: Add native chroot support to Tor
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:13 cypherpunks]:
 > That's good, then symlinks can be used to make the files appear in their
 expected places if desired.

 Hard links will work in a chroot. Symlinks won't work, because symlinks
 only contain the path to the file outside the chroot.

 > Is the only thing blocking this the fact that no one has written the
 code yet? I could easily write a patch.

 I don't think this change needs a proposal.

 How about you write the code for a new Chroot option, and then we'll
 review it?

 If you can write unit tests, or integration tests, that will help us make
 sure it works on different platforms.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26145 [- Select a component]: The main executable file "Tor Browser" file should be renamed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26145: The main executable file "Tor Browser" file should be renamed
--+
 Reporter:  David_Hedlund |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by David_Hedlund):

 It's hard to create paths to files with white spaces in GNOME .desktop
 files for example.

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[tor-bugs] #26145 [- Select a component]: The main executable file "Tor Browser" file should be renamed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26145: The main executable file "Tor Browser" file should be renamed
--+
 Reporter:  David_Hedlund |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Current filename: tor-browser_en-US/Tor Browser
 Proposed filename: tor-browser_en-US/Tor_Browser

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add native chroot support to Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3782: Add native chroot support to Tor
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 That's good, then symlinks can be used to make the files appear in their
 expected places if desired. Is the only thing blocking this the fact that
 no one has written the code yet? I could easily write a patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add native chroot support to Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3782: Add native chroot support to Tor
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:11 cypherpunks]:
 > Tor currently needs to access a few directories, including
 `/var/lib/tor`, `/var/log/tor`, and `/etc/tor`. I believe all of these
 have files that can't simply be opened once before a chroot because they
 need to be re-read when Tor reloads (e.g. when it receives a `SIGHUP`).
 Would it be an issue to create a `/var/lib/tor/chroot` directory and
 populate it with hardlinks to the relevant files?

 Those directories are the default. Tor has the DataDirectory, Log, and -f
 options, which can all be used to place the relevant files in a cheroot
 directory.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26144 [- Select a component]: "Digital rights management" (DRM) status for Tor Browser for each OS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26144: "Digital rights management" (DRM) status for Tor Browser for each OS
--+
 Reporter:  David_Hedlund |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by David_Hedlund):

 Tor Browser for GNU/Linux must be released with DRM completely removed for
 https://directory.fsf.org/wiki/Tor_Browser to remain approved. That is a
 requirement by the Free Software Directory.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26144 [- Select a component]: "Digital rights management" (DRM) status for Tor Browser for each OS (was: Digital rights management (DRM) status for Tor Browser for each OS)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26144: "Digital rights management" (DRM) status for Tor Browser for each OS
--+
 Reporter:  David_Hedlund |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26144 [- Select a component]: Digital rights management (DRM) status for Tor Browser for each OS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26144: Digital rights management (DRM) status for Tor Browser for each OS
--+
 Reporter:  David_Hedlund |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by David_Hedlund):

 I don't prefer the term "Digital rights management" but use it in the
 title to help people get an actual result if they search for it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26144 [- Select a component]: Digital rights management (DRM) status for Tor Browser for each OS (was: DRM status for Tor Browser for each OS)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26144: Digital rights management (DRM) status for Tor Browser for each OS
--+
 Reporter:  David_Hedlund |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

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[tor-bugs] #26144 [- Select a component]: DRM status for Tor Browser for each OS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26144: DRM status for Tor Browser for each OS
--+
 Reporter:  David_Hedlund |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I'm not talking about if DRM has been disabled by default but if it is
 completely removed.

 * Windows: ?
   https://yro.slashdot.org/story/17/02/02/231229/windows-drm-protected-
 files-used-to-decloak-tor-browser-users
 * macOS: ?
 * GNU/Linux: ?
 * Orbot: ?

 Please provide at least one reference
 (https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ or release notes) for each
 answered OS.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11110 [Archived/general]: trademark violation at torforum

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#0: trademark violation at torforum
--+
 Reporter:  phobos|  Owner:  wseltzer
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/general  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 It seems the forums now have a big banner saying that the forum is
 unofficial.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7679 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test integration of Minion (out-of-order data transmission thing) with Tor relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7679: Test integration of Minion (out-of-order data transmission thing) with 
Tor
relays
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:10 cypherpunks]:
 > Do they really want to cooperate with the community, or simply marketing
 about their research for their own career, while hide their patches as
 their "intellectual property"?

 It is the norm for research projects to not release their code,
 unfortunately.

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[tor-bugs] #26143 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Domain forwarding to sub-subdomain trips BAD_DOMAIN.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26143: Domain forwarding to sub-subdomain trips BAD_DOMAIN.
--+--
 Reporter:  Squishberkamides  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Version 7.5.4 32bit linux
 Domain registered to Alexandra, *.domain.cw; page operation generates
 whinging ostensibly that cyber.www.domain.cw is invalid per
 SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN.

 Unsure if UNBOUND X ncdr x IOS !SYNTAX FIGHT NIGHT, #6464 LIVES or savvy
 opsec rising to ...bid Cht'hulu welcome.

 ppps: About Tor Browser does not offer a Tor version.
 ps: The CONSOLE DOES NOTHING!
 pps: So there's no notion at login that a captcha exists, and I am offered
 endless text math because...bsd bounds checks are for every context?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5236 [Applications/Tor bundles/installation]: Make a deb of the Torbrowser and add to repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5236: Make a deb of the Torbrowser and add to repository
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  bundles/installation   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Isn't this fixed now that there is the launcher?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add native chroot support to Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3782: Add native chroot support to Tor
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Tor currently needs to access a few directories, including `/var/lib/tor`,
 `/var/log/tor`, and `/etc/tor`. I believe all of these have files that
 can't simply be opened once before a chroot because they need to be re-
 read when Tor reloads (e.g. when it receives a `SIGHUP`). Would it be an
 issue to create a `/var/lib/tor/chroot` directory and populate it with
 hardlinks to the relevant files?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7003 [Core Tor/Tor]: Wipe relay key material from memory on common crash conditions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7003: Wipe relay key material from memory on common crash conditions
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  small-feature, tor-relay, intro  |  Actual Points:
  hardening memwipe  |
Parent ID:  #5456| Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 What key material is being considered as sensitive here? Is it only
 private keys, or does it also include ephemeral session keys and related
 information? It's important to determine what's in scope.

 Also, coredumps do not have to be an issue if Tor sets
 `prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0)`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20424 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove --enable-openbsd-malloc (Tor maxes CPU when --enable-openbsd-malloc is used)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20424: Remove --enable-openbsd-malloc (Tor maxes CPU when 
--enable-openbsd-malloc
is used)
-+-
 Reporter:  icanhasaccount   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-31, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, fast-fix  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I'd like to point out that jemalloc has more issues with security than
 either ptmalloc or OpenBSD's malloc. The large, aligned heaps make ASLR
 less effective (and that's one reason why Firefox on *nix machines is so
 much easier to compromise than on Windows).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25622 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate setting MOZ_DISABLE_NONLOCAL_CONNECTIONS to prevent proxy bypasses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25622: Investigate setting MOZ_DISABLE_NONLOCAL_CONNECTIONS to prevent proxy
bypasses
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-proxy-bypass  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


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[tor-bugs] #26142 [Core Tor/Tor]: replace uses of U64_* and I64_* macros with their C99 stdint.h or inttypes.h equivalents

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26142: replace uses of U64_* and I64_* macros with their C99 stdint.h or
inttypes.h equivalents
--+-
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  technical-debt, cleanup
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 There are many macros in compat.h that try to portably handle 64-bit
 integer values in `printf()` and `scanf()` calls.  Now that we seem to
 require C99, we should use the equivalent macros from stdint.h or
 inttypes.h instead.  For example, `U64_FORMAT` is equivalent to `PRIu64`
 in inttypes.h.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate AS-aware circuit selection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26137: Integrate AS-aware circuit selection
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-client traffic-   |  Actual Points:
  analysis path-selection|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:3 teor]:
 > Also, our experience of research code is that it often needs significant
 work to be suitable for long-term use on millions of tor clients.

 That's very true. Luckily, the code is not ''too'' convoluted.

 > In particular, the "Eliminate path restrictions entirely" section of
 proposal 291 is relevant, because it conflicts with adding AS path
 restrictions:
 > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-April/013057.html

 Wait, is this section advocating for allowing a single relay to be used as
 both a guard and exit in a single circuit? Or does it just mean that the
 second (unused) guard would be allowed to act as a middle or exit? Anyway,
 it would not necessarily conflict with that as it could be entirely
 optional and controlled by the configuration file (just like the use of a
 limited number of guards itself is technically optional).

 > We get a lot of proposals that are someone's first proposal.
 >
 > You could read proposal 291, and use it as a model to write a draft
 proposal. Then you can send it to the tor-dev mailing list, and ask for
 help improving it.

 That sounds like a good idea. I think I will consider doing that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22511 [Community]: Tor Code of Conduct

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22511: Tor Code of Conduct
---+
 Reporter:  alison |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22079 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 That's probably a good idea. I was a bit worried because I contribute to
 Tor and I have a moral objection to signing codes of conduct or any
 similar written ultimatum. I am glad to know that it only applies to core
 members and would like to see it reworded to cause less confusion.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25886 [Core Tor/Tor]: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25886: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge-client, tor-guard,|  Actual Points:
  bootstrap  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25886 [Core Tor/Tor]: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25886: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge-client, tor-guard,|  Actual Points:
  bootstrap  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 My GitHub branch is here: https://github.com/neelchauhan/tor/tree/b25886

 CI passes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate AS-aware circuit selection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26137: Integrate AS-aware circuit selection
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-client traffic-   |  Actual Points:
  analysis path-selection|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > > This needs a proposal, and then it can go on the roadmap.
 >
 > I wasn't sure if it required a proposal since the code is already
 written and an analysis of the idea (implementation details rather than
 just raw code, etc) is present in the research paper.

 We require a proposal so that we specify precisely what the code is meant
 to do. Then we can write tests to ensure that's what the code actually
 does.

 Also, our experience of research code is that it often needs significant
 work to be suitable for long-term use on millions of tor clients.

 > > Any proposal should analyse the impact of related proposals,
 particularly 271 and 291:
 > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals
 > It would have no impact whatsoever on those proposals, since the AS-
 aware path selection does not depend on any particular guard rotation
 schedule. It will simply take into account what AS the guards are in when
 it selects the other two relays. This means it's also future-proofed for
 any changes to guard rotation behavior that happens down the road.

 I would encourage you to read the proposals and the relevant threads on
 the tor-dev mailing list.

 In particular, the "Eliminate path restrictions entirely" section of
 proposal 291 is relevant, because it conflicts with adding AS path
 restrictions:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-April/013057.html

 > As someone who has never written a proposal for Tor, is there anything I
 can do to speed up the process? I have extensive experience in information
 security, but do not know the ins and outs of the Tor protocol itself or
 the proposal process, so I would not feel comfortable writing the proposal
 without knowing more about the general requirements (other than those
 described in
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/001-process.txt
 001-process.txt]).

 We get a lot of proposals that are someone's first proposal.

 You could read proposal 291, and use it as a model to write a draft
 proposal. Then you can send it to the tor-dev mailing list, and ask for
 help improving it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22511 [Community]: Tor Code of Conduct

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22511: Tor Code of Conduct
---+
 Reporter:  alison |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22079 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 Hmmm, interesting. I see what you mean...

 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/community/policies.git/tree/code_of_conduct.txt#n253

 I'll point this out to Alison. Policies can't apply to folks outside of...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/community/policies.git/tree/membership.txt

 Maybe we should reword that bit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25821 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem getconf cache doesn't clear for CONF_CHANGED events; probably should set value

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25821: Stem getconf cache doesn't clear for CONF_CHANGED events; probably 
should
set value
---+
 Reporter:  dmr|  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  controller |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks Dave, looks good! Merged. Honestly over time our Controller's
 caching code has grown more complicated than I'd like. I'll give thought
 to simplifying it at some point but no reason that needs to be part of
 this. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate AS-aware circuit selection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26137: Integrate AS-aware circuit selection
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-client traffic-   |  Actual Points:
  analysis path-selection|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > This needs a proposal, and then it can go on the roadmap.
 >
 > Any proposal should analyse the impact of related proposals,
 particularly 271 and 291:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals
 It would have no impact whatsoever on those proposals, since the AS-aware
 path selection does not depend on any particular guard rotation schedule.
 It will simply take into account what AS the guards are in when it selects
 the other two relays. This means it's also future-proofed for any changes
 to guard rotation behavior that happens down the road.

 As someone who has never written a proposal for Tor, is there anything I
 can do to speed up the process? I have extensive experience in information
 security, but do not know the ins and outs of the Tor protocol itself or
 the proposal process, so I would not feel comfortable writing the proposal
 without knowing more about the general requirements.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22511 [Community]: Tor Code of Conduct

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22511: Tor Code of Conduct
---+
 Reporter:  alison |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22079 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:30 atagar]:
 > It only applied to our internal developer community. If you aren't on
 tor-internal@ then no need to take an interest in it. :)
 It says:

 >This code of conduct covers all community participants
 and
 >paid and unpaid contributors

 That seems to imply all code contributors, not just core members.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26133 [Webpages/Website]: Add OnionBrowser to TorProject.org/download redesigned page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26133: Add OnionBrowser to TorProject.org/download redesigned page
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 But OnionBrowser has nothing to do with the Tor Browser, i.e. it doesn't
 have the same level of fingerprinting resistance also it leaks leaks leaks
 more than wikileaks, so putting it side by side with other Tor Browser
 builds is misleading I think to the visitors.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26133 [Webpages/Website]: Add OnionBrowser to TorProject.org/download redesigned page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26133: Add OnionBrowser to TorProject.org/download redesigned page
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > The support.torproject.org seems like a better place.
 I think it would be easiest to find if it is side by side with all the
 other Tor browser versions on torproject.org/downloads , so that the users
 do not have to search through the support FAQ.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26141 [Applications/Tor Browser]: total burn crash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26141: total burn crash
--+--
 Reporter:  gilbertoblue  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gilbertoblue):

 those troubleshooting tips are completely useless for me

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26141 [Applications/Tor Browser]: total burn crash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26141: total burn crash
--+--
 Reporter:  gilbertoblue  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gilbertoblue):

 very sorry but

 Copy Tor Log to Clipbaord

 does NOT work.   A paste into a text file results in NOTHING

 Maybe you can tell me where the log file is located

 Windows 10

 thanks

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26141 [Applications/Tor Browser]: total burn crash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26141: total burn crash
--+--
 Reporter:  gilbertoblue  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * severity:  Critical => Normal
 * component:  Applications => Applications/Tor Browser
 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha =>
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team


Comment:

 Try the troubleshooting steps here:
 https://tb-manual.torproject.org/en-US/troubleshooting.html

 If they don't work, use "Copy Tor Log to Clipboard" and paste the results
 in this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25483 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Windows reproducible build of snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25483: Windows reproducible build of snowflake
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201805   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by sukhbir):

 Replying to [comment:34 gk]:
 > That's reproducible on two different build machines for me. I worked
 around both errors on one of the machines my just getting rid of
 everything `webrtc` related and starting over in this regard. We should
 not need to do this, though. I therefore keep the second machine as-is for
 debugging purposes.

 Sorry, did you mean the errors you have are reproducible or the error I
 mentioned in #comment:24?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25483 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Windows reproducible build of snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25483: Windows reproducible build of snowflake
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201805   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by sukhbir):

 I tried building `c4e3596` again and it worked for me. I agree that you
 should not have to remove everything related to `webrtc` and I will check
 that.

 The checkout error above suggests that this may have been a network issue;
 can you try building again? If that doesn't work, I will look why existing
 builds of `webrtc` interfere with this one (basing it on the initial state
 of the tor-browser-build directory to the same as yours).

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[tor-bugs] #26141 [Applications]: total burn crash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26141: total burn crash
--+
 Reporter:  gilbertoblue  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Applications  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Critical  |   Keywords:  crash
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 http://newjazz.net/TOR.png

 What does this mean?  I tried re-installing the latest version.  However,
 the same problem exists once again.   Absolutely nothing I can do

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25886 [Core Tor/Tor]: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25886: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge-client, tor-guard,|  Actual Points:
  bootstrap  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => tor-bridge-client, tor-guard, bootstrap
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Old description:

> On their review for #25691, teor notes (about for_direct_connect):
>
> >We should pass for_direct_conn into this function, and use
> node_has_preferred_descriptor().
>
> >For the mid and exit case:
> >We won't bootstrap unless we have enough actual mid and exit bandwidth,
> even if we have mids or exits listed as our bridges.
> >
> >For the guard case:
> >The guard case is unchanged for non-bridge clients.
> >
> >The bridge client case could be tricky, because:
> >
> >   1. compute_frac_paths_available() only checks guard-flagged nodes,
> not bridges
> >   2. even if it did check bridges, they don't have bandwidths
> >   3. even if we used a weight of 1 for each bridge, we don't require
> 65% of bridges to be up to bootstrap
> >
> >To workaround this issue, I suggest we make f_guard = 1.0 in
> compute_frac_paths_available() if we are using bridges, and have at least
> one bridge with ~~the preferred~~ a full descriptor.
>
> Edit: bridge clients always use full descriptors for bridges

New description:

 On their review for #25691, teor notes (about for_direct_connect):

 >We should pass for_direct_conn into this function, and use
 node_has_preferred_descriptor().

 >For the mid and exit case:
 >We won't bootstrap unless we have enough actual mid and exit bandwidth,
 even if we have mids or exits listed as our bridges.
 >
 >For the guard case:
 >The guard case is unchanged for non-bridge clients.
 >
 >The bridge client case could be tricky, because:
 >
 >   1. compute_frac_paths_available() only checks guard-flagged nodes, not
 bridges
 >   2. even if it did check bridges, they ~~don't have bandwidths~~ only
 have self-measured bandwidths
 >   3. even if we used a weight of 1 for each bridge, we don't require 65%
 of bridges to be up to bootstrap
 >
 >To workaround this issue, I suggest we make f_guard = 1.0 in
 compute_frac_paths_available() if we are using bridges, and have at least
 one bridge with ~~the preferred~~ a full descriptor.

 Edit: bridge clients always use full descriptors for bridges
 Edit: bridges have self-measured bandwidths

--

Comment:

 You also need to rewrite the guard weights when the client is using
 bridges:

 Replying to [ticket:25886 nickm]:
 > >For the guard case:
 > >The guard case is unchanged for non-bridge clients.
 > >
 > >The bridge client case could be tricky, because:
 > >
 > >   1. compute_frac_paths_available() only checks guard-flagged nodes,
 not bridges
 > >   2. even if it did check bridges, they ~~don't have bandwidths~~ only
 have self-measured bandwidths
 > >   3. even if we used a weight of 1 for each bridge, we don't require
 65% of bridges to be up to bootstrap
 > >
 > >To workaround this issue, I suggest we make f_guard = 1.0 in
 compute_frac_paths_available() if we are using bridges, and have at least
 one bridge with ~~the preferred~~ a full descriptor.
 >
 > Edit: bridge clients always use full descriptors for bridges
 > Edit: bridges have self-measured bandwidths

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17873 [Core Tor/Tor]: replacing 0.0.0.0 listeners at runtime fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17873: replacing 0.0.0.0 listeners at runtime fails
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client port bind switching  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Build is green now: https://travis-ci.org/rl1987/tor/builds/381377375

 There's also branch `bug17873_take3_squashed2` with cleaner history. See:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/116

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25886 [Core Tor/Tor]: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25886: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by neel):

 * owner:  (none) => neel
 * cc: neel@… (added)
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 I am interested in this ticket. However, I have a question:

 When I add `for_direct_conn` in `frac_nodes_with_descriptors()`, should I
 replace instances of `node_has_any_descriptor()` with
 `node_has_preferred_descriptor()` and pass in `for_direct_conn` (and
 modifying instances for `frac_nodes_with_descriptors()` to add
 `for_direct_conn`)? Is there more that I need to do?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22511 [Community]: Tor Code of Conduct

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22511: Tor Code of Conduct
---+
 Reporter:  alison |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22079 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 It only applied to our internal developer community. If you aren't on tor-
 internal@ then no need to take an interest in it. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25946 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25946: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere | Resolution:
 Severity:  Major|  worksforme
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS
 Everywhere


Comment:

 FWIW this is the underlining issue: https://github.com/EFForg/https-
 everywhere/issues/15482

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26133 [Webpages/Website]: Add OnionBrowser to TorProject.org/download redesigned page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26133: Add OnionBrowser to TorProject.org/download redesigned page
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The support.torproject.org seems like a better place.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17569: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  kernelcorn   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability tbb-security, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:46 LabraTor]:
 > I strongly encourage to implement uBlock Orgin in TBB as it is done in
 Tails. I'm fine if user customization of uBlock Origin is restricted but
 please move on with this.
 I've been lobbying for blocking some useless trash by default in TB (via
 the Firefox built-in Disconnect blocklist), but for the case of uBlock
 Origin do you have a solution for comment:33?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26139 [Core Tor/Tor]: start aplication

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26139: start aplication
--+
 Reporter:  xrooters  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * version:   => Tor: 0.3.3.5-rc
 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 Hi, thanks for reporting this bug.

 It looks like there are a few log lines missing.

 Can you please copy and paste the rest of the bug log?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22511 [Community]: Tor Code of Conduct

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22511: Tor Code of Conduct
---+
 Reporter:  alison |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22079 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > No. Users of Tor are not part of the development community.
 What about cypherpunks. Some of them doesn't pass CoC. Should we ban them?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25848 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Replace Gson with Jackson

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25848: Replace Gson with Jackson
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25815   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  metrics-team => karsten


Comment:

 I'll start working on this.

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[tor-bugs] #26140 [Applications/Orbot]: Orbot's VPN is not followed by apps (Android 8.1)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26140: Orbot's VPN is not followed by apps (Android 8.1)
+---
 Reporter:  pant|  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+---
 I installed orbot from https://github.com/n8fr8/orbot/releases selecting
 universal release because of
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26126 . Problem is that
 the VPN that orbot creates is not used by any app.

 I use Resurrection Remix (RR-O-v6.0.0-20180512-klte-Official) based on
 android 8.1.

 Also I installed AFWALL+ allowing only VPN access to apps (not including
 orbot) and the apps stop having access to internet. For example Firefox
 stated 'Unable to connect'. Without AFWALL+ filtering, when I visit
 check.torproject.org it shows my public IP address.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26126 [Applications/Orbot]: Tor configuration did not verify: Error: -4 ERR= OUT=

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26126: Tor configuration did not verify: Error: -4 ERR= OUT=
+---
 Reporter:  Winston |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by pant):

 Same happend when I installed Orbot-16.0.2-RC-1-fullperm-armeabi-
 release.apk https://github.com/n8fr8/orbot/releases ...

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[tor-bugs] #26139 [- Select a component]: start aplication

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26139: start aplication
--+
 Reporter:  xrooters  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 [Sun May 20 08:50:50 2018] Tor Software Error - The Tor software
 encountered an internal bug. Please report the following error message to
 the Tor developers at bugs.torproject.org: "Bug: 8   tor
 0x0001065c9786 tor_main + 70 (on Tor 0.3.3.5-rc 81d71f0d41adf0d8)
 "

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26138 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirPort /tor/server/all document contains spurrious blank line following serving relay's descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26138: DirPort /tor/server/all document contains spurrious blank line following
serving relay's descriptor
--+
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => easy intro
 * priority:  Medium => Very Low
 * severity:  Normal => Trivial
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Extra blank lines are permitted in the directory document format:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n212

 Extra whitespace is a trivial bug that would be nice to fix eventually.

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