Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 in short plz allow selfsign cert over tor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://onion + (SNImismatch & AltNamemismatch) = insecure warning, red
 padlock.
 https://onion + outdatedDateCertificate = error

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 http://onion = secure
 https://onion + selfsign = secure (because pubkey is transmitted over
 onion channel)
 https://onion + evsign = secure

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https:// cleardomain + selfsign = warn
 https:// .onion + selfsign = should ignore insecure warning

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Please allow https:// self-signed cert(cacert or whatever).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17569: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  kernelcorn   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-usability tbb-security, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Please don't vandalize tickets as well.

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[tor-bugs] #26175 [Applications/GetTor]: Support Experimental Tor Browser for Github Provider

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26175: Support Experimental Tor Browser for Github Provider
-+-
 Reporter:  iry  |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Could you please upload
 [https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en#downloads-alpha
 Experimental Tor Browser] to
 https://github.com/TheTorProject/gettorbrowser ? Since it is considered as
 the fastest and most convenient way to download Tor Browser in censored
 area, this would be extremely helpful.

 I assume the work has been done with an automation script, so if it is
 possible to open source it, I will try modifying the script myself and
 then do a pull request on the GitHub.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22220 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Move cell encoding/decoding out of hs_intropoint.c to hs_cell.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#0: hs: Move cell encoding/decoding out of hs_intropoint.c to hs_cell.c
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, prop224-extra   |  Actual Points:
  refactor code-movement |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 In `hs_intropoint.c`, I noticed code like:

 {{{
   encoded_len = trn_cell_intro_established_encoded_len(cell);
   tor_assert(encoded_len > 0);
   encoded_cell = tor_malloc_zero(encoded_len);
   result_len = trn_cell_intro_established_encode(encoded_cell,
 encoded_len,
 cell);
   tor_assert(encoded_len == result_len);
 }}}

 in `hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell()`, and:

 {{{
   encoded_len = trn_cell_introduce_ack_encoded_len(cell);
   tor_assert(encoded_len > 0);
   encoded_cell = tor_malloc_zero(encoded_len);
   result_len = trn_cell_introduce_ack_encode(encoded_cell, encoded_len,
 cell);
   tor_assert(encoded_len == result_len);
 }}}

 in `send_introduce_ack_cell()`.

 Would it be okay if I have a function in `hs_cell.c` which does the
 encoding, and I pass in the function calls to get the cell length and
 encoded cells? The functions I am thinking about passing are:

  * Either `trn_cell_intro_established_encoded_len()` or
 `trn_cell_introduce_ack_encoded_len()`, and
  * Either `trn_cell_intro_established_encode()` or
 `trn_cell_introduce_ack_encode()`

 And in the new function, I return a `ssize_t` for `encoded_len`, and pass
 in the functions, the cell itself, and the pointer to `*encoded_cell` to
 get returned the cell itself.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+--
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201805  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:62 gk]:
 > Okay, I cherry-picked ef3476c5068d8597084c781a25792ce9ccef378c and fixed
 two typos in a follow-up commit
 (a3447ddb13c279e7e4c384610b98a045e7f932bb). Thanks, great work!
 >
 > What's the idea behind the "const-ification" in the other commit? FWIW:
 I am not sure whether this is actually bound to this bug (given you used
 the same bug number).

 Something igt0 suggested when he reviewed the patch. Technically I should
 be using `const` often where I am using `let`. Maybe it's better to ignore
 this patch for now and we can decide whether to constify the whole
 codebase at some point.

 > As said in my previous comment another thing open for this ticket is
 adapting the changes to ESR 60.
 This is happening in #26100. I with my patch in the previous comment plus
 the patches we will be proposing for #26100, I expect the circuit display
 will work.

 > Additionally, we might want to open a new ticket for my point 1 in
 comment:57.

 I opened #26174.

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[tor-bugs] #26174 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Link "Learn More" in circuit display to section in FAQ explaining why Guards don't change

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26174: Link "Learn More" in circuit display to section in FAQ explaining why
Guards don't change
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The new circuit display implemented in #24309 has a "Learn More" link that
 currently points to the Manual. But we'd like to change this to point to a
 location on the new website's FAQ that explains guard behavior in detail.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+--
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201805  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is a patch that fixes two issues:
   1. mcs observed that one of the Relay lines was wrapping on a version of
 macOS.
   2. In TBB/ESR60, the door hanger sometimes is rendering too small to
 show everything inside (typically the bottom and right edges are cut off).
 The `ensureCorrectPopupDimensions` function fixes this problem. Something
 similar also happens in ESR52 when I add `white-space: nowrap;` to the CSS
 file, and `ensureCorrectPopupDimensions` fixes that as well.

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commits/24309+10

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[tor-bugs] #26173 [Community/Relays]: Adopt a Node

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26173: Adopt a Node
--+
 Reporter:  DrWhax|  Owner:  Phoul
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:  adoptanode
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This ticket is about "adopt a node" a relay adoption idea by the "hart
 voor internetvrijheid" foundation in the Netherlands. We've been inspired
 by Frënn vun der Ënn and various discussions we had with people over the
 years.

 TODO: find proposal text. I'll edit ticket when I found it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, TorBrowserTeam201805 => ux-team, tor-hs,
 TorBrowserTeam201805R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Ok, updated patch with both gk and mcs's feedback and fixed the word
 wrapping.  That's what I get for assuming my text editor's word wrap
 functionality would just work the way I expected it to.

 gk: The _sslStatus != null check is required because now, the _isSecure
 check will be true for .onion domains, even if they are lacking a
 certificate.  Without that check, we'd be doing certificate related
 operations for HTTP onions.

 mcs: The URI is already normalized (?) before it reaches any of this code.
 Had a similar concern with one of gk's patches awhile back :).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-23247-Communicating-security-expectations-
 for-.o.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24658 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split/refactor crypto.h into smaller separate modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24658: Split/refactor crypto.h into smaller separate modules
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:
 |  ffmancera
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto, refactor, review-|  Actual Points:
  group-32, review-group-34, |
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm, isis  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Great, thanks! Looks good to me!

 Last up we have stream stuff to do.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26170 [Core Tor/Tor]: Core Tor releases typo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26170: Core Tor releases typo
---+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  doc|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Yes,that's correct.  Let's add addition modulo 12 to the list of things I
 can do wrong.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26171 [Metrics/Statistics]: Explain which cells are counted for onion service traffic graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26171: Explain which cells are counted for onion service traffic graphs
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I suggest we change:
 "This graph shows the amount of onion-service traffic from version 2 and
 version 3 onion services in the network per day"
 To:
 "This graph shows the amount of onion-service traffic from version 2 and
 version 3 onion services relayed by rendezvous points per day"

 I wonder if we should keep "per day", it's a bit confusing when the
 bandwidth is in Gigabits per second.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26171 [Metrics/Statistics]: Explain which cells are counted for onion service traffic graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26171: Explain which cells are counted for onion service traffic graphs
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [ticket:26171 teor]:
 > I can't work out what is being measured on the onion service traffic
 graph:
 > https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-rend-relayed-cells.html
 >
 > Does it include:
 > * cells sent from rendezvous points to clients?
 > * cells sent from rendezvous points to services?
 > * cells sent to rendezvous points from clients?
 > * cells sent to rendezvous points from services?

 I can answer this question from the tor code:

 Tor reports the number of relay cells relayed by the rendezvous point.
 (It doesn't report the circuit-level extend and destroy cells).

 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/bd153e46408fa4f9432a5de1b1f5f106f00e34cf/src/or/command.c#L565

 Using the same wording as the question:
 * cells sent from clients to services via rendezvous points and
 * cells sent from services to clients via rendezvous points

 > Also, the related blog post says:
 > "A related statistic here is "How much of the Tor network is actually
 hidden service usage?". There are two different ways to answer this
 question…"
 > https://blog.torproject.org/some-statistics-about-onions
 >
 > Does the graph try to answer this question?

 I don't think it does, but I'd need to look at the metrics code to
 confirm.

 > Or is it just measuring rendezvous point traffic without counting the
 traffic on the relays on rest of the circuit?

 I'm going to assume that metrics makes no attempt to multiply the traffic
 by the number of relays in the circuit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26170 [Core Tor/Tor]: Core Tor releases typo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26170: Core Tor releases typo
---+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => doc
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * component:  Webpages/Website => Core Tor/Tor
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 I changed it to "On or after Feb 22, 2019", which is 9 months from the
 release date.

 I'm assigning this to nickm for review, because it was his change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26171 [Metrics/Statistics]: Explain which cells are counted for onion service traffic graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26171: Explain which cells are counted for onion service traffic graphs
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by arma):

 And by "how many cells" I mean "how many cells on rendezvous circuits".

 (In a sense this is a network team question, because they're the ones who
 wrote the code to collect and publish the number. The metrics team just
 takes the number and visualizes it.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26171 [Metrics/Statistics]: Explain which cells are counted for onion service traffic graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26171: Explain which cells are counted for onion service traffic graphs
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by arma):

 I believe the count is simply how many cells are handled at the rendezvous
 point. And handled means "received from one side and sent to the other
 side".

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[tor-bugs] #26172 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: geoipFile and geoip6File cloned from optional torrcDefaultsFile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26172: geoipFile and  geoip6File cloned from optional torrcDefaultsFile
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 {{{
   var torrcDefaultsFile =
 TorLauncherUtil.getTorFile("torrc-defaults", false);
 }}}
 {{{
   var geoipFile = torrcDefaultsFile.clone();
   geoipFile.leafName = "geoip";

   var geoip6File = torrcDefaultsFile.clone();
   geoip6File.leafName = "geoip6";

   var args = [];
   if (torrcDefaultsFile)
   {
 args.push("--defaults-torrc");
 args.push(torrcDefaultsFile.path);
   }
 }}}
 Missed "optional" torrc-defaults file leads to exception and failed Tor
 start with unclear reason for user.

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[tor-bugs] #26171 [Metrics/Statistics]: Explain which cells are counted for onion service traffic graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26171: Explain which cells are counted for onion service traffic graphs
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 I can't work out what is being measured on the onion service traffic
 graph:
 https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-rend-relayed-cells.html

 Does it include:
 * cells sent from rendezvous points to clients?
 * cells sent from rendezvous points to services?
 * cells sent to rendezvous points from clients?
 * cells sent to rendezvous points from services?

 Also, the related blog post says:
 "A related statistic here is "How much of the Tor network is actually
 hidden service usage?". There are two different ways to answer this
 question…"
 https://blog.torproject.org/some-statistics-about-onions

 Does the graph try to answer this question?
 Or is it just measuring rendezvous point traffic without counting the
 traffic on the relays on rest of the circuit?

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[tor-bugs] #26170 [Webpages/Website]: Core Tor releases typo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26170: Core Tor releases typo
--+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 It says 0.3.3 end of life is on {{{On or after Mar 22, 2018}}} but that is
 the day that it should be released.
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/CoreTorReleases?version=40

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26042 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a new option "RouteDNSTraffic" to prevent noobs from insecure way to use Tor.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26042: Add a new option "RouteDNSTraffic" to prevent noobs from insecure way to
use Tor.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * priority:  High => Medium
 * resolution:   => not a bug
 * status:  reopened => closed
 * type:  task => enhancement
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 indigotime]:
 > >Tor itself should reroute the tcp port 53 request to TorDNS system to
 prevent linking.
 > No, no and no.
 >
 > It's just need to include DNSCrypt and DNS-over-TLS resolvers into Tor
 Browser (Orbot, Orfox).

 Tor Browser uses the exit to resolve DNS queries.

 The users using port 53 are running applications that don't support
 SOCKS5, or are not doing DNS.

 There's really nothing Tor can do to reliably fix applications.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename HSDir consensus flag to OnionDir

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26168: Rename HSDir consensus flag to OnionDir
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 arma]:
 > An interesting side note: there is a protocol version named HSDir too.
 We could leave that one alone, for historical reasons, or we could start
 understanding a synonym OnionDir protocol version too. There might be a
 bit more code changes on that one.

 I think we should make sure that all references to HSDir have a plan to
 migrate to OnionDir.
 But we don't need to do them all in this ticket. (For example, there is
 already a ticket to alias the HS options.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26166 [Core Tor/Tor]: Protect directory servers and torproject.org against TCP reset attacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26166: Protect directory servers and torproject.org against TCP reset attacks
-+-
 Reporter:  indigotime   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  TCP, RST, reset  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 It is difficult to distinguish spoofed RST packets from actual RST
 packets. A network-level adversary can generate packets that look like
 they came from the user's computer.

 We certainly can't do it at the application level in Tor. (And it would be
 really hard to do in a cross-platform way.)

 For machines we control on torproject.org, I believe the situation is
 similar.

 If you find documentation for a reliable method of distinguishing spoofed
 packets, please post a link here, and reopen the ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26156 [Core Tor/Tor]: Undefined references to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() with OpenSSL 1.1.0 no-deprecated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26156: Undefined references to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() with OpenSSL 1.1.0 no-
deprecated
+
 Reporter:  laomaiweng  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl tor-crypto  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by laomaiweng):

 Works fine for me both with OpenSSL 1.1.0 and 1.0.1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25549 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25549: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  saper
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  isis, catalyst   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM. I don't know what to do about #26076 for now. Perhaps we'll start to
 see a pattern emerge to the failures, or maybe we'll have to ignore that
 test on appveyor for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26002 [Metrics/Statistics]: Simplify graph with number of bytes spent on answering directory requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26002: Simplify graph with number of bytes spent on answering directory 
requests
+-
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Thanks for checking! I'll deploy the database change when the current run
 has finished and the website change when the next run tonight finishes
 without issues. And if this all goes well, I'll merge and resolve
 tomorrow.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26169 [Metrics/Website]: Replace Gson with Jackson in Tor Metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26169: Replace Gson with Jackson in Tor Metrics
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-26169=3dc1998467c44ed04cb0063cc87576ef1387d69e
 commit 3dc1998 in my task-26169 branch].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-23247-Communicating-security-expectations-
 for-.o.patch" added.


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[tor-bugs] #26169 [Metrics/Website]: Replace Gson with Jackson in Tor Metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26169: Replace Gson with Jackson in Tor Metrics
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Related to Onionoo ticket #25848 and metrics-lib ticket #26159, we should
 replace Gson with Jackson in Tor Metrics. For reasons, see those tickets.
 I'll work on this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26159 [Metrics/Library]: Replace Gson with Jackson in metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26159: Replace Gson with Jackson in metrics-lib
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Fantastic! I'll include this commit in a pre-release tarball by Wednesday
 evening, unless I spot any issues myself. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26162 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Replace Gson with Jackson in CollecTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26162: Replace Gson with Jackson in CollecTor
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by karsten):

 Let's only do this if the changes are really small. It would be really bad
 to spend too much time on CollecTor so that we won't have enough time left
 for the other releases.

 Do you want to write a patch that does what you suggest, and I continue
 preparing and testing the other patches? And if it turns out to be harder
 than expected, we save this additional step for later?

 (By the way, CollecTor also uses a JSON formatter/parser for the reference
 checker in its relay descriptors module. That means, even if we use
 metrics-lib classes for `index.json` formatting ''and'' parsing, we'll
 still have unrelated JSON code in CollecTor.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26163 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Replace Gson with Jackson in ExoneraTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26163: Replace Gson with Jackson in ExoneraTor
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/exonerator.git/commit/?h=task-26163=a563481caeab5644ce9dffe61d2a314428dd4c64
 commit a563481 in my task-26163 branch].

 The reason why I'm working on this ticket now, rather than after releasing
 metrics-lib and CollecTor this week, is to minimize the risk of running
 into things we don't like before we releasing anything.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Very nice work. I have these additional comments:
 * In browser/base/content/browser.js, a space is missing after the `if`
 here: `if(this._isEV) {`
 * In dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp, a space is missing after the
 `if` here: `if(NS_FAILED(rv)) {`
 * Should we remove the comments and meta data (title, desc, defs) from the
 SVG files?
 * In browser/base/content/pageinfo/security.js,
 dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp, and
 security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUIImpl.cpp: is it safe to assume the
 host name is lower case? The browser seems to switch `.ONION` to `.onion`
 when I try to use the former but I don't know why that happens.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26167 [Applications/Torbutton]: Make Torbutton security settings more customizable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26167: Make Torbutton security settings more customizable
--+
 Reporter:  indigotime|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton|Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  settings, security level  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 More cutomization = easier to fingerprint 


 鹿

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, TorBrowserTeam201805R => ux-team, tor-hs,
 TorBrowserTeam201805
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Overall, looks good to me! Some minor things:

 1) I had trouble parsing your commit message (there are some typos and
 things in the "-" lines missing etc.). https://chris.beams.io/posts/git-
 commit/ might be a useful resource. At least it helped me a lot.

 2) There is code in `browser.js` regarding the PointerLock API that might
 require patching as well (IIRC this or similar code is used or was used to
 show the same info when entering into fullscreen, at least on some
 platforms):
 {{{
  get pointerlockFsWarningClassName() {
 // Note that the fullscreen warning does not handle
 _isSecureInternalUI.
 if (this._uriHasHost && this._isEV) {
   return "verifiedIdentity";
 }
 if (this._uriHasHost && this._isSecure) {
   return "verifiedDomain";
 }
 return "unknownIdentity";
 }}}

 3) Could you explain why you needed to add `this._sslStatus != null`  in
 {{{
 } else if (this._uriHasHost && this._isSecure && this._sslStatus != null)
 {
 }}}
 If that's not obvious I think adding a comment would be useful.

 4) The `const bool` does not really fit into the surrounding code (where
 just `bool` is used). I think we should stick to the latter. Or maybe even
 better just get rid of this variable and do things like
 {{{
 if (!StringEndsWith(host, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".onion")))
 }}}
 in both places. (In the `parentIsOnion` case, maybe rename `host` to
 `parentHost` then as this makes the context clearer.

 5) I like the strings added to the Page Info window. However, doing it
 that way we have trouble translating them until we got our code upstreamed
 and Mozilla takes care of the translation. This has the unfortunate side-
 effect of mixed english $LANG text.

 We had a similar issue in #20244 (see in particular
 comment:2:ticket:20244) and worked around it with a Torbutton overlay. I
 wonder if that could be a solution for this case as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26042 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a new option "RouteDNSTraffic" to prevent noobs from insecure way to use Tor.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26042: Add a new option "RouteDNSTraffic" to prevent noobs from insecure way to
use Tor.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by indigotime):

 >Tor itself should reroute the tcp port 53 request to TorDNS system to
 prevent linking.
 No, no and no.

 It's just need to include DNSCrypt and DNS-over-TLS resolvers into Tor
 Browser (Orbot, Orfox).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename HSDir consensus flag to OnionDir

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26168: Rename HSDir consensus flag to OnionDir
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 An interesting side note: there is a protocol version named HSDir too. We
 could leave that one alone, for historical reasons, or we could start
 understanding a synonym OnionDir protocol version too. There might be a
 bit more code changes on that one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename HSDir consensus flag to OnionDir

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26168: Rename HSDir consensus flag to OnionDir
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Here is I think the patch we want for step 1. (patch on maint-0.2.9 so it
 will last the longest)
 {{{
 diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c
 index 521e237..f72e995 100644
 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c
 +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c
 @@ -2948,6 +2948,8 @@ routerstatus_parse_entry_from_string(memarea_t
 *area,
  rs->is_unnamed = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(tok->args[i], "HSDir")) {
  rs->is_hs_dir = 1;
 +  } else if (!strcmp(tok->args[i], "OnionDir")) {
 +rs->is_hs_dir = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(tok->args[i], "V2Dir")) {
  rs->is_v2_dir = 1;
}
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #26168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename HSDir consensus flag to OnionDir

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26168: Rename HSDir consensus flag to OnionDir
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Over time, nobody is going to know what an HSDir is. Eventually we will
 want to use a more understandable name. I propose OnionDir.

 Step 1: Make clients able to parse the OnionDir flag, and they just treat
 it as a synonym for HSDir.

 Step 2: Wait a long time until all clients from before step 1 are gone.

 Step 3: Have dir auths start saying OnionDir instead of HSDir.

 (In the above plan, step 2 could take years. But I think it's still the
 simplest plan. The only real risk is if we somehow screw up with step 1,
 and don't notice the screw-up until we try step 3.)

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[tor-bugs] #26167 [Applications/Torbutton]: Make Torbutton security settings more customizable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26167: Make Torbutton security settings more customizable
-+-
 Reporter:  indigotime   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:   |Version:
  Applications/Torbutton |   Keywords:  settings, security
 Severity:  Normal   |  level
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Torbutton allows to switch security level between 3 presets. Can you make
 it more customizable, like WebAPI Manager? (https://addons.mozilla.org/en-
 US/firefox/addon/webapi-manager/)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22220 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Move cell encoding/decoding out of hs_intropoint.c to hs_cell.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#0: hs: Move cell encoding/decoding out of hs_intropoint.c to hs_cell.c
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, prop224-extra   |  Actual Points:
  refactor code-movement |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * cc: neel@… (added)
 * owner:  (none) => neel


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25750 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: update Tor Launcher for ESR 60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25750: update Tor Launcher for ESR 60
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201805R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201805 => ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201805R


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:37 sysrqb]:
 > I think I corrected all of GK's comments. I pushed branch `bug25750_6`.

 Looks good, thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26002 [Metrics/Statistics]: Simplify graph with number of bytes spent on answering directory requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26002: Simplify graph with number of bytes spent on answering directory 
requests
+-
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Changes look fine as well as the changes in the graphed results.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26162 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Replace Gson with Jackson in CollecTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26162: Replace Gson with Jackson in CollecTor
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 CollecTor already uses all o.tp.descriptor.index classes.  Why duplicate
 the writing functionality?  Maybe, this should be implemented by using
 only o.tp.descriptor.index classes in CollecTor?  Future json processing
 lib changes would not affect CollecTor anymore (except for simply
 including the dependency).

 Setting to needs_revision for discussion.

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[tor-bugs] #26166 [- Select a component]: Protect directory servers and torproject.org against TCP reset attacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26166: Protect directory servers and torproject.org against TCP reset attacks
--+-
 Reporter:  indigotime|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:  TCP, RST, reset
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Some ISP's using TCP reset attacks to enforce censorship and block Tor.
 Is it possible to make torproject.org and Tor directory servers to drop
 (ignore) all spoofed TCP reset packets?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25517 [Core Tor/Tor]: TROVE-2018-005

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25517: TROVE-2018-005
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  trove, 033-must, security,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I ran into a compilation error on windows, and fixed it with
 `240bb177140099690213dfc524a235abd2aa0eb8`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26159 [Metrics/Library]: Replace Gson with Jackson in metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26159: Replace Gson with Jackson in metrics-lib
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 The changes are fine.  All ant tests and checks pass.  The indexNode
 functionality can read a current index.json and writes an identical one
 locally.

 Ready to merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25750 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: update Tor Launcher for ESR 60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25750: update Tor Launcher for ESR 60
+--
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201805  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I think I corrected all of GK's comments. I pushed branch `bug25750_6`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25517 [Core Tor/Tor]: TROVE-2018-005

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25517: TROVE-2018-005
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  trove, 033-must, security,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Old description:

> Tracking issue for TROVE-2018-005.

New description:

 Tracking issue for TROVE-2018-005.

 (The bug here is a memory-related denial-of-service attack, but only
 applies to directory authorities.  They've all been informed.)

--

Comment:

 Okay, we've finally got this ready.  I've merged trove-2018-005_033 to
 maint-0.3.3, and trove-2018-005-034 to master.  I have trove-2018-005_032
 sitting ready for a backport to maint-0.3.2, if we decide to do that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26165 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make it possible to use gcc:var/setup without hardening wrapper

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26165: Make it possible to use gcc:var/setup without hardening wrapper
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201805  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 I am now trying this patch:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_26165=0bee21ddba177e8217091df8b22e7b184378fbaa

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[tor-bugs] #26165 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make it possible to use gcc:var/setup without hardening wrapper

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26165: Make it possible to use gcc:var/setup without hardening wrapper
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm,
  |  boklm201805
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In `projects/gcc/config` we define `var/setup` which can be used in the
 build scripts from other components to setup gcc. It is however assuming
 we want to use hardening-wrapper, which prevents us from using it in
 `projects/firefox/build` to setup a gcc host compiler in the Windows
 build.

 It also seems we want to use gcc to build llvm (as part of the changes for
 #26073), without hardening-wrapper:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser-
 build/commit/80c6edec3de1b3a2a1d8f879c95b0bf804cdf9f0

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26147 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Information leaks with automatic searching via URL bar.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26147: Information leaks with automatic searching via URL bar.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I suggest displaying Yes/No buttons and a Don't ask again checkbox. That
 shouldn't harm user experience that much, especially those who rely on the
 address bar for searching instead of the little Search box on the top
 right.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26151 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Snowflake rendezvous using Amazon SQS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26151: Snowflake rendezvous using Amazon SQS
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by n8fr8):

 I guess I need to understand the interactive nature of a Snowflake
 rendezvous better... My basic thought was that this could be used for a
 variety of "bridge" type publishing capabilities. If you can provide a
 bridge on a public IP, you can broadcast it here. This is meant for the
 ephemeral, temporary type bridges that might be made available from mobile
 devices or home appliances, while people are not using them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17873 [Core Tor/Tor]: replacing 0.0.0.0 listeners at runtime fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17873: replacing 0.0.0.0 listeners at runtime fails
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client port bind switching  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Pushed commit 4f9143d08c63389de7451b8ffdc4a34984904662 to
 `bug17873_take3_squashed2`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22646 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Implement hidden service client authentication support in chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22646: Implement hidden service client authentication support in chutney
+---
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  prop224, prop224-maybe  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26164  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * parent:   => #26164


Comment:

 #26164 has a better explanation

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26073 [Applications/Tor Browser]: patch tor-browser-build.git for Firefox 60 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26073: patch tor-browser-build.git for Firefox 60 ESR
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201805, ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by sukhbir):

 > actually using an esr version of the langpacks

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser-build/issues/2

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[tor-bugs] #26164 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Create HS network in chutney with client-auth enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26164: Create HS network in chutney with client-auth enabled
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  chutney tor-hs client-auth
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 To improve our HS integration tests as part of `make test-network-all` we
 should make a network template similar to `hs` etc. where the HS is
 client-auth-protected, and the client needs to use the client auth token
 to submit data.

 This might be a bit of a hurdle to setup, since we would need to first
 start up the HS, so that it generates the client auth tokens, and then we
 would need to hax the client torrc to make it happen.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26141 [Applications/Tor Browser]: total burn crash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26141: total burn crash
--+---
 Reporter:  gilbertoblue  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gilbertoblue):

 note, the backslashes I used got deleted

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser (was: Add Adblock Plus to the Tor Browser)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17569: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  kernelcorn   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability tbb-security, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  wontfix =>


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:50 cypherpunks]:
 > > So let's remove HTTPS Everywhere as well since it makes connections to
 get ruleset updates
 >
 > Complete BS. Tor Bundled add-on does not make connection at all. uBO is
 not.
 Please be more respectful and always double check things ;~)
 https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/https-everywhere-introduces-new-
 feature-continual-ruleset-updates

 > > There are valid reasons to be against uBO in the Tor Browser
 >
 > You wrote your answer already
 Yes, but it needs an official response from a consensus of TB devs and a
 followup ticket (for the proposed Firefox Disconnect list alternative).

 Please don't vandalize tickets as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26141 [Applications/Tor Browser]: total burn crash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26141: total burn crash
--+---
 Reporter:  gilbertoblue  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gilbertoblue):

 1) Copy to Clipboard, to see errors

 This does NOT work at all, as mentioned above


 2) I was told to add to torrc-defaults, to enable logging

 Log debug C:\\path\\to\\file.log   (eg. Log debug d:\\myLog.log   )

 This does NOT work at all either

 This is really quite stunning that neither technique works to enable
 logging

 Original error:

 http://newjazz.net/TOR.png



 thanks, if you can

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25544 [Core Tor/Tor]: Complete vanguard specification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25544: Complete vanguard specification
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, torspec, guard-   |  Actual Points:
  discovery, 034-roadmap-master, |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Mike, your changes look good to me.

 I pushed another commit on my github repo at `mesh-vanguards` with some
 more text on how the python script is used right now. If you think that's
 inappropriate for the proposal let me now.

 I think now is the time to decide what's the role of prop#247 and what's
 the role of `xxx-mesh-vanguards.txt`. I think it's confusing to let both
 of them live at the same time because they are pretty similar in terms of
 text. We should figure this out so that we get this merged in torspec.

 Should we let prop#247 be "Vanguard integration inside Tor core", whereas
 this new proposal is "Mesh vanguard design using external script"? And
 make both of them proper proposals (aka get a proposal number for this new
 one too). Or what should be the plan?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26076 [Core Tor/Tor]: AppVeyor CI: Tor didn't declare that there would be no encryption FAIL src/test/test_keygen.sh (exit status: 5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26076: AppVeyor CI: Tor didn't declare that there would be no encryption FAIL
src/test/test_keygen.sh (exit status: 5)
-+-
 Reporter:  saper|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25549   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've just seen a run where the first one failed but the second one
 succeeded.  So, Hmm.

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[tor-bugs] #26163 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Replace Gson with Jackson in ExoneraTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26163: Replace Gson with Jackson in ExoneraTor
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 Related to Onionoo ticket #25848 and metrics-lib ticket #26159, we should
 replace Gson with Jackson in ExoneraTor. For reasons, see those tickets.
 I'll work on this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26156 [Core Tor/Tor]: Undefined references to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() with OpenSSL 1.1.0 no-deprecated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26156: Undefined references to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() with OpenSSL 1.1.0 no-
deprecated
+
 Reporter:  laomaiweng  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl tor-crypto  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 I've tried the approach you suggest in my branch `bug26156_034`; pull
 request at https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/120

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25549 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25549: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  saper
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  isis, catalyst   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Simplified further per your comments.  I've made a new branch called
 `appveyor_min_034_v2` -- PR at https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/119
 .

 I still don't have a solution for #26076

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25848 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Replace Gson with Jackson in Onionoo (was: Replace Gson with Jackson)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25848: Replace Gson with Jackson in Onionoo
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25815   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * priority:  Medium => High


Comment:

 I made some progress on this, but decided to focus on metrics-lib (#26159)
 and CollecTor (#26162) first. I'll keep working on this one and also on
 equivalents for metrics-web and ExoneraTor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26162 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Replace Gson with Jackson in CollecTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26162: Replace Gson with Jackson in CollecTor
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 db.git/commit/?h=task-26162=0b1ebc8dde839f8bf2f3ba59cd6b68b4e25dc463
 ​commit 0b1ebc8 in my task-26162 branch].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25575 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Server space request (175 GB total) for hosting Tor Browser downloads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25575: Server space request (175 GB total) for hosting Tor Browser downloads
-+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20628   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I think we're good to go on this.  Please report back after adding a few
 locales, so we can keep an eye on things.

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[tor-bugs] #26162 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Replace Gson with Jackson in CollecTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26162: Replace Gson with Jackson in CollecTor
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 Related to Onionoo ticket #25848 and metrics-lib ticket #26159, we should
 replace Gson with Jackson in CollecTor. For reasons, see those tickets.
 I'll work on this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26159 [Metrics/Library]: Replace Gson with Jackson in metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26159: Replace Gson with Jackson in metrics-lib
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/commit/?h=task-26159=80ec51552665d4afb5092b6eafc23818465e241f
 commit 80ec515 in my task-26159 branch].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26159 [Metrics/Library]: Replace Gson with Jackson in metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26159: Replace Gson with Jackson in metrics-lib
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  metrics-team => karsten


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26156 [Core Tor/Tor]: Undefined references to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() with OpenSSL 1.1.0 no-deprecated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26156: Undefined references to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() with OpenSSL 1.1.0 no-
deprecated
+
 Reporter:  laomaiweng  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl tor-crypto  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25575 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Server space request (175 GB total) for hosting Tor Browser downloads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25575: Server space request (175 GB total) for hosting Tor Browser downloads
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20628   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 retired savii as a dist mirror.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26158 [Core Tor/Tor]: A little bug of circular path of Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26158: A little bug of circular path of Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  TBD.Chen |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  circular-path, security-low, |  Actual Points:
  031-backport, 032-backport, 033-backport,  |
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 One-line fix in my branch `bug26158_031`; please review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26158 [Core Tor/Tor]: A little bug of circular path of Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26158: A little bug of circular path of Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  TBD.Chen |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  circular-path, security-low, |  Actual Points:
  031-backport, 032-backport, 033-backport,  |
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 We may as well apply this fix as far back as possible; it's unlikely to
 cause any surprising side effects.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26102 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update cov-diff script to remove extraneous timestamp info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26102: Update cov-diff script to remove extraneous timestamp info
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 thanks; merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26101 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update cov-diff script to understand * character

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26101: Update cov-diff script to understand * character
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 thanks; merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26102 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update cov-diff script to remove extraneous timestamp info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26102: Update cov-diff script to remove extraneous timestamp info
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM as far as I could tell from a quick try.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26101 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update cov-diff script to understand * character

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26101: Update cov-diff script to understand * character
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM as far as I could tell from a quick try.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17873 [Core Tor/Tor]: replacing 0.0.0.0 listeners at runtime fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17873: replacing 0.0.0.0 listeners at runtime fails
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client port bind switching  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Great with the test.

 One minor issue: could you switch from using `print "x"` to `print("x")`
 in the Python code instead and add `from __future__ import
 print_function`?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25415 [Core Tor/Tor]: moria1 seg faults on testing relay reachability

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25415: moria1 seg faults on testing relay reachability
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.2-alpha
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  033-backport, tor-dirauth, crash,|  Actual Points:
  033-must, review-group-34  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Oops; good diagnosis, everybody.

 Cherry-picked into 0.3.3 as 3d126632430fe6.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26121 [Core Tor/Tor]: BUILDTIMEOUT_SET totals are still off

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26121: BUILDTIMEOUT_SET totals are still off
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport 034-backport tor-   |  Actual Points:
  client timeouts performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:   => 033-backport 034-backport tor-client timeouts performance


Comment:

 Marking for possible backports.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26071 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please give Tommy LDAP access

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26071: Please give Tommy LDAP access
-+
 Reporter:  phoul|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26121 [Core Tor/Tor]: BUILDTIMEOUT_SET totals are still off

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26121: BUILDTIMEOUT_SET totals are still off
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Logic and code seems sound.

 Would be nice to somehow be able to test these assumptions and logic.

 Moving this to merge_ready because this bug is probs not the right place
 to write such tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26161 [Core Tor/Tor]: Design and implement a Rust dirauth module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26161: Design and implement a Rust dirauth module
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, tor-module, rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26160 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths() and related functions to dirauth module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26160: Move dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths() and related functions to dirauth
module
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, tor-module  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by teor):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


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[tor-bugs] #26161 [Core Tor/Tor]: Design and implement a Rust dirauth module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26161: Design and implement a Rust dirauth module
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-dirauth, tor-module, rust
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Some of our protoceratops`*` functions are only used when dirauths vote:
 * protover_compute_vote
 * protover_compute_for_old_tor

 This function is implemented in Rust and C:
 * protover_compute_vote

 We should work out how to split protover in Rust and C, and put the
 dirauth parts in a separate module.

 `*` I blame autocorrect

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26156 [Core Tor/Tor]: Undefined references to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() with OpenSSL 1.1.0 no-deprecated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26156: Undefined references to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() with OpenSSL 1.1.0 no-
deprecated
+
 Reporter:  laomaiweng  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl tor-crypto  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  openssl => openssl tor-crypto
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26160 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths() and related functions to dirauth module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26160: Move dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths() and related functions to dirauth
module
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, tor-module  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => tor-dirauth, tor-module


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 New text looks great to me! I didn't review the tor browser code patch.

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[tor-bugs] #26160 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths() and related functions to dirauth module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26160: Move dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths() and related functions to dirauth
module
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths() is only called by dirauths.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26155 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bandwidth file Timestamp is the latest scanner result, not the file creation time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26155: Bandwidth file Timestamp is the latest scanner result, not the file
creation time
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 > > > but i don't remember now if we commented that software and
 software_version should be in 3rd and 4th positions or they can be in
 arbitrary positions.
 > >
 > > We have always said they can be in arbitrary positions.
 > >
 > > Is there any reason that they need to be near the top?
 > > Otherwise, let's not have a restriction.
 >
 > i can't think of any. Initially we added them with that order in
 ``sbws``, i just forgot to change that.

 I don't understand what needs to change in sbws.

 The software and software version lines can be in any position on or after
 the 3rd line.
 (The first and second lines are reserved for timestamp and version.)
 So putting the software and software version lines in the 3rd and 4th
 positions is ok.

 Can you explain what you want to change in sbws?


 > Other question: in the examples i used ISO 8601 in the format
 "2018-05-08T16:13:26" (with "T"), though Tor uses "2018-05-08 16:13:26"
 (with space) in other files.
 >
 > I did that because if we use ISO 8601 with space in the Bandwidth Lines,
 it would break the logic of having SP as key_value separator. However we
 are not using in it in Bandwidth Lines, and in the header Lines the
 separator is new line. Which format should we use?

 The timestamp format without the space, as specified in:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/bandwidth-file-spec.txt#n93

 See nickm's response here:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-May/013141.html

 The format with the space is a legacy format that is harder to parse.


 More spec questions from https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-
 scanner/issues/169#issuecomment-390923878 :

 > When there are not any scan results (similar to the earliest_bandwith
 case https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-
 scanner/blob/master/sbws/core/generate.py#L136), which should be the
 timestamp?.

 If there are no results in the file, then it really doesn't matter what's
 in the header.

 The timestamp is mandatory, so you can't leave it out.

 Here are your options:
 1. specify that the time must be in the past - tor will warn that the file
 is too old
 2. don't generate the file, delete any existing file - tor will warn that
 the file is missing
 3. generate an empty file, truncate any existing file - old tors will log
 stack contents, see #26007

 I suggest that we say that generators SHOULD NOT generate a file, and
 SHOULD delete any existing file, because it is the least confusing option.
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/bandwidth-file-spec.txt#n61

 If you want, you can also say that:
 * generators SHOULD wait until enough relays are measured before
 generating the file (option 2)
 * generators MAY use a placeholder timestamp (option 1j, but the time MUST
 be at least 5 days in the past to avoid silent failures.
 * generators MUST NOT generate an empty file (option 3), because it
 triggers a bug in tor.

 Please update the spec with these changes.

 The earliest_bandwidth and latest_bandwidth are optional.
 If there is no valid value for these lines, the generator SHOULD leave
 them out.
 Please update the spec with these changes.


 > I don't understand well what do you mean by "continuously" and
 "timestamp calculation" in the trac ticket:
 >
 > > If there are scanners that do not run continuously, they SHOULD be
 excluded from the timestamp calculation

 Some torflow scanners do not run continuously. They only run when there
 are unmeasured relays.

 In a small network, if all relays are measured by the other scanners, the
 latest timestamp for the unmeasured scanner can become too old. Then the
 timestamp in the file becomes too old, and tor stops voting using the
 file. But the results are still valid, because the other scanners are
 still measuring all the relays.

 This is a bug in torflow that we won't fix.

 But we should document the issue in the spec so future scanners should not
 implement the same bug.

 Replacing "scanners" with "generators" makes this sentence even more
 confusing. See my comments in the pull request.

 > AFAIU, sbws run continuously and to generate the bandwidth file use
 results from a date period https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-
 scanner/blob/master/sbws/core/generate.py#L134.
 > Should we in this case search for 

[tor-bugs] #26159 [Metrics/Library]: Replace Gson with Jackson in metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26159: Replace Gson with Jackson in metrics-lib
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Related to Onionoo ticket #25848, we should replace Gson with Jackson in
 metrics-lib.

 Otherwise, if we don't switch here, Onionoo will have to include two
 dependencies in order to parse CollecTor's `index.json` using metrics-lib
 and to format and parse its various JSON files in its `status/` and `out/`
 directories.

 Generally, we'll want to switch in other applications that depend on
 metrics-lib, and then we'll want to have a single dependency for JSON
 parsing/formatting in those applications.

 Setting priority to high, because we should ideally put out a release with
 this change in the next few days and then releases of all other
 applications by the end of this month.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Adblock Plus to the Tor Browser (was: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17569: Add Adblock Plus to the Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  kernelcorn   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-usability tbb-security, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17569: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  kernelcorn   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-usability tbb-security, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 > So let's remove HTTPS Everywhere as well since it makes connections to
 get ruleset updates

 Complete BS. Tor Bundled add-on does not make connection at all. uBO is
 not.

 > There are valid reasons to be against uBO in the Tor Browser

 You wrote your answer already

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