[tor-bugs] #29323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build libevent

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29323: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build libevent
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29321
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We should replace our mingw-w64/gcc toolchain with the mingw-w64/clang one
 for building libevent.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29322 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build OpenSSL

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29322: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build OpenSSL
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29321
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We should ditch mingw-w64/gcc for OpenSSL and switch to mingw-w64/clang
 instead.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build tor

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29321: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build tor
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29318
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We should switch to our mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build tor.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29320 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Rust

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29320: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Rust
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29318
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We should ditch mingw-w64/gcc for Rust.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28238: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201901,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901   |
Parent ID:  #29318   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:16 cypherpunks]:
 > Whoa! Cypherpunks operational!
 >
 > Of course, that explodes, but whether I'm the only one who is interested
 in it?

 Care to give more context? Which of the bundles did you test? On which
 Windows version? What happened? What error did you get, if any?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29307 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian Stretch for cross-compiling our Windows builds

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29307: Use Debian Stretch for cross-compiling our Windows builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902R,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201902  |
Parent ID:  #28238   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902, GeorgKoppen201902 => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201902R, GeorgKoppen201902


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #29120, #26861, #27045, #27265, ...

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #29120, #26861, #27045, #27265, #28885, #29180, #29187 by 
gk:


Comment:
Moving our review tickets to February.

--
Tickets URL: 

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28716 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a mingw-w64-clang project

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28716: Create a mingw-w64-clang project
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902R,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201902  |
Parent ID:  #28238   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201901, GeorgKoppen201901 => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201902R, GeorgKoppen201902
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I think I am pretty close to the toolchain I am happy with. I pushed
 another couple of commits to `bug_28716_v2`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/log/?h=bug_28716_v2) and squashed everything into
 `bug_28716_v8_squashed` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser-build.git/log/?h=bug_28716_v8_squashed). That branch has two
 commits: 736c85a9e533014c70017a9b5a19b36353d06540 has the squashed
 contents for providing mingw-w64/clang and
 7322ee826b486039aa007dc94891d2b7218ace1c on top of that provides an `lld`
 patch for optionally dealing with PE header timestamp issues (by zeroing
 them out similar to `ld`'s `-Wl,--no-insert-timestamp`). I'll try to get
 that one upstreamed.

 I played a bit with bumping the llvm revision to r351992 in order to get a
 proper `llvm-strip` and `llvm-objcopy` but run into a bunch of issues
 which made me pause for now (see:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1471698 for context).

 FWIW: that's 9.0a1 material, too.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29307 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian Stretch for cross-compiling our Windows builds

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29307: Use Debian Stretch for cross-compiling our Windows builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201902  |
Parent ID:  #28238   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_29307` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_29307=8b4e03eb5f39e0bb34c8b7cdf00a9dc5102a7d5d)
 has the commit for review. It's on top of the one from #29319 for easier
 testing.

 That's 9.0a1 material as well.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29319 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove FTE support in Windows bundles

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29319: Remove FTE support in Windows bundles
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902R,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201902  |
Parent ID:  #29307   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: boklm (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29319 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove FTE support in Windows bundles

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29319: Remove FTE support in Windows bundles
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902R,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201902  |
Parent ID:  #29307   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 boklm: One thing that made me wonder while preparing the patch is the
 `pycrypto` build for Linux. In particular:
 {{{
 ./configure --build=i686-linux-gnu [% c("var/configure_opt") %]
 }}}
 Do you know why we have this line setting `--build` unconditionally to a
 32bit system? We don't have it in our old Gitian descriptor at least.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29307 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian Stretch for cross-compiling our Windows builds

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29307: Use Debian Stretch for cross-compiling our Windows builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201902  |
Parent ID:  #28238   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 I think given that FTE is about to go away we'll just rip the remaining
 Windows support out. This will be done in #29319.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29319 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove FTE support in Windows bundles

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29319: Remove FTE support in Windows bundles
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902R,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201902  |
Parent ID:  #29307   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902, GeorgKoppen201902 => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201902R, GeorgKoppen201902
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_29319` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_29319=3fc6bfc9d8df2bb558261c05c5e0c6d9bb69e942)
 has a patch for review.

 Note: we should start deploying that on `master` once we'll prepare for
 the first 9.0 alpha.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24195 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build fteproxy and obfsproxy for Windows 64

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24195: Build fteproxy and obfsproxy for Windows 64
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We have no plans to fix that. See: #29319.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29319 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove FTE support in Windows bundles

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29319: Remove FTE support in Windows bundles
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201902,
 |  GeorgKoppen201902
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29307
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We have FTE support in our 32bit bundles but lack it for 64bit Windows
 ones (#24195). Given that FTE support is going away soon and that we want
 to fix #29307 for our mingw-w64/clang toolchain we rip out FTE from 32bit
 bundles as well.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28238: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201901,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901   |
Parent ID:  #29318   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * parent:   => #29318


Comment:

 oops

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28238: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201901,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * parent:  #29318 =>


Comment:

 Whoa! Cypherpunks operational!

 Of course, that explodes, but whether I'm the only one who is interested
 in it?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28238: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201901,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901   |
Parent ID:  #29318   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:   => #29318


Comment:

 Here is a 32bit one to try out:

 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/torbrowser-install-tbb-
 nightly_28238_1_en-US.exe
 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/torbrowser-install-tbb-
 nightly_28238_1_en-US.exe.asc

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Searching after start-up when about:tor is loaded returns "400 Bad Request" sometimes

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29119: Searching after start-up when about:tor is loaded returns "400 Bad 
Request"
sometimes
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression, tbb-8.0-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 When this happens, you always get:
 {{{
 06:40:20.543 "Handler function threw an exception: [Exception...
 "Component returned failure code: 0x80040111 (NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE)
 [nsIHttpChannelInternal.remoteAddress]"  nsresult: "0x80040111
 (NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE)"  location: "JS frame ::
 resource://devtools/shared/base-loader.js ->
 resource://devtools/shared/webconsole/network-monitor.js ::
 _onResponseHeader :: line 1369"  data: no]
 Stack: _onResponseHeader@resource://devtools/shared/base-loader.js ->
 resource://devtools/shared/webconsole/network-monitor.js:1369:5
 _dispatchActivity@resource://devtools/shared/base-loader.js ->
 resource://devtools/shared/webconsole/network-monitor.js:1011:9
 NetworkMonitor.prototype.observeActivity<@resource://devtools/shared/base-
 loader.js -> resource://devtools/shared/webconsole/network-
 monitor.js:1073:7
 exports.makeInfallible/<@resource://devtools/shared/base-loader.js ->
 resource://devtools/shared/ThreadSafeDevToolsUtils.js:109:14
 Line: 1369, column: 0" 1 ThreadSafeDevToolsUtils.js:88:5
 reportException
 resource://devtools/shared/ThreadSafeDevToolsUtils.js:88:5
 exports.makeInfallible/<
 resource://devtools/shared/ThreadSafeDevToolsUtils.js:115:7
 }}}
 HAR:
 {{{
 {
   "log": {
 "version": "1.1",
 "creator": {
   "name": "Firefox",
   "version": "60.5.0"
 },
 "browser": {
   "name": "Firefox",
   "version": "60.5.0"
 },
 "pages": [
   {
 "startedDateTime": "2019-02-04T06:45:51.143+00:00",
 "id": "page_1",
 "title": "About Tor",
 "pageTimings": {
   "onContentLoad": -1549262751143,
   "onLoad": -1549262751143
 }
   }
 ],
 "entries": [
   {
 "pageref": "page_1",
 "startedDateTime": "2019-02-04T06:45:51.143+00:00",
 "request": {
   "bodySize": 0,
   "method": "POST",
   "url": "https://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion/;,
   "httpVersion": "",
   "headers": [
 {
   "name": "Host",
   "value": "3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion"
 },
 {
   "name": "User-Agent",
   "value": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:60.0)
 Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0"
 },
 {
   "name": "Accept",
   "value":
 "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8"
 },
 {
   "name": "Accept-Language",
   "value": "en-US,en;q=0.5"
 },
 {
   "name": "Accept-Encoding",
   "value": "gzip, deflate, br"
 },
 {
   "name": "Content-Type",
   "value": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
 },
 {
   "name": "Content-Length",
   "value": "6"
 },
 {
   "name": "Connection",
   "value": "keep-alive"
 },
 {
   "name": "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests",
   "value": "1"
 }
   ],
   "cookies": [],
   "queryString": [],
   "headersSize": 392
 },
 "response": {
   "status": 0,
   "statusText": "",
   "httpVersion": "",
   "headers": [
 {
   "name": "server",
   "value": "nginx"
 },
 {
   "name": "date",
   "value": "Mon, 04 Feb 2019 06:45:58 GMT"
 },
 {
   "name": "content-type",
   "value": "text/html; charset=UTF-8"
 },
 {
   "name": "content-length",
   "value": "166"
 },
 {
   "name": "strict-transport-security",
   "value": "max-age=0"
 },
 {
   "name": "x-frame-options",
   "value": "SAMEORIGIN"
 },
 {
   "name": "content-security-policy",
   "value": "default-src https: blob: data: 'unsafe-inline'
 'unsafe-eval'; frame-ancestors 'self'"
   

[tor-bugs] #29318 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Drop mingw-w64/gcc toolchain

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29318: Drop mingw-w64/gcc toolchain
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This ticket is the parent ticket for all things related to dropping the
 mingw-w64/gcc toolchain in favor of our new mingw-w64/clang one.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29317 [Core Tor/Tor]: Protect heartbeat logs using PrivCount

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29317: Protect heartbeat logs using PrivCount
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  privcount
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #22898
   Points:  3 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Sometimes, we ask relay operators to share their heartbeat logs on mailing
 lists or the bug tracker. Other relay operators keep graphs of their
 heartbeat logs (or other tor statistics).

 Once we have implemented PrivCount, we can add noise to these stats, round
 them, and then log them:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2019-February/013659.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29234 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser Fails to start macos 10.14.3

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29234: Tor Browser Fails to start macos 10.14.3
--+--
 Reporter:  bbush |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by bbush):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I fixed my problem. I ran the following command in the terminal:

 defaults write -g NSRequiresAquaSystemAppearance -bool Yes

 I will close the ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Searching after start-up when about:tor is loaded returns "400 Bad Request" sometimes

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29119: Searching after start-up when about:tor is loaded returns "400 Bad 
Request"
sometimes
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression, tbb-8.0-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 gk told me to come here from the blog:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/279574#comment-279574

 Linux x64
 Tor Browser 8 to now (8.0.5)
 TorButton "Safest"
 DuckDuckGoOnion

 I started to notice it in September 2018 around TBB 8, and it goes on to
 the present day.  I use DuckDuckGoOnion from the URL bar or the broswer's
 UI search bar.  The error "400 Bad Request nginx" usually appears on the
 first search after starting Tor Browser or a New Identity. When I click a
 second time, it always goes through ok from that point forward until 1) I
 reopen Tor Browser or make a New Identity or 2) less often in the same
 session when I haven't searched in a long time (30-90 minutes I think).
 While on "Safer," I think the error doesn't appear as often.

 I can't speak for Startpage because I do not use it.

 I don't know if the following relates, but I received it after successful
 searches on "Safest" on https://duckduckgo.com/html/ (not the onion) in
 the webpage UI's search box, not by searching from the URL bar or
 browser's UI search bar.  The page was empty, white, and black text said:
 We've detected that you have connected over Tor. There appears to be
 an issue with the Tor Exit Node you are currently using. Please recreate
 your Tor circuit or restart your Tor browser in order to fix this. If this
 error persists, please let us know: error-lite-tor @ duckduckgo.com

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.4 eventually hits "Delaying directory fetches: No running bridges" after some period of inactivity with bridges

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29245: Tor 0.4 eventually hits "Delaying directory fetches: No running bridges"
after some period of inactivity with bridges
+--
 Reporter:  ArmalsLoveArmalsLife|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-regression, snowflake?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by ArmalsLoveArmalsLife):

 One note though: It's not an issue with the snowflake server since all it
 takes for me to get Tor working again is to just restart the browser and
 then it immediately works again.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29077 [Obfuscation/meek]: uTLS for meek-client camouflage

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29077: uTLS for meek-client camouflage
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat utls |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by yawning):

 I have changed meek_lite to use `Firefox_Auto` and a forked version of
 utls that adds a number of compatibility fixes.  Additionally I believe
 that the Firefox fingerprint is unchanged in 65.  There was one
 ciphersuite difference between FF 65 as packaged and ran on Fedora and
 that produced by utls, but that is due to Fedora disabling 3DES.

 There's one more feature I want to add to meek_lite before tagging, but
 unless anything comes up, this is close to what I'm currently leaning
 towards tagging as 0.0.9.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29315 [Metrics/Website]: Write down guidelines for adding new stats

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29315: Write down guidelines for adding new stats
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 There, attached a first draft. Please let me know what you think!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29315 [Metrics/Website]: Write down guidelines for adding new stats

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29315: Write down guidelines for adding new stats
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "guidelines.txt" added.

 Initial guidelines for adding stats

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29316 [- Select a component]: Donald Trump

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29316: Donald Trump
+--
 Reporter:  revelation  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Donald Trump transgender,  dressed in woman's clothing.  baby pictures.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29315 [Metrics/Website]: Write down guidelines for adding new stats

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29315: Write down guidelines for adding new stats
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  3|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 We're going to add a few new stats to Tor Metrics in the next months:
 BridgeDB, PrivCount, sbws, and maybe more, in no specific order.

 Let's write down some initial guidelines what we expect and what others
 can expect. And let's refine these initial guidelines as we add some
 actual stats. Once we're happy with them we should put them on Tor
 Metrics.

 Assigning this ticket to myself for now, as I'm going to post a first
 draft soon. Cc'ing a few folks who we'll be working together with on
 adding new data.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 The function `dirserv_load_fingerprint_file()` reads the file `approved-
 routers`. I have a few questions:

  1. Should the ed25519 key in the `approved-routers` file be a
 base16-encoded key (similar to what we do right now with RSA
 fingerprints)?
  2. Would it be okay that if a ed25519 key was given, I check keypin
 hashtable to get the relay's corresponding RSA key and then add it to the
 list? I propose will be done with a new function that searches the ed25519
 keypin hash table for each entry until a matching ed25519 key is given,
 and then return a corresponding RSA key.

 I am concerned with Point 2 however because of the O(n^2^) running time
 from needing to go through the list of all Tor relays. Another concern is
 that mapping ed25519 to RSA could mean we prolong the life of the RSA
 code.

 Would it be better to overhaul the relay data structures to be
 ed25519-first and then do this?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27503: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201901, TorBrowserTeam201901|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by onionsoup):

 I consistently get a "your tab just crashed" message when running this
 build, so I can't actually load any webpages. The "your tab just crashed"
 page is accessible however.
 Replying to [comment:36 gk]:
 > Okay, let's try finding out something with a debug build. I created one
 based on ESR 60.5.0 with accessibility support:
 >
 > https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/torbrowser-install-win64
 -tbb-nightly_en-US_27503_6050.exe
 > https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/torbrowser-install-win64
 -tbb-nightly_en-US_27503_6050.exe.asc
 >
 > Could someone affected by this bug run it and attach the log output here
 reproducing the issue in comment:13? I hope we see some assertions in it
 that might give us a hint at what is going on and where to look closer.
 >
 > Note: you might need to start Tor Browser several times until it finally
 starts up: once due to a crash on first start and the second time due to a
 bug in network status parsing on Windows which stalls the Tor startup.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27503: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201901, TorBrowserTeam201901|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by onionsoup):

 * Attachment "debuglog.txt" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29232 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a function that prints a link specifier and link specifier list

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29232: Write a function that prints a link specifier and link specifier list
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel (added)
 * owner:  (none) => neel
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.4 eventually hits "Delaying directory fetches: No running bridges" after some period of inactivity with bridges

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29245: Tor 0.4 eventually hits "Delaying directory fetches: No running bridges"
after some period of inactivity with bridges
+--
 Reporter:  ArmalsLoveArmalsLife|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-regression, snowflake?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by ArmalsLoveArmalsLife):

 Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > Does this happen only with snowflake, or non-snowflake?
 I'm in a censored area for the moment so I can't answer that question
 (meek is a no-no since it's too damn slow).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29314 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Give Timeline access permissions to cypherpunks account

2019-02-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29314: Give Timeline access permissions to cypherpunks account
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:  qbi
  ArmalsLoveArmalsLife   |
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Internal Services/Service -
 |  trac
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 It's impossible for me to contribute to trac without following the
 timeline, I'm sorry but it looks increasingly to me that you're
 gatekeeping potential contributors with moves that make no sense such this
 one

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs