Re: [tor-bugs] #26832 [Applications/Tor Check]: Allow use of https://check.torproject.org/api/ip by content

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26832: Allow use of https://check.torproject.org/api/ip by content
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Description changed by arthuredelstein:

Old description:

> I would like to create a page on another domain that demonstrates stream
> isolation in Tor Browser. This is the mechanism whereby each website is
> downloaded by via a different Tor circuit, but a web page in an iframe is
> downloaded via the same Tor circuit as the first party parent document
> was.
>
> Right now, https://check.torproject.org/api/ip cannot be included in
> iframes or fetched by a script in a web page.
>
> So I would like to propose setting
> `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`
> and removing the `X-Frame-Options` header
> for this particular endpoint.

New description:

 I would like to create a page on another domain that demonstrates stream
 isolation in Tor Browser. This is the mechanism whereby each website is
 downloaded via a different Tor circuit, but a web page in an iframe is
 downloaded via the same Tor circuit as the first party parent document
 was.

 Right now, https://check.torproject.org/api/ip cannot be included in
 iframes or fetched by a script in a web page.

 So I would like to propose setting
 `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`
 and removing the `X-Frame-Options` header
 for this particular endpoint.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26832 [Applications/Tor Check]: Allow use of https://check.torproject.org/api/ip by content

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26832: Allow use of https://check.torproject.org/api/ip by content
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)
 * status:  new => needs_review


Old description:

> I would like to create a page on another domain that demonstrates stream
> isolation in Tor Browser. This is the mechanism whereby a web page in an
> iframe is downloaded via the same Tor circuit as the first party parent
> document was.
>
> Right now, https://check.torproject.org/api/ip cannot be included in
> iframes or fetched by a script in a web page.
>
> So I would like to propose setting
> Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
> and removing the `X-Frame-Options` header
> for this particular endpoint.

New description:

 I would like to create a page on another domain that demonstrates stream
 isolation in Tor Browser. This is the mechanism whereby each website is
 downloaded by via a different Tor circuit, but a web page in an iframe is
 downloaded via the same Tor circuit as the first party parent document
 was.

 Right now, https://check.torproject.org/api/ip cannot be included in
 iframes or fetched by a script in a web page.

 So I would like to propose setting
 `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`
 and removing the `X-Frame-Options` header
 for this particular endpoint.

--

Comment:

 Here's a proposed patch.
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/check/commit/26832

 Any feedback appreciated. Thanks in advance! :)

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[tor-bugs] #26832 [Applications/Tor Check]: Allow use of https://check.torproject.org/api/ip by content

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26832: Allow use of https://check.torproject.org/api/ip by content
+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 I would like to create a page on another domain that demonstrates stream
 isolation in Tor Browser. This is the mechanism whereby a web page in an
 iframe is downloaded via the same Tor circuit as the first party parent
 document was.

 Right now, https://check.torproject.org/api/ip cannot be included in
 iframes or fetched by a script in a web page.

 So I would like to propose setting
 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
 and removing the `X-Frame-Options` header
 for this particular endpoint.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25405 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: cannot use Moat if a meek bridge is configured

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25405: cannot use Moat if a meek bridge is configured
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201807R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Looks good to me. I'll wait for dcf to ack the `meek` part and then do a
 final round of testing.

 I slightly refactored the logic and merged the meek-client-torbrowser
 patch.
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/meek.git/diff/?id=488084d89003c524c84e05a2c89917351899b602=502001aed9e40f79807b913b02ea82f7c381e47d

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26830 [Core Tor/Tor]: SKIP test_keygen.sh on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26830: SKIP test_keygen.sh on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.3-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 035-must,   |  Actual Points:
  regression, fast-fix   |
Parent ID:  #26076   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Ok, turns out that we need to check for MSYS as well as CYGWIN and MINGW.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26830 [Core Tor/Tor]: SKIP test_keygen.sh on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26830: SKIP test_keygen.sh on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.3-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 035-must,   |  Actual Points:
  regression, fast-fix   |
Parent ID:  #26076   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26830 [Core Tor/Tor]: SKIP test_keygen.sh on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26830: SKIP test_keygen.sh on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.3-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 035-must,   |  Actual Points:
  regression, fast-fix   |
Parent ID:  #26076   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 CI says:

 test_keygen.sh runs and passes on Linux:
 https://travis-ci.org/teor2345/tor/jobs/404690439

 But apparently my uname test was wrong:
 {{{
 PASS: src/test/test_keygen.sh
 }}}
 https://ci.appveyor.com/project/torproject/tor/build/1.0.404

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26520 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript is broken with TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 in ESR 60-based Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26520: NoScript is broken with TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 in ESR 60-based Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201807R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201807 => ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201807R


Comment:

 Here's a patch for review:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/26520

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[tor-bugs] #26831 [- Select a component]: Feature: conditionally allow non-localhost inbound connections with command-line flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26831: Feature: conditionally allow non-localhost inbound connections with
command-line flag
--+
 Reporter:  dbkaplun  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I am able to run ZNC without torsocks. Here's my attempt to proxy ZNC via
 torsocks:
 {{{
 foo@foo:~$ torsocks -d znc
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: Logging subsytem initialized. Level 5,
 file (null), time 1 (in init_logging() at torsocks.c:303)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: Config file not provided by
 TORSOCKS_CONF_FILE. Using default /etc/tor/torsocks.conf (in
 config_file_read() at config-file.c:543)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: Config file setting tor address to
 127.0.0.1 (in conf_file_set_tor_address() at config-file.c:298)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: Config file setting tor port to 9050 (in
 conf_file_set_tor_port() at config-file.c:254)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: [config] Onion address range set to
 127.42.42.0/24 (in set_onion_info() at config-file.c:108)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: Config file /etc/tor/torsocks.conf opened
 and parsed. (in config_file_read() at config-file.c:572)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: [fclose] Close caught for fd 3 (in
 tsocks_fclose() at fclose.c:45)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: [onion] Pool init with subnet 127.42.42.0
 and mask 24 (in onion_pool_init() at onion.c:104)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: [onion] Pool initialized with base 0,
 max_pos 255 and size 8 (in onion_pool_init() at onion.c:132)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: [fclose] Close caught for fd 5 (in
 tsocks_fclose() at fclose.c:45)
 [ .. ] Checking for list of available modules...
 [ >> ] ok
 [ .. ] Opening config [/home/foo/.znc/configs/znc.conf]...
 [ >> ] ok
 [ .. ] Loading global module [webadmin]...
 [ >> ] [/usr/lib/znc/webadmin.so]
 [ .. ] Binding to port [+21212]...
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: [socket] Creating socket with domain 10,
 type 1 and protocol 6 (in tsocks_socket() at socket.c:33)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: [listen] Non localhost inbound connection
 are not allowed. (in tsocks_listen() at listen.c:64)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: [close] Close caught for fd 6 (in
 tsocks_close() at close.c:33)
 [ !! ] Unable to bind [Operation not permitted]
 [ ** ] Unrecoverable config error.
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: [close] Close caught for fd 5 (in
 tsocks_close() at close.c:33)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: [onion] Destroying onion pool containing
 0 entry (in onion_pool_destroy() at onion.c:148)
 1531790543 DEBUG torsocks[2727]: [fclose] Close caught for fd 2 (in
 tsocks_fclose() at fclose.c:45)
 foo@foo:~$
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26830 [Core Tor/Tor]: SKIP test_keygen.sh on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26830: SKIP test_keygen.sh on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.3-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 035-must,   |  Actual Points:
  regression, fast-fix   |
Parent ID:  #26076   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 Please see my branch bug26830_029, particularly the appveyor CI.
 (I don't have a Windows box to test it on.)

 The Windows uname check is based on:
 https://stackoverflow.com/questions/3466166/how-to-check-if-running-in-
 cygwin-mac-or-linux

 I'm assigning nickm as reviewer, because he's on CI this week.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26076 [Core Tor/Tor]: AppVeyor CI: Tor didn't declare that there would be no encryption FAIL src/test/test_keygen.sh (exit status: 5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26076: AppVeyor CI: Tor didn't declare that there would be no encryption FAIL
src/test/test_keygen.sh (exit status: 5)
-+-
 Reporter:  saper|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.3-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328, 034-deferred-20180602,  |
  035-removed-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.7.3-rc


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26830 [Core Tor/Tor]: SKIP test_keygen.sh on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26830: SKIP test_keygen.sh on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.3-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 035-must,   |  Actual Points:
  regression, fast-fix   |
Parent ID:  #26076   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.7.3-rc


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Re: [tor-bugs] #3723 [Core Tor/Tor]: Report version of bwscanners in votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3723: Report version of bwscanners in votes
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, 035-triaged-in-20180711  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 It looks like the squashed and rebased code is in juga's
 ticket3723_03_squashed_rebased branch.

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[tor-bugs] #26830 [Core Tor/Tor]: SKIP test_keygen.sh on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26830: SKIP test_keygen.sh on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 035-must,
 Severity:  Normal   |  regression, fast-fix
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26076
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We need our CI to be reliable, so we know if recent commits have broken
 the build.

 So until we fix the root cause in #26076, let's SKIP test_keygen.sh on
 Windows.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18642 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18642: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, oom, tor-relay, dns, 035|  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:23 dgoulet]:
 > Replying to [comment:22 neel]:
 > > If I have to make something, I am thinking about something like:
 `OOMHandlerClearOnlyDNS (0/1)` where 0 is the default (run all OOM checks)
 and 1 is to only run OOM on DNS (if you're an exit).
 >
 > Wait no, no need for that at all. What I was saying is that we should
 only run that OOM handler in the case tor is running as an Exit and one
 way to look at that is with `ExitRelay 1` global option ;).

 That's not how ExitRelay works:

 ExitRelay 0|1|auto

 Tells Tor whether to run as an exit relay. If Tor is running as a non-
 bridge server, and ExitRelay is set to 1, then Tor allows traffic to exit
 according to the ExitPolicy option (or the default ExitPolicy if none is
 specified).

 If ExitRelay is set to 0, no traffic is allowed to exit, and the
 ExitPolicy option is ignored.

 If ExitRelay is set to "auto", then Tor behaves as if it were set to
 1, but warns the user if this would cause traffic to exit. In a future
 version, the default value will be 0. (Default: auto)

 https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en

 Instead, try something like:
 {{{
 smartlist_t *exit_policy = router_get_my_routerinfo()->exit_policy;
 if (!policy_is_reject_star(exit_policy, AF_INET) ||
 !policy_is_reject_star(exit_policy, AF_INET6)) {
   /* Run the OOM handler on DNS */
 }
 }}}

 But that won't handle OOM when the operator has turned exiting off, but
 used to have it on. So instead, maybe we should:
 * always run the OOM handler on DNS
 * check the approximate size of the DNS cache before running the OOM
 handler on it, or
 * set a flag when we run the OOM handler and we're not an exit, then clear
 the flag when we become an exit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26828 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: Please create email alias for Sarah, new Fundraising Director

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26828: Please create email alias for Sarah, new Fundraising Director
-+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   | Resolution:
 Severity:  Normal   |  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 It is done!

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[tor-bugs] #26829 [Core Tor/Tor]: torspec: bandwidth file generators should write the file atomically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26829: torspec: bandwidth file generators should write the file atomically
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-dirauth, metrics, tor-bwauth,
 Severity:  Normal   |  torspec
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26797
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Generators should either:
 * write the file to a temporary location, then rename it to the final
 path, or
 * write the file to an archival location, then symlink it to the final
 path

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[tor-bugs] #26828 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: Please create email alias for Sarah, new Fundraising Director

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26828: Please create email alias for Sarah, new Fundraising Director
-+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services   |Version:
  Admin Team |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512



 Please create an email alias (no LDAP) for Sarah Stevenson, our new
 Fundraising Director.

 Name: Sarah Stevenson
 Desired username: sstevenson
 Forwarding email: sarah.e.steven...@gmail.com
 PGP key fingerprint: 93B3 AC08 4257 FA3D D4BB  8E95 CC08 5DBA C015 612A

 Thank you!

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEENecqn2ZVRfkstmYkugyUAPgPkc4FAltNLuQACgkQugyUAPgP
 kc631g//RLju7DgSPb/ma1Jl1gBjkOqACCTv5m4Gdu3S8Ka3BKtZLDEdU8yOrYRJ
 GMb4iE5QrTKlmyaPQWOnbEdgUn87rw56A+oLHLL4u8SaU7RCNOXxUPwI015McR7a
 TiccTPxqkDAiaXlPvNRoHdGc/AVAoh93VpWdnzLpakoGgjVi1B+fshZkht9kephA
 o/atEQpO3HAE3mFUCuMPeqsOIkMK9snDpH88vBaj7F4JwiLf8Sbegk/61zeM8y8n
 jmBKs5P68cdeVdmjMS7WE9dwYrNaWjczg7NbTEzxqGAxnkHtN5Kn0DypzRq6gYUE
 CMpY/evXTCtwooWXPvGWO7iszUWWV35AhhD0E2vHxXl6h0QUI/Y27LZCCxfa/d5P
 MbPS1+7tip4UDbYbKFTgFljrAxmsaUWQgtPZVTWtvxotK/+JaOLphxEHGfcqyvzm
 4ptReg7q3fmoUkn2uW7uobAr3v37KbcyZh0FetSQvu0aFGw049u5IpA0Ps/I3meW
 BunNWalMT5ShFqrohKISGE7+HF+d6dVesv6a9bpD6wmsBG7Um7JRsOo2krpKtfTA
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 eC/QtU/WCABlYSDQX6HsPpCYzkdhTPNDVpE5DKK1+Cr9ZVWuVLA=
 =NboC
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #26827 [Core Tor/Tor]: torspec: DirAuths should only read the V3BandwidthsFile once per vote

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26827: torspec: DirAuths should only read the V3BandwidthsFile once per vote
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-dirauth, metrics, tor-bwauth,
 Severity:  Normal   |  torspec
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26797
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Once #26797 is implemented, we should document it in the spec.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23082 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_addr_parse is overly permissive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23082: tor_addr_parse is overly permissive
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-unreached, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel@… (removed)
 * owner:  neel => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23082 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_addr_parse is overly permissive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23082: tor_addr_parse is overly permissive
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-unreached, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23082 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_addr_parse is overly permissive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23082: tor_addr_parse is overly permissive
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-unreached, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26401 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Orfox patches onto Tor Browser 8.0 for TBA

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26401: Rebase Orfox patches onto Tor Browser 8.0 for TBA
---+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201807R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26531 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:8 igt0]:
 > ''21f0480aff98 Bug 25741 - TBA: Only include Firefox Account permissions
 if we want them''
 > **LGTM**
 >

 After the next round of reviews, I'll fixup this commit so it includes:
 {{{
 diff --git a/mobile/android/base/FennecManifest_permissions.xml.in
 b/mobile/android/base/FennecManifest_permissions.xml.in
 index 590429845085..1b7b2d5475ec 100644
 --- a/mobile/android/base/FennecManifest_permissions.xml.in
 +++ b/mobile/android/base/FennecManifest_permissions.xml.in
 @@ -30,7 +30,9 @@
  
  
  
 +#ifdef MOZ_ANDROID_LOCATION
  
 +#endif

  
  
 }}}

 (based on the comment I made at the bottom of ticket:24796#comment:10)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24805 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist in late 2018

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24805: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist in late 2018
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 034-triage-20180328,   |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328, 035-removed-20180711,|
  035-roadmap|
Parent ID:  #24786   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 fallback, 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328,
 035-removed-20180711
 =>
 fallback, 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328,
 035-removed-20180711, 035-roadmap


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:36 nickm]:
 > These tickets are being triaged out of 0.3.5.  The ones marked "035
 -roadmap-proposed" may return.

 Oops, this is on the 0.3.5 roadmap, if:
 * we reach the 30% changed/new relays threshold, so the list can help with
 censorship
 * we reach the 25% down relays threshold in consensus health

 Here's how we're progressing:

 The branch now has ~35 new and ~2 changed IPv4 addresses.

 Our target is >30% of the final count having new or changed IPv4
 addresses, we currently have a best case scenario of:
 (2 + 35)/(150 + 35) = 20%.

 If we have 185 fallbacks, we can also increase the limit per operator to
 185 x 5% = 9 relays.
 That should gain us 10 more relays from existing large operators, which
 gives us 24% new or changed IPv4 addresses.

 20/150 = 13% of fallbacks are down.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24796 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review all requested and required Android permissions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24796: Review all requested and required Android permissions
--+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26531| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:9 sysrqb]:
 > I'm not sure what Fennec does when it receives the BOOT_COMPLETED
 intent.
 #26825
 > I'm also not sure how it uses SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW.
 #26826

 > I'll move READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS under the MOZ_ANDROID_LOCATION ifdef
 guard for Fennec - including this permission likely breaks state
 separation.

 We should include this as a FIXUP into the commit:
 {{{
 commit 85e08083165e95299b9ea4e96dd6d47bcd7dd1ee
 Author: Matthew Finkel 
 Date:   Mon Apr 16 04:22:51 2018 +

 Bug 25741 - TBA: Only include Firefox Account permissions if we want
 them
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26825 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Does the app need RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED intent?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26825: TBA - Does the app need RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED intent?
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24796| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * priority:  Medium => High


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[tor-bugs] #26826 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Does the app need the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26826: TBA - Does the app need the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission?
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #24796
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I don't know. We should decide.

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[tor-bugs] #26825 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Does the app need RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED intent?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26825: TBA - Does the app need RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED intent?
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #24796
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I don't know. We should decide.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24796 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review all requested and required Android permissions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24796: Review all requested and required Android permissions
--+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26531| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I commented-out some of the permissions.

 Branch 26401_1+24796 (based on the last branch for #26401)

 {{{
 $ grep -n -e feature -e permission obj-arm-linux-
 
androideabi/gradle/build/mobile/android/app/intermediates/manifests/full/officialWithoutGeckoBinariesNoMinApiPhoton/debug/AndroidManifest.xml
 3:  
 4:  
 5:  
 6:  
 7:  
 8:  
 9:  
 10:  
 11:  
 12:  
 13:  
 14:  
 15:  
 }}}

 Permissions shown by Android:
 {{{
 Storage:
 read the contents of your USB storage
 modify or delete the contents of your USB storage

 Other:
 view network connections
 have full network access
 run at startup
 install shortcuts
 uninstall shortcuts
 prevent phone from sleeping
 control vibration
 }}}

 Remaining permissions we should consider excluding:
 {{{
 android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
 android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
 }}}

 And, I think, if we do not include the updater then we can likely exclude:
 {{{
 android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
 android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
 }}}

 I'm not sure what Fennec does when it receives the BOOT_COMPLETED intent.
 I'm also not sure how it uses SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW.

 I'll move READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS under the MOZ_ANDROID_LOCATION ifdef
 guard for Fennec - including this permission likely breaks state
 separation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23082 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_addr_parse is overly permissive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23082: tor_addr_parse is overly permissive
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-unreached, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => neel


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26647 [Core Tor/Tor]: defect: Spec for net/listeners/* doesn't covers HTTPTunnelPort directive or ExtORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26647: defect: Spec for net/listeners/* doesn't covers HTTPTunnelPort 
directive or
ExtORPort
-+-
 Reporter:  pyhedgehog   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, controller, easy, intro,   |  Actual Points:
  fast-fix, 032-backport, 033-backport,  |
  034-backport, 035-triaged-in-20180711  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:8 pyhedgehog]:
 > Should also find it's way to docs and [https://stem.torproject.org/
 stem].

 ticket26647 patches control-spec.txt, which is the documentation for the
 Tor control protocol. Stem usually follows torspec updates pretty closely.

 Here's my review:

 tor/ticket26647 is a nice simple change that seems fine. Let's merge it.

 torspec/ticket26647 needs revision, because we did some tor releases since
 the patch. Then we can merge it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26787 [Core Tor/Tor]: Core file left on travis hardened rust builld

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26787: Core file left on travis hardened rust builld
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  travis, 035-must, regression, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  build, 029-backport, 032-backport, |
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => merge_ready
 * keywords:  travis, 035-must, regression, tor-build =>
 travis, 035-must, regression, tor-build, 029-backport, 032-backport,
 033-backport, 034-backport


Comment:

 The patch is simple enough, and it passes all our CI (except for a Windows
 failure due to #26076).

 Let's merge it as a precaution, and watch travis for a few days?

 I have marked it for backport back to 0.2.9, because we backported
 distcheck CI back to 0.2.9.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24698 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser keeps hanging and freezing, plus it takes a very long time to load after hibernation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24698: Torbrowser keeps hanging and freezing, plus it takes a very long time to
load after hibernation
--+---
 Reporter:  justmeee  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by white_supremacy_pedo):

 >Additionally, when it does work it takes a very long time to load from
 hibernation to get to a point where the tabs function properly, sometimes
 as much as 20 minutes (with approx 15 open tabs, and that's really not
 many).

 That's a firefox bug, happened to me on firefox (non-tbb)

 >I will often have several tabs open and need to hibernate the computer to
 finish later. These problems typically occur after returning from
 hibernating. This keeps costing me hours of lost work.

 How does it cost hours of work? You can set TBB to restore tabs after
 crash or restart

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24796 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review all requested and required Android permissions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24796: Review all requested and required Android permissions
--+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26531| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 The permissions requested by Fennec (base) are reasonably reduced, but
 GeckoView still requests many permissions we do not want. Currently
 GeckoView's manifest
 (`mobile/android/geckoview/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml`) is not
 preprocessed, so we'll need to comment-out most of the same permissions as
 we ifdef-out in Fennec's permissions.

 {{{
 $ grep -n -e feature -e permission obj-arm-linux-
 
androideabi/gradle/build/mobile/android/app/intermediates/manifests/full/officialWithoutGeckoBinariesNoMinApiPhoton/debug/AndroidManifest.xml
 3:  
 4:  
 5:  
 6:  
 7:  
 8:  
 9:  
 10:  
 11:  
 12:  
 13:  
 14:  
 15:  
 16:  
 17:  
 18:  
 19:  
 20:  
 21:  
 22:  
 23:  
 24:  
 25:  
 26:  
 27:  
 28:  
 }}}


 All Permissions for Tor Browser for Android - as described by Android:
 {{{
 Camera:
 take pictures and videos

 Location:
 access approximate location (network-basesd)
 access precise location (GPS and network-based)

 Microphone:
 record audio

 Storage:
 read the contents of your USB storage
 modify or delete the contents of your USB storage


 Other:
 view network connections
 have full network access
 run at startup
 install shortcuts
 uninstall shortcuts
 prevent phone from sleeping
 control vibration
 connect and disconnect from Wi-Fi
 view Wi-Fi connections
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #26824 [Webpages/Website]: Please remove/deactivate Fundraising Director job posting on website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26824: Please remove/deactivate Fundraising Director job posting on website
--+
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512


 Hello. Please remove/deactivate the Fundraising Director job posting on
 our website. (Announcement coming soon.) Thank you!

 https://www.torproject.org/about/jobs-fundraising-director.html.en

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEENecqn2ZVRfkstmYkugyUAPgPkc4FAltNGMYACgkQugyUAPgP
 kc4H8A/6A4MWOtfLLbqjei2rIv/HZ9UOmYkXqCCBOneUFkvMLarC0eOwpLgda6om
 R5+58BuXk290SkBo74XRAXQvtYQqg/0i/ANvtw0aZIBhYh9aHyuRtqnrgLEHqNrx
 zCpY2x5uhObo6dxjL8F+kVfmmA/sCv82/LIzeFB5bklJsW47wFf0Pbsdzkgv1lAE
 6ZsSfyPlXSW+c5JydSXjuoteKfDdKt1ttDKsBTBSFY1v0+fv+teKzWM6py6TIjE5
 U7zZWRNuM2PZf1q1Tqr9B0H9hAUyZ+a7tHoGapwKaWV/qn4VGyhQWp47iEjYnULD
 e4Ydfcd4USg3gk71u99lKlNjbzdPsCEAr08Xknt7FRxf4WWAF6JR0UXMfSuH6yAh
 18ExbeSCEhqKiqkiN4++npv8jpeVLDfBSHL/vZcRWQd+EnT7Lq27LLWUbV2o0V39
 SEztUUBqX2cxqaBFuorG0t3dfD7tlod5TW8e92GFyab6gQX3SWSbe6sh+/5qevDv
 E2nqW/hXdDxcix9K5cj8qysFihyb6bahxFXLtX40jZ17JnIYYcfXmv/jS3JT2dZK
 47n9/jjXBgg19vdx+SkPpAmR4LdDVs6cl6p/mtpBq4yDP7+Ij97OTXW1uFigh+77
 4GBJRwsh58yqNdULyPgr9tnK0han/fPkYlrSlhrPgG8t2MKOGmI=
 =5xcC
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26823 [Core Tor/Tor]: TOR doesn't work at all on slow connections. TOR is fully broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26823: TOR doesn't work at all on slow connections. TOR is fully broken
-+-
 Reporter:  white_supremacy_pedo |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  slow connection, pedo, cp, tor,  |  Actual Points:
  broken |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  pastly   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR
-+-

Comment (by white_supremacy_pedo):

 When the bug happens TOR log is spammed with lines like this:
 [NOTICE] Rend stream is 120 seconds late. Giving up on address
 '[scrubbed].onion'.
 [NOTICE] Tried for 120 seconds to get a connection to [scrubbed]:80.
 Giving up.
 [NOTICE] Tried for 120 seconds to get a connection to [scrubbed]:443.
 Giving up. (waiting for circuit)
 [NOTICE] Tried for 120 seconds to get a connection to [scrubbed]:80.
 Giving up. (waiting for circuit)

 occasionally I get other lines like (not in order, just examples):
 [NOTICE] Have tried resolving or connecting to address '[scrubbed]' at 3
 different places. Giving up.
 [NOTICE] We tried for XX seconds to connect to '[scrubbed]' using exit XXX
 at XXX. Retrying on a new circuit.
 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit.
 [NOTICE] Our IP address has changed.  Rotating keys...
 [NOTICE] No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for circuit XXX (a
 Measuring circuit timeout 3-hop circuit in state doing handshakes with
 channel state open) to ms. However, it appears the circuit has timed
 out anyway.
 [NOTICE] Tor has not observed any network activity for the past XX
 seconds. Disabling circuit build timeout recording.
 [NOTICE] Your Guard XXX is failing more circuits than usual. Most likely
 this means the Tor network is overloaded. Success counts are XXX/XXX. Use
 counts are XX/XX. XXX circuits completed, XX were unusable, XX collapsed,
 and XX timed out. For reference, your timeout cutoff is XX seconds.
 [NOTICE] Your Guard XXX is failing to carry more streams on its circuits
 than usual. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded or your
 network connection is poor. Use counts are XX/XX. Success counts are
 XXX/XXX. XXX circuits completed, XX were unusable, XX collapsed, and XX
 timed out. For reference, your timeout cutoff is XX seconds.

 XXX - removed

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[tor-bugs] #26823 [Core Tor/Tor]: TOR doesn't work at all on slow connections. TOR is fully broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26823: TOR doesn't work at all on slow connections. TOR is fully broken
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:  (none)
  white_supremacy_pedo   |
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker  |   Keywords:  slow connection, pedo,
 |  cp, tor, broken
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:  pastly
  Sponsor:  SponsorR |
-+-
 tor stops working on slow connections for no reasons. it is unusable at
 all in countries with slow connections.

 how to get this bug:
 1. connect to internet using slow connection ( <150kbit/s, 200ms+ latency)
 2. start torbrowser. it connects fast, no problems.
 3. start browsing cp websites or dark markets. everything works.
 4. now go to kitchen, cook and eat some food, leave PC running.
 5. after 10-50 minutes, go back to your PC.
 6. click something on TorBrowser, a link. DOESN'T WORK. when I click link
 there is zero network activity, so Tor doesn't even try to request it
 but when I look tor.exe actually is connected to tor entry node with
 status Established. but nothing is sent or received when you click in
 TorBrowser (or if you try to use 127.0.0.1:9150 with other application, so
 it's not a TorBrowser bug).
 7. while Tor doesn't work at all, clearnet works perfectly with low
 latency.
 8. now I kill tor.exe external TCP connections (read again. I am not
 killing process, just it's external connections).
 9. tor.exe instantly reconnects to those TCP connections. But when I click
 something in TorBrowser there is zero network activity.
 10. I repeat step 9 again. tor.exe reconnects again (but to different
 entry node?) and it INSTANTLY works again. I can click links on TorBrowser
 and they load.
 11. After some minutes pass, go back to step 5.

 In steps 8-10, instead of killing TOR tcp connections you can also kill
 tor.exe to start working again. TorBrowser will restart it and it will
 work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26811 [Core Tor/Stem]: tox fails with pip 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26811: tox fails with pip 10
---+
 Reporter:  dmr|  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  dev testing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by dmr):

 Replying to [comment:2 dmr]:
 > I'm not convinced that the `pip install -e .` line needs to be in the
 `tox.ini` config //at all//, as I'm pretty sure `tox` will install things
 just fine without it, but I didn't have the time to explore that route
 further at the present.
 >
 > So I think the best option moving forward in the interim is to take the
 patch, and file another ticket to look further into it at a later point.
 (But let me know your thoughts!)

 Filed as #26822

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26822 [Core Tor/Stem]: Investigate relying on tox's default install capabilities instead of an explicit command

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26822: Investigate relying on tox's default install capabilities instead of an
explicit command
--+
 Reporter:  dmr   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  testing code-improvement  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dmr):

 For reference, #14091 is what originally added `tox` support. I glanced at
 it - it didn't seem to provide much clue about the line.

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[tor-bugs] #26822 [Core Tor/Stem]: Investigate relying on tox's default install capabilities instead of an explicit command

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26822: Investigate relying on tox's default install capabilities instead of an
explicit command
---+--
 Reporter:  dmr|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  testing code-improvement
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 From [ticket:26811#comment:2]:
 > I'm not convinced that the `pip install -e .` line needs to be in the
 `tox.ini` config //at all//, as I'm pretty sure `tox` will install things
 just fine without it, but I didn't have the time to explore that route
 further at the present.
 >
 > So I think the best option moving forward in the interim is to take the
 patch, and file another ticket to look further into it at a later point.
 (But let me know your thoughts!)

 This ticket is //that// ticket. **Its purpose:** investigate removing the
 `pip install -e .` line from the config (or note why it might be
 necessary).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18642 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18642: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, oom, tor-relay, dns, 035|  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18642 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18642: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, oom, tor-relay, dns, 035|  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 My new PR is here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/235

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26811 [Core Tor/Stem]: tox fails with pip 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26811: tox fails with pip 10
---+
 Reporter:  dmr|  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  dev testing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks Dave, sounds good. Patch pushed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26401 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Orfox patches onto Tor Browser 8.0 for TBA

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26401: Rebase Orfox patches onto Tor Browser 8.0 for TBA
---+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201807R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26531 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Sorry, I forgot to update this ticket. I have another branch ready for
 review. Some of the above comments are different from the changes I made.

 Branch tor-browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1+26401_1

 > ad48b4d56152 Bug 25741 - TBA: Disable media autoplay by default
 > The pref media.autoplay.enabled is already false in the 000-tor-browser-
 android.js. Should we change it here as well?

 I reverted this change. The pref is enough.

 > 035fbfb88a3c Bug 25741 - TBA: Disable all data reporting by default
 > Can we change toolkit.telemetry.enabled preference to false?

 I reverted the default checkbox change.

 > db3c54ef05e7 Orfox: NetCipher enabled, checks if orbot is installed
 > Is import android.os.Looper needed?

 I moved this `import` into the correct commit. It was included in the
 wrong one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26772 [Core Tor/Tor]: [warn] Introduction circuit established without a rend_intro_point_t object

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26772: [warn] Introduction circuit established without a rend_intro_point_t 
object
--+--
 Reporter:  cstest|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26821 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: [torsocks] configure script from the tarball breaks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26821: [torsocks]  configure script from the tarball breaks
---+-
 Reporter:  yurivict271|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by yurivict271):

 You have something installed that it needs that it isn't supposed to need.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26821 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: [torsocks] configure script from the tarball breaks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26821: [torsocks]  configure script from the tarball breaks
---+-
 Reporter:  yurivict271|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Right ... yeah very weird. I'm not getting that on Linux so like if the
 make dist is failing on FreeBSD.

 What if you go from the torsocks git, then `make dist`, is that tarball
 usable?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26821 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: [torsocks] configure script from the tarball breaks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26821: [torsocks]  configure script from the tarball breaks
---+-
 Reporter:  yurivict271|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by yurivict271):

 With {{{configure}}} one isn't supposed to run {{{autogen.sh}}}.
 {{{autoreconf}}} runs {{{autogen.sh}}}.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26821 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: [torsocks] configure script from the tarball breaks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26821: [torsocks]  configure script from the tarball breaks
---+-
 Reporter:  yurivict271|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 You ran `autogen.sh` ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18642 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18642: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, oom, tor-relay, dns, 035|  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 OK thanks for the clarification.

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[tor-bugs] #26821 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: [torsocks] configure script from the tarball breaks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26821: [torsocks]  configure script from the tarball breaks
---+-
 Reporter:  yurivict271|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 Tarball:
 https://people.torproject.org/~dgoulet/torsocks/torsocks-2.2.0.tar.xz

 Build breaks in the FreeBSD port after the configure script run:
 {{{
 config.status: executing libtool commands
 ===>  Building for torsocks-2.2.0_1
 gmake[2]: Entering directory '/usr/ports/net/torsocks/work/torsocks-2.2.0'
 CDPATH="${ZSH_VERSION+.}:" && cd . && /bin/sh
 /usr/ports/net/torsocks/work/torsocks-2.2.0/config/missing aclocal-1.15 -I
 config
 /usr/ports/net/torsocks/work/torsocks-2.2.0/config/missing: aclocal-1.15:
 not found
 WARNING: 'aclocal-1.15' is missing on your system.
  You should only need it if you modified 'acinclude.m4' or
  'configure.ac' or m4 files included by 'configure.ac'.
  The 'aclocal' program is part of the GNU Automake package:
  
  It also requires GNU Autoconf, GNU m4 and Perl in order to run:
  
  
  
 gmake[2]: *** [Makefile:411: aclocal.m4] Error 127
 }}}

 Autoreconf though generates the non-breaking configure script.
 Something is wrong with this configure, or something is missing, not sure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18642 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18642: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, oom, tor-relay, dns, 035|  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:22 neel]:
 > If I have to make something, I am thinking about something like:
 `OOMHandlerClearOnlyDNS (0/1)` where 0 is the default (run all OOM checks)
 and 1 is to only run OOM on DNS (if you're an exit).

 Wait no, no need for that at all. What I was saying is that we should only
 run that OOM handler in the case tor is running as an Exit and one way to
 look at that is with `ExitRelay 1` global option ;).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18642 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18642: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, oom, tor-relay, dns, 035|  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 Thank you so much for your feedback.

 My question is, what is that argument going to be called? If there is no
 name yet, should I create it?

 If I have to make something, I am thinking about something like:
 `OOMHandlerClearOnlyDNS (0/1)` where 0 is the default (run all OOM checks)
 and 1 is to only run OOM on DNS (if you're an exit).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18598 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure speech recognition is disabled by default (WebSpeech API)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18598: Make sure speech recognition is disabled by default (WebSpeech API)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201807R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting => tbb-fingerprinting,
   TorBrowserTeam201807R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26197 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Sync git.torproject.org/stem.git to github.com/torproject/stem.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26197: Sync git.torproject.org/stem.git to github.com/torproject/stem.git
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dmr):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * cc: dmr, atagar, isabela (added)
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 After chatting with atagar to confirm, this effort is done as far as I'm
 aware!
 `torproject-pusher` is automatically sync'ing stem git.tpo -> GitHub, as
 well as auto-closing PRs / marking them as merged.

 If something's not done/ready here, please feel free to re-open.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26034 [Core Tor/Tor]: LibreSSL 2.7.x supports some OpenSSL 1.1 APIs?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26034: LibreSSL 2.7.x supports some OpenSSL 1.1 APIs?
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-removed-20180711  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by toralf):

 with LibreSSL 2.6.5 at a hardened Gentroo I do get with current git tree:
 {{{
 orproject@mr-fox ~/tor $ git describe
 tor-0.3.5.0-alpha-dev-621-g5aaea38d8
 torproject@mr-fox ~/tor $
 torproject@mr-fox ~/tor $ make
 make  all-am
 make[1]: Entering directory '/home/torproject/tor'
   CC   src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_hkdf.o
 afl-cc 2.52b by 
 src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_hkdf.c:24:10: fatal error: openssl/kdf.h: No such
 file or directory
  #include 
   ^~~
 compilation terminated.
 make[1]: *** [Makefile:8150: src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_hkdf.o] Error 1
 make[1]: Leaving directory '/home/torproject/tor'
 make: *** [Makefile:4554: all] Error 2

 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24985 [Core Tor/Tor]: Preserve circuit-layer confidentiality against a quantum-capable adversary

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24985: Preserve circuit-layer confidentiality against a quantum-capable 
adversary
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  post-quantum, cryptography, tor- |  Actual Points:
  circuit, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  9001
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3
-+-
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24986 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement prop#249 "Large Create Cells"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24986: Implement prop#249 "Large Create Cells"
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-cell, tor-circuit, trunnel, 034  |  Actual Points:
  -roadmap-master, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328, 035-roadmap-master, |
  035-triaged-in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #24985   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3
-+-
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25651 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle incoming extend2/extended2 fragmented requests/replies. (prop249)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25651: Handle incoming extend2/extended2 fragmented requests/replies. (prop249)
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-cell, tor-circuit, trunnel, 034  |  Actual Points:
  -roadmap-subtask, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-included-20180328, 035-roadmap-subtask,|
  035-triaged-in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #24986   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorM-can
-+-
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26476 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser candidates for 8.0a9 on Windows don't start anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26476: Tor Browser candidates for 8.0a9 on Windows don't start anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201806,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201806, tbb-rbm |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 This is the ulimit problem I am grappling with:

 In the build log:

 > 22:54.42
 
/var/tmp/dist/mingw-w64/lib/gcc/x86_64-w64-mingw32/6.4.0/../../../../x86_64-w64-mingw32/bin/ld:
 cannot find
 /var/tmp/dist/mingw-w64/lib/gcc/x86_64-w64-mingw32/6.4.0/crtend.o: Too
 many open files

 In the container:

 > debug-firefox$ ulimit -n
 > 1024

 Outside the container:

 > cat /etc/security/limits.conf
 >
 > tom   hardnofile  65535
 > tom   softnofile  65535
 > root  hardnofile  65535
 > root  softnofile  65535

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18642 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18642: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, oom, tor-relay, dns, 035|  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 One comment to validate which could be an issue.

 Also, there is a potential argument to only run that OOM handler if you
 are an Exit like `options->ExitRelay`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20700 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement standard client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20700: prop224: Implement standard client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, 035-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  master, 035-triaged-in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #25955   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:33 nickm]:
 > Notes:
 >   * Apparently we have two things called Appendix E in `rend-
 spec-v3.txt` now.  I don't think this is new with this patch, but let's
 fix that.
 >   * When you list "./authorized_clients/alice", etc in appendix F, do
 you intend to specify that this list has to be inside the service
 directory?  I ask because if you're doing this, I don't think it makes
 sense to list them all separately in the torrc, and list the directory
 separately as well.
 >   * Do we want to allow multiple keys per file?
 >   * I'd suggest renaming all the client options so that they don't start
 with "HiddenService": It makes things much easier if only our service-side
 options start with "HiddenService".  How about ClientOnionAuth or
 something?
 >   * We should say what happens if Tor encounters an unrecognized auth-
 type, user name, or onion service name in one of these files.  I say it
 should ignore that key.

 Thanks for the review. Pushed relevant fixes on my github repo, same
 branch name.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26814 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor won't start on windows 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26814: tor won't start on windows 10
--+---
 Reporter:  Grabler   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 I am not familiar with this specific problem, but you can find some
 potentially helpful advice here:
  https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/questions/1140218
 (since Tor Browser is based on Firefox, the advice there should be
 applicable).

 Some things to try:
 * Completely remove Tor Browser and install a new copy. Maybe you already
 did that if you reinstalled Windows 10 though.
 * Double check that your anti-malware/anti-virus software is not
 interfering with Tor Browser. You may need to completely uninstall that
 kind of software and then reboot Windows to be sure it is not interfering.
 * Install a copy of Firefox ESR 52.9.0 and see if you encounter the same
 problem.
 * Try starting Tor Browser as Administrator (this is not recommended as a
 long term solution though).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26800 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Set up email forwarding for kushal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26800: Set up email forwarding for kushal
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 It is done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26703 [Core Tor/Tor]: Lower log level of "Scheduler type KIST has been enabled"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26703: Lower log level of "Scheduler type KIST has been enabled"
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy, kist, tor-scheduler, 035   |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Trivial fix. I'm good with log_info for now and we can work out later to
 have it in a status line.

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26807 [Obfuscation/Censorship analysis]: Venezuela blocks access to the Tor network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26807: Venezuela blocks access to the Tor network
-+-
 Reporter:  ptdetector   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ptdetector):

 https://ve.linkedin.com/in/nicola-cardillo-1979731b/en
 > Nicola Cardillo - Network Operations Center Manager - CANTV

 https://ve.linkedin.com/in/luis-monsanto-880a944
 > Luis Monsanto - Regulatory Affairs Advisor - CANTV

 32 000 enchufados

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[tor-bugs] #26820 [Core Tor/Tor]: Server-side support for non-obsolete TLS handshakes via NSS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26820: Server-side support for non-obsolete TLS handshakes via NSS
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  035-roadmap-subticket, 035-triaged-
 Severity:  Normal   |  in-20180711
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26631
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8-can   |
-+-


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[tor-bugs] #26819 [Core Tor/Tor]: Minimal client-side support for TLS via NSS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26819: Minimal client-side support for TLS via NSS
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  035-roadmap-subticket, 035-triaged-
 Severity:  Normal   |  in-20180711
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26631
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8-can   |
-+-
 When porting libtor-tls to NSS, we'll start with client-side support for
 our TLS features.  This will only have to include originating connections,
 and only with the most recent link handshake.  It won't need any key
 export support at all.

 At this point, we can have "--enable-nss" imply "--disable-openssl", and
 also have it imply that ORPort cannot be set (since you can't be a Tor
 server with this minimal TLS support.)

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[tor-bugs] #26818 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use NSS for RSA

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26818: Use NSS for RSA
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  035-roadmap-subticket, 035-triaged-
 Severity:  Normal   |  in-20180711
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26631
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8-can   |
-+-
 RSA will be the last major cryptographic algorithm for us to use NSS for.
 As with DH, we'll need a way to convert to and from OpenSSL's RSA keys,
 until we have our TLS layer converted.

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[tor-bugs] #26817 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use NSS for DH

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26817: Use NSS for DH
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  035-roadmap-subticket, 035-triaged-
 Severity:  Normal   |  in-20180711
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26631
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8-can   |
-+-
 Diffie-Hellman will be nice intermediate step on the way to getting NSS
 support.  We'll need a way to convert to OpenSSL DH params for now,
 though, so we can have our TLS layer still work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26815 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use NSS for our symmetric crypto, digests, and PRNG.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26815: Use NSS for our symmetric crypto, digests, and PRNG.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-subticket, 035-triaged-  |  Actual Points:
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #26631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * cc: ahf, catalyst (added)


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/234 is the PR here, and it also
 includes #26816.  The branch name is `nss_symmetric`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26815 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use NSS for our symmetric crypto, digests, and PRNG.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26815: Use NSS for our symmetric crypto, digests, and PRNG.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-subticket, 035-triaged-  |  Actual Points:
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #26631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26811 [Core Tor/Stem]: tox fails with pip 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26811: tox fails with pip 10
---+--
 Reporter:  dmr|  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dev testing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => atagar


Comment:

 Setting to `needs_review`, but if you want to push it back to me for more
 investigation, let me know. I would think the patch can't be harmful to
 include, though - at least to get pip10 environments working.

 I'm not convinced that the `pip install -e .` line needs to be in the
 `tox.ini` config //at all//, as I'm pretty sure `tox` will install things
 just fine without it, but I didn't have the time to explore that route
 further at the present.

 So I think the best option moving forward in the interim is to take the
 patch, and file another ticket to look further into it at a later point.
 (But let me know your thoughts!)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26811 [Core Tor/Stem]: tox fails with pip 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26811: tox fails with pip 10
---+--
 Reporter:  dmr|  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dev testing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by dmr):

 Here's a patch to remove `--allow-all-external`. `tox` now runs again:
 [[https://github.com/torproject/stem/pull/6|Pull request]] (branch head
 `8eed973786a81b103f03398d92af51aafb69807c`)

 However, this patch now produces unexpected output for `py27`:
 {{{
 Installing collected packages: stem
   Found existing installation: stem 1.6.0.dev0
 Not uninstalling stem at path/to/gitroot, outside environment
 path/to/gitroot/.tox/py27
 Can't uninstall 'stem'. No files were found to uninstall.
   Running setup.py develop for stem
 Successfully installed stem
 }}}
 In contrast to fine output in `py35`:
 {{{
 Installing collected packages: stem
   Found existing installation: stem 1.6.0.dev0
 Uninstalling stem-1.6.0.dev0:
   Successfully uninstalled stem-1.6.0.dev0
   Running setup.py develop for stem
 Successfully installed stem
 }}}
 I'm not sure why there's a difference between python2 and python3.
 The tests all appear to work fine.

 I've ran this patch locally for a few weeks to check further whether this
 has any effect on updating the stem installation. As far as I can tell,
 there's no negative effect - changing the test code results in different
 tests (as expected) and changing the implementation results in different
 test results (as expected).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26816 [Core Tor/Tor]: Link NSS into Tor, while still using OpenSSL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26816: Link NSS into Tor, while still using OpenSSL
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-subticket, 035-triaged-  |  Actual Points:
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #26631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See #26815 for POC branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18598 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure speech recognition is disabled by default (WebSpeech API)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18598: Make sure speech recognition is disabled by default (WebSpeech API)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 (Setting to review to confirm this is a reasonable decision for now.)

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[tor-bugs] #26816 [Core Tor/Tor]: Link NSS into Tor, while still using OpenSSL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26816: Link NSS into Tor, while still using OpenSSL
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  035-roadmap-subticket, 035-triaged-
 Severity:  Normal   |  in-20180711
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26631
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Before we have OpenSSL entirely swappable with NSS, we'll have an
 intermediate stage where both libraries can be linked into Tor, and
 OpenSSL gets used for the parts that aren't ported yet.

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[tor-bugs] #26815 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use NSS for our symmetric crypto, digests, and PRNG.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26815: Use NSS for our symmetric crypto, digests, and PRNG.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  035-roadmap-subticket, 035-triaged-
 Severity:  Normal   |  in-20180711
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26631
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8-can   |
-+-


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26807 [Obfuscation/Censorship analysis]: Venezuela blocks access to the Tor network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26807: Venezuela blocks access to the Tor network
-+-
 Reporter:  ptdetector   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ptdetector):

 > At least last I checked, CANTV was doing their censorship by IP:port
 TCP-level blocking, and no DPI was involved. Unless they changed?

 It's IP:any_port for my tests with inbound connections now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26590 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SVG isn't blocked in Safest security setting with 8.0a9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26590: SVG isn't blocked in Safest security setting with 8.0a9
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-security-slider,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201807R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-security-slider, TorBrowserTeam201807 =>
 ff60-esr, tbb-security-slider, TorBrowserTeam201807R
 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26590 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SVG isn't blocked in Safest security setting with 8.0a9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26590: SVG isn't blocked in Safest security setting with 8.0a9
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-security-slider,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201807   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 I confirmed we need to update the pref name. Here's a patch that does
 that:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/26590

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26807 [Obfuscation/Censorship analysis]: Venezuela blocks access to the Tor network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26807: Venezuela blocks access to the Tor network
-+-
 Reporter:  ptdetector   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:1 ptdetector]:
 > > They're blocking bridges from that site too, so you have to get new
 bridges every 6-12 days.

 I would guess that this part is wrong. Instead, I guess that some of the
 bridges given out on bridges.torproject.org go down or rotate to a new IP
 address, you need to get a fresh set every so often as they rotate. And
 somebody misinterpreted "oh shoot my bridges stopped working" as
 censorship.

 At least last I checked, CANTV was doing their censorship by IP:port TCP-
 level blocking, and no DPI was involved. Unless they changed?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24805 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist in late 2018

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24805: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist in late 2018
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 034-triage-20180328,   |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328, 035-removed-20180711 |
Parent ID:  #24786   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phoul):

 3 more relays added from EmeraldOnion
 https://github.com/Phoul/tor/commit/54cf36400669c555a3af84b167fd79f19b9ebbe3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26574 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Save TBA updates in the internal android storage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26574: Save TBA updates in the internal android storage
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26242| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:1 igt0]:
 > We can not use the internal cache storage, though. It doesn't allow
 medium/big size files. (Normally fennec APK is around 30MB).

 Are the MARs ~30MB, too? I expect the APKs will be 30-40MB, but I wonder
 if the updates are smaller? I'll a little sad if we're forced to download
 a new APK for every update. But, if this is limitation imposed by the
 operating system, then we may need to use that workaround. As long as the
 user consents to downloading the update for TBA begins downloading the new
 APK, I don't believe this violates the private browsing mode requirements.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26807 [Obfuscation/Censorship analysis]: Venezuela blocks access to the Tor network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26807: Venezuela blocks access to the Tor network
-+-
 Reporter:  ptdetector   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ptdetector):

 cantv.com.ve follows the blocklist used against customers as well

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26336 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update tor-browser-settings addon for Fennec 61

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26336: Update tor-browser-settings addon for Fennec 61
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26531| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Yeah. I'm closing this as WONTFIX. Updating this extension for FF60 isn't
 worth our time. We'll concentrate on getting torbutton working on mobile,
 instead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26514 [Applications/Tor Browser]: intermittent updater failures on Win64 (Error 19)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26514: intermittent updater failures on Win64 (Error 19)
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201807  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 So far, after many attempts, we have not reproduced this bug in an
 ESR60-based build. However, since it seems to be timing related, maybe we
 are just getting lucky (that no failures occur).

 Investigating the failures with the ESR52-based Tor Browser, we found that
 it is easy to reproduce in an optimized build. But we found that we cannot
 reproduce the problem after adding some logging to the libmar code.  We
 are now going to be smarter about the logging, e.g., we will not execute
 any additional code (and especially we will not log anything) until after
 an error occurs within libmar's signature verification code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26814 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor won't start on windows 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26814: tor won't start on windows 10
--+--
 Reporter:  Grabler   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  startup   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Core Tor => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17400 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Decide how to use the multi-lingual Tor Browser in the alpha/release series

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17400: Decide how to use the multi-lingual Tor Browser in the alpha/release 
series
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-usability-stoppoint-|  Actual Points:
  wizard, TorBrowserTeam201608   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * cc: antonela (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check if Tor clients sometiems send duplicate cells on rendezvous circuits: Possible replay detected! An INTRODUCE2 cell with thesame ENCRYPTED section was seen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26806: Check if Tor clients sometiems send duplicate cells on rendezvous 
circuits:
Possible replay detected! An INTRODUCE2 cell with thesame ENCRYPTED section
was seen
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: dgoulet (removed)
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Although in this case, tor would be sending twice the same `INTRODUCE1`
 cell... There is a case where a tor client will send twice an INTRO cell
 which is when the initial intro request timed out (due to not receiving
 the intro ACK), then the client will resend an INTRO cell with the same
 rendezvous cookie. However, I believe we have a mechanism that prevents
 tor from picking that intro point again.

 Thus I suspect we aren't flagging the timed out intro point correctly
 client side leading to a possibly double send on the same intro point
 (intro point are picked randomly by the client). I think in theory
 `hs_cache_client_intro_state_note()` is responsible for that and oops! it
 is only used if we get a NACK ... not on circuit timeout! Not looking like
 a regression, more likely we always had that problem.

 Moving this to 035 so we can fix that.

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[tor-bugs] #26814 [Core Tor]: tor won't start on windows 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26814: tor won't start on windows 10
--+-
 Reporter:  Grabler   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  |   Keywords:  startup
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 tor won't run on my windows 10 pc, hp
 I had it running a few weeks ago. I had to reset windows.
 I am trying to install tor now, version 7.5.6
 I use firefox as my regular browser
 I get the error msg:
 "The application was unable to start correctly (0xc022)
 Click OK to close the application"
 I tried rebooting, permissions, nothing works
 I checked the wiki and blog, the issue was not addressed.
 I checked stack exchange, no help.
 I turned off my anti virus, web root, no help
 disabled MS Onedrive startup
 looked at mailing list, no help
 looked at tor bug tracker site
 nothing helps
 any ideas?
 thanks,
 Glenn

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #6946, #18342, #26665, #26810

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #6946, #18342, #26665, #26810 by karsten:


Action: resolve

Comment:
Closing, because Onionoo 6.1-1.15.0 is now released.

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[tor-bugs] #26813 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Modify about:buildconfig to include reproducible build information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26813: Modify about:buildconfig to include reproducible build information
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 While reading the Hacking doc, I saw the following:

 >  Be aware that this process is not fully future-proof. In particular, if
 Debian has updated their development tool chain since the bundles have
 been built, you may encounter differences between your resulting bundles
 and the original binaries. This should be rare, however, as we use only
 the "Long Term Support" or "Oldstable" of Debian in our build VMs. The
 only reason they should change the tool chain is in the event of serious
 security issues in the development tools themselves.

 It seems like it would be advantageous to include a bunch of (additional)
 information in about:buildconfig to allow fully reproducing (or at least
 comparing) builds, such as git tags/commits and information about
 reproducible build environment, such as the versions of packages.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26689 [Core Tor/Tor]: No support for an upstream proxy that uses NTLM authentication

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26689: No support for an upstream proxy that uses NTLM authentication
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26709 [Core Tor/Tor]: Onion V3 addresses not always working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26709: Onion V3 addresses not always working
-+-
 Reporter:  time_attacker|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  onion, tor-hs, 034-backport, |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 032-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  onion, tor-hs => onion, tor-hs, 034-backport, 033-backport,
 032-backport
 * priority:  Medium => Very High
 * severity:  Critical => Major
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 I'm promoting this to 035 milestone and flagging it for backport since if
 we are correct, this is a major reachability issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26709 [Core Tor/Tor]: Onion V3 addresses not always working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26709: Onion V3 addresses not always working
---+---
 Reporter:  time_attacker  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  onion, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by dgoulet):

 So I've been having this issue but rarely. This weekend, it happened to me
 in the morning where one of my service wasn't computing the same hashring
 as the client. No matter how many times I would restart the client, with
 latest consensus, they were always different. So the service was the
 issue.

 Every single parameter on the service side was correct in order to compute
 the right hashring (SRV, time period num from the `ns->valid_after`,
 replica, ...).

 My investigation lead me to `hs_service_descriptor_t->time_period_num`
 value. In theory, every descriptor is _only_ built for a specific time
 period, they don't overlap. When we build a descriptor, we keep the time
 period num it is built for and then we never change it (which in theory
 should be OK). But, descriptor rotation happens at each new SRV which
 happens 12h *before* a new time period.

 Thus, I believe we have an issue where a descriptor can be between two
 time periods leading to something like: Current Desc: `TP - 1`, and Next
 desc.: `TP + 1` or something like that which means there is up to a 12h
 time frame where the current time period num has simply no descriptor for
 it and thus the service is unreachable.

 See `build_descriptors_for_new_service()` ... there is something
 problematic there where we use `now` to check if we are in between `TP`
 and `SRV` and if so, then we get the previous/current time period num but
 this time using the `valid_after` ... these can be offset which can lead
 to missing a time period num for the descriptor we are building.

 I'm running an experiment right now that should confirm the theory. I'll
 have results in hopefully less than 48h.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26585 [Metrics/Onionoo]: improve AS number and name coverage (switch maxmind to RIPE Stat)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26585: improve AS number and name coverage (switch maxmind to RIPE Stat)
-+--
 Reporter:  nusenu   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by irl):

 https://bgpstream.caida.org/docs/api/broker could also provide further
 information.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26647 [Core Tor/Tor]: defect: Spec for net/listeners/* doesn't covers HTTPTunnelPort directive or ExtORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26647: defect: Spec for net/listeners/* doesn't covers HTTPTunnelPort 
directive or
ExtORPort
-+-
 Reporter:  pyhedgehog   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, controller, easy, intro,   |  Actual Points:
  fast-fix, 032-backport, 033-backport,  |
  034-backport, 035-triaged-in-20180711  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pyhedgehog):

 Should also find it's way to docs and [https://stem.torproject.org/ stem].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23345 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Update transports.html in tb-manual.tp.o to include the snowflake PT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23345: Update transports.html in tb-manual.tp.o to include the snowflake PT
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  Jaruga
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  snowflake |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by Jaruga):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 ProTipGuyFWIWWeLoveARMA]:
 Yes, it is already acknowledged and pending merger. Your new issue is a
 duplicate of #23222, there is no need to reopen this.

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