Re: [tor-bugs] #7921 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove/hide fingerprintable UI options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7921: Remove/hide fingerprintable UI options
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-firefox-patch  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 "Resist Fingerprinting" checkbox? Why not just enable "Resist
 Fingerprinting" by default?
 Disabling "Resist Fingerprinting" will make browser unique.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26582 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable DNT for all Tor Browser users.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26582: Disable DNT for all Tor Browser users.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Wait,

 about:preferences#privacy > "manage..." > "Always apply do not track"

 Why this settings exist!?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26582 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable DNT for all Tor Browser users.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26582: Disable DNT for all Tor Browser users.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Old Tor Browser:
 I was able to enable DNT from preferences.

 Update, update, update.

 Current Tor Browser:
 There's no such settings.

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[tor-bugs] #26582 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable DNT for all Tor Browser users.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26582: Disable DNT for all Tor Browser users.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
--+--
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26486

 I'm using this browser for a long time, and I realized "Tor Browser 7.x
 does not have DNT enabled".

 But I already have this setting in about:config:
 privacy.donottrackheader.enabled: true

 So do consider disabling DNT by browser level(ignore about:config and
 disable it).

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[tor-bugs] #26581 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Import "Healthy Onions" to Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26581: Import "Healthy Onions" to Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
--+--
 https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/healthyonions/

 Tor Browser could use something like this.

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[tor-bugs] #26580 [- Select a component]: torsocks complains about unknown system call #417 on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26580: torsocks complains about unknown system call #417 on FreeBSD
--+
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Command:

 {{{
 torify telnet {some-onion}.onion {some port}
 }}}

 When it connects, pressing Ctrl-C prints this error:
 {{{
 ^C1530319165 WARNING torsocks[69407]: [syscall] Unsupported syscall number
 417. Denying the call (in tsocks_syscall() at syscall.c:496)
 }}}
 and telnet doesn't exit.

 torsocks-2.2.0 on FreeBSD 11.1

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[tor-bugs] #26579 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor very slow to load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26579: about:tor very slow to load
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 On a slow Linux machine, I notice that about:tor is extremely slow to
 load. The browser window appears, but the page only appears after 20 or 30
 seconds. On a faster machine (multicore) the page appears quickly. This
 might be related to #26381, but I think it's more likely a separate issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12968 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Specify HEASLR (High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization) in MinGW-w64

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12968: Specify HEASLR (High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization) in
MinGW-w64
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-rbm, ff60-esr, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806, boklm201806  |
Parent ID:  #24631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sukhbir):

 (EDIT: When I said that they are using the same flags, they are building
 with `--image-base,0x14000` and that works for them. It seemed like I
 said they are building with `mcmodel` but that's not what I meant.)

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[tor-bugs] #26578 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do clients request new consensus documents more often than we expect?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26578: Do clients request new consensus documents more often than we expect?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In our user count estimates, we used the reasoning that clients fetch a
 new consensus document every 2 to 4 hours, or on average 3 hours, so that
 represents 8 fetches per day on average.

 But in reality, it seems that clients fetch consensus documents way more
 frequently than that: looking at just my local Tor client, I see
 {{{
 Jun 28 21:11:52.190 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 28 22:43:52.355 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 28 23:59:52.417 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 01:42:52.501 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 03:33:52.601 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 05:09:52.699 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 06:04:52.754 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 07:54:52.874 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 08:56:52.946 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 10:32:53.036 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 12:36:53.121 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 14:06:53.186 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 14:53:53.215 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 15:52:53.256 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 17:15:53.319 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 Jun 29 18:20:53.367 [info] update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads():
 Launching microdesc standard networkstatus consensus download.
 }}}

 So first, this means maybe our user counting algorithms are off, since
 they involve heuristics like "divide by 10 where 10 is an estimate of the
 average daily consensus fetches from a client."

 And second, does it mean that we are putting more load on the network than
 we expected, or need? How often do clients need a new consensus document
 really?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12968 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Specify HEASLR (High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization) in MinGW-w64

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12968: Specify HEASLR (High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization) in
MinGW-w64
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-rbm, ff60-esr, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806, boklm201806  |
Parent ID:  #24631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sukhbir):

 Replying to [comment:25 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:24 sukhbir]:
 > > As an update, I have been trying to build and find a solution for this
 with boklm's changes above, and it fails with a similar error to the one
 boklm had.
 > >
 > > As per the `ffmpeg` commit, they apply `--image-base,0x14000` to
 get a higher entropy for HEASLR. Since that is not working for us, how
 about we just go with `-Wl,--high-entropy-va` for now till we find a
 solution?
 >
 > What prevents us from finding that out now? Did you try to use
 `-mcmodel=medium` or `-mcmodel=large`? Why is ffpmeg not hitting the dwarf
 related problem in the first place? I.e. why is the linker not complaining
 for them?

 I tried (today) with `-mcmodel=medium`, `-mcmodel=large` (both with
 boklm's changes above and the GCC patch) and we have a similar if not the
 same error. As to why it works for ffmpeg, it seems they are using the
 same flags so I am not sure; I am going to compare the toolchain and see
 if there is a difference there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26566 [Applications/Tor Check]: check.torproject.org doesn't recognise tbb-alpha

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26566: check.torproject.org doesn't recognise tbb-alpha
+-
 Reporter:  tgragnato   |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by boklm):

 #26577 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26577 [Applications/Tor Check]: check.tp.o thinks Tor Browser 8.x user agent isn't Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26577: check.tp.o thinks Tor Browser 8.x user agent isn't Tor Browser
+---
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26566  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * parent:   => #26566


Comment:

 It seems to be a duplicate of #26566.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26574 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Save TBA updates in the internal android storage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26574: Save TBA updates in the internal android storage
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by igt0):

 Third party apps are not able to access the data directory of an specific
 application (unless they shared the same sharedUserId). So if we just
 store the apk in the fennec internal storage, the android installer is not
 able to access the APK. I am investigating alternatives.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26577 [Applications/Tor Check]: check.tp.o thinks Tor Browser 8.x user agent isn't Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26577: check.tp.o thinks Tor Browser 8.x user agent isn't Tor Browser
+-
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by arma):

 * cc: sysrqb (added)


Comment:

 And cc'ing Sir Matt too, since I see from
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/check.git/commit/?id=aa25675a220bc91104fd887216d09314ca26c822
 that he did a user agent commit to check in March.

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[tor-bugs] #26577 [Applications/Tor Check]: check.tp.o thinks Tor Browser 8.x user agent isn't Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26577: check.tp.o thinks Tor Browser 8.x user agent isn't Tor Browser
+-
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 If you go to check.torproject.org with the new Tor Browser 8.x alpha, you
 get told "Congratulations. This browser is configured to use Tor. However,
 it does not appear to be Tor Browser."

 I assume this is because check has a list of user-agents that it thinks
 are Tor Browser, and this new one isn't on the list?

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[tor-bugs] #26576 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't find absolute path from /proc/self/exe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26576: Don't find absolute path from /proc/self/exe
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Similar to #20283, Mozilla cleaned up their 13+ year old code for finding
 the install directory path in
 [[https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1403366|Bug 1403366]].
 Instead of relying on argv[0], they now follow `/proc/self/exe` on Linux
 systems (they changed how they handle this on other platforms, too).

 I'm not sure if we should revert part of the patch.

 {{{
 commit 4fe745918004db0e36e737f945901650be10c1de
 Author: Mike Hommey 
 Date:   Thu Sep 28 10:37:27 2017 +0900

 Bug 1403366 - Stop requiring argv[0] for XRE_GetBinaryPath and the
 underlying BinaryPath::Get. r=froydnj

 --HG--
 extra : rebase_source : ac7bb0d7766fce5b6325c34c2868b26eec594e18
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26484 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove the Windows bustage workaround implemented in #26476

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26484: Remove the Windows bustage workaround implemented in #26476
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 My build is missing --icf=safe (because the linker doesn't support it) and
 RUSTC_OPT_LEVEL is unknown. The other flags are present.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26484 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove the Windows bustage workaround implemented in #26476

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26484: Remove the Windows bustage workaround implemented in #26476
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 I think the things to investigate are:

  - RUSTC_OPT_LEVEL
  - -ffunction-sections
  - -fdata-sections
  - -Wl,--icf=safe -Wl,--print-icf-sections
  - -Wl,--gc-sections
  - cargo_rustc_flags += -C lto

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26484 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove the Windows bustage workaround implemented in #26476

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26484: Remove the Windows bustage workaround implemented in #26476
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 Would it be possible to get a ./mach build --verbose > build-log.txt of a
 crashing build?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26564 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor compilation fails when cross-compiling for macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26564: Tor compilation fails when cross-compiling for macOS
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression, macos, refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Yes, thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26381 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor page does not load on first start in localized Windows bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26381: about:tor page does not load on first start in localized Windows bundle
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, ff60-esr, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 The sandbox related part is interesting. I wonder whether we could create
 a minimum PoC for that, so that the issue is visible in a vanilla Firefox,
 too, and then we could go with that to Mozilla's bugzilla to get further
 help...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25962 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25962: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Seems to no longer happen with 8.0a9.

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[tor-bugs] #26575 [Community/Relays]: Tor Relay Guide DNS instructions for FreeBSD says resolv.conv instead of resolv.conf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26575: Tor Relay Guide DNS instructions for FreeBSD says resolv.conv instead of
resolv.conf
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The last command for the FreeBSD DNS instructions is "chflags schg
 /etc/resolv.conv" and the file should be "/etc/resolv.conf".
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide#FreeBSD1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25786 [Core Tor/Tor]: Policies for HTTPTunnelPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25786: Policies for HTTPTunnelPort
--+--
 Reporter:  pyhedgehog|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by neel):

 * owner:  (none) => neel
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enabling pdfjs disableRange option prevents pdfs from loading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26540: Enabling pdfjs disableRange option prevents pdfs from loading
+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr   |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > Well, flipping that preference has been an experiment. And I am not
 convinced yet that the usability impact was worth it. Thus, I wonder if we
 should just abandon this "fix" idea and try to look again in a new ticket
 at dealing with the original linkability concern? Maybe ESR60 makes it
 easier now to isolate those range requests properly? What do you think?

 Yeah I'm inclined to agree.  For the time being, I'm investigating whether
 we can enable FPI for these range requests .

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26381 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor page does not load on first start in localized Windows bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26381: about:tor page does not load on first start in localized Windows bundle
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, ff60-esr, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Tracking down the root cause of this is proving to be challenging. My
 Windows debugging skills seem to be inadequate, especially when the
 browser is running in multiprocess mode. Here are some additional things
 that Kathy and I learned:
 * In addition to the undefined entity bug, sometimes a blank page is
 loaded instead of about:tor. When a blank page is loaded, that tab is
 useless (all pages silently fail to load, including internal pages such as
 about:config).
 * The problems with about:tor do not always occur. They seem to occur
 every time with a clean install or when running with
 TOR_FORCE_NET_CONFIG=1.
 * When about:tor does not load correctly, Wextensions (all) do not work
 either. This points to some kind of race or other bug during
 initialization.
 * Reducing the sandbox level makes these problems disappear: if I set
 `security.sandbox.content.level` to `2` about:tor loads correctly every
 time, but a setting of `3` or higher causes problems.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26568 [Core Tor/Tor]: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not opened port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26568: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not 
opened
port
-+-
 Reporter:  karalabe |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, auto, control, port, |  Actual Points:
  invalid, empty |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I think removing the gotPort field here was wrong.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26568 [Core Tor/Tor]: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not opened port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26568: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not 
opened
port
-+-
 Reporter:  karalabe |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, auto, control, port, |  Actual Points:
  invalid, empty |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Git bisect tells me that 6ed384b827dce21ea3a44b58792cc28b2ed48056 was the
 first bad commit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26574 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Save TBA updates in the internal android storage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26574: Save TBA updates in the internal android storage
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by igt0):

 We can not use the internal cache storage, though. It doesn't allow
 medium/big size files. (Normally fennec APK is around 30MB).

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[tor-bugs] #26574 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Save TBA updates in the internal android storage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26574: Save TBA updates in the internal android storage
--+
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Currently, UpdateService downloads the new apk and saves it to an external
 storage, it violates the disk avoidance principle.

 We should modify its code to use the internal storage.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26568 [Core Tor/Tor]: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not opened port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26568: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not 
opened
port
-+-
 Reporter:  karalabe |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, auto, control, port, |  Actual Points:
  invalid, empty |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  regression?, auto, control, port, invalid, empty =>
 regression, auto, control, port, invalid, empty
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 I can confirm that 0.3.4 has this problem too, and 0.3.3 does not.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26535 [Core Tor/Tor]: Appveyor fails test_ntor.sh and test_hs_ntor.sh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26535: Appveyor fails test_ntor.sh and test_hs_ntor.sh
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci appveyor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:5 nickm]:
 > I'm surprised that this isn't affecting other platforms, though.  Why
 would this be windows-only?
 Maybe python2, not python3, is installed as python on most non-Windows
 platforms by default? (or at least the ones we run CI on?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26535 [Core Tor/Tor]: Appveyor fails test_ntor.sh and test_hs_ntor.sh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26535: Appveyor fails test_ntor.sh and test_hs_ntor.sh
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci appveyor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 I'm surprised that this isn't affecting other platforms, though.  Why
 would this be windows-only?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25790 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orfox lists external apps when the user clicks and holds an Android URI in a WebPage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25790: Orfox lists external apps when the user clicks and holds an Android URI 
in
a WebPage
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25703| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by igt0):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Since we are going to use FF60, we need to cherry pick this patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25902 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable Firefox Mobile accessibility services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25902: Disable Firefox Mobile accessibility services
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25703| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by igt0):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We don't need to fix this, FF already has enough protections see:
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25902#comment:4]

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[tor-bugs] #26573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Cleanup logging on < API 21

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26573: TBA: Cleanup logging on < API 21
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Compiling with localWithGeckoBinariesNoMinApiPhotonDebug (or another
 NoMinApi variant), these methods don't exist when using the lower APIs and
 can't be revolved at run-time. It'd be nice we can avoid this in the the
 situations where we know it won't work. This only happens in onCreate from
 GeckoApp, but the errors are misleading. These errors are not fatal.

 These errors generally come from `Hardwareutils.isSystemSupported()`, I
 haven't tracked down where the getDrawable*() methods are used.

 {{{
 12-31 19:06:13.340 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser I/GeckoApplication:
 zerdatime 373344 - application start
 12-31 19:06:20.390 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser W/dalvikvm: VFY:
 unable to resolve virtual method 466:
 Landroid/content/Context;.checkSelfPermission (Ljava/lang/String;)I
 12-31 19:06:20.770 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser D/dalvikvm: DexOpt:
 couldn't find static field Landroid/os/Build;.SUPPORTED_ABIS
 12-31 19:06:20.770 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser W/dalvikvm: VFY:
 unable to resolve static field 173 (SUPPORTED_ABIS) in Landroid/os/Build;
 12-31 19:06:20.810 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser I/dalvikvm: Could
 not find method android.system.Os.uname, referenced from method
 org.mozilla.gecko.util.HardwareUtils.isX86System
 12-31 19:06:20.810 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser W/dalvikvm: VFY:
 unable to resolve static method 19531: Landroid/system/Os;.uname
 ()Landroid/system/StructUtsname;
 12-31 19:06:23.260 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser D/dalvikvm: DexOpt:
 couldn't find static field Landroid/os/Build;.SUPPORTED_ABIS
 12-31 19:06:23.290 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser W/dalvikvm: VFY:
 unable to resolve static field 173 (SUPPORTED_ABIS) in Landroid/os/Build;
 12-31 19:06:24.260 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser W/dalvikvm: VFY:
 unable to find class referenced in signature (Landroid/view/SearchEvent;)
 12-31 19:06:24.260 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser I/dalvikvm: Could
 not find method android.view.Window$Callback.onSearchRequested, referenced
 from method
 android.support.v7.view.WindowCallbackWrapper.onSearchRequested
 12-31 19:06:24.260 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser W/dalvikvm: VFY:
 unable to resolve interface method 20450:
 Landroid/view/Window$Callback;.onSearchRequested
 (Landroid/view/SearchEvent;)Z
 12-31 19:06:24.290 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser I/dalvikvm: Could
 not find method android.view.Window$Callback.onWindowStartingActionMode,
 referenced from method
 android.support.v7.view.WindowCallbackWrapper.onWindowStartingActionMode
 12-31 19:06:24.290 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser W/dalvikvm: VFY:
 unable to resolve interface method 20454:
 Landroid/view/Window$Callback;.onWindowStartingActionMode
 (Landroid/view/ActionMode$Callback;I)Landroid/view/ActionMode;
 12-31 19:06:25.370 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser I/dalvikvm: Could
 not find method android.content.res.Resources.getDrawable, referenced from
 method android.support.v7.widget.ResourcesWrapper.getDrawable
 12-31 19:06:25.370 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser W/dalvikvm: VFY:
 unable to resolve virtual method 696:
 Landroid/content/res/Resources;.getDrawable
 (ILandroid/content/res/Resources$Theme;)Landroid/graphics/drawable/Drawable;
 12-31 19:06:25.380 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser I/dalvikvm: Could
 not find method android.content.res.Resources.getDrawableForDensity,
 referenced from method
 android.support.v7.widget.ResourcesWrapper.getDrawableForDensity
 12-31 19:06:25.380 2133-2133/org.torproject.torbrowser W/dalvikvm: VFY:
 unable to resolve virtual method 698:
 Landroid/content/res/Resources;.getDrawableForDensity
 (IILandroid/content/res/Resources$Theme;)Landroid/graphics/drawable/Drawable;
 }}}

 
[[https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/Context.html#checkSelfPermission(java.lang.String)|android.content.Context.checkSelfPermission()]]
 - added in API level 23
 
[[https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build.html#SUPPORTED_ABIS|android.os.Build.SUPPORTED_ABIS]]
 - added in API level 21
 
[[https://developer.android.com/reference/android/system/Os.html#uname()|android.system.Os.uname()]]
 - added in API level 21
 
[[https://developer.android.com/reference/android/view/SearchEvent|android.view.SearchEvent]]
 - added in API level 23
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #21014 [Obfuscation/Censorship analysis]: Turkey blocking of direct connections, 2016-12-12

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21014: Turkey blocking of direct connections, 2016-12-12
-+-
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  metrics-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  censorship block tr Turkey UX|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 19 months later, there's a very similar pattern in relay users from
 Turkey, jumping from 5k to 30k in about a day, on 2018-06-09. Is it
 another blocking event that's resulting in an illusory increase in the
 number of users? A Reddit user
 [https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/8ute8y/tor_network_is_blocked_in_turkey/
 reports] on 2018-06-29 that Tor is blocked.

 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2018-03-31=2018-06-29=tr=off
 [[Image(userstats-relay-country-tr-2018-03-31-2018-06-29-off.png,600px)]]

 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 country.html?start=2018-03-31=2018-06-29=tr=off
 [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-tr-2018-03-31-2018-06-29.png,600px)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21014 [Obfuscation/Censorship analysis]: Turkey blocking of direct connections, 2016-12-12

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21014: Turkey blocking of direct connections, 2016-12-12
-+-
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  metrics-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  censorship block tr Turkey UX|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "userstats-bridge-country-tr-2018-03-31-2018-06-29.png"
 added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21014 [Obfuscation/Censorship analysis]: Turkey blocking of direct connections, 2016-12-12

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21014: Turkey blocking of direct connections, 2016-12-12
-+-
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  metrics-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  censorship block tr Turkey UX|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "userstats-relay-country-tr-2018-03-31-2018-06-29-off.png"
 added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26572 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove src/common/compat.[ch and src/common/util.c: Make util.h a stub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26572: Remove src/common/compat.[ch and src/common/util.c: Make util.h a stub
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactoring   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26481| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:  Sponsor3-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Answered comments; merged to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26572 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove src/common/compat.[ch and src/common/util.c: Make util.h a stub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26572: Remove src/common/compat.[ch and src/common/util.c: Make util.h a stub
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  refactoring   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26481| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:  Sponsor3-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26467 [Core Tor/Tor]: Coverity issues for week 25

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26467: Coverity issues for week 25
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged this to 0.2.9 and forward!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26560 [Core Tor/Tor]: install more optional libs for Travis CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26560: install more optional libs for Travis CI
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor3-can
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15618 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15618: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as
rendevous (pending)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs needs-insight needs-  |  Actual Points:
  diagnosis  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 IIUC, the only way for a client to send two `ESTABLISH_REND` on the same
 circuit is to call `hs_client_circuit_has_opened()` twice, since that's
 the func that calls `client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened()` and
 `rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened()`. s7r seems to disprove this theory in
 comment:18 but I don't see another way.

 My suggestion would be to use the flag `circ->has_opened` that is set by
 `circuit_has_opened()`, and make sure that we don't call
 `hs_client_circuit_has_opened()`  if the `has_opened` flag is already set
 to make sure we dont call the func twice.

 This will block the "double has_opened" theory. There might be other ways
 to cause this bug, or it might just be a custom client, so there is still
 work here...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26572 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove src/common/compat.[ch and src/common/util.c: Make util.h a stub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26572: Remove src/common/compat.[ch and src/common/util.c: Make util.h a stub
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactoring   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26481| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:  Sponsor3-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: dgoulet (removed)
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * keywords:   => refactoring
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 Two comments on the PR but else that is good to go!

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[tor-bugs] #26572 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove src/common/compat.[ch and src/common/util.c: Make util.h a stub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26572: Remove src/common/compat.[ch and src/common/util.c: Make util.h a stub
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #26481
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor3-can  |
--+
 See branch `remove_util_and_compat`.  PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/193

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26572 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove src/common/compat.[ch and src/common/util.c: Make util.h a stub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26572: Remove src/common/compat.[ch and src/common/util.c: Make util.h a stub
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26481| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor3-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26437 [Core Tor/Tor]: Forking tests fails on Windows if there is a space in the path of the test runner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26437: Forking tests fails on Windows if there is a space in the path of the 
test
runner
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Seems like AppVeyor checks are still failing here. Requesting revision.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26434 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Emptied a dirserv buffer, but it's still spooling!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26434: Bug: Emptied a dirserv buffer, but it's still spooling!
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by toralf):

 Happened here at a stable hardened Gentoo Linux server too (for the first
 time):
 {{{
 Jun 29 08:02:13.000 [warn] connection_dir_finished_flushing(): Bug:
 Emptied a dirserv buffer, but it's still spooling! (on Tor 0.3.4.2-alpha
 bc951e83aac770d1)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26568 [Core Tor/Tor]: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not opened port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26568: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not 
opened
port
-+-
 Reporter:  karalabe |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, auto, control, port,|  Actual Points:
  invalid, empty |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by karalabe):

 I have a fairly funky build setup, I pulled latest master where this issue
 was happening (not sure when it started, just started using Tor now). If I
 revert to latest stable (0.3.3.7), then everything works fine. Didn't test
 0.3.4 as it conflicts with my builder.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26475 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ESR60-based .dmg images are not built reproducibly with Stylo enabled using rustc > 1.25.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26475: ESR60-based .dmg images are not built reproducibly with Stylo enabled 
using
rustc > 1.25.0
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201806,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201806  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by manish.earth):

 There's also this tool, which is kinda like mozregression

 https://github.com/rust-lang-nursery/cargo-bisect-rustc

 It works off of the tarballs.

 I've never tried it with Firefox though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Maybe it has nothing to do with JIT after all (though that doesn't mean
 that this ticket shouldn't be addressed) but such relief came when ye
 finally catch the fish:

 {{{
 [NoScript] Cannot collect noscript activity data Error: Could not
 establish connection. Receiving end does not exist.
 Stack trace:
 collectSeen@moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:265:38
  Could not establish connection. Receiving end does not exist. collectSeen
 @moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:265:38
   log.js:12:5
 error moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/lib/log.js:12:5
 collectSeen moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:274:10
 [NoScript] Cannot collect noscript activity data Error: Could not
 establish connection. Receiving end does not exist.
 Stack trace:
 collectSeen@moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:265:38
  Could not establish connection. Receiving end does not exist. collectSeen
 @moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:265:38
   log.js:12:5
 error moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/lib/log.js:12:5
 collectSeen moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:274:10
 [NoScript] Cannot collect noscript activity data Error: Could not
 establish connection. Receiving end does not exist.
 Stack trace:
 collectSeen@moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:265:38
  Could not establish connection. Receiving end does not exist. collectSeen
 @moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:265:38
   log.js:12:5
 error moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/lib/log.js:12:5
 collectSeen moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:274:10
 [NoScript] Cannot collect noscript activity data Error: Could not
 establish connection. Receiving end does not exist.
 Stack trace:
 collectSeen@moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:265:38
  Could not establish connection. Receiving end does not exist. collectSeen
 @moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:265:38
   log.js:12:5
 error moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/lib/log.js:12:5
 collectSeen moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:274:10
 NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE: Component returned failure code: 0x80040111
 (NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE) [nsIWebNavigation.loadURIWithOptions]  browser-
 child.js:359
 [NoScript] Cannot collect noscript activity data Error: Could not
 establish connection. Receiving end does not exist.
 Stack trace:
 collectSeen@moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:265:38
  Could not establish connection. Receiving end does not exist. collectSeen
 @moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:265:38
   log.js:12:5
 error moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/lib/log.js:12:5
 collectSeen moz-extension://[NoScript's UUID]/bg/main.js:274:10
 NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE: Component returned failure code: 0x80040111
 (NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE) [nsIWebNavigation.loadURIWithOptions]  browser-
 child.js:359
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26565 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create unit tests for reading measured bandwidths with non-NULL routerstatuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26565: Create unit tests for reading measured bandwidths with non-NULL
routerstatuses
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26475 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ESR60-based .dmg images are not built reproducibly with Stylo enabled using rustc > 1.25.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26475: ESR60-based .dmg images are not built reproducibly with Stylo enabled 
using
rustc > 1.25.0
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201806,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201806  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by alexcrichton):

 If you're ok downloading prebuilt artifacts I'd recommend bisection via
 nightlies which rustup can download. Otherwise there's nightly source
 tarballs as well at urls like https://static.rust-lang.org/dist/2018-06-29
 /rustc-nightly-src.tar.gz

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26485 [Core Tor/Tor]: June mystery: the microdesc consensus is getting 9 sigs, but the ns consensus is getting only 5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26485: June mystery: the microdesc consensus is getting 9 sigs, but the ns
consensus is getting only 5
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => tor-dirauth
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * component:  Core Tor/DirAuth => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 This seems to affect "tor" and has a branch from nickm so going in Core
 Tor/Tor component.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > Is that on Windows? Or Linux? Or...
 Yeah Linux.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25812 [Community/Relays]: Update the tor relay guide about ed25519 changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25812: Update the tor relay guide about ed25519 changes
--+
 Reporter:  ffmancera |  Owner:  nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 thanks

 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide?action=diff=220

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26564 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor compilation fails when cross-compiling for macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26564: Tor compilation fails when cross-compiling for macOS
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, macos, refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * cc: catalyst (added)


Comment:

 nickm just merged catalyst's fix-macos-includes to master, does master
 work for you now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25812 [Community/Relays]: Update the tor relay guide about ed25519 changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25812: Update the tor relay guide about ed25519 changes
--+--
 Reporter:  ffmancera |  Owner:  nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 nusenu]:
 >
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide?action=diff=219
 >
 > please reopen if you are unhappy with this change

 Thanks, but the text is too definite:
 {{{
 Tor relays are not allowed to downgrade their tor version from a
 [[org/teams/NetworkTeam/CoreTorReleases#Listofreleases|supported]] to an
 unsupported major version of tor. Relays that do attempt do downgrade will
 be rejected from the network automatically.
 }}}

 Relays can't downgrade from a version that supports ed25519 keys, to a
 version that ignores them. So relays that downgrade from 0.2.9 (or later)
 to 0.2.8 (or earlier) will be rejected.

 But relays that move between two versions that are both 0.2.9 or later
 will not be rejected from the consensus. (For example, 0.3.2 is supported,
 and 0.3.0 is not supported, but the downgrade still works.)

 Here's a more accurate version:
 {{{
 Tor relays should not downgrade their tor version from a
 [[org/teams/NetworkTeam/CoreTorReleases#Listofreleases|supported]] to an
 unsupported version of tor. Some unsupported versions are insecure. Relays
 that attempt to downgrade to an insecure version will be rejected from the
 network automatically.
 }}}

 The authorities implement a number of different version checks, and this
 text covers past and future checks. Most of the time, we just reject old
 versions. But sometimes it's more complicated (like ed25519).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26571 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OS X Tor Browser alpha installer icon misplaced.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26571: OS X Tor Browser alpha installer icon misplaced.
--+--
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Duplicate of #26263.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26263 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser app icon positioned incorrectly in DMG installer window

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26263: browser app icon positioned incorrectly in DMG installer window
+--
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: pastly (added)


Comment:

 #26571 is a duplicate.

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[tor-bugs] #26571 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OS X Tor Browser alpha installer icon misplaced.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26571: OS X Tor Browser alpha installer icon misplaced.
--+--
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 See https://i.imgur.com/PwFsY3k.png

 OS X 10.11.6

 TB 8.0a9

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25812 [Community/Relays]: Update the tor relay guide about ed25519 changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25812: Update the tor relay guide about ed25519 changes
--+
 Reporter:  ffmancera |  Owner:  nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide?action=diff=219

 please reopen if you are unhappy with this change

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > > Is that reproducible (e.g. by loading a particular URL)? I am curious
 where the NoScript relation is coming from.
 > Thanks for taking interest in this. It's a bit difficult to reproduce
 immediately but sometimes when I'm on a page and I ctrl+click on a link so
 that it opens in a new tab, the cpu usage gets to 100% on one core for
 about 10sec and it's taking 20sec or so just to starting loading up the
 page, from the browser console I see NoScript doing its thing (i.e. the
 CSP hack) during that time. (on 8.0a9 of course) It doesn't happen always
 so it's difficult to give clear ways to reproduce other than "just browse
 with safer security setting and ctrl+click on links".

 Is that on Windows? Or Linux? Or...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26539 [Webpages/Website]: add checksums to download page; make checksum vs. sig file purpose much clearer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26539: add checksums to download page; make checksum vs. sig file purpose much
clearer
+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gpg, verify gpg signatures  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > Is that reproducible (e.g. by loading a particular URL)? I am curious
 where the NoScript relation is coming from.
 Thanks for taking interest in this. It's a bit difficult to reproduce
 immediately but sometimes when I'm on a page and I ctrl+click on a link so
 that it opens in a new tab, the cpu usage gets to 100% on one core for
 about 10sec and it's taking 20sec or so just to starting loading up the
 page, from the browser console I see NoScript doing its thing (i.e. the
 CSP hack) during that time. (on 8.0a9 of course) It doesn't happen always
 so it's difficult to give clear ways to reproduce other than "just browse
 with safer security setting and ctrl+click on links".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > Can this be given a higher prio? It's seems to severely affect my
 browsing as some tabs take a while to even start loading with Safer-Safest
 (seems related to NoScript doing its work).

 Is that reproducible (e.g. by loading a particular URL)? I am curious
 where the NoScript relation is coming from.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21863 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ensure proxy safety on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21863: Ensure proxy safety on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-7.0-must, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  proxy-bypass, TorBrowserTeam201806 |
Parent ID:  #26531   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:24 sysrqb]:
 > In addition, I went down the rabbit hole: "What does Android *do* when
 you ask it to establish a connection using a proxy". The result of this
 long and windy path is "it seems safe", but only when the Java/Dalvik/ART
 VM uses the default AOSP configuration.
 >
 > I'll attempt succinctly explaining proxy safety on Android here, but we
 should seriously consider using Necko for all networking calls in the
 future (which means exposing necko via jni). I believe GeckoView is
 already considering this - but how hard could it be? :)

 Yes, please. Do you have a ticket for GeckoView tracking this work? I
 looked a bit around but did not find anything.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26242 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Implement update strategy for TBA

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26242: Implement update strategy for TBA
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26531| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:   => #26531


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create First Tor Browser for Android Alpha Release

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26531: Create First Tor Browser for Android Alpha Release
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #5709 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 sysrqb]:
 > Must complete:
 >  1. The first alpha should not be based on Firefox ESR but on the
 regular release channel which we tend to follow for the mobile Tor Browser
 >  1. We need to make sure there are no proxy bypasses possible
 >  1. We need good hints for our users that this is an alpha, possibly
 showing the missing features (UX team help)
 >  1. Rebrand Orfox -> Tor Browser
 >
 > Must Do:
 >  a. What do we want to do with the updater/updating users in case we
 want to not only use Google's Play Store but have the browser available in
 >  F-Droid and on our website as well?

 I guess this means we need an update strategy as well. Thus, lets add
 #26242 to the child ticket list, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Can this be given a higher prio? It's seems to severely affect my browsing
 as some tabs take a while to even start loading with Safer-Safest (seems
 related to NoScript doing its work).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26039 [Applications/Tor Browser]: /preferences/extension-overrides.js will not be loaded in ESR 60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26039: /preferences/extension-overrides.js will not be loaded in 
ESR
60
-+---
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good, applied to `master` (commit
 8cfb90c7f21a220378adaaa8f5f54ce0e9cccb39).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Back and Forward button should be on the left side of the toolbar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26237: Back and Forward button should be on the left side of the toolbar
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:8 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > > One thing which is very handy is the search engine drop down in the
 search box. DDG often has not the up-to-date content I need, so I can
 easily select a different search engine for that purpose. Is that possible
 with the URL bar, too?
 > The answer is yes. Type a word, you can then try from a selection of
 search engines that appear in the bottom.

 Huh, indeed. I wonder how I missed that. Great, then, yes, let's leave out
 the search bar.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Back and Forward button should be on the left side of the toolbar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26237: Back and Forward button should be on the left side of the toolbar
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > One thing which is very handy is the search engine drop down in the
 search box. DDG often has not the up-to-date content I need, so I can
 easily select a different search engine for that purpose. Is that possible
 with the URL bar, too?
 The answer is yes. Type a word, you can then try from a selection of
 search engines that appear in the bottom.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Back and Forward button should be on the left side of the toolbar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26237: Back and Forward button should be on the left side of the toolbar
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R => ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201806
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 arthuredelstein]:
 > Here's a proposed patch to try to clean up the toolbar:
 > https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/26237
 >
 > I moved the HTTPS-Everywhere button off the toolbar by default, because
 it's rarely needed, but I left the NoScript button visible for temporary
 whitelisting purposes. (The HTTPS-E button can still be found in the
 Customize panel.)
 >
 > I removed the search box and the "Flexible Space" around the URL bar, to
 give more room for v3 .onion domains. This seems OK given that the URL box
 also behaves as a search box.

 One thing which is very handy is the search engine drop down in the search
 box. DDG often has not the up-to-date content I need, so I can easily
 select a different search engine for that purpose. Is that possible with
 the URL bar, too? If not, I think we should get the search box back. In
 general, I think we should get as close as possible to the layout which we
 have in the current stable and then open a ticket for redoing the toolbar
 properly together with ux-team input in case we feel we need that. (So,
 yes, no Home button)

 > I also included the Downloads button, but it auto-hides as long as no
 items have been download.
 >
 > Here's what the result looks like:
 > [[Image(toolbar_26237.png)]]
 >
 > Question: do we want to include a bookmarks button? It's not present in
 TBB 7.5 but maybe it's nice to have.

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[tor-bugs] #26570 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Redirect pre-8.0 stable users to a separate update directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26570: Redirect pre-8.0 stable users to a separate update directory
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff60-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201809
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26050
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In order to achieve watershed for the ESR60 switch, we should redirect
 pre-8.0 stable users to a separate update directory, using the option
 added in #26234, so that they are updated to 8.0 first before being
 updated to the latest version.

 This ticket is similar to #26569, but for the `release` channel.

 We should do this after `8.0` has been released.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26475 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ESR60-based .dmg images are not built reproducibly with Stylo enabled using rustc > 1.25.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26475: ESR60-based .dmg images are not built reproducibly with Stylo enabled 
using
rustc > 1.25.0
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201806,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201806  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 So, I tried for a while to get the bisecting going but it seems non-
 trivial. Alex: What is the recommended way of doing rust compiler
 bisecting? What I tried was using `git bisect` with the commit for 1.25.0
 and 1.26.1, updating the sub modules and tarring the result up + using it
 on my build machines, but that breaks for different reasons (first one is
 no properly vendored crates are included (we compile with --enable-
 vendor); trying to get crates via crates.io-index fails with an SSL
 error...).

 Maybe easier: Are there somewhere nightly source tarballs available (like
 they are for the official releases) which I could test? I did not find any
 so far but that might already narrow down the problem sufficiently.

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[tor-bugs] #26569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Redirect pre-8.0a9 alpha users to a separate update directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26569: Redirect pre-8.0a9 alpha users to a separate update directory
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff60-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201806
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26050
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In order to achieve watershed for the ESR60 switch, we should redirect
 pre-8.0a9 alpha user to a separate update directory, using the option
 added in #26234, so that they are updated to 8.0a9 first before being
 updated to the latest version.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26411 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stop using old MAR format in the second esr60-based stable release

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26411: Stop using old MAR format in the second esr60-based stable release
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201809, ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26050  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * parent:   => #26050


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stop using old MAR format in the second esr60-based alpha

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26410: Stop using old MAR format in the second esr60-based alpha
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26050   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * parent:   => #26050


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26450 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build components for which dependencies are already available

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26450: Build components for which dependencies are already available
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 boklm]:
 > So the goal would be to be able build almost everything while the
 langpacks are not yet available, and then be able to do the final builds
 quickly once the langpacks are available?

 Yes.

 > I think we could remove the dependency on `firefox-langpacks` during
 testbuilds, where we don't build any locale. This should allow us to run
 `make testbuild` (after editing `rbm.local.conf` to select `alpha` or
 `release` in `torbrowser-testbuild`. Or maybe we could think about adding
 `testbuild-alpha`, `testbuild-release`, `testbuild-nightly` targets if
 that's easier) to start the initial building while the langpacks are not
 yet available.
 >
 > In branch `bug_26450` I made a patch that should disable the dependency
 on `firefox-langpacks` when the list of locales is empty (which should be
 the case in `testbuild`):
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_26450=88ff6003f2d8b45aca111e2f7cfcce3837fe5414

 Let's try that one. Merged to `master` (commit
 71207ea2468a8535e73dc8e8aa09aecfedbbed34).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stop using old MAR format in the second esr60-based alpha

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26410: Stop using old MAR format in the second esr60-based alpha
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Merged to `master` (commit
 660007aa541e3c8cc4fda2776e8a277fdbc74915).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25812 [Community/Relays]: Update the tor relay guide about ed25519 changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25812: Update the tor relay guide about ed25519 changes
--+
 Reporter:  ffmancera |  Owner:  nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25812 [Community/Relays]: Update the tor relay guide about ed25519 changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25812: Update the tor relay guide about ed25519 changes
--+---
 Reporter:  ffmancera |  Owner:  nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > can you elaborate on what specifically you want to be updated?

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20522#comment:17

 If you are the nusenu cypherpunks, you sent an email about the change to
 tor-relays.

 I think the best advice is: "Don't downgrade the tor version on your relay
 to an unsupported version." and a link to nusenu's email.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26564 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor compilation fails when cross-compiling for macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26564: Tor compilation fails when cross-compiling for macOS
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, macos, refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => regression, macos, refactor
 * version:   => Tor: unspecified
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Looks like we left out one of the headers in the refactor.

 If we activate the macOS builders in Travis (#24629) we will catch issues
 like this earlier.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26566 [Applications/Tor Check]: check.torproject.org doesn't recognise tbb-alpha

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26566: check.torproject.org doesn't recognise tbb-alpha
+-
 Reporter:  tgragnato   |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  hiro => arlolra
 * component:  Webpages/Webtools => Applications/Tor Check


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26568 [Core Tor/Tor]: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not opened port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26568: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not 
opened
port
-+-
 Reporter:  karalabe |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, auto, control, port,|  Actual Points:
  invalid, empty |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 What was the last version that worked?
 Does this issue happen with Tor 0.3.3 or Tor 0.3.4?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26568 [Core Tor/Tor]: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not opened port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26568: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not 
opened
port
-+-
 Reporter:  karalabe |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, auto, control, port,|  Actual Points:
  invalid, empty |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  auto, control, port, invalid, empty => regression?, auto,
 control, port, invalid, empty
 * version:   => Tor: unspecified
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Hi, thanks for this bug report.
 Which branch and commit are you using?

 Questions for the developers:
 Are we writing the file before we assign and open the control port?
 Or did we change one of the control port functions in the refactor?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26506 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript not working on TBB/ESR60 on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26506: NoScript not working on TBB/ESR60 on Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 A user reported that noscript is not working for them on Linux 64:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/275993#comment-275993

 I'm not sure if it's the same issue, or a different one for which we
 should open a new ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26357 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Revert 2be5a50 giving pastly extra permissions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26357: Revert 2be5a50 giving pastly extra permissions
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26416 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please create a few repositories for pospeselr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26416: Please create a few repositories for pospeselr
-+-
 Reporter:  pospeselr|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Back and Forward button should be on the left side of the toolbar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26237: Back and Forward button should be on the left side of the toolbar
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 That's excellent Arthur, what I'd propose next is to place the Torbutton
 in the place of the home button which is very rarely needed (who needs to
 go back to about:tor?).

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[tor-bugs] #26568 [Core Tor/Tor]: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not opened port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26568: --ControlPortWriteToFile reports port 0 on --ControlPort=auto, not 
opened
port
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:  (none)
  karalabe   |
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|
 Severity:  Major|   Keywords:  auto, control, port, invalid, empty
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 If I start the latest tor code with `--ControlPort=auto` and
 `--ControlPortWriteToFile=/path/to/file`, then the contents of the file
 end up as `PORT=127.0.0.1:0`, which is kind of useless :)

 I guess some code got messed up lately that updates the port before
 writing it out to the control file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26549 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revision counter for v3 ephemeral hidden service is lost

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26549: Revision counter for v3 ephemeral hidden service is lost
+
 Reporter:  akwizgran   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25552  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by akwizgran):

 Confirming that the bug25552_ope branch fixes this bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26541 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix minor mistakes in the bandwidth-file dir-spec entry

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26541: Fix minor mistakes in the bandwidth-file dir-spec entry
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, torspec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3723| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26541 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix minor mistakes in the bandwidth-file dir-spec entry

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26541: Fix minor mistakes in the bandwidth-file dir-spec entry
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, torspec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3723| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 juga]:
 > PR in: https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/18

 Ok, this patch is ready to go!

 It's on GitHub at https://github.com/juga0/torspec/tree/ticket26541

 I splioff #26567 for the ArgumentCharValue fix. Someone can do it
 eventually.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26567 [Core Tor/Tor]: Replace ArgumentCharValue with ValueChar in dir-spec and bandwidth-file-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26567: Replace ArgumentCharValue with ValueChar in dir-spec and bandwidth-file-
spec
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, torspec, easy, intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-bwauth, torspec => tor-bwauth, torspec, easy, intro


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[tor-bugs] #26567 [Core Tor/Tor]: Replace ArgumentCharValue with ValueChar in dir-spec and bandwidth-file-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26567: Replace ArgumentCharValue with ValueChar in dir-spec and bandwidth-file-
spec
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   |   Keywords:  tor-bwauth, torspec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Having ArgumentChar and ArgumentCharValue is confusing, see:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26541#comment:15

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26519 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Avoid Firefox icons in ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26519: Avoid Firefox icons in ESR60
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201806R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 A user reported on the blog an issue that looks similar to this one:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/275977#comment-275977

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25267 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Create user/brade/tor-browser-build repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25267: Create user/brade/tor-browser-build repo
-+-
 Reporter:  brade|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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