Re: [tor-bugs] #27337 [Core Tor/sbws]: Round relay bandwidths in bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27337: Round relay bandwidths in bandwidth files
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by teor):

 > If you think we should implement smoothing in sbws' rounding algorithm,
 please open a new ticket, and we'll implement the rest of proposal 276.

 The ticket already exists, it's #27689,

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27337 [Core Tor/sbws]: Round relay bandwidths in bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27337: Round relay bandwidths in bandwidth files
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27337 [Core Tor/sbws]: Round relay bandwidths in bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27337: Round relay bandwidths in bandwidth files
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by teor):

 You are correct: sbws' bandwidth rounding scheme adds a maximum error of
 -/+ 5%, and a minimum error of +/- 0.5% (as long as the bandwidth is above
 200).

 We round to 2 significant figures so that compressed consensus diffs are
 small. This is a partial implementation of proposal 276:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/276-lower-bw-
 granularity.txt#n27

 I believe that this added error is acceptable, given the current design of
 the bandwidth weighting system.

 Here's how bandwidth measurement system works right now, with the accuracy
 levels at each step:
 * relays report their observed bandwidths every day, or when they are more
 than half or twice the previous bandwidth (greater than -50% or +100%
 change)
 * relays are measured up to a few times per day (usually around 2% change,
 but potentially unlimited change):
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/276-lower-bw-
 granularity.txt#n27
 * every hour, these observations and measurements are used to create
 bandwidths for votes, rounded to 2 significant figures (+/- 5% change)
 * the consensus uses the low-median of the votes for each relay (choosing
 one figure among several that often differ by more than 100%)
 * clients download compressed diffs of the consensus (no change)
 * clients choose relays at random using bandwidth weights from the
 consensus (no change)

 The rounding step doesn't introduce very much relative inaccuracy (5% or
 less), compared to the rest of the system (2%, 50%, 100%, or greater).

 Even if the rest of the system were perfectly accurate, this change
 doesn't introduce very much absolute inaccuracy:
 * the largest relay is approximately 3% of exit probability:
 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/BC630CBBB518BE7E9F4E09712AB0269E9DC7D626
 * So the change in probability for this relay is 5% * 3% = 0.15%, or at
 most 1 in 667 exit choices
 * And the overall affect across the network would be 5%, or at most 1 in
 20 relay choices, but on average, it would be about 1.4%, or 1 in 70 relay
 choices

 Torflow's existing rounding already affects at most 1 in 200 relay
 choices, or on average, 1 in 700 relay choices.

 If you believe that the added rounding in sbws will have a significant
 effect on the network, please open a new ticket with appropriate
 calculations, or send an email to the tor-dev list. Then we will consider
 modifying proposal 276.

 If you think we should implement smoothing in sbws' rounding algorithm,
 please open a new ticket, and we'll implement the rest of proposal 276.

 (The code that was written for this ticket has been release. We don't re-
 use old tickets for new work: it makes changelogs really confusing.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27977 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build Orbot with rbm/tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27977: Build Orbot with rbm/tor-browser-build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:7 sisbell]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 >
 >
 > > Where come the required libraries like OpenSSL into play? I expected
 seeing the openssl project being a dependency of the orbot project in its
 `config`.
 >
 > This is handled by https://github.com/n8fr8/tor-android which is pulled
 as a gradle dependency in orbot. tor-android project handles building of
 tor, openssl and libevent for android. If we need to build these libraries
 and use them through config, it will also require pulling down and
 configuring the tor-android project and patching it. Is this the way you
 are looking at going? Or is prebuilt gradle dependency good for now?

 We should do that, yes, but maybe not now due to time constraints. So, I
 think the prebuilt gradle dependency is good for now but we should fix
 that before the next major alpha release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27977 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build Orbot with rbm/tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27977: Build Orbot with rbm/tor-browser-build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Changes (android-1113)

  * Added gradle dependencies to list (similar to firefox)
  * Upgrade gradle to 4.4 (it appears there is one plugin that needs 4.4)
  * Added sysrqb patch
  * Add patch to point to our maven repo for gradle dependencies
  * Copy aar files to distribution directory

 For some reason jsocksAndroid is not building as part of standard build so
 I need to modify script for that. Also need some cleanup of the config
 regarding the git repo.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27337 [Core Tor/sbws]: Round relay bandwidths in bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27337: Round relay bandwidths in bandwidth files
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by starlight):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * cc: starlight@… (added)
 * resolution:  implemented =>
 * parent:  #27108 =>


Comment:

 The chosen approach suffers from severe non-linear steps between round
 values:

 {{{
 10 -> 11 +10.0%
  4 ->  41000  +2.5%
 }}}

 The proper way to accomplish this is to round by taking the natural
 log of the value, round that to the nearest 1/20th for uniform
 5% steps and then raise e by the result:

 {{{
 10 rounds to  98716
 105000 rounds to 103777
 98716 -> 103777 +5.1%

 4 rounds to 40135
 42000 rounds to 42193
 40135 -> 42193 +5.1%

 1100 rounds to 1096
 1050 rounds to 1043
 1043 -> 1096 +5.1%
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28407 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Host Name text area contains verified and unverified names on the same line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28407: Host Name text area contains verified and unverified names on the same 
line
--+--
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by crimson_king):

 * cc: doug.hs@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28205 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: linking against other libwebrtc binaries errors out on missing symbols

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28205: linking against other libwebrtc binaries errors out on missing symbols
---+---
 Reporter:  eighthave  |  Owner:  eighthave
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  android|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by arlolra):

 Replying to [comment:17 eighthave]:
 >
 >
 > Anyone know anything about **gn**?  I guess it is something from ninja
 or deploy_tools.  This is stumping me:
 >
 > https://gitlab.com/eighthave/go-webrtc/-/jobs/119428248
 > {{{
 > + gn gen out/Release '--args=target_os="android" target_cpu="arm"
 is_debug=false use_custom_libcxx=false'
 > ERROR at //build/config/android/internal_rules.gni:122:23: Can't load
 input file.
 > deps += [ "${_target_label}__build_config" ]
 >   ^---
 > }}}

 Maybe the more pressing part of that error is,

 {{{
 Unable to load:
   /builds/eighthave/go-
 webrtc/third_party/webrtc/src/third_party/findbugs/BUILD.gn
 I also checked in the secondary tree for:
   /builds/eighthave/go-
 webrtc/third_party/webrtc/src/build/secondary/third_party/findbugs/BUILD.gn
 + exit 1
 $ export ANDROID_HOME=$WEBRTC_SRC/third_party/android_tools/sdk
 $ ls -lR $ANDROID_HOME
 ls: cannot access '/builds/eighthave/go-
 webrtc/third_party/webrtc/src/third_party/android_tools/sdk': No such file
 or directory
 }}}

 It looks like you're missing some dependencies.  My `.gclient_entries` has
 some lines like,

 {{{
 'src/third_party/android_tools':
 
'https://chromium.googlesource.com/android_tools.git@9914c5704717424998c69e837be3631914d787cc',
 'src/third_party/android_tools/ndk':
 
'https://chromium.googlesource.com/android_ndk.git@aabf5c8f4b1ce4269be4791b469e27b15d93a3f2',
 }}}

 I think those are there because my `.gclient`  file has `target_os =
 ['android', 'linux']`.   I may have manually edited that and sync'd, I
 don't remember, but there should be some command line flag to gclient to
 specify that.  That should pull them in and unblock.  Let me know if you
 need help figuring out how that work.

 While I'm here, are you doing this? `./build/linux/sysroot_scripts
 /install-sysroot.py --arch=arm`
 From https://github.com/keroserene/go-webrtc/blob/master/build.sh#L74-L79

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28407 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Host Name text area contains verified and unverified names on the same line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28407: Host Name text area contains verified and unverified names on the same 
line
--+--
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 If they are the same strings, should only one of them be displayed?

 E.g. I see on
 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/3FA93D41E9A7C4C47B77C0D7F617999B6D5D0B62
 that it seems to list the same string twice, which is maybe relay
 operators think that they've configured something incorrectly.

 And I guess if we're trying to draw a distinction between verified and
 unverified, we should make it clearer what each of them means. (What do
 they mean?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28433 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB is broken right now: Processing Failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28433: BridgeDB is broken right now: Processing Failed
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay, this is now resolved. I think I corrected the problem so this
 specific issue won't happen again. We'll see.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 034-backport, 035-must,  |  Actual Points:
  035-rc-blocker?|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 We should test this in chutney, but chutney is unreliable on 0.3.4 and
 later due to #28192.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28382 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update bandwidth file headers in dir-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28382: Update bandwidth file headers in dir-spec
-+
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry, teor  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Spec tickets with code go in the latest milestone, I think

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[tor-bugs] #28439 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test static builds using Travis CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28439: Test static builds using Travis CI
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We're seeing a few reports of build failures in static builds.
 We should add a static build to Travis CI, to hopefully catch these
 earlier.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25483 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Windows reproducible build of snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25483: Windows reproducible build of snowflake
---+---
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201805   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:44 tom]:
 > Alternately, if I could get a Firefox building with --enable-webrtc with
 this toolchain: would that indicate that it was at least possible to do
 what you need to do?  Trying that wouldn't be that difficult for me, but
 trying to work on a new project I am unfamiliar with would be more
 difficult.

 If it's easy for you to do this, please do, especially if it results in a
 libwebrtc.a as a side-effect build artifact. Then we can see if go-webrtc
 easily links with it.

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[tor-bugs] #28438 [Core Tor/Tor]: Which macOS build image should we use on Travis?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28438: Which macOS build image should we use on Travis?
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 https://blog.travis-ci.com/2018-11-01-xcode-10-1-is-now-available

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[tor-bugs] #28437 [Core Tor/Tor]: Try Ubuntu xenial builds on travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28437: Try Ubuntu xenial builds on travis
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  fast-fix
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 https://docs.travis-ci.com/user/reference/xenial/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28378 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add libsystemd-devel to the travis config, if available

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28378: Add libsystemd-devel to the travis config, if available
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, tor-systemd,   |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 033-backport, 034-backport,  |
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:  #28113   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  wontfix =>


Comment:

 Oh wow.

 trusty calls it libsystemd-daemon-dev, xenial and later call it
 libsystemd-dev.

 So that will make the apt section interesting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28205 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: linking against other libwebrtc binaries errors out on missing symbols

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28205: linking against other libwebrtc binaries errors out on missing symbols
---+---
 Reporter:  eighthave  |  Owner:  eighthave
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  android|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:17 eighthave]:
 > Anyone know anything about **gn**?  I guess it is something from ninja
 or deploy_tools.  This is stumping me:
 Right, [https://gn.googlesource.com/gn/+/master/docs/quick_start.md gn]
 processes .gn and .gni files and outputs .ninja file. It's not actually
 part of depot_tools (depot_tools just contains a shim that calls the real
 gn binary), rather it's part of the webrtc source code, under
 src/tools/gn.

 > https://gitlab.com/eighthave/go-webrtc/-/jobs/119428248
 > {{{
 > + gn gen out/Release '--args=target_os="android" target_cpu="arm"
 is_debug=false use_custom_libcxx=false'
 > ERROR at //build/config/android/internal_rules.gni:122:23: Can't load
 input file.
 > deps += [ "${_target_label}__build_config" ]
 >   ^---
 > }}}

 I haven't seen this error before. Maybe try omitting `target_cpu="arm"`? I
 only mention that because the
 
[https://gn.googlesource.com/gn/+/bdb0fd02324b120cacde634a9235405061c8ea06/docs/cross_compiles.md
 gn cross compiles documentation] gives as an example
 {{{
 gn gen out/Default --args='target_os="android"'
 }}}
 and says: "(We don't have to specify target_cpu because of the
 conditionals mentioned above)." It seems unlikely that this will help, but
 I don't know.

 You can try using the gn
 [https://gn.googlesource.com/gn/+/master/docs/quick_start.md#print-
 debugging print command] to see what it's trying to access. Try:
 {{{
 print("${_target_label}__build_config")
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28436 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update link to gn cross_compile.md

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28436: Update link to gn cross_compile.md
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28436 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update link to gn cross_compile.md

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28436: Update link to gn cross_compile.md
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-28436-Update-link-to-gn-cross_compiles.md.patch"
 added.


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[tor-bugs] #28436 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update link to gn cross_compile.md

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28436: Update link to gn cross_compile.md
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Was looking at this area of the code today and noticed that this link in a
 comment had changed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28423 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve precision of finegrained periodic event scheduling?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28423: improve precision of finegrained periodic event scheduling?
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28335| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Does this behaviour differ by OS?
 I know that macOS tries to coalesce timers across the entire OS wherever
 possible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28435 [Core Tor/Tor]: adjust Doxyfile for source tree moves

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28435: adjust Doxyfile for source tree moves
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28435 [Core Tor/Tor]: adjust Doxyfile for source tree moves

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28435: adjust Doxyfile for source tree moves
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 patch in https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/503

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28205 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: linking against other libwebrtc binaries errors out on missing symbols

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28205: linking against other libwebrtc binaries errors out on missing symbols
---+---
 Reporter:  eighthave  |  Owner:  eighthave
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  android|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:21 eighthave]:
 > @dcf @arlolra any idea about the asan linking errors? I'm just shooting
 in the dark here.

 So I personally don't use Travis and I don't know what the .travis.yml is
 about. But I see from its [https://github.com/keroserene/go-
 webrtc/commits/62dbae8e3b7e7db076e079a7437166966c747033/.travis.yml commit
 history] that it's been modified many times to make adjustments to
 compiler and asan settings. So feel free to make any changes in
 .travis.yml that you need. For example see [https://github.com/keroserene
 /go-webrtc/issues/43 #43] and [https://github.com/golang/go/issues/16150
 #16150] that disabled asan for non-linux platforms.

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[tor-bugs] #28435 [Core Tor/Tor]: adjust Doxyfile for source tree moves

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28435: adjust Doxyfile for source tree moves
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The major source tree rearrangement means that Doxygen doesn't find any
 source files. We should set `RECURSIVE = YES` to fix this. (We could also
 explicitly enumerate all of the directories, but recursing is more future-
 proof.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28205 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: linking against other libwebrtc binaries errors out on missing symbols

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28205: linking against other libwebrtc binaries errors out on missing symbols
---+---
 Reporter:  eighthave  |  Owner:  eighthave
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  android|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:16 eighthave]:
 > The whole shebang builds and the tests pass, but only for go 1.11:
 > https://gitlab.com/eighthave/go-webrtc/-/jobs/118746063
 >
 > For some bizarre reason, the rest bail out with "go get: no install
 location for directory /builds/eighthave/go-webrtc outside GOPATH":
 > https://gitlab.com/eighthave/go-webrtc/pipelines/36080763

 This error is not really a problem: "no install location for directory
 /builds/eighthave/go-webrtc outside GOPATH". You can ignore it. It just
 means that your checkout of go-webrtc isn't under GOPATH; i.e., you did
 `git clone https://github.com/keroserene/go-webrtc` rather than `go get
 github.com/keroserene/go-webrtc` initially. That's actually how I usually
 do it too. But to make the error message go away, you can use `go get` to
 download the go-webrtc repo.

 Go 1.11 took steps away from using a centralized GOPATH and introduced
 [https://github.com/golang/go/wiki/Modules modules]. That's probably why
 you don't get the error under 1.11.

 The rbm Tor Browser build actually doesn't use `go get` at all--we
 manually `git clone` the main repo and all its dependencies and put them
 in the same place under GOPATH that `go get` would have put them. We do
 that because before the new modules system, there wasn't a way to download
 a specific commit hash for each dependency.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28362 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure our .may_includes files describe a noncircular dependency structure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28362: Make sure our .may_includes files describe a noncircular dependency
structure
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Tried to fix?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28433 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB is broken right now: Processing Failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28433: BridgeDB is broken right now: Processing Failed
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 I agree that it's happening.

 Sysrqb is a good person for trying to fix it.

 I wonder if maybe the captcha subsystem is not working right.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28205 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: linking against other libwebrtc binaries errors out on missing symbols

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28205: linking against other libwebrtc binaries errors out on missing symbols
---+---
 Reporter:  eighthave  |  Owner:  eighthave
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  android|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by ahf):

 * cc: ahf (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28183 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor-0.3.5.3_alpha unexpected stop bug: (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall shutdown)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28183: tor-0.3.5.3_alpha unexpected stop bug: (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall
attempt (syscall shutdown)
-+-
 Reporter:  n05  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox regression 035-must  |  Actual Points:
  034-backport? 033-backport 029-backport?   |
  regression? 035-rc-blocker?|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_information
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 merged to 0.3.5 and forward.  If this ever shows up for somebody in 0.3.4
 or earlier, we should backport, but I think it won't.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28335 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make most periodic events turn themselves off when Tor is dormant, sleeping, etc.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28335: Make most periodic events turn themselves off when Tor is dormant,
sleeping, etc.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25500| Points:  10
 Reviewer:  dormant   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:   => dormant


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[tor-bugs] #28434 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows Size issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28434: Windows Size issue
+--
 Reporter:  aerpel  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.16   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  window size |  Actual Points:
  adjustment|
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I ran the Tor Browser bundle on Debian stretch/stable (installed via the
 Debian repostories).
 As DE, I am using KDE (plasma 5.8.6), with default taskbar/window frame
 sizes.
 My screens resolution is 1680x1050.
 I started using the Tor Browser with version 8.0 on this machine, and the
 issue has existed since.

 Expected behaviour:
 When opening the Thor browser, the windows height automatically adjusts to
 a multiple of 100 (<=1000) and a width of 1000.

 Actual behaviour:
 The windows opens in a size of 1000x895.

 It seems that monitor height minus the Tor Browser Window title bar, the
 tab bar, the address bar and the KDE panel is 895 pixel.
 Somehow the Tor Browser thinks it can reach 900 (which it cannot) and
 therefore, a size of 895 is reached, instead of the correct 800.

 Therefore the whole concept of default windows sizes against browser
 fingerprinting is circumvented.

 The window's size was determinded by www.panoticlick.eff.org, which was
 used to check how effective the Tor browser is against fingerprinting.

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[tor-bugs] #28433 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB is broken right now: Processing Failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28433: BridgeDB is broken right now: Processing Failed
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 As I've seen reported on IRC by ~3 people (and AFAICT not acknowledged by
 anyone who can fix it):

 Go to https://bridges.torproject.org/options.

 Hit one of the buttons that is supposed to give you bridges.

 Get presented with "Processing Failed"

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[tor-bugs] #28432 [Community/Translations]: German translation of 'circuit' should be made consistent on the landing page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28432: German translation of 'circuit' should be made consistent on the landing
page
-+-
 Reporter:  wayward  |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:   |Version:
  Community/Translations |   Keywords:  localization, german,
 Severity:  Normal   |  translation, easy
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 User pointed out below that the German localization of 'circuit' is
 inconsistent in various places:

 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/277954#comment-277954

 "In the German version of TBB, on the introductory page, there are three
 different translations for the English 'circuit'. There is: 1. Circuit-
 Ansicht (which is no translation!). 2. In the explanatory text there is
 'Zeige deinen Pfad' - here 'circuit' becomes 'Pfad' (= 'path') and users
 are told to 'choose'( = 'wählen', which should be "click on" = 'klicken
 auf' - not 'choose') 'Neuer Pfad für diese Seite'. 3. If you do so and
 click on the "Informations-Symbol" which is the padlock, you will not get
 'Neuer Pfad für diese Seite', but 'Neuen Kanal für diese Seite'. (By the
 way: this should be: 'NeueR Pfad' (nominative) instead of 'NeueN Pfad'
 (accusative) - but this is only a minor mistake.)

 So you have three names for the English word 'circuit': 1. circuit, 2.
 Pfad, 3. Kanal

 On the right, at the bottom of the introduction. you will read 'Pfad'
 again. If you click on that field, you will get to Duck Duck Go and you
 will read 'Circuits' again, and:'Relays'. In the old version of TBB you
 used 'Relais' as translation for 'relay'. And if you click on the green
 padlock, 'relay' is translated as 'Verteiler'."



 We should pick which word works best and change these strings to match
 where appropriate.

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[tor-bugs] #28431 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update control spec with items from "extra dormant" code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28431: Update control spec with items from "extra dormant" code
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28335
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8  |
--+
 Before we merge the parent, we should update the control-spec.txt to
 explain the new commands that it provides.

 Currently those are "SIGNAL ACTIVE" and "SIGNAL DORMANT", but that could
 change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28335 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make most periodic events turn themselves off when Tor is dormant, sleeping, etc.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28335: Make most periodic events turn themselves off when Tor is dormant,
sleeping, etc.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25500| Points:  10
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay -- this isn't _done_, but it's ready for initial review.  (See non-
 closed child tickets for items that we might still want to do.)

 The branch is `dormant`, with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/502

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[tor-bugs] #28430 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tests for 'extra dormant' code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28430: Tests for 'extra dormant' code
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28335
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8  |
--+
 I could use some guidance about how best to test this code.

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[tor-bugs] #28429 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the new "extra dormant" code configurable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28429: Make the new "extra dormant" code configurable
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28335
   Points:  .5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8  |
--+
 I think we want at minimum these options:

 A way to say how long without activity counts for becoming dormant.

 A way to say whether having an open stream with no network traffic on it
 should keep Tor from becoming dormant.


 I think maybe we also want:

 A way to say how often to check for becoming dormant.

 A way to say that Tor should start out dormant, or should remember
 dormancy status across invocations?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27977 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build Orbot with rbm/tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27977: Build Orbot with rbm/tor-browser-build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:


 > Where come the required libraries like OpenSSL into play? I expected
 seeing the openssl project being a dependency of the orbot project in its
 `config`.

 This is handled by https://github.com/n8fr8/tor-android which is pulled as
 a gradle dependency in orbot. tor-android project handles building of tor,
 openssl and libevent for android. If we need to build these libraries and
 use them through config, it will also require pulling down and configuring
 the tor-android project and patching it. Is this the way you are looking
 at going? Or is prebuilt gradle dependency good for now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28420 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add collector-protocol to spec.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28420: Add collector-protocol to spec.tpo
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by ln5):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28205 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: linking against other libwebrtc binaries errors out on missing symbols

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28205: linking against other libwebrtc binaries errors out on missing symbols
---+---
 Reporter:  eighthave  |  Owner:  eighthave
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  android|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by eighthave):

 @dcf @arlolra any idea about the asan linking errors? I'm just shooting in
 the dark here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27443 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Firefox RBM config and build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27443: Update Firefox RBM config and build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, TBA-a2, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 It seems this problem got "solved" in 1.28.0 by upgrading `libbacktrace`
 (https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/50955). Unforunately, that's not
 the small fix I hoped to find. So, I'll dig deeper tomorrow. Maybe we can
 backport the patch for `libbacktrace` that apparently fixed the problem...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28358 [Core Tor/Tor]: Nyx forces Tor error: sandbox_getaddrinfo(): Bug: (Sandbox) failed to get address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28358: Nyx forces Tor error: sandbox_getaddrinfo(): Bug: (Sandbox) failed to 
get
address
---+---
 Reporter:  wagon  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox, regression, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  sandbox => sandbox, regression, 034-backport
 * status:  assigned => new
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28358 [Core Tor/Tor]: Nyx forces Tor error: sandbox_getaddrinfo(): Bug: (Sandbox) failed to get address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28358: Nyx forces Tor error: sandbox_getaddrinfo(): Bug: (Sandbox) failed to 
get
address
--+
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  arma => (none)
 * keywords:   => sandbox
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 Hmmm... so `router_pick_published_address(get_options(), , 0)` which
 is called by `GETINFO address`  triggers the sandbox.

 Issue seems to be that `sandbox_getaddrinfo_cache_disabled = 0` and
 `sandbox_getaddrinfo_is_active = 1` which means that `tor_getaddrinfo()`
 will only query the cache and never call `getaddrinfo()`.

 Not sure here, seems the solution is either call `getaddrinfo()` when the
 sandbox is active (not entirely why we don't) or disable the getaddrinfo
 cache when looking up the address from the GETINFO command (using:
 sandbox_disable_getaddrinfo_cache()).

 I'm still confused on how this can work in normal circumstances if
 `Sandbox = 1` ONLY queries the cache?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28410 [Core Tor/Tor]: systemd restart loop when tor@default.service::Type=notify

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28410: systemd restart loop when tor@default.service::Type=notify
--+
 Reporter:  jchevali  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  systemd   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  reopened => needs_information
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Hmmm... we've just released 0.3.5.4-alpha which should contain the fix for
 the above you are seeing:

 Commit 212bd9778b5c249f02f8fbdc1e8ccbe4c108f03a
 {{{
 $ git describe --contains 212bd9778b5
 tor-0.3.5.4-alpha~1^2
 }}}

 Easy check: do you have `TOR_USEC_PER_SEC` in `hibernate.c`?

 The `HAVE_SYSTEMD` should be enough to include the right header or the
 libsystemd version could be too old? (check for `sd_notifyf()` in
 `/usr/include` maybe?).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28423 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve precision of finegrained periodic event scheduling?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28423: improve precision of finegrained periodic event scheduling?
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28335| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I ran an experiment for a while to see how frequently
 second_elapsed_callback was called on a not-too-loaded desktop after we
 made it a periodic event:
 {{{
 Nov 13 13:31:52.000 [notice] Called 4560 times in 4564 seconds
 }}}

 We need to check whether this is ok.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28164 [Webpages/Blog]: Add "Read More" links to blog post teasers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28164: Add "Read More" links to blog post teasers
-+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Description changed by arthuredelstein:

Old description:

> Currently, on https://blog.torproject.org, there is teaser for each of
> the 10 most recent posts. But the teaser includes an image and just the
> first couple of lines of text from the blog post. There is no obvious way
> for visitors to know that there is more text in each post, or how they
> can read the rest of the text.
>
> If we can add a "Read More >>" link to each teaser, I think this would be
> much clearer.

New description:

 Currently, on https://blog.torproject.org, there is a teaser for each of
 the 10 most recent posts. But the teaser includes an image and just the
 first couple of lines of text from the blog post. There is no obvious way
 for visitors to know that there is more text in each post, or how they can
 read the rest of the text.

 If we can add a "Read More >>" link to each teaser, I think this would be
 much clearer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28164 [Webpages/Blog]: Add "Read More" links to blog post teasers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28164: Add "Read More" links to blog post teasers
-+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: sstevenson (added)


Comment:

 Fixing this issue is especially important for the donation campaign, as we
 want people to be able to click through to the "Strength in Numbers" blog
 post and find the "Donate" button.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28414 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor doesn't load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28414: Tor doesn't load
--+---
 Reporter:  Wnm987|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Wnm987):

 When i open Tor Browser it automatically connects to the home page (so i
 don't have the possibility to choose to connect or use cancel button),
 where DuckDuckGo search bar is, but the pointer shows me that the client
 is still loading and if i click on it won't respond anymore. Even if i
 restart my computer the clien't doesn't work.
 But when i shut down my PC for several hours and turn it on,the Tor
 Browser works until i close it; infact if i try to open it after some
 hours (or just minutes) turning my pc on i won't be able to use Tor. I
 tried turning Windows Firewall off, even kaspersky (actually Tor Browser
 works for me even with both opened), but nothing works, if not shutting
 down the PC for many hours. It's frustrating...
 My operating system is Windows 10, and yes, i have the latest version.
 My network is fine.
 Sorry for my bad english.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25702 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 1.1 Update Tor Browser icon to follow design guidelines.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25702: Activity 1.1 Update Tor Browser icon to follow design guidelines.
--+---
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor17
--+---
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "assets.zip" added.


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[tor-bugs] #28428 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Downloading a file destroys my Nautilus settings.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28428: Downloading a file destroys my Nautilus settings.
-+-
 Reporter:  sugrynidos   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Component:  Applications/Tor
 |  Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:  linux, gnome, nautilus,  |  Actual Points:
  sort   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 Every time I download a file and press the "Save"-button in the Save-
 window, the setting in Nautilus called "Sort folders before files" is
 disabled. This is extremely annoying as I prefer to have it enabled. It
 started happening from Tor Browser 8.0 and still happening in 8.0.3.

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[tor-bugs] #28427 [Webpages/Website]: Add Nighat Dad to Board page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28427: Add Nighat Dad to Board page
--+--
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 https://www.torproject.org/about/board.html.en

 Nighat Dad
 Director
 Nighat is the founder and Executive Director of the Digital Rights
 Foundation, Pakistan. She is an accomplished lawyer and human rights
 activist. Nighat is a pioneer for access to a safe and open internet in
 Pakistan and globally. She was a TED Global Fellow for 2017, was listed as
 one of TIME magazine's Next Generation Leaders in 2015, and was the
 recipient of the Atlantic Council Freedom Award and Human Rights Tulip
 Award. Nighat was also the only Pakistani selected as a Young Global
 Leader by the World Economic Forum in 2018. Recently her organization, the
 Digital Rights Foundation, was named among the 10 best social
 entrepreneurs at the United Nations General Assembly 2018 meeting by
 Forbes magazine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28183 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor-0.3.5.3_alpha unexpected stop bug: (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall shutdown)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28183: tor-0.3.5.3_alpha unexpected stop bug: (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall
attempt (syscall shutdown)
-+-
 Reporter:  n05  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox regression 035-must  |  Actual Points:
  034-backport? 033-backport 029-backport?   |
  regression? 035-rc-blocker?|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 ack.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28362 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure our .may_includes files describe a noncircular dependency structure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28362: Make sure our .may_includes files describe a noncircular dependency
structure
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Travis is unhappy with a code warning: https://travis-
 ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/451958130

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Typo in comment for rend_cache_failure in feature/rend/rendcache.c: "usuable" should be "usable"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28425: Typo in comment for rend_cache_failure in feature/rend/rendcache.c:
"usuable" should be "usable"
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27841 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close intro circuit after introduction has been completed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27841: Close intro circuit after introduction has been completed
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs dos 033-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 Merged into 035 and master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28426 [Internal Services/Service - git]: translations repo: please move 2 branches to the translations attic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28426: translations repo: please move 2 branches to the translations attic
-+
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * type:  defect => task


Old description:

> ey there:
>
> in https://git.torproject.org/translation.git/ two more branches can be
> moved to https://git.torproject.org/translation-attic.git
>
> There are:
>
> * torbutton-browserproperties
> * torbutton-browserproperties_completed (go figure!)
>
> thanks

New description:

 ey there:

 in https://git.torproject.org/translation.git/ two more branches can be
 moved to https://git.torproject.org/translation-attic.git

 There are:

 * torbutton-browserproperties
 * torbutton-browserproperties_completed (go figure!)

 This file has been deleted from master at
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/commit/src/chrome/locale/en/browser.properties?id=fc91b515a6e0d9e5455d39e52abf2c1352e20f3c

 because:
 "To keep the browser.startup.homepage pref value out of translators hands,
 all of the localized browser.properties files have been removed and the
 pref value (about:tor) has been moved to a new non-localized.properties
 file. We no longer provide a value for spellchecker.dictionary, which
 means non en-US users will probably need to set their spellchecking
 language from the browser context menu or via about:config after they
 install a dictionary for their language. The browser will also consult the
 LANG environment variable and use a "default default" of en-US if an en-US
 dictionary is installed."


 thanks

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[tor-bugs] #28426 [Internal Services/Service - git]: translations repo: please move 2 branches to the translations attic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28426: translations repo: please move 2 branches to the translations attic
-+
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 ey there:

 in https://git.torproject.org/translation.git/ two more branches can be
 moved to https://git.torproject.org/translation-attic.git

 There are:

 * torbutton-browserproperties
 * torbutton-browserproperties_completed (go figure!)

 thanks

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Typo in comment for rend_cache_failure in feature/rend/rendcache.c: "usuable" should be "usable"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28425: Typo in comment for rend_cache_failure in feature/rend/rendcache.c:
"usuable" should be "usable"
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:   => tor-doc
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28424 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor hs_service_callback() to no longer need to run once per second?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28424: Refactor hs_service_callback() to no longer need to run once per second?
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28335| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
--+
Description changed by nickm:

Old description:

> This is maybe a lot of work, but it would help if we could make all the
> once-a-second portions of this function into things that we can turn off
> if we're dormant?  I'm hoping for a feature (optional?) where a dormant
> onion service does the minimum work possible to keep itself online and
> wait for introductions.
>
> This is a reach task; if we do the reset of the parent ticket, we'll be
> fine.

New description:

 This is maybe a lot of work, but it would help if we could make all the
 once-a-second portions of this function into things that we can turn off
 if we're dormant?  I'm hoping for a feature (optional?) where a dormant
 onion service does the minimum work possible to keep itself online and
 wait for introductions.

 This is a reach task; if we do the rest of the parent ticket, we'll be
 fine.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Typo in comment for rend_cache_failure in feature/rend/rendcache.c: "usuable" should be "usable"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28425: Typo in comment for rend_cache_failure in feature/rend/rendcache.c:
"usuable" should be "usable"
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by neel):

 PR is here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/501

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Typo in comment for rend_cache_failure in feature/rend/rendcache.c: "usuable" should be "usable" (was: Typo in comment for rend_cache_failure: "usuable" should be

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28425: Typo in comment for rend_cache_failure in feature/rend/rendcache.c:
"usuable" should be "usable"
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by neel:

Old description:



New description:

 PR is here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/501

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[tor-bugs] #28425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Typo in comment for rend_cache_failure: "usuable" should be "usable"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28425: Typo in comment for rend_cache_failure: "usuable" should be "usable"
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28027 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor keeps opening circuits while waiting for bridge descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28027: Tor keeps opening circuits while waiting for bridge descriptors
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, regression, tor-guard  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by neel):

 Thanks for the clarification.

 Also, if a bridge is usable, is it okay to call
 `note_that_we_completed_a_circuit()` in `learned_bridge_descriptor()` if
 we get a bridge descriptor?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 034-backport, 035-must,  |  Actual Points:
  035-rc-blocker?|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  regression, assert, 035-must, 035-rc-blocker? => regression,
 034-backport, 035-must, 035-rc-blocker?
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Proposed fix on 034:

 Branch: `ticket27750_034_01`
 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/500

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[tor-bugs] #28424 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor hs_service_callback() to no longer need to run once per second?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28424: Refactor hs_service_callback() to no longer need to run once per second?
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28335
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can  |
--+
 This is maybe a lot of work, but it would help if we could make all the
 once-a-second portions of this function into things that we can turn off
 if we're dormant?  I'm hoping for a feature (optional?) where a dormant
 onion service does the minimum work possible to keep itself online and
 wait for introductions.

 This is a reach task; if we do the reset of the parent ticket, we'll be
 fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27841 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close intro circuit after introduction has been completed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27841: Close intro circuit after introduction has been completed
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs dos 033-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 LGTM!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, assert, 035-must, 035|  Actual Points:
  -rc-blocker?   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by udo):

 FWIW:
 Upgraded to 0.3.5.4-alpha recently but had to change the open ports after
 local ISP complained about ssh brute force.
 With these changed ports after three full days no manifestation of
 tor_bug_occurred_() occurred yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB often opens on secondary monitor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28323: TBB often opens on secondary monitor
--+---
 Reporter:  heyjoe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by heyjoe):

 > Hm, so, this does not happen always?

 Correct.

 > When you are starting Tor Browser are you just seeing the browser window
 on the second screen or everything browser related (e.g. the Tor Launcher
 start-up wizard as well)?

 Just the browser window.

 > Does Firefox 60esr behave differently during start-up in your
 environment?

 I no longer use Firefox. The last time I did (perhaps September) it didn't
 behave this way. The issue reported here has been an issue for a very long
 time (1-2 years perhaps, maybe more) so it is not related to FF 60esr. I
 think it is related to TBB's settings which resize/reposition the window
 on identity change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, assert, 035-must, 035|  Actual Points:
  -rc-blocker?   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Ok, here is my analysis (we are in mainloop.c, function
 `conn_close_if_marked()`:

 The idea of the function is to do some actions for a connection that is
 marked "for close". Tor must flush everything on the wire for a connection
 that is about to get closed thus it looks at the *write* bucket and see if
 it can:

 `ssize_t sz = connection_bucket_write_limit(conn, now);`

 Then it tries to flush regardless of the value in `sz` which if `sz = 0`
 then `retval` will be `0` as well. Which brings us to where the `BUG()`
 happens in the condition:

 {{{
   } else if (sz == 0) {
 /* Also, retval==0.  If we get here, we didn't want to write
 anything
  * (because of rate-limiting) and we didn't. */
 }}}

 The whole point of this condition iiuc is to keep the connection "alive"
 because it is being rate limited but still has data to flush (we check
 `connection_wants_to_flush()`).

 I believe #28089 fixed this for the `is_writing()` case and now we are
 only seeing the `is_reading()` case on tor >= 0.3.4.8.

 `connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(conn);` can most of the time *not*
 stop the connection from reading because simply the bucket aren't empty
 for the read() part of the connection. Which means that we will hit the
 `BUG()` probably often when the connection can't write anymore. From the
 code:

 {{{
 if (BUG(connection_is_reading(conn))) {
   /* + We should make this code unreachable; if a connection
 is
* marked for close and flushing, there is no point in reading
 to it
* at all. Further, checking at this point is a bit of a hack:
 it
* would make much more sense to react in
* connection_handle_read_impl, or to just stop reading in
* mark_and_flush */
   connection_read_bw_exhausted(conn, true/* kludge. */);
 }
 }}}

 I agree with the comment. We shouldn't even `BUG()` there in the first
 place, actually, it makes no sense to call the bw exhausted. We should
 simply stop reading() because the connection is marked for close and move
 on regardless of the read state.

 Again, this condition is only relevant if we _need_ to flush data on the
 wire but we are prevented to do so because of rate limit.

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[tor-bugs] #28423 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve precision of finegrained periodic event scheduling?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28423: improve precision of finegrained periodic event scheduling?
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28335
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8  |
--+
 The periodic.c events are scheduled with respect to the current time, via
 event_add() with a timeout.  But libevent's periodic events are scheduled
 with respect to their last planned time, to prevent drift.

 With the parent branch, I'm changing second_elapsed_callback() to just be
 a regular periodic event.  Will the change in scheduling mechanism break
 anything?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28422 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a timed "wakeup handler" for hibernation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28422: Add a timed "wakeup handler" for hibernation
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28335| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 We already did most of this as #26064; another commit in my branch does
 the rest (for the shutdown case).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28410 [Core Tor/Tor]: systemd restart loop when tor@default.service::Type=notify

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28410: systemd restart loop when tor@default.service::Type=notify
--+
 Reporter:  jchevali  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  systemd   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by jchevali):

 gcc version is 4.9.2-10.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28410 [Core Tor/Tor]: systemd restart loop when tor@default.service::Type=notify

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28410: systemd restart loop when tor@default.service::Type=notify
--+
 Reporter:  jchevali  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  systemd   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by jchevali):

 By the way, I'm building on jessie, not stretch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28410 [Core Tor/Tor]: systemd restart loop when tor@default.service::Type=notify

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28410: systemd restart loop when tor@default.service::Type=notify
--+
 Reporter:  jchevali  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  systemd   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by jchevali):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  not a bug =>


Comment:

 It appears that simply adding libsystemd-dev (amd64 215-17+deb8u7) to my
 system is enough to prevent me from building, even ''before'' I may add
 --enable-systemd to the configure command.

 {{{
 ./configure --prefix= --enable-lzma=yes --enable-zstd=no --disable-
 asciidoc --disable-unittests
 }}}

 Building with the library installed makes it error. Removing it makes it
 stop erroring.

 {{{
   ...
   ...
   ...
   CC   src/feature/hibernate/hibernate.o
 src/feature/hibernate/hibernate.c: In function ‘hibernate_begin’:
 src/feature/hibernate/hibernate.c:876:5:
warning: implicit declaration of function ‘sd_notifyf’ [-Wimplicit-
 function-declaration]
  sd_notifyf(0, "EXTEND_TIMEOUT_USEC=%" PRIu64,
  ^
 src/feature/hibernate/hibernate.c:876:5:
   warning: nested extern declaration of ‘sd_notifyf’ [-Wnested-externs]
 src/feature/hibernate/hibernate.c:877:62:
   error: ‘TOR_USEC_PER_SEC’ undeclared (first use in this function)
  ((uint64_t)(options->ShutdownWaitLength) + 30) * TOR_USEC_PER_SEC);
   ^
 src/feature/hibernate/hibernate.c:877:62:
   note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function
 it appears in
 Makefile:9071: recipe for target 'src/feature/hibernate/hibernate.o'
 failed
 make[1]: *** [src/feature/hibernate/hibernate.o] Error 1
 make[1]: Leaving directory '/tmp/tor-0.3.5.4-alpha-with-lzma'
 Makefile:4987: recipe for target 'all' failed
 make: *** [all] Error 2
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28027 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor keeps opening circuits while waiting for bridge descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28027: Tor keeps opening circuits while waiting for bridge descriptors
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, regression, tor-guard  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by dgoulet):

 H I think the problem lies in the fact that "tor" thinks it can
 complete a circuit but in fact it can't because it has no running bridges
 as in it just switched to using one and is waiting for it to be usable.

 That being said, I think the avenue to resolving this is rather to signal
 tor that we can NOT complete circuits when our Guard state just changed.

 To do that, simply call `note_that_we_maybe_cant_complete_circuits()`.
 Quick look at this, probably it should be done around this in `config.c`:

 {{{
 if (transition_affects_guards) {
   if (guards_update_all()) {
 abandon_circuits = 1;
   }
 }
 }}}

 The tricky part will be to confirm that tor does at some point realizes it
 can complete circuits once the bridge is usable and thus the HS subsystem
 can start building circuits.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28392 [Applications]: personal information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28392: personal information
--+-
 Reporter:  megryan4679   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28386 [- Select a component]: Multi-user bug reporting account "cypherpunks" cited on Wiki main page is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28386: Multi-user bug reporting account "cypherpunks" cited on Wiki main page 
is
broken
--+-
 Reporter:  califuture|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 That was removed due to spam. We are monitoring the situation and will put
 back `cypherpunks` rights once things stabilize.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28286 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing header in freespace.c when building for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28286: Missing header in freespace.c when building for Android
--+
 Reporter:  goapunk   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28331 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor gets my public ip address wrong. No wonder you cannot reach me.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28331: Tor gets my public ip address wrong. No wonder you cannot reach me.
-+--
 Reporter:  peterinprivate   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  public ip, split tunnelling  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28361 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow few nodes-list options in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28361: Allow few nodes-list options in torrc
+--
 Reporter:  wagon   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-options, torrc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28361 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow few nodes-list options in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28361: Allow few nodes-list options in torrc
+--
 Reporter:  wagon   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-options, torrc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  arma => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28361 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow few nodes-list options in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28361: Allow few nodes-list options in torrc
+--
 Reporter:  wagon   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-options, torrc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => tor-options, torrc
 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * status:  assigned => new
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 IIRC, you are proposing a feature to define a "group of nodes" and then
 use that in the option that takes a node list?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28405 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unable to parse networkstatus consensus (related to CR in time field)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28405: Unable to parse networkstatus consensus (related to CR in time field)
--+--
 Reporter:  nth   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28413 [Core Tor/Tor]: FreeBSD build warning in aes_new_cipher()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28413: FreeBSD build warning in aes_new_cipher()
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-crypto, 029-backport,|  Actual Points:  0
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28382 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update bandwidth file headers in dir-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28382: Update bandwidth file headers in dir-spec
-+--
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry, teor  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28419 [Core Tor/Tor]: libtorrunner: memory leak in tor_runner error path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28419: libtorrunner: memory leak in tor_runner error path
--+--
 Reporter:  merge |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  memleak   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => memleak
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28413 [Core Tor/Tor]: FreeBSD build warning in aes_new_cipher()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28413: FreeBSD build warning in aes_new_cipher()
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto, 029-backport,|  Actual Points:  0
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28413 [Core Tor/Tor]: FreeBSD build warning in aes_new_cipher()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28413: FreeBSD build warning in aes_new_cipher()
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto, 029-backport,|  Actual Points:  0
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet
 * keywords:   => tor-crypto, 029-backport, 033-backport, 034-backport


Comment:

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28336 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split ROLE_ALL into new roles and make it always on role

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28336: Split ROLE_ALL into new roles and make it always on role
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  mainloop  |  Actual Points:  1.5
Parent ID:  #28335| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented
 * actualpoints:   => 1.5


Comment:

 Done as part of parent ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28421 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move control_per_second_events() into a separate callback.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28421: Move control_per_second_events() into a separate callback.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #28335| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 Done as part of parent ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28354 [Metrics/Website]: Does the total consensus weight graph belong in the traffic section?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28354: Does the total consensus weight graph belong in the traffic section?
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28328   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Alright. Leaving the graph where it is, because it seems to be the best
 place for now. Happy to reconsider later. Thanks for the suggestion
 anyway! Closing as wontfix.

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[tor-bugs] #28422 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a timed "wakeup handler" for hibernation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28422: Add a timed "wakeup handler" for hibernation
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28335
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8  |
--+
 The only part of consider_hibernation() that we can't turn off when we're
 hibernating is the part where we decide to wake up because of elapsed
 time.  So let's do that with a timer rather than in
 run_scheduled_events().

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[tor-bugs] #28421 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move control_per_second_events() into a separate callback.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28421: Move control_per_second_events() into a separate callback.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28335
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25013 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move TorButton code to the tor browser repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25013: Move TorButton code to the tor browser repository
-+-
 Reporter:  igt0 |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a2,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:  #10760   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk, sysrqb, mcs, |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by igt0):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Yeah, oddly enough, the submodule was using an old git hash.

 I updated the patch:

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25013/0001-Bug-25013
 -Add-torbutton-as-a-tor-browser-submodule.2.patch

 - Updated the submodule commit
 - Added a reference to the bug #27611

 Replying to [comment:62 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:61 igt0]:
 > > Patch for tor browser:
 > >
 > >
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25013/0001-Bug-25013
 -Add-torbutton-as-a-tor-browser-submodule.patch
 > >
 > > ** Bug 25013: Add torbutton as a tor-browser submodule**
 >
 > This is essentially a fix for #27611 as you seem to indicate in your
 commit message? If so, lets mention that ticket there, too.
 >
 > The submodule commit seems wrong. I can't check Torbutton out. I guess
 it should be ac8d9251494056e761bb2cf5c2a4795a888f38bd instead?
 >
 > s/non restartless/non-restartless/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25013 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move TorButton code to the tor browser repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25013: Move TorButton code to the tor browser repository
-+-
 Reporter:  igt0 |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a2,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:  #10760   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk, sysrqb, mcs, |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by igt0):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-25013-Add-torbutton-as-a-tor-browser-
 submodule.2.patch" added.

 v2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27293 [Webpages/Website]: Expired core people's gpg keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27293: Expired core people's gpg keys
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * cc: ahf, hiro, hellais, mo, saint, dawuud, donncha, micahlee (added)


Comment:

 Reran the script and updated above. It seems some keys are updated in the
 pool but not on db.torproject.org, so it could be easily solved with a
 signed statement to refresh them on db.tpo.

 Would be happy to shrink this list a bit more :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28410 [Core Tor/Tor]: systemd restart loop when tor@default.service::Type=notify

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28410: systemd restart loop when tor@default.service::Type=notify
--+
 Reporter:  jchevali  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  systemd   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug
 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 type=simple probably works because your tor is built without systemd
 notify support.

 Try configuring your tor build with --enable-systemd, which activates
 systemd notify support.

 If that doesn't work, please re-open this ticket, and we'll look into it
 further.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28416 [Core Tor/Tor]: The ns consensus isn't explicitly ns in the network-status-version line of flavored consensuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28416: The ns consensus isn't explicitly ns in the network-status-version line 
of
flavored consensuses
--+
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  dir-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Spec tickets go in the latest Tor milestone, I think

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