Re: [tor-bugs] #26273 [- Select a component]: Additional Software (VPN) to be built into Tails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26273: Additional Software (VPN) to be built into Tails
--+-
 Reporter:  Privacy_Major |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Yeah, I think this is a terrible idea. The second problem is that VPNs
 concentrate traffic in one place, so whichever ones they might pick become
 great centralized targets for attack and surveillance.

 But the first problem is that filing tails suggestions on this bugtracker
 is not the right place to do it. Tails has its own mechanism for
 submitting tickets, bugs, and ideas. You should submit this idea that way
 if you still think it's a good idea.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26259 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't count 0-length RELAY_DATA cell as valid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26259: Don't count 0-length RELAY_DATA cell as valid
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Should we go farther and disallow 0-length payloads completely? Like,
 "you're violating the protocol if you try to send them"?

 (I thought we already had a ticket for this concept? We came up with the
 issue in Wilmington.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26276 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Improve captcha text.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26276: Improve captcha text.
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Please log bugs like this on the trac project bugtracker at
 https://trac.edgewall.org

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25788 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can Travis check 32-bit builds?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25788: Can Travis check 32-bit builds?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I think doing 32-bit Linux under 64-bit processors would still be ok.

 32-bit macOS would be faster (no docker) but might be slower because
 MacPorts doesn't have some 32-bit binary packages. (So we'd end up
 building them from source.) But we should eventually do it, because macOS
 has slightly different data types then Linux.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26276 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Improve captcha text.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26276: Improve captcha text.
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26276 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Improve captcha text.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26276: Improve captcha text.
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Other user may answer:
 "The answer is twelve"

 And the captcha will say incorrect. Why not limit the input to numeric
 [0-9]{1,2} ?

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[tor-bugs] #26276 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Improve captcha text.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26276: Improve captcha text.
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
--+-
 Related to #26266, I think you need to provide better captcha text.

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/captcha

 five plus six plus one
 Response

 You need to change the text "Response" to "Response (numeric)" or "Input
 Number", otherwise the user(26266) might think he/she have to answer 12 or
 twelve. Which?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26275 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Do not in-place upgrade to TBB v8 (ESR60)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26275: Do not in-place upgrade to TBB v8 (ESR60)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 This is exactly the type of friction we do not want. Forcing the user
 reinstall (and re-verify) their installation will prevent many users
 upgrading. We could offer an option that resets the tor browser
 preferences to the defaults - but this functionality isn't built into
 Firefox. Unfortunately, cleansing the entire profile is non-trivial due to
 the current design. See #16441 (and #24993, #22528, #19135) for some
 details.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26258 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rust tests don't fail on failure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26258: Rust tests don't fail on failure
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport regression 034-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26258 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rust tests don't fail on failure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26258: Rust tests don't fail on failure
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport regression 034-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Fails in Travis in cargo offline mode.  Failure replicates when manually
 run.  Maybe some Cargo.lock files need updating, or the external deps repo
 needs updating?

 https://api.travis-ci.org/v3/job/387272070/log.txt
 {{{
 FAIL: src/test/test_rust.sh
 ===

 error: attempting to make an HTTP request, but --frozen was specified
 error: attempting to make an HTTP request, but --frozen was specified
 error: attempting to make an HTTP request, but --frozen was specified
 error: attempting to make an HTTP request, but --frozen was specified
 error: attempting to make an HTTP request, but --frozen was specified
 error: attempting to make an HTTP request, but --frozen was specified
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26275 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Do not in-place upgrade to TBB v8 (ESR60)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26275: Do not in-place upgrade to TBB v8 (ESR60)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Or,
 1. Delete any modification from TBB7x (user-installed add-ons and its
 setings, modified pref.js)
 2. Do upgrade

 So everyone's identity should be the same.

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[tor-bugs] #26275 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Do not in-place upgrade to TBB v8 (ESR60)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26275: Do not in-place upgrade to TBB v8 (ESR60)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
--+--
 TBB updater shouldn't upgrade current TBB 7.x users.
 Instead, show a dialogue:

 ===
 A new TBB is now available!
 Please download new TBB from https://tpo
 ===

 Everyone should start using fresh browser - ESR52 and 60 is completely
 different.

 If you use updater to do in-place upgrade, many people will carry over old
 settings and some might cause a persistent problem.

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26274
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26125

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26274 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Deprecate check.tpo and move that functionality to the client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26274: Deprecate check.tpo and move that functionality to the client
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Right. Tor Browser does not load `check.torproject.org` at startup by
 default. `about:tor` is the default homepage and it is a local page. The
 attack, as described, seems very difficult.

 See #7494

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26258 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rust tests don't fail on failure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26258: Rust tests don't fail on failure
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport regression 034-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25788 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can Travis check 32-bit builds?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25788: Can Travis check 32-bit builds?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 I think we should clarify what we intend to accomplish with this. With the
 container approach, it would build 32-bit binaries but not emulate a
 32-bit processor, right? I think we would be able to catch some integer
 limit bugs, but maybe not some more subtle bugs that only appear on true
 32-bit hardware.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set codegen-units to 1 in src/rust/Cargo.toml to eke out every last drop of performance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25269: Set codegen-units to 1 in src/rust/Cargo.toml to eke out every last 
drop of
performance
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, easy, 034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328, fast-fix |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 See my `bug25269` branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set codegen-units to 1 in src/rust/Cargo.toml to eke out every last drop of performance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25269: Set codegen-units to 1 in src/rust/Cargo.toml to eke out every last 
drop of
performance
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, easy, 034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328, fast-fix |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => isis
 * points:   => .1
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
 * keywords:  rust, easy, 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328 => rust,
 easy, 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328, fast-fix
 * type:  defect => enhancement


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24737: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page
+--
 Reporter:  starlight   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by starlight):

 The critical factor in socket memory allowance is

net.ipv4.tcp_mem =   

 where  is the absolute maximum memory allocated to socket
 buffers in 4096 byte pages.  Checking a couple of systems the
 default values vary form 2/3rds of a 3G virtual machine to 20% of
 an 8GB physical machine.  Not to be confused with tcp_rmem
 and tcp_wmem per-socket tuning parameters.

 Correct advice advice for preventing OOM daemon crashes in
 worst-case scenarios should probably be something like:

 1) find out what tcp_mem  is and subtract that from physical
 memory to arrive at memory available for the daemon; subtract an
 additional 384-512MB for the kernel.  Tune tcp_mem if you don't
 like the defaults.

 2) The remaining memory is allocated to one or more tor daemons
 where each daemon is allocated 130% of MaxMemInQueues.

 The above can be turned into a table indicating MaxMemInQueues
 values for different typical distros easily enough, though
 hopefully most operators are able to divide a number by 1.3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26273 [- Select a component]: Additional Software (VPN) to be built into Tails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26273: Additional Software (VPN) to be built into Tails
--+
 Reporter:  Privacy_Major |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Why a VPN? https://matt.traudt.xyz/posts/vpn-tor-not-mRikAa4h.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26274 [- Select a component]: Deprecate check.tpo and move that functionality to the client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26274: Deprecate check.tpo and move that functionality to the client
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > Right now, every time Tor browser starts up, it loads the same page.

 It fires up `about:tor` and not `check.tp.o`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26273 [- Select a component]: Additional Software (VPN) to be built into Tails (was: Add adational Software (VPN) to new Tails)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26273: Additional Software (VPN) to be built into Tails
--+
 Reporter:  Privacy_Major |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

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[tor-bugs] #26274 [- Select a component]: Deprecate check.tpo and move that functionality to the client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26274: Deprecate check.tpo and move that functionality to the client
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Right now, every time Tor browser starts up, it loads the same page. This
 is a risk for a huge watering hole attack. Compromising that one subdomain
 and serving an exploit will reliably compromise ~100% of Tor users. This
 would only take a single rogue CA (due to HPKP going away), and the
 compromise of one of any number of registrars. If the check is done
 locally client-side, such an exploit would be significantly more difficult
 and would have to exploit the a simple API.

 Unlike the automatic updater which verifies a signature, the only
 signature relied upon by check.tpo is the TLS certificate. The web PKI is
 not ideal for protecting a single centralized page that is automatically
 opened by every Tor user, and only by Tor users.

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[tor-bugs] #26273 [- Select a component]: Add adational Software (VPN) to new Tails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26273: Add adational Software (VPN) to new Tails
--+
 Reporter:  Privacy_Major |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Suggestions for additional software to be added in the new versions of
 “Tails”

 Add 5, 6 or more best VPN services, known for security and
 privacy. Some say this extra layer of encryption is very beneficial. when
 software is pre installed. All the users would to do is simple inter their
 user name and password in one of the VPN services; user may sign up for 1
 or more of these services and use them randomly on diferent days.

 Being closely associated with “Tail”, perhaps these VPN services may offer
 discounts to the users and even payment/donations to your team’s efforts.
 But please don’t get cought up/snared in the commercialization ($$) the
 VPN services may tempt you with.

 But please, privacy and security first, even internally of these VPN
 companies

 Thanks for your consideration, Jack

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24569 [Community]: Let's use .onion in many situations officially

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24569: Let's use .onion in many situations officially
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community|Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 It wouldn't be possible to do #3 unless it was done locally (client-side).
 If someone is not using Tor, naturally they will be unable to connect and
 won't see the "You are not using Tor" message, which will make people
 think twice (as opposed to if the site just didn't load).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24618 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser doesn't prevent maximizing windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24618: Tor Browser doesn't prevent maximizing windows
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 On Linux at least (with Xorg), it's easily possible to force a window to
 remain its current size. The Xephyr nested X server has the option to do
 that with its own windows. Firefox could be patched to do the same.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25633 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ctrl-D makes it too easy to create bookmarks accidentally

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25633: Ctrl-D makes it too easy to create bookmarks accidentally
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 From looking through about:config for "bookmark", nothing seemed relevant.

 This seems like a rather severe problem, especially given the fact that it
 is so easy to accidentally do ^D in the browser when you are trying to do
 something like ^W instead. I have personally done it probably a dozen
 times, although I have the configuration directory configured to exist in
 tmpfs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26265 [Core Tor/Tor]: A proposal and demo for a fuzzing system that works with Rust through C code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26265: A proposal and demo for a fuzzing system that works with Rust through C
code
--+
 Reporter:  debily|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fuzzing Rust afl  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25386| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isis):

 * cc: isis (added)


Comment:

 This probably won't fix #25386, but it is a pretty good start on #24265.
 What we really need eventually is a way for the ''same'' random fuzzer
 input to be sent to both a C function and a Rust function, both of which
 are supposed to behave identically (e.g. the parsers in
 `src/or/protover.c` and `src/rust/protover/protover.rs`).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26265 [Core Tor/Tor]: A proposal and demo for a fuzzing system that works with Rust through C code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26265: A proposal and demo for a fuzzing system that works with Rust through C
code
--+
 Reporter:  debily|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fuzzing Rust afl  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25386| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * cc: chelseakomlo (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26272 [Core Tor/Tor]: gcc 7 fails on -Wunused-const-variable for Zstd headers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26272: gcc 7 fails on -Wunused-const-variable for Zstd headers
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, 033-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport, 031-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please see my branch bug26272-031 on https://ghithub.com/teor2345/tor.git

 Waiting for travis to complete...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26271 [Core Tor/Tor]: client failed in onion_extend_cpath on Illumos/JoyentSmartOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26271: client failed in onion_extend_cpath on Illumos/JoyentSmartOS
--+
 Reporter:  ruebezahl |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by ruebezahl):

 could you please refer the duplicate issue by ticket number?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26271 [Core Tor/Tor]: client failed in onion_extend_cpath on Illumos/JoyentSmartOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26271: client failed in onion_extend_cpath on Illumos/JoyentSmartOS
--+
 Reporter:  ruebezahl |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 This issue will be fixed in 0.3.3.7.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26269 [Core Tor/Tor]: new compiler warning src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null pointer dereference

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26269: new compiler warning src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null
pointer dereference
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => 034-must
 * version:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26268 [Applications/Orbot]: cannot edit list of tor enabled apps

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26268: cannot edit list of tor enabled apps
+---
 Reporter:  grey-olli@… |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  orbot   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by teor):

 * version:  Tor: 0.3.3.5-rc =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final =>


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[tor-bugs] #26272 [Core Tor/Tor]: gcc 7 fails on -Wunused-const-variable for Zstd headers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26272: gcc 7 fails on -Wunused-const-variable for Zstd headers
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  fast-fix, 033-backport,
 Severity:  Normal   |  032-backport, 031-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 When using gcc 7 on macOS:
 {{{
 $ gcc-7 --version
 gcc-7 (Homebrew GCC 7.3.0) 7.3.0
 }}}

 I see the following errors:
 {{{
 In file included from ../src/common/compress_zstd.c:29:0:
 /usr/local/Cellar/zstd/1.3.4//include/zstd.h:593:29: error:
 'ZSTD_defaultCMem' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-variable=]
  static ZSTD_customMem const ZSTD_defaultCMem = { NULL, NULL, NULL };
 /**< this constant defers to stdlib's functions */
  ^~~~
 /usr/local/Cellar/zstd/1.3.4//include/zstd.h:404:21: error:
 'ZSTD_skippableHeaderSize' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-
 variable=]
  static const size_t ZSTD_skippableHeaderSize = 8;  /* magic number +
 skippable frame length */
  ^~~~
 /usr/local/Cellar/zstd/1.3.4//include/zstd.h:403:21: error:
 'ZSTD_frameHeaderSize_max' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-
 variable=]
  static const size_t ZSTD_frameHeaderSize_max = ZSTD_FRAMEHEADERSIZE_MAX;
  ^~~~
 /usr/local/Cellar/zstd/1.3.4//include/zstd.h:402:21: error:
 'ZSTD_frameHeaderSize_min' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-
 variable=]
  static const size_t ZSTD_frameHeaderSize_min = ZSTD_FRAMEHEADERSIZE_MIN;
  ^~~~
 /usr/local/Cellar/zstd/1.3.4//include/zstd.h:401:21: error:
 'ZSTD_frameHeaderSize_prefix' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-
 variable=]
  static const size_t ZSTD_frameHeaderSize_prefix =
 ZSTD_FRAMEHEADERSIZE_PREFIX;
  ^~~
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26265 [Core Tor/Tor]: A proposal and demo for a fuzzing system that works with Rust through C code (was: A demo for a fuzzing system that works for Rust through C code)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26265: A proposal and demo for a fuzzing system that works with Rust through C
code
--+
 Reporter:  debily|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fuzzing Rust afl  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25386| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

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[tor-bugs] #26271 [Core Tor/Tor]: client failed in onion_extend_cpath on Illumos/JoyentSmartOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26271: client failed in onion_extend_cpath on Illumos/JoyentSmartOS
--+--
 Reporter:  ruebezahl |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Tor 0.3.3.6 (git-7dd0813e783ae16e) running on SunOS with Libevent
 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2o, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma N/A, and Libzstd N/A.

 on SunOS 5.11 joyent_20180524T002819Z i86pc i386 i86pc Solaris

 and getting lots of these:

 {{{

 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 src/or/circuitbuild.c:2772: onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info
 || client failed. (on Tor 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion info || client failed
 in onion_extend_cpath at src/or/circuitbuild.c:2772. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug: /opt/local/bin/tor'log_backtrace+0x47
 [0x5cf7e7] (on Tor 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug:
 /opt/local/bin/tor'tor_bug_occurred_+0xbb [0x5ea9db] (on Tor 0.3.3.6
 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug:
 /opt/local/bin/tor'circuit_establish_circuit+0x8bb [0x51954b] (on Tor
 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug:
 /opt/local/bin/tor'circuit_launch_by_extend_info+0x84 [0x52c7b4] (on Tor
 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug:
 /opt/local/bin/tor'circuit_build_needed_circs+0x2f6 [0x52ce76] (on Tor
 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug:
 /opt/local/bin/tor'second_elapsed_callback+0x3b8 [0x4916c8] (on Tor
 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug:
 /opt/local/lib/libevent-2.1.so.6.0.2'event_process_active_single_queue+0x372
 [0xfc7fec883c32] (on Tor 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug:
 /opt/local/lib/libevent-2.1.so.6.0.2'event_base_loop+0x5bf
 [0xfc7fec88471f] (on Tor 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug: /opt/local/bin/tor'do_main_loop+0x214
 [0x492184] (on Tor 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug: /opt/local/bin/tor'tor_run_main+0x26d
 [0x49367d] (on Tor 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug: /opt/local/bin/tor'tor_main+0x42
 [0x48cbf2] (on Tor 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug: /opt/local/bin/tor'main+0x1e
 [0x48caae] (on Tor 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug: /opt/local/bin/tor'_start_crt+0x83
 [0x48c913] (on Tor 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Bug: /opt/local/bin/tor'_start+0x18
 [0x48c878] (on Tor 0.3.3.6 7dd0813e783ae16e)
 Jun 02 19:18:57.000 [warn] Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.

 }}}

 I already checked #25692 but it seems the fix is already part of 3.3.6
 7dd0813e783ae16e. "make test" ran with 0 errors, as well as the compile.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26270 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move dirauth module code from src/or/dirauth to src/dirauth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26270: Move dirauth module code from src/or/dirauth to src/dirauth
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * cc: dgoulet (added)
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Patch in https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/130

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24737: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page
+--
 Reporter:  starlight   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by starlight):

 KIST scheduler is effective at minimizing data queued on egress socket
 buffers, but ingress socket memory is determined by the TCP/IP stack and
 remote peer behavior.  Perhaps then 150% of MaxMemInQueues provides a
 better margin?  A Shadow test simulating all-out botnet attack scenarios
 would help greatly determining extreme worst-case memory consumption.

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[tor-bugs] #26270 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move dirauth module code from src/or/dirauth to src/dirauth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26270: Move dirauth module code from src/or/dirauth to src/dirauth
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8  |
--+
 During the modularization discussion at the network team Seattle hackfest
 we decided to move the dirauth module code from src/or/dirauth to
 src/dirauth.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24737: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page
+--
 Reporter:  starlight   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by starlight):

 update from the trenches:

 Situation is dramatically better and better understood.

 Major caveat, certainly should be mentioned: all-bets-are-off if
 collection for either of

 `CellStatistics 1`
 `ConnDirectionStatistics 1`

 are set.  CellStatistics in particular results in excess gigabytes of
 memory consumption on busy relays.


 0.3.4.1-alpha stats for two relays running now for ten days
 relays not experiencing attack or abuse activity

 {{{
 medium-size guard with slow CPU, excess BW capacity
 ===
 ~11M self-measure
 ~4M Blutmagie BW avg

 MaxMemInQueues 1024MB

 /proc/meminfo

 MemAvailTot: 3071560
 MemTotal:4059768 kB
 MemFree: 2808820 kB
 Cached:   262740 kB
 Mlocked:  698840 kB
 SwapTotal:   2097144 kB
 SwapFree:2083096 kB
 Dirty:72 kB
 Slab: 295564 kB
 CommitLimit: 4127028 kB
 Committed_AS: 594968 kB

 /proc/$(pgrep tor)/status

 VmPeak:   836876 kB
 VmSize:   689024 kB
 VmHWM:777472 kB
 VmRSS:629680 kB
 VmData:   551248 kB
 }}}




 {{{
 somewhat fast Exit, consensus rank ~170, exit rank ~60
 ==
 ~25M self-measure
 ~16M Blutmagie BW avg

 MaxMemInQueues 2048MB

 /proc/meminfo

 MemAvailTot: 13784300
 MemTotal:   16457808 kB
 MemFree:13482956 kB
 Cached:   301344 kB
 Mlocked:  939808 kB
 SwapTotal:   4194296 kB
 SwapFree:4194296 kB
 Dirty:   236 kB
 Slab: 754436 kB
 CommitLimit:12423200 kB
 Committed_AS:1506840 kB

 /proc/$(pgrep tor)/status

 VmPeak:  1181552 kB
 VmSize:   988900 kB
 VmHWM:   1129152 kB
 VmRSS:936500 kB
 VmData:   855580 kB
 }}}

 Observed similar values in recent months running 0.3.3, including the
 final days
 of last winter's overload attacks.

 In light of the observations and the numerous improvements in memory OOM
 accounting,
 reporting and mitigation, plus the new circuit queued-cell maximum logic,
 it appears
 safe to recommend MaxMemInQueues values incorporating reasonable premiums
 that allow
 for usual OS-process overheads.  Perhaps physical memory of 120% or 130%
 MaxMemInQueues
 per dameon instance?  If Shadow-environment tests for simulating attacks
 exist it would
 be worth running them against 0.3.4 before arriving at final
 recommendations.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26269 [Core Tor/Tor]: new compiler warning src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null pointer dereference

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26269: new compiler warning src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null
pointer dereference
--+--
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by toralf):

 FWIW tor-0.3.4.1-alpha-65-g9f884a38e

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[tor-bugs] #26269 [Core Tor/Tor]: new compiler warning src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null pointer dereference

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26269: new compiler warning src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null
pointer dereference
--+--
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 {{{
 CC   src/or/rephist.o
   CC   src/or/router.o
 src/or/router.c: In function ‘router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star’:
 src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null pointer dereference
 [-Wnull-dereference]
return router_get_my_routerinfo()->policy_is_reject_star;
   ~~^~~
 src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null pointer dereference
 [-Wnull-dereference]
 src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null pointer dereference
 [-Wnull-dereference]
 src/or/router.c: In function ‘check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed’:
 src/or/router.c:2636:36: warning: potential null pointer dereference
 [-Wnull-dereference]
prev = router_get_my_routerinfo()->bandwidthcapacity;
   ~~^~~
 src/or/router.c:2636:36: warning: potential null pointer dereference
 [-Wnull-dereference]
 src/or/router.c:2636:36: warning: potential null pointer dereference
 [-Wnull-dereference]
 src/or/router.c: In function ‘check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed’:
 src/or/router.c:2696:8: warning: potential null pointer dereference
 [-Wnull-dereference]
prev = router_get_my_routerinfo()->addr;
~^~
 src/or/router.c:2696:8: warning: potential null pointer dereference
 [-Wnull-dereference]
 src/or/router.c:2696:8: warning: potential null pointer dereference
 [-Wnull-dereference]
   CC   src/or/routerlist.o
   CC   src/or/dirauth/shared_random.o
 }}}
 and
 {{{
   CC   src/test/src_test_test-test_dos.o
   CC   src/test/src_test_test-test_entrynodes.o
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c: In function
 ‘test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_repair’:
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c:1254:26: warning: potential null pointer
 dereference [-Wnull-dereference]
  n->is_possible_guard = 0;
  ~^~~
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c:1254:26: warning: potential null pointer
 dereference [-Wnull-dereference]
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c: In function
 ‘test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_remove’:
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c:1319:26: warning: potential null pointer
 dereference [-Wnull-dereference]
  n->is_possible_guard = 0;
  ~^~~
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c:1319:26: warning: potential null pointer
 dereference [-Wnull-dereference]
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c:1328:26: warning: potential null pointer
 dereference [-Wnull-dereference]
  n->is_possible_guard = 0;
  ~^~~
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c:1328:26: warning: potential null pointer
 dereference [-Wnull-dereference]
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c: In function
 ‘test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_status’:
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c:1153:26: warning: potential null pointer
 dereference [-Wnull-dereference]
  n->is_possible_guard = 0;
  ~^~~
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c:1153:26: warning: potential null pointer
 dereference [-Wnull-dereference]
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c:1191:26: warning: potential null pointer
 dereference [-Wnull-dereference]
  n->is_possible_guard = 1;
  ~^~~
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c:1191:26: warning: potential null pointer
 dereference [-Wnull-dereference]
 In file included from ./src/common/crypto.h:21:0,
  from ./src/or/or.h:69,
  from src/test/test_entrynodes.c:13:
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c:85:13: warning: potential null pointer
 dereference [-Wnull-dereference]
tor_free(n->md->onion_curve25519_pkey);
 ~^~~
 ./src/common/util.h:90:39: note: in definition of macro ‘tor_free’
  typeof(&(p)) tor_free__tmpvar = &(p);  \
^
 ./src/common/util.h:118:21: warning: potential null pointer dereference
 [-Wnull-dereference]
  #define raw_freefree
  ^
 ./src/common/util.h:91:5: note: in expansion of macro ‘raw_free’
  raw_free(*tor_free__tmpvar);   \
  ^~~~
 src/test/test_entrynodes.c:84:3: note: in expansion of macro ‘tor_free’
tor_free(n->rs);
^~~~
 ./src/common/util.h:118:21: warning: potential null pointer dereference
 [-Wnull-dereference]
  #define raw_freefree
  ^
 ./src/common/util.h:91:5: note: in expansion of macro ‘raw_free’
  raw_free(*tor_free__tmpvar);   \
  ^~~~

[tor-bugs] #26268 [Applications/Orbot]: cannot edit list of tor enabled apps

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26268: cannot edit list of tor enabled apps
+
 Reporter:  grey-olli@… |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.5-rc
 Severity:  Major   |   Keywords:  orbot
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 I've deselected everything except orfox. Saved. Some orbot version
 upgrades has gone. Now I want to add telegram to tor enabled apps, but
 there's no separate edit button - only icon for orfox. VPN mode selection
 for installed apps works.

 Deinstallation of orbot doesn't help - on reinstall I've same - only one
 app avaliable and no way to edit. Clearing app data and cache via settings
 doesn't help also.

 My device details:
 Samsung Galaxy Grand Prime, Android 5.1.1 (kernel 3.10.65-1217339),
 android security patch level 2017-07-01, SE for Android status: enforcing,
 security software version:  ASKS v1.2_161011

 The above bug details happening on just upgraded orbot with version
 16.0.2-RC-1 (Tor 0.3.3.5-openssl1.0.2o)

 Please provide fall back method to reset tor-enabled apllication list.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25895 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cross-compiling tor rust for Windows is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25895: Cross-compiling tor rust for Windows is broken
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, 034-proposed, tbb-wants,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-roadmap-proposed,  034-must  |
Parent ID:  #25849   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW, I tested Hello71's fix a while back and it solves the cross-
 compiling issue in this bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25237 [Core Tor/Tor]: spec: Document our circuit close reasons

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25237: spec: Document our circuit close reasons
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-spec, 034-triage-20180328,   |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 LGTM; merged to master!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26038 [Core Tor/Tor]: Misc Rust/Cargo improvements (incl. use global cargo cache)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26038: Misc Rust/Cargo improvements (incl. use global cargo cache)
--+
 Reporter:  Hello71   |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by isis):

 FWIW, [https://travis-ci.org/isislovecruft/tor/builds/381856538 CI
 passes].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26038 [Core Tor/Tor]: Misc Rust/Cargo improvements (incl. use global cargo cache)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26038: Misc Rust/Cargo improvements (incl. use global cargo cache)
--+
 Reporter:  Hello71   |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isis):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Triaging more non-vital tickets into 0.3.5, but we're happy to take this
 in 0.3.4 if we get to it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26038 [Core Tor/Tor]: Misc Rust/Cargo improvements (incl. use global cargo cache)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26038: Misc Rust/Cargo improvements (incl. use global cargo cache)
--+
 Reporter:  Hello71   |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isis):

 * cc: Sebastian (added)
 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 I think I'd like to hear from Sebastian, if possible, about the reasoning
 for using a different CARGO_HOME originally? Perhaps this had something to
 do with capturing build artifacts in Jenkins?

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #25686, #25787

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #25686, #25787 by nickm:


Action: accept

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unused Rust code warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26245: Unused Rust code warnings
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => isis
 * status:  new => assigned


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18614, #24107, #24108, #24661, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18614, #24107, #24108, #24661, #25061, #25496, #25497, 
#25499, #25507, #25550, #25753, #25882, #22489, #24454, #25440, #26040, #24857, 
#25754, #26076 by nickm:
milestone to Tor: 0.3.5.x-final

Comment:
Deferring non-must tickets to 0.3.5

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24977 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24977: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const
char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180502  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 H this new branch adds a call to the recalculate consensus data
 function to the `hs_service` callback... it makes me think that we might
 have the wrong approach. Here is why with the hs service callback example:

 So in the case of not having a live consensus because of a skewed clock,
 having the recalculation in a mainloop event means that the `hs_service`
 callback can be called _before_ it. Which seems to be the reason why this
 was added to the hs service callback:

 {{{
 +  if (need_to_recalculate_consensus_data)
 +recalculate_consensus_data_callback(NULL, NULL);
 }}}

 Because we recalculate the data in an event loop now, it means other
 events can trigger the assert() on the hsdir indexes because they would
 see the consensus being live but the recalculate consensus callback was
 not yet triggered. For instance, a client request to a .onion will trigger
 the assert() if done before the recalculation happened because it would
 consider the consensus live.

 In other words, there is a time gap between "clock jump, now I have a live
 consensus" and "recalculate conensus data", we'll end up in some desynch
 state imo. HS is just one big example, there might be more.

 The earlier patch from asn did recalculate everything on the spot when a
 clock jump was noticed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25977 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cross-compiling tor rust for macOS is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25977: Cross-compiling tor rust for macOS is broken
-+
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust build 034-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25779   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 The patch in #25895 should solve this issue if you pass the LLVM target
 triple to Tor's configure.

 But whatever Tor Browser is doing at build time to set the default rustc
 target isn't working for cargo. So maybe you can fix it on your end.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some URLs are saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of the browsing history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22867: Some URLs are saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of
the browsing history
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:19 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > Can you download compile the latest esr 60 TorBrowser nightly and see if
 the bug still occurs?
 I'll wait till the alpha to test esr 60 so don't worry, I'll keep testing
 the hell out of it as long as I'm alive ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26267 [Core Tor/Tor]: export rand from the crypto crate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26267: export rand from the crypto crate
+
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => isis


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25386 [Core Tor/Tor]: Link Rust Tests to C Dependencies in Tor (allow integration testing from Rust to C)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25386: Link Rust Tests to C Dependencies in Tor (allow integration testing from
Rust to C)
-+-
 Reporter:  Hello71  |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-test, 033-backport,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-34, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180401  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:46 manish.earth]:
 > Okay, so (2) is specifically a problem with doctests only? Regular
 `cargo test` works fine?

 That's right, I believe.

 > Or is (3) a problem for regular cargo test as well?

 I think (3) is a problem for all the tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25812 [Community/Relays]: Update the tor relay guide about ed25519 changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25812: Update the tor relay guide about ed25519 changes
--+--
 Reporter:  ffmancera |  Owner:  nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final =>


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #25788, #25386

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #25788, #25386 by isis:
milestone to Tor: 0.3.5.x-final

Comment:
Triaging some tickets not absolutely vital to 0.3.4 release to 0.3.5.  These 
are fine to do in 0.3.4, but they aren't a must.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25895 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cross-compiling tor rust for Windows is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25895: Cross-compiling tor rust for Windows is broken
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, 034-proposed, tbb-wants,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-roadmap-proposed,  034-must  |
Parent ID:  #25849   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  rust, 034-proposed, tbb-wants, 033-backport, 034-roadmap-
 proposed =>
 rust, 034-proposed, tbb-wants, 033-backport, 034-roadmap-proposed,
 034-must


Comment:

 We found out in #25977 that cargo isn't getting the target triple.
 When we fix that, it should fix both bugs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25977 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cross-compiling tor rust for macOS is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25977: Cross-compiling tor rust for macOS is broken
-+
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust build 034-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25779   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  rust build => rust build 034-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24977 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24977: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const
char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180502  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 This looks better, but it adds a once-a-second event at the same time when
 we're trying to remove those.

 Have a look at bug24977_again in my public repo; what do you think of
 that?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25788 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can Travis check 32-bit builds?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25788: Can Travis check 32-bit builds?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 We can add [https://github.com/travis-ci/travis-
 ci/issues/5770#issuecomment-197771661 a few commands] to build/run in a
 32-bit docker container.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26004 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor to accept node_id at the end of a bandwidth file line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26004: Allow Tor to accept node_id at the end of a bandwidth file line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fast-fix, 034-backport-maybe, 033|  Actual Points:
  -backport-maybe, 032-backport-maybe, 031   |
  -backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe, tor-  |
  dirauth|
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 All directory authorities that vote on bandwidths are running 0.3.3 or
 later. torflow and sbws do not produce lines with node_id at the end. (And
 all other generators should be able to obey this constraint.)

 So I don't think we need to backport this fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in assert_connection_ok when changing Exit options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25245: Crash in assert_connection_ok when changing Exit options
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, regression?, tor-exit, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  relay, ipv6, 033-must, 033-triage-20180320,|
  033-included-20180320  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 We can fix this in 0.3.5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25705 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor circuit_build_failed to separate build vs path failures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25705: Refactor circuit_build_failed to separate build vs path failures
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25546| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => 033-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25957 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.3.5-rc died: Caught signal 11

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25957: Tor 0.3.3.5-rc died: Caught signal 11
+---
 Reporter:  Pine64ARMv8 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, openssl  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  crash, openssl, 033-must => crash, openssl
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 We can't make progress on this issue until we have more information

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unused Rust code warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26245: Unused Rust code warnings
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 catalyst]:
 > > Do we want to make warnings fatal when building Rust? Maybe only if
 `--enable-fatal-warnings` is set?
 >
 > +1

 +2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unused Rust code warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26245: Unused Rust code warnings
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by isis):

 * keywords:  034-must-maybe, rust => 034-must, rust


Comment:

 Unclobbering the keywords.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26004 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor to accept node_id at the end of a bandwidth file line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26004: Allow Tor to accept node_id at the end of a bandwidth file line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, 034-backport-maybe, 033|  Actual Points:
  -backport-maybe, 032-backport-maybe, 031   |
  -backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe, tor-  |
  dirauth|
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unused Rust code warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26245: Unused Rust code warnings
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must-maybe, rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isis):

 * keywords:  034-must, rust => 034-must-maybe, rust


Comment:

 I suspect this is caused by #26267.

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[tor-bugs] #26267 [Core Tor/Tor]: export rand from the crypto crate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26267: export rand from the crypto crate
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  rust, fast-fix
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  .1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorV-can  |
--+
 In #26107, it appears I forgot to add

 {{{#!rust
 pub mod rand;
 }}}

 in `src/rust/crypto/lib.rs`. This is possibly causing #26245.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26139 [Core Tor/Tor]: start aplication

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26139: start aplication
--+---
 Reporter:  xrooters  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24630 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop initialising rust git submodules, travis does this automatically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24630: Stop initialising rust git submodules, travis does this automatically
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, teor-was-assigned,   |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
  very-small |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * keywords:
 tor-ci, 032-backport, teor-was-assigned, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328 very-small
 =>
 tor-ci, teor-was-assigned, 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328
 very-small
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 There's no need to backport an efficiency patch

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25517 [Core Tor/Tor]: TROVE-2018-005

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25517: TROVE-2018-005
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  trove, 033-must, security,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 We won't backport to 0.3.2, because all authorities except the bridge
 authority are running 0.3.3 now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26121 [Core Tor/Tor]: BUILDTIMEOUT_SET totals are still off

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26121: BUILDTIMEOUT_SET totals are still off
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  033-backport 034-backport tor-   |  Actual Points:
  client timeouts performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Great; squashed and merged to 0.3.3 and forward!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25939 [Core Tor/Tor]: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25939: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with 
stem
+--
 Reporter:  maqp|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  034-must regression tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 woo; merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26043 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: building snowflake into a bundle of pluggable transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26043: building snowflake into a bundle of pluggable transports
---+--
 Reporter:  hans   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 In email you asked me to merge a `.gitlab-ci.yml` file to help with
 [https://gitlab.com/eighthave/snowflake your GitLab setup]. It seems find
 to me, but I'll put this ticket in "needs review" for a bit so arlolra can
 look.

 It seems like there are two versions of the patch. Which one do you want?
  *
 
[https://gitlab.com/eighthave/snowflake/commit/35299e9d69518cac374403be60c38c667620a64b
 35299e9d69518cac374403be60c38c667620a64b] (this is the one you sent in
 email)
  *
 
[https://gitlab.com/eighthave/snowflake/commit/25b304a9a856f8c791882ad523df26ffc8fa629c
 25b304a9a856f8c791882ad523df26ffc8fa629c] (this one is currently at the
 head of your master)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24737: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page
+--
 Reporter:  starlight   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 There is no patch in this ticket, moving it to unspecified until we have
 something to review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25042 [Archived/Torouter]: Connecting to tor cuts my connection to the internet.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25042: Connecting to tor cuts my connection to the internet.
---+-
 Reporter:  GGNderbomb |  Owner:  ioerror
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/Torouter  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker| Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by teor):

 * version:  Tor: 0.3.1.8 =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23816 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use exponential backoff with jitter and/or tune its parameters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23816: Use exponential backoff with jitter and/or tune its parameters
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  031-backport-maybe, 029-backport-|  Actual Points:
  maybe  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => 031-backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25686 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mystery bug causes relays to attempt many many descriptor publishes, with no X-Desc-Gen-Reason header

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25686: Mystery bug causes relays to attempt many many descriptor publishes, 
with
no X-Desc-Gen-Reason header
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-proposed 034-must|  Actual Points:
  regression 033-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 So, it appears that the lead offenders here are the ones running 0.2.5 and
 earlier.  That's good.  The answer here is probably to just those IPs if
 they're being annoying.

 On the other hand, it seems that some Tors running versions with the
 #22885 fix of 7f329206488cf84 are still sometimes sending descriptors with
 no reasons.  That's bad; I thought we fixed that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23681 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Clients mark intro circs as timed-out within seconds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23681: prop224: Clients mark intro circs as timed-out within seconds
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, 031-backport, 029   |  Actual Points:
  -backport-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, 031-backport => prop224, tor-hs,
 031-backport, 029-backport-maybe


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure directory_initiate_request handles pluggable transports correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20532: Make sure directory_initiate_request handles pluggable transports 
correctly
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge-client, bridge-bypass,|  Actual Points:
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorM
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  bridge-client, bridge-bypass => bridge-client, bridge-bypass,
 031-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25791 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_util_fgets_eagain fails on FreeBSD 0.2.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25791: test_util_fgets_eagain fails on FreeBSD 0.2.9
-+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.14
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  jenkins, regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  jenkins => jenkins, regression
 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.9.14
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25787 [Core Tor/Tor]: geoip_load_file() tests don't work on all window build environments

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25787: geoip_load_file() tests don't work on all window build environments
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must regression tests win32  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  043-must regression tests win32 => 034-must regression tests
 win32


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unused Rust code warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26245: Unused Rust code warnings
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  034-must-maybe, rust => 034-must, rust


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26094 [Core Tor/Tor]: mapage: increase minimal bandwidth requirements to be consistent with the relay guide and FAQ

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26094: mapage: increase minimal bandwidth requirements to be consistent with 
the
relay guide and FAQ
---+
 Reporter:  nusenu |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-doc => tor-doc, fast-fix


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24104 [Core Tor/Tor]: Delay descriptor bandwidth reporting on large relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24104: Delay descriptor bandwidth reporting on large relays
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-stats, chutney-  |  Actual Points:
  wants, bwauth-wants, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:15 juga]:
 > Should i also make the `2` in `cur > prev*2` and `cur > prev/2` a named
 #define in case we want to change it to other number in the future?.

 Yes, that would be helpful.

 > And in the end there is no need to check whether the relay is large
 here?

 No, we are just checking whether it has been up for a day.
 See comment 2.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26043 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: building snowflake into a bundle of pluggable transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26043: building snowflake into a bundle of pluggable transports
---+
 Reporter:  hans   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:1 hans]:
 > The part I don't understand is the `node` code, that'll be quite
 difficult to use on Android.  Does Snowflake require the Javascript code
 to work?

 The client doesn't need any of the JavaScript code. That's only for the
 middle proxy. The only code the client needs is in the client/
 subdirectory (and its dependencies, go-webrtc and WebRTC itself).

 I don't know what your requirements are for PLUTO2, but possibly the
 mkmulti script from #13770 can help. It rewrites applications (with a
 `main` package) into libraries.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24104 [Core Tor/Tor]: Delay descriptor bandwidth reporting on large relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24104: Delay descriptor bandwidth reporting on large relays
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-stats, chutney-  |  Actual Points:
  wants, bwauth-wants, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by juga):

 Should i also make the `2` in `cur > prev*2` and `cur > prev/2` a named
 #define in case we want to change it to other number in the future?.

 And in the end there is no need to check whether the relay is large here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24991 [Core Tor/Tor]: relay frequently claiming "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry guards"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24991: relay frequently claiming "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary 
entry
guards"
-+-
 Reporter:  alecmuffett  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  single-onion, guards, logging,   |  Actual Points:
  easy, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23863   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It's not perfect, but this code is operating sufficiently well for our
 purposes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24104 [Core Tor/Tor]: Delay descriptor bandwidth reporting on large relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24104: Delay descriptor bandwidth reporting on large relays
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-stats, chutney-  |  Actual Points:
  wants, bwauth-wants, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:13 juga]:
 > Is the place to do this change `check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/router.c#n2629)?
 >
 > If i've the line
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/router.c#n2643 as:
 > `if (get_uptime() < 60*60*24 && last_changed+MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ <
 now || !prev)`, then the descriptor would still be uploaded when there is
 not `prev`.
 >
 > Should instead i do `get_uptime() > 60*60*24 return;` at the beginning
 of the function so that there are not any further checks when the relay is
 up for more than 1 day?

 Yes, but please make `60*60*24` a named #define with a comment. It should
 be like MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22132 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney should avoid waiting for set times: wait for conditions instead

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22132: Chutney should avoid waiting for set times: wait for conditions instead
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_revision
 * cc: pastly (added)


Comment:

 Here's an example script that uses stem to check each node on the network
 to see if it has bootstrapped:

 https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-
 scanner/blob/master/tests/testnets/simple.common/03-network-in-ready-
 state.py

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26266 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26266: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT
--+---
 Reporter:  fuckthisfuckingtrac   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #10353| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #10353


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26266 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26266: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT
--+---
 Reporter:  fuckthisfuckingtrac   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #10353| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Oops.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26266 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26266: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT
--+---
 Reporter:  fuckthisfuckingtrac   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * parent:  #10353 =>


Comment:

 > You make it really hard to BUG report!!
 Use multi-user account cypherpunks.
 > You cant delete them! Only close the browser and restart WTF? You guys
 use ur brain?
 Use `New Identity`
 > Iam angry because I sat hours over this problem
 Search, learn, read. Then post.
 > Thanks
 Sign CoC

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26266 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26266: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT
--+---
 Reporter:  fuckthisfuckingtrac   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #10353| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * parent:   => #10353


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26266 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26266: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT
--+--
 Reporter:  fuckthisfuckingtrac   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Duplicate of #10353

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26266 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26266: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT
--+--
 Reporter:  fuckthisfuckingtrac   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified =>


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[tor-bugs] #26266 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26266: TOR BROWSER PRIVATE MODE == Useless, no cookies handled, BULLSHIT
--+--
 Reporter:  fuckthisfuckingtrac   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I have to massive critic this trac here. Registering? tor? anonymity?

 This fucking captcha do not work, I sat 5 minutes to come over this
 bullshit. What do I wrong? should I type 5 or five, you admins are
 somewhat dull, no user friendly interface. What grandmother project uses
 trac tdoay? Tor Project? ... WTF

 You make it really hard to BUG report!!

 In Private Mode NO, Absolute NO plugin extension for cookie handling is
 supported. If you open a new private window this window uses the same
 cookies as all other private windows - and comes better: You cant delete
 them! Only close the browser and restart WTF? You guys use ur brain?

 THIS IS A BUG!! For the Tor Browser this is a massive BUG. You let
 unexperienced users in believe, that there are no cookies, becaus CM of FF
 do not show anything in private mode. This is damn useless and from my
 opinion, this is manipulation, this project is undermined or something.

 This problem must be solved, or Tor Browser and basic configuration could
 be understood to be extra build tracking users activity -> in this
 configuration Tor Browser only hide the fact that you are traced!

 Bullshit, Iam angry because I sat hours over this problem, and now You
 will tell me its a feature. NO. For Tor Browser this cant be. Its against
 the principle, do you realice that?

 Move this ticket wherever you want, I cant with this tracshit.

 Thanks

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