Re: [tor-bugs] #27895 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add push access to alexishan

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27895: Add push access to alexishan
-+--
 Reporter:  legind   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  teor => (none)
 * component:  - Select a component => Internal Services/Service - git


Comment:

 I can't modify git, but one of the git admins should do this task soon.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27905 [Applications/Tor Browser]: many occurrences of "Firefox" in about:preferences

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27905: many occurrences of "Firefox" in about:preferences
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
  ff60-esr,tbb-8.0-issues,TorBrowserTeam201809R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr,tbb-8.0-issues,TorBrowserTeam201809 =>
 ff60-esr,tbb-8.0-issues,TorBrowserTeam201809R
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is a patch:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug27905-01=f8bdd93d75fb9d74ffacf4b0524c50a9026ceb95

 For some reason Mozilla made it possible for the brand short name to be
 localized, and in fact the ESR60 language packs include a brand.ftl file
 (all of which probably have `-brand-short-name = Firefox`, so what's the
 point?) We worked around this problem by adding a `tor-browser-brand.ftl`
 file which is used instead of `brand.ftl`.

 Note that there are two items with about:preferences that are not fixed by
 this patch:
 1. There is an occurrence of `Firefox` within the `Change Block List`
 "dialog" which is not easily fixed because it is hard-coded within a
 localizable string. This was fixed in Firefox 61 but may not be easy to
 backport; see https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/8ebf84e9825d
 2. The `Data Collection and Use" section also includes some hard-coded
 occurrences of `Firefox`. But I think we should hide that section anyway;
 see #27909.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27910 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0.1 incorrectly opens with default screen.width 1000 and default screen.height 998

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27910: Tor Browser 8.0.1 incorrectly opens with default screen.width 1000 and
default screen.height 998
---+---
 Reporter:  monmire|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This ticket appears to be a duplicate of #27845. Let's keep the discussion
 in one place.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a def

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27845: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser
window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a
defect?
---+---
 Reporter:  monmire|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by mcs):

 #27910 is a duplicate.

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[tor-bugs] #27910 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0.1 incorrectly opens with default screen.width 1000 and default screen.height 998

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27910: Tor Browser 8.0.1 incorrectly opens with default screen.width 1000 and
default screen.height 998
-+-
 Reporter:  monmire  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Component:  Applications/Tor
 |  Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-  |  Actual Points:
  resolution |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 Platform: Tor Browser 8.0.1, macOS 10.10.5, desktop computer.

 My Tor Project FP Central: https://fpcentral.tbb.torproject.org/
 fingerprint report states the default screen size should be "either at
 1000x1000 or at a multiple of 200x100."

 This defect persistently recurs with each clean new Tor Browser 8.

 I first noticed this same defect in Tor Browser 8.0, and the same defect
 persists in Tor Browser 8.5a2.

 On the same macOS 10.10.5 desktop platform, Tor Browser 7.5.6 and earlier
 versions correctly opened with default screen.width 1000 and default
 screen.height 1000.

 My Tor Project FP Central fingerprint report included the following
 message:

 "Your Tor browser is not at the recommended size. It should be either at
 1000x1000 or at a multiple of 200x100. The easiest way to fix the
 resolution difference is to launch a new Tor identity and not change the
 size of the browser's window. The developer's console should also be
 closed since it has a direct impact on the reported screen dimensions. The
 only step required is to open the Onion menu on the left of the URL
 address bar and click on "New identity". You will clean your browser state
 and start from a fresh profile."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27900 [Core Tor/Tor]: Please establish which C standard tor code complies with

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27900: Please establish which C standard tor code complies with
--+
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by yurivict271):

 Yes, it builds with {{{-std=gnu99}}}.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27901 [Core Tor]: Build fails on FreeBSD/mips, but succeeds when auroreconf is run before the build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27901: Build fails on FreeBSD/mips, but succeeds when auroreconf is run before 
the
build
-+
 Reporter:  yurivict271  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bsd freebsd  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:   => bsd freebsd


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24249 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create automated mechanism for C/Rust types to stay in sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24249: Create automated mechanism for C/Rust types to stay in sync
--+---
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:  chelseakomlo
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by chelseakomlo):

 Alex Crichton pointed me to this, which can be helpful for verifying Rust
 C bindings: https://github.com/alexcrichton/ctest

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[tor-bugs] #27909 [Applications/Tor Browser]: hide "Data Collection and Use" section within about:preferences

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27909: hide "Data Collection and Use" section within about:preferences
--+
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  ff60-esr,tbb-8.0-issues
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We should hide the "Data Collection and Use" section within
 about:preferences. It is potentially confusing and also contains a link to
 the Firefox Privacy Notice.

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[tor-bugs] #27908 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept with existing statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27908: PrivCount proof of concept with existing statistics
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #22898
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Let's implement a proof-of-concept implementation of PrivCount that adds
 some noise to existing relay statistics, and then aggregates them.

 This proof of concept will help us answer open questions, find bugs and
 unexpected issues, and get started on the metrics analysis. (But it
 doesn't need to be secure, because the stats are already public for each
 relay.)

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[tor-bugs] #27907 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount config and version spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27907: PrivCount config and version spec
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  needs-proposal, privcount
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #25153
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Specify how:
 * PrivCount is configured
 * How we transition between PrivCount versions

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[tor-bugs] #27906 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount noise specification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27906: PrivCount noise specification
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  needs-proposal, privcount
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #25153
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Let's write a spec for PrivCount noise:
 * how noise is determined for each statistic
 * how much noise each relay adds
 * how to interpret the final result
 * how to avoid obvious pitfalls

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[tor-bugs] #27905 [Applications/Tor Browser]: many occurrences of "Firefox" in about:preferences

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27905: many occurrences of "Firefox" in about:preferences
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:
 Severity:  Normal   |  
ff60-esr,tbb-8.0-issues,TorBrowserTeam201809
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 There are many occurrences of `Firefox` within about:preferences.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27830 [Webpages/Website]: Update the newsletter.tpo layout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27830: Update the newsletter.tpo layout
--+-
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27903 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8 does not respect gtk3 settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27903: Tor Browser 8 does not respect gtk3 settings
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gapegas7uftp):

 Also, many preference changes not respected when re-entering file chooser
 dialog.

 To trigger,

  1. Open a file (CTRL-O)
  1. Right-click and change Sort Folders Before Files (check)
  1. Change sorting field (Modified)
  1. Also, could make other changes (like Show hideen files or Show Time)
  1. Double click on a file to open (a test file)
  1. Do other things
  1. Open a file again (CTRL-O)
  1. Setting changes made before are now gone

 This also works same way with Save Page (CTRL-S)

 Also, new in Tor Browser 8, clicking on Home (Open your personal folder)
 in File Chooser now goes to `tor_browser_LANG/Browser` instead of actual
 home directory. This is not too big of a thing, but it is different than
 Tor Browser 7. Maybe it is more security better, so not a thing anyway.

 On Linux.  Also, I am using a settings.ini file for bettter GTK3
 ticket:27546

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27894 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Isolate TBB in a VM with X2Go

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27894: Isolate TBB in a VM with X2Go
--+
 Reporter:  colony.three@…|  Owner:  colony.three@…
 Type:  project   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by traumschule):

 are you able to edit
 [[doc/TorifyHOWTO/IsolatingProxy#IllustrationusingVirtualMachines]]?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27894 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Isolate TBB in a VM with X2Go

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27894: Isolate TBB in a VM with X2Go
--+
 Reporter:  colony.three@…|  Owner:  colony.three@…
 Type:  project   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by colony.three@…):

 Yep, the changes I suggested work too.

 I can write a wiki page on this (under Unixish?) if appropriate, but it's
 not clear where to create a page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27900 [Core Tor/Tor]: Please establish which C standard tor code complies with

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27900: Please establish which C standard tor code complies with
--+
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 yurivict271]:
 > So it is something else, not {{{c99}}}.

 Did you try {{{-std=gnu99}}. The code uses GNU extensions on gcc.

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[tor-bugs] #27904 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for Android does not protect master password screen with FLAG_SECURE

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27904: Tor Browser for Android does not protect master password screen with
FLAG_SECURE
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This issue got reported to us by nightwatch-cybersecurity at our HackerOne
 bug bounty program and subsequently filed at Mozilla's bug tracker
 (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1491627).

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[tor-bugs] #27903 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8 does not respect gtk3 settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27903: Tor Browser 8 does not respect gtk3 settings
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  regression
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Sorting folders first is ignored in Tor Browser 8 on the file chooser
 dialog. Rather, the default gtk3 behavior is used which mixes files and
 folders. However, that worked on Tor Browser 7.

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[tor-bugs] #27902 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is not working with macOS 10.14

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27902: Tor Browser is not working with macOS 10.14
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201809
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 After macOS 10.14 got released we got the first report that Tor Browser is
 broken with it in our blog (see:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/277669#comment-277669). That's likely
 to be a parent ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27768 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Menu button does not work in Tor Browser 8 on Windows (was: Issues & Enhancements)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27768: Menu button does not work in Tor Browser 8 on Windows
+--
 Reporter:  therapid|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression


Comment:

 No worries, thanks for the report. Let's change the ticket description to
 cover item 2. Looking at the screenshot you made it seems you are in
 customization mode and in that one the menu button does indeed not work
 (which is okay). Does the issue happen as well if you are outside of that
 customization mode, e.g. on the Tor Browser start page?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27894 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Isolate TBB in a VM with X2Go

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27894: Isolate TBB in a VM with X2Go
--+
 Reporter:  colony.three@…|  Owner:  colony.three@…
 Type:  project   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Nothing we plan to do. But this could be added to our Wiki somewhere if
 someone got it working.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Have a Tor package that can run Flash safely

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7680: Have a Tor package that can run Flash safely
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  SponsorJ, flash   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  SponsorJ, needs-triage, flash => SponsorJ, flash
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 arma]:
 > Like #7008, I think we should work to close the subtickets here, and
 then close this one as wontfix.

 Done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7008 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make it safe to run Flash in TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7008: Make it safe to run Flash in TBB
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  project   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  SponsorJ, apparmor|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7680 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  SponsorJ, needs-triage, apparmor => SponsorJ, apparmor
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:14 arma]:
 > Time has passed, and Flash is going extinct.
 >
 > I say we find a way to close all the subtickets, and then close this one
 as wontfix.

 Done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Local config file for Flash Player

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5531: Local config file for Flash Player
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  needs-triage  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7008 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Flash is essentially dead, closing this as WONTFIX.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3974 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable flash's "allow cookies" pref somehow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3974: Disable flash's "allow cookies" pref somehow
--+--
 Reporter:  erinn |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7008 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We don't want to do that anymore as Flash is essentially dead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #4335 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Per-urlbar domain plugin control

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4335: Per-urlbar domain plugin control
-+-
 Reporter:  trallala |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 |  Torbutton: 1.4.0
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-bounty, tbb-linkability, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  torbutton  |
Parent ID:  #7008| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We don't want that as plugins are essentially gone.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27894 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Isolate TBB in a VM with X2Go (was: TBB Does Not Work With X2Go)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27894: Isolate TBB in a VM with X2Go
--+
 Reporter:  colony.three@…|  Owner:  colony.three@…
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:   => tbb-sandboxing
 * owner:  tbb-team => colony.three@…
 * type:  enhancement => project
 * status:  needs_information => assigned


Comment:

 Happy to hear. As it seems you intend to keep working on it i turn this
 ticket into a project assigned to you.

 This is related to [[doc/TorBrowser/Sandbox|sandboxing Tor Browser]].

 Please note the security risks attached to X2Go using python and XML:
 - https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-14647
 - https://docs.python.org/2/library/xml.html#xml-vulnerabilities

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27680 [Webpages/Website]: Explain how to use auth cookie for onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27680: Explain how to use auth cookie for onion services
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 #4700 might be worth a hint

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