Re: [tor-bugs] #30446 [Applications/Tor Browser]: google recaptcha doesnt work on any website or page using latest tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30446: google recaptcha doesnt work on any website or page using latest tor
browser
--+--
 Reporter:  kingfitz  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  torbrowser, recaptcha |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * priority:  High => Medium
 * owner:  hiro => tbb-team
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * component:  Webpages/Webtools => Applications/Tor Browser
 * severity:  Major => Normal


Comment:

 (A) Are you using the default setting for the security slider? That is,
 allowing javascript, etc?

 (B) Assuming yes to question 'A', I believe this is a choice by the
 destination website, to punish the IP address that you're coming from, and
 isn't actually about the browser at all. :(

 That said, I use websites that use recaptcha, in Tor Browser, and it works
 for me. (I still haven't figured out what the internet thinks is a traffic
 light, but that's a different problem.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30446 [Webpages/Webtools]: google recaptcha doesnt work on any website or page using latest tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30446: google recaptcha doesnt work on any website or page using latest tor
browser
---+---
 Reporter:  kingfitz   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Component:  Webpages/Webtools
  Version:  Tor: unspecified   |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:  torbrowser, recaptcha  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
 this is a very old and annoying issue, google recaptcha (v2) never works.
 I do the recaptcha correctly every time, and on clicking verify it just
 resets the recaptcha into an endless loop of aggravating infinity.i
 cant log into certain sites or even use someones contact page due to
 recaptcha loop. pick any website with a recaptcha, in my case trying to
 log into discord.  recaptcha doesnt validate, ever...I wonder if it will
 be fixed sometime this decade?  ive seen this problem for years.

 Tor browser version:
 8.0.9 (based on Mozilla Firefox 60.6.1esr) (64-bit)  windows 10 x64.
 doesnt work on macOS version either.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30350 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to Tor network through Snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30350: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to 
Tor
network through Snowflake bridge.
---+---
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011 |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by amiableclarity2011):

 On this April 17th, I only ran Tor browser for a short time. I don't know
 whether I was able to connect to Tor network through Snowflake bridge for
 a long time on this April 17th or not. On this May 1st, I can't connect to
 Tor network through Snowflake bridge.
 Today in China, Tor browser 8.5a12 version still can't connect to Tor
 network through Snowflake bridge.

 Below are Tor log messages.

 5/9/19, 03:41:11.103 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/9/19, 03:41:11.103 [NOTICE] Switching to guard context "bridges" (was
 using "default")
 5/9/19, 03:41:11.103 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/9/19, 03:41:11.104 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/9/19, 03:41:11.104 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/9/19, 03:41:11.104 [NOTICE] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/9/19, 03:41:11.104 [NOTICE] Renaming old configuration file to
 "/home/scientist/tor-browser-linux64-8.5a12_en-US.tar.xz 2019 5 9/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc.orig.1"
 5/9/19, 03:41:12.560 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 1% (conn_pt): Connecting to
 pluggable transport
 5/9/19, 03:41:12.570 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 2% (conn_done_pt): Connected to
 pluggable transport
 5/9/19, 03:41:54.183 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to a
 relay
 5/9/19, 03:42:24.236 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 10%
 (conn_done): Connected to a relay. (DONE; DONE; count 1; recommendation
 warn; host 2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72 at 0.0.3.0:1)
 5/9/19, 03:42:24.237 [WARN] 1 connections have failed:
 5/9/19, 03:42:24.237 [WARN]  1 connections died in state handshaking (TLS)
 with SSL state SSLv2/v3 read server hello A in HANDSHAKE
 5/9/19, 03:42:24.256 [NOTICE] Closing no-longer-configured Socks listener
 on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/9/19, 03:42:24.256 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/9/19, 03:42:24.256 [WARN] Pluggable Transport process terminated with
 status code 0

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28780 [Core Tor/Tor]: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is active

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28780: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is 
active
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  6
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Ok, in addition to the pathbias fix and log improvements above, I pushed
 two more additional commits to the PR:

 1.
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/966/commits/54bc9f59c0b52f75de76872db7fc872dc4f8f7f4
 - Check for liveness while holding open padding circuits.
 2.
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/966/commits/d03035c8a68f1c0201167d106de703a9ebf2f64a
 - Refactor and clarify hold open logic.

 With these two commits, it should be much easier to verify that it is not
 possible for circpad to hold open a circuit if more than
 CIRCPAD_DELAY_INFINITE==UNIT32_MAX microseconds (or about 1.25 hours) pass
 with no circuit cell delivery events happening. I have not written tests
 for this yet, but if we like this approach, I can.

 I am open to adding additional checks to
 circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(), but I want to temperature check
 how people felt about this handbrake-style lifespan check in the first
 place, because that's the type of thing I'd add to
 circuit_expire_old_circuit_clientside() first.

 I can still be persuaded to eliminate circuit_mark_for_close() and make it
 super clear for callers that they must pick between a new error-close
 version and a differently-named normal-close version, and have each
 version assert if they are called with reason codes that should be used
 with the other version, but that change will be invasive and I am not sure
 that will actually save us from circuit-leak errors (which will actually
 arise from circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside()).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29197 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: remove use of overlays from Tor Launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29197: remove use of overlays from Tor Launcher
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:2 pili]:
 > This will need some ux team work

 As far as I know, our plan is to not make any functional or UX changes.
 XUL overlays are just a fancy #include like mechanism for UI layout. The
 removal of XUL overlays is a "behind the scenes" task that should not
 affect anything visible to our users.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * parent:  #29995 => #28634


Comment:

 This is needed for #28634+#28780 for 0.4.1.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30445 [Community/Relays]: some suggestions to the tor relay guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30445: some suggestions to the tor relay guide
-+--
 Reporter:  caioau   |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Community/Relays
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Hello, I have some suggestions that I did in my relays to be listed in the
 relay guide, they are:

 1. create a non root user add that user to sudo group: root acess should
 be disabled from ssh, so we need to create another user, the set
 PermitRootLogin no in the sshd_config

 2. ssh hardening
 2.1 get new ssh host keys:

 delete old keys (we cannot be sure if new keys were generated, so its good
 to generate new keys)

 {{{

 sudo -s
 cd /etc/ssh
 rm ssh_host_*
 ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 4096 -f ssh_host_rsa_key
 ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f ssh_host_ed25519_key

 }}}

 2.2 disable insecure ssh ciphers: openssh uses some insecure ciphers, se
 in https://stribika.github.io/2015/01/04/secure-secure-shell.html

 just put the followings lines in the sshd_config

 {{{
 HostKeyAlgorithms ssh-ed25519-cert-...@openssh.com,ssh-rsa-
 cert-...@openssh.com,ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa

 KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha...@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
 ,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256

 Ciphers
 
chacha20-poly1...@openssh.com,aes256-...@openssh.com,aes128-...@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr

 MACs hmac-sha2-512-...@openssh.com,hmac-
 sha2-256-...@openssh.com,umac-128-...@openssh.com

 }}}

 2.3 disable password authentication and only use public key
 authentication:

 in your machine run:

 ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -o -a 300 -f ~/.ssh/key

 then copy to the server:

 ssh-copy-id -i ~/.ssh/key user@server

 then try login in with the key ( -i points to the keyfile)

 then make sure that on the sshd_config has this settings:

 {{{
 PubkeyAuthentication yes
 PasswordAuthentication yes
 PermitEmptyPasswords no

 }}}

 2.4 (optional) change the default port, there are alot of bots trying to
 get in , so changing the port makes sense to make their job more difficult

 run: to get an random port number

 {{{
 python -c 'from random import SystemRandom as r;
 print(r().randint(49152,65535))'
 }}}

 the change it in the Port setting in the sshd_config

 2.5 limit the brute force, you can use fail2ban, but I find it simpler to
 use ufw and instead of allowing ssh use the limit.

 3.1 enable swap, sometimes when linux is out of memory then it kills the
 tor process, so creating swap prevents that, or even better use zram.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22729 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revisit relay read/write history resolution (for onion services)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22729: Revisit relay read/write history resolution (for onion services)
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, guard-discovery-stats,   |  Actual Points:
  privcount  |
Parent ID:  #22898   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 In ticket:23512#comment:35, jaym reported that after the fix, write totals
 were larger than read totals for relays under attack by the oom side
 channel.

 There are many possible sources for this discrepancy, and it may not
 actually not be visible under our current live network's stats resolution
 -- the discrepancy was shown only in chutney. We should see if we can
 reproduce it using his code at
 https://github.com/frochet/dropping_on_the_edge/tree/master/hs_drop_attack
 in a more realistic fashion

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30444 [Webpages/Website]: Tor Browser Downloads page https://2019.www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html has no links to download latest version: Tor Browser 8.0.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30444: Tor Browser Downloads page
https://2019.www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html has no links to
download latest version: Tor Browser 8.0.9
--+
 Reporter:  monmire   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Component:
  |  Webpages/Website
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  Tor-Browser-Downloads-page issue  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
 Tor Browser Downloads page
 https://2019.www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html has links to
 download Tor Browser previous version: 8.0.8, but should have links to
 download latest version: 8.0.9.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30441 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30441: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by phw):

 Roger got a non-snap obfs4 bridge from BridgeDB that was also offline.
 Its vanilla port worked (and hence it had the 'Running' flag and was
 distributed by BridgeDB) but its obfs4 port would just reset connections.
 It may be that the problem of "BridgeDB hands out offline bridges" is
 really just a lot of smaller problems that come together.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30443 [- Select a component]: NoScript still not working right, not sure if https everywhere is working right either, addons?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30443: NoScript still not working right, not sure if https everywhere is 
working
right either, addons?
--+
 Reporter:  justmeee  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by justmeee):

 * Attachment "yahoo login page should go straight here.png" added.

 This is the page I should be going to directly when i type in
 mail.yahoo.com if NS is working.  Now, I only go there sometimes.  Did NOT
 have this problem before all this issue with the certificates, and the
 only thing that makes it work consistently is changing that config setting
 to false.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30443 [- Select a component]: NoScript still not working right, not sure if https everywhere is working right either, addons?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30443: NoScript still not working right, not sure if https everywhere is 
working
right either, addons?
--+
 Reporter:  justmeee  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by justmeee):

 * Attachment "yahoo screen i should NOT be getting.png" added.

 When I go to mail.yahoo.com, I should NOT see this page, but sometimes I
 still do, and scripts are working even though everything says NS should be
 blocking them.  This is only one example.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30443 [- Select a component]: NoScript still not working right, not sure if https everywhere is working right either, addons?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30443: NoScript still not working right, not sure if https everywhere is 
working
right either, addons?
---+--
 Reporter:  justmeee   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version: |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 Did not have these problems before the recent certificate issue, so I
 believe the fix is not working right.  Pasting a copy of the info so far:



 Got the update.

 This fix is not working correctly. Torbrowser 8.5a12

 Pages are being displayed as if NoScript was turned off, so I'm seeing
 images that NoScript blocked before, they just have a ghost image of
 noscript on top of the image it's supposed to be blocking.

 For a comparison, I went to config and turned off the xpinstall that
 someone earlier recommended, yes i read the warnings, and reloaded the
 page, then it displayed as if NoScript was working correctly and I saw
 ONLY the NoScript image, NOT what it was supposed to be blocking.

 So it's not working right.
 Changed 3 hours ago by justmeee
 Attachment: yahoo screen i should NOT be getting.png​ added

 Yahoo screen I should NOT be getting, but I get this with 8.5a12 with
 config set to true. I did NOT get this before these NoScript problems.
 Changed 3 hours ago by justmeee
 Attachment: yahoo login page should go straight here.png​ added

 Yahoo page I SHOULD be getting when going to mail.yahoo.com. This is where
 I went directly before the NoScript problems, and where I go directly when
 config is set to false, but NOT when set to true, so this is one example
 of fix being buggy.
 comment:59 Changed 3 hours ago by justmeee

 Here's another example:

 When I go to mail.yahoo.com, when NoScript was working correctly, I would
 go straight to the login page. When NoScript is NOT working correctly, I
 get the extra page where you have to click on the link to login.

 Again, the config change corrected this, so the fix does not seem to be
 working right.

 Images attached that show screenshots of where I went Before the NoScript
 problems started and when config is set to false, and the different screen
 I get when config is set to true with updated 8.5a12. This is just one
 example, but I'm seeing other examples across several sites.

 I hope the images attached?
 comment:60 Changed 2 hours ago by gk

 Do you have a master password set? What is the status of NoScript on
 about:addons? Does it work for you if you start with a fresh 8.5a12?
 comment:61 Changed 81 minutes ago by justmeee

 No master password.

 So I restarted it. It was working ok with config set to true, but I didn't
 make any changes since having the problems from before. So I restarted and
 opened those same pages several times just to see. It seems to happen
 sometimes. So sometimes when it starts, I will get the ghost image
 background (of the image that should NOT be there) with the NoScript on
 top of it, and mail goes to the wrong page as if NoScript was not working
 right. 1 out of the last 6 start ups produced this result.

 In all instances, config was set to true, and addons showed it was
 enabled. The icons are in the toolbar and show it working. So I'm also
 concerned if https anywhere is working right too.

 Installed a fresh copy, no change, had the same poor result on the third
 time opening it.
 comment:62 Changed 75 minutes ago by gk
 Resolution: → fixed
 Status: reopened → closed

 Sounds like a different bug. Could you open a ticket? Does this happen
 with a fresh 8.0.9 as well? What operating system are you on?

 

 I'm using Win 7 64bit.  I loaded the 8.0.9 and it gave me the same fail on
 the first try, the items that were blocked before are still showing up
 even though everything says NoScript is working, and I have a ghost image
 over it from NoScript.  So what happened before all this started was I
 would ONLY have the NoScript image, NOT the blocked item.  Now I see the
 item that's supposed to be blocked, plus a transparent partial NS image on
 top of it.  And yahoo is not taking me directly to the login, it gives me
 the extra screen so scripts are running in spite of everything saying
 NoScript should be working.

 Did not have these problems before the certificate problem.

 Same thing, the problem goes away if I set that config mentioned in the
 other ticket to false, then NoScript starts working correctly but as
 others have said, that's not the right way to fix this.

 Reattaching the yahoo screenshots here too.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online

Re: [tor-bugs] #30258 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Snowflake proxy stops working during browsing session

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30258: Snowflake proxy stops working during browsing session
---+--
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:7 dcf]:
 > cypherpunks, is it better for you now?
 It's much better now, thanks cohosh and family, though you should probably
 consult with your logs on whether any proxy is deadlocking instead of my
 imprecise observations next time.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23888 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23888: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon
---+---
 Reporter:  oarel  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team tor-pt |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---

Comment (by arlolra):

 Replying to [comment:19 cohosh]:
 > Thanks for the merge!

 There's a bunch more refactoring again in that branch,
 https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commits/webext

 It's getting closer to a point where there's a cleaner separation between
 what's library code and what's necessary for each of the use cases.


 > If you think you can make the changes for #27385 easily in a way that
 will match the WebExtension and it sounds like a fun task please feel free
 to do so. I can help out here but it will also take me longer to get up to
 speed with how the coffeescript proxy works.

 Ok, I'll try and tackle that next.


 > There are other things like setting it up for localization that I can
 work on once the UI is set :)
 >
 > Also in case you're interested: I set up a way to test the browser-based
 proxy in snowbox:
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowbox/commit/6775554566b71325b5716a4794529f5a686cc403
 > You probably already have a good setup but I found this useful for not
 having to install coffeescript on my host machine.

 Neat, I'll give it a look, thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30206 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Segfault in proxy-go

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30206: Segfault in proxy-go
---+
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30441 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30441: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by phw):

 We discussed this on IRC and figured that the ~330 snap bridges may be the
 culprit to some extent. There's quite a bit of churn among them, so Serge
 may deem a snap bridge running at hour ''t'' and once a user tries to use
 it at hour ''t+1'' it may already be offline.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23888 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23888: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon
---+---
 Reporter:  oarel  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team tor-pt |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * cc: cohosh (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28780 [Core Tor/Tor]: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is active

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28780: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is 
active
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  6
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Replying to [comment:33 asn]:
 > I'm also getting this Bug on my #28634 branch with hte latest #28780
 revision:
 > {{{
 > May 08 13:34:07.858 [info] circpad_circuit_should_be_marked_for_close():
 Circuit 4 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 > May 08 13:21:01.602 [info] pathbias_should_count(): Bug: Circuit 4 is
 now being counted despite being ignored in the past. Purpose is Circuit
 kept open for padding, path
 > state is already counted (on Tor 0.4.1.0-alpha-dev 4b09a5063381fc1c)
 > }}}

 Aha, I tracked this down. This log message is because we changed the
 purpose on the onion service circuit that was being ignored by pathbias in
 the past. The fix is simple; we should still ignore it in this case:
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/966/commits/b3a93fc26b6c8e50d009ee3d5ac49ebdd23320d8

 > {{{
 > May 08 17:41:12.611 [notice] pathbias_mark_use_success(): Bug: Used
 circuit 18 is in strange path state new. Circuit is a Circuit kept open
 for padding currently open. (on Tor 0.4.1.0-alpha-dev 4b09a5063381fc1c)
 > May 08 17:41:12.611 [notice] pathbias_count_use_attempt(): Bug: Used
 circuit is in strange path state new. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for
 padding currently open. (on Tor 0.4.1.0-alpha-dev 4b09a5063381fc1c)
 > }}}

 Are these two log messages preceded by a similar pathbias_should_count()
 message as the one above? This looks like another consequence of the first
 issue.

 Just in case it is not, I committed pathbias log message improvements
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/966/commits/a8cea4260166bd77fa6fc1f29c0d2705d0c6e0c0
 to help chase this down otherwise. Control port CIRC and CIRC_MINOR event
 logs might help more.

 I'm still thinking about overall approach here. I am leaning towards using
 approx_time() to cheaply assert that PADDING circuits don't ever sit
 around unused for more than their 1.25 hour delay period, and about how to
 refactor circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside() and/or
 circuit_mark_for_close without risking more pathbias or other issues.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30284 [Applications/Tor Browser]: start fails with "Control port file not created"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30284: start fails with "Control port file not created"
+--
 Reporter:  belm0   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by echaskaris):

 I put in an SD card and I can see the
 
directories(/storage/extSdCard/Android/data/org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/files/Download)
 in file manager

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23888 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23888: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon
---+---
 Reporter:  oarel  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team tor-pt |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:16 arlolra]:
 > Replying to [comment:15 cohosh]:
 > > I just started looking at #27385 as well. I noticed you're making
 changes in the `/proxy` directory of snowflake.git. Was the plan to tackle
 both this ticket and #27385 at once?
 >
 > No, I can look into that after if you want.
 >
 > My plan was to reuse, wherever possible, the same code for both the
 badge and the webextension, which inevitably means some refactoring will
 touch other files in `proxy/`.
 >
 > If you're going to do that simultaneously, maybe I should merge what I
 have so far and we can coordinate a tighter review timeline so there are
 less conflicts?

 Thanks for the merge! If you think you can make the changes for #27385
 easily in a way that will match the WebExtension and it sounds like a fun
 task please feel free to do so. I can help out here but it will also take
 me longer to get up to speed with how the coffeescript proxy works.

 There are other things like setting it up for localization that I can work
 on once the UI is set :)

 Also in case you're interested: I set up a way to test the browser-based
 proxy in snowbox:
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowbox/commit/6775554566b71325b5716a4794529f5a686cc403
 You probably already have a good setup but I found this useful for not
 having to install coffeescript on my host machine.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30284 [Applications/Tor Browser]: start fails with "Control port file not created"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30284: start fails with "Control port file not created"
+--
 Reporter:  belm0   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by echaskaris):

 I think extSDcard is for the SD card, but I don't have one. Internal
 storage is at /storage/sdcard0.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29627 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29627: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite
---+
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29430 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged with commit 0ce8339e490bb99096ff69cac17d648af028c951 to `master`.
 (And thanks dcf for the digging, it's not nitpicky :) ).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30136 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Decide whether to use "Tor Browser" or "Tor Browser for Android" for mobile stable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30136: Decide whether to use "Tor Browser" or "Tor Browser for Android" for 
mobile
stable
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5-must, GeorgKoppen201904,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed with commit 3d5e5cc086f443c5ab5a0125a174d3e5f50181a2 on `tor-
 browser-60.6.1esr-8.5-1`, thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30284 [Applications/Tor Browser]: start fails with "Control port file not created"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30284: start fails with "Control port file not created"
+--
 Reporter:  belm0   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 Hm. What about
 {{{
 05-07 13:09:22.958 E/cutils  (216): Failed to
 mkdirat(/storage/extSdCard/Android): Read-only file system
 545405-07 13:09:22.958 W/ContextImpl(23487): Failed to ensure
 directory:
 /storage/extSdCard/Android/data/org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/files/Download
 545505-07 13:09:22.958 W/Vold(216): Returning OperationFailed - no
 handler for errno 30
 }}}
 ?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30441 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30441: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by phw):

 In
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/?id=d15fe16cfdbcf7514e74f537f78ba55bd7229dd8
 d15fe16c] and
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/?id=978f9be81c6e7110d8c40bc76b22230f87b1d988
 978f9be8] we improved log messages to get a better understanding of what's
 going on. The latest run produced these log messages:

 > Trying to insert 1291 bridges into hashring, 1062 of which have the
 'Running' flag...
 > Tried to insert 1280 bridges into hashring.  Resulting hashring is of
 length 1061.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  AffectsTails,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905RR |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Sounds like a different bug. Could you open a ticket? Does this happen
 with a fresh 8.0.9 as well? What operating system are you on?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905RR |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by justmeee):

 No master password.

 So I restarted it.  It was working ok with config set to true, but I
 didn't make any changes since having the problems from before.  So I
 restarted and opened those same pages several times just to see.  It seems
 to happen sometimes.  So sometimes when it starts, I will get the ghost
 image background (of the image that should NOT be there) with the NoScript
 on top of it, and mail goes to the wrong page as if NoScript was not
 working right.  1 out of the last 6 start ups produced this result.

 In all instances, config was set to true, and addons showed it was
 enabled.  The icons are in the toolbar and show it working.  So I'm also
 concerned if https anywhere is working right too.

 Installed a fresh copy, no change, had the same poor result on the third
 time opening it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30284 [Applications/Tor Browser]: start fails with "Control port file not created"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30284: start fails with "Control port file not created"
+--
 Reporter:  belm0   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:7 echaskaris]:
 > Thank ''you''! I'm doing this correctly right?

 Thanks! Yes, that is exactly what we requested!

 Unfortunately, this is still a mystery. The file is successfully created,
 but tor never writes to it. I wonder if tor is dying, or it is starting
 slowly and doesn't create the cookie before the timeout?

 {{{
 533105-08 18:13:35.919 I/OnionProxyManager(13091): Waiting for control
 port
 533205-08 18:13:35.919 I/OnionProxyManager(13091): Control port file
 existence: true
 533305-08 18:13:35.919 I/OnionProxyManager(13091): isCreated is: true
 [snip]
 590305-08 18:13:50.929 W/OnionProxyManager(13091): Control port file
 not created
 590405-08 18:13:50.929 W/OnionProxyManager(13091): Control port file
 length is: 0
 590505-08 18:13:50.929 I/FileUtilities(13091):
 /data/data/org.torproject.torbrowser_nightly/app_torservice/lib/tor/control.txt
 590605-08 18:13:50.939 I/System.out(13091): Sending status: STOPPING
 590705-08 18:13:50.959 I/System.out(13091): Sending status: OFF
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30136 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Decide whether to use "Tor Browser" or "Tor Browser for Android" for mobile stable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30136: Decide whether to use "Tor Browser" or "Tor Browser for Android" for 
mobile
stable
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5-must, GeorgKoppen201904,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:10 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:9 sysrqb]:
 > > These look good, but I noticed another bug we should fix (probably a
 fixup for #28622). When I built with `official` branding, I see the
 `about:firefox` favicon is using the `alpha` icon (blue-ish), instead of
 the `official` icon (purple-ish). I'm rebuilding now to confirm this
 wasn't caused by something else.
 >
 > Hm, how did the rebuild go? Do you still see the issue? If so, could you
 attach a screenshot showing the problem? I double-checked the assets in
 `mobile/branding/official` (which should get used by the stable build) and
 did not find any alpha related icon.


 Whoops! I forgot to update this. The rebuild was good, I'm guessing this
 was caused by some artifact. I think this is ready.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26536 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create APK signing keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26536: Create APK signing keys
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Oh, and this is on Debian Stretch (above is for Fedora 29) - the paths are
 different on the distros.

 {{{
 $ cat pkcs11_java.cfg
 name = OpenSC-PKCS11
 description = SunPKCS11 via OpenSC
 library = /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/opensc-pkcs11.so
 slotListIndex = 0
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905RR |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Do you have a master password set? What is the status of NoScript on
 `about:addons`? Does it work for you if you start with a fresh 8.5a12?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905RR |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by justmeee):

 Here's another example:

 When I go to mail.yahoo.com, when NoScript was working correctly, I would
 go straight to the login page.  When NoScript is NOT working correctly, I
 get the extra page where you have to click on the link to login.

 Again, the config change corrected this, so the fix does not seem to be
 working right.

 Images attached that show screenshots of where I went Before the NoScript
 problems started and when config is set to false, and the different screen
 I get when config is set to true with updated 8.5a12.  This is just one
 example, but I'm seeing other examples across several sites.

 I hope the images attached?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905RR |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by justmeee):

 * Attachment "yahoo screen i should NOT be getting.png" added.

 Yahoo screen I should NOT be getting, but I get this with 8.5a12 with
 config set to true.  I did NOT get this before these NoScript problems.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905RR |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by justmeee):

 * Attachment "yahoo login page should go straight here.png" added.

 Yahoo page I SHOULD be getting when going to mail.yahoo.com.  This is
 where I went directly before the NoScript problems, and where I go
 directly when config is set to false, but NOT when set to true, so this is
 one example of fix being buggy.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! (armagadd-on-2.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30388: NoScript and all user-installed add-ons got deactivated! 
(armagadd-on-2.0)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905RR |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by justmeee):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Got the update.

 This fix is not working correctly.  Torbrowser 8.5a12

 Pages are being displayed as if NoScript was turned off, so I'm seeing
 images that NoScript blocked before, they just have a ghost image of
 noscript on top of the image it's supposed to be blocking.

 For a comparison, I went to config and turned off the xpinstall that
 someone earlier recommended, yes i read the warnings, and reloaded the
 page, then it displayed as if NoScript was working correctly and I saw
 ONLY the NoScript image, NOT what it was supposed to be blocking.

 So it's not working right.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29197 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: remove use of overlays from Tor Launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29197: remove use of overlays from Tor Launcher
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by pili):

 * cc: antonela (added)
 * keywords:  ff68-esr => ff68-esr, ux-team


Comment:

 This will need some ux team work

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29627 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29627: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29430 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by mcs):

 At the same time dcf made comment:11, I opened #30442.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30442 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: PT spec: should 255 bytes be sent in the RFC 1929 UNAME field?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30442: PT spec: should 255 bytes be sent in the RFC 1929 UNAME field?
-+
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by mcs):

 Late breaking news: ticket:29627#comment:11

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29899 [Core Tor/Stem]: Descriptor exit_policy can raise TypeError?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29899: Descriptor exit_policy can raise TypeError?
---+
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Hi juga, thought of an elegant fit for this that avoids locking. Feel free
 to reopen if you need anything else...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=87cea95

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30442 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: PT spec: should 255 bytes be sent in the RFC 1929 UNAME field?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30442: PT spec: should 255 bytes be sent in the RFC 1929 UNAME field?
-+
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Section 3.5 of the PT spec says:
  If the encoded argument list is less than 255 bytes in
  length, the "PLEN" field must be set to "1" and the "PASSWD"
  field must contain a single NUL character.

 When Kathy Brade and I implemented #29627, we viewed the above as a spec
 bug and allowed up to 255 bytes to be sent in the RFC 1929 UNAME field.
 Was that the wrong thing to do? Or should the PT spec be changed to read
 "If the encoded argument list is less than or equal to 255 bytes in
 length..."?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29627 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29627: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29430 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:9 mcs]:
 > That is a good question.  We think the code is correct but the spec is
 wrong.  SOCKS5 supports up to 255 bytes in each auth field.  The
 obfs4proxy code reads a byte to get the length and does not have any other
 limitations, so up to and including 255 is supported.  Kathy and I wanted
 to maximize the space available for args, so we used <=.  Do you think
 this is OK?  Should we file a bug against the PT spec?

 There's for sure a small ambiguity in the PT spec, when the length of the
 username field is exactly 255. I almost mentioned it before but thought I
 was being too nitpicky. Suppose the PT receives a connection with a
 255-byte username `k=aaa...aaa` and a 1-byte password `\x00`. There are
 two possible strings with that encoding, and no way to distinguish between
 them:
  * the 255-byte string `k=aaa...aaa`
  * the 256-byte string `k=aaa...aaa\x00`
 Obviously in the PT context `\x00` is an unlikely byte to appear, so in
 this case both goptlib and obfs4proxy disambiguate by taking the first
 interpretation.

 To eliminate the ambiguous case, whenever the length of
 `this.mMeekClientEscapedArgs` is exactly 255, you could put 254 bytes in
 the username field and 1 byte in the password field.

 Though now that I check, technically the spec doesn't even say how the
 username and password fields are supposed to be combined, or whether a
 decoder is even required to look at the password field if the username
 field is not full. But the existing implementations work by concatenation
 without regard to the length of the fields, except that a password field
 consisting of a single `\x00` is treated as an empty string. An
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/pt-
 spec.txt?id=4dcd7e94f17c072e771119ec90d7cbce4a4788a4#n162 older version]
 of the spec stated the the fields should be joined by concatenation, but
 didn't say what to do with an empty password field.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30434 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Log sanitization scrubs HH:MM:SS timestamps as if they were IPv6 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30434: Log sanitization scrubs HH:MM:SS timestamps as if they were IPv6 
addresses
---+-
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30382 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30382: Provide control port event for when we are missing v3 client auth for an
onion
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, hs-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14389  | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor27-must
+--

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:5 mcs]:
 > Specifically, I wonder if it will be safe for Tor Browser to assume the
 control port event will be sent before the browser receives a failure for
 the CONNECT, or at least to assume that will occur in most cases.

 Hmmm... Control port events, when they occur, are queued in a list and
 then an tor main loop event will send the queued events on the socket.

 So, if I'm not mistaken, you will get a connect failure _before_ you get
 the control port event because tor will return the SOCKS failure before
 that control port "empty queue" event is triggered.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30206 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Segfault in proxy-go

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30206: Segfault in proxy-go
---+-
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_information => merge_ready


Comment:

 Okay.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30368 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30368: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies
---+--
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:6 cohosh]:
 > Hm, fwiw, when I was doing manual checks around the time the ticket was
 filed the snowflake.bamsoftware.com proxy-go instances were reliable and
 reachable from the US but definitely not from the VPS in China. At the
 same time, the additional proxy-go instances I set up on another server
 was definitely reachable from both places.

 I believe you. That's good evidence that there ''is'' some sort of
 targeted blocking. It seems to be less severe, at least, since May 3
 according to the tests. We don't have tests from beforehand to know
 whether it used to be equally unreliable.

 > What do you mean by success rate here? The other proxy I set up is
 reachable 100% of the time (in that it bootstraps past the 10% that all
 snowflake connections automatically bootstrap to).

 I know that anything past 10% means the IP of the proxy was reachable, but
 mentally I'm not quite thinking of a less than complete bootstrap as
 complete "success" because to a user it looks like failure. E.g. in
 comment:16:ticket:30350 the user got to 75% after 13 seconds but then no
 further progress. So I'm thinking of it in kind of a "works/doesn't work"
 way, and in that way, snowflake-bridge and snowflake-cohosh seem to have
 roughly equal utility according to the data so far. While we know that the
 GFW sometimes fails open and allows access to blocked IP addresses, this
 doesn't look like that because the success rate is too high.

 Or maybe there really ''is'' some kind of protocol detection happening,
 once the WebRTC DataChannel is connected, and it's not simple IP blocking.
 That would be consistent with the evidence. I would not expect it as a
 first step of blocking, but certainly my intuition has been wrong before.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26536 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create APK signing keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26536: Create APK signing keys
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * cc: eighthave (added)


Comment:

 This is a little-bit of a brain dump. I went on a deep-dive into the code
 for APK signing and using a nitrokey as a key store. As far as I
 understand it, the answer is "you can't because the stars didn't align
 correctly" - but I'm CCing Hans in case I missed something. Maybe this
 works if we get `opensc-pkcs11` packages from `stretch-backport`?

 At the beginning, I followed some of the
 [https://geoffreymetais.github.io/code/key-signing/ existing] guides for
 putting a signing certificate in PKCS12 key store onto the nitrokey.
 Unfortunately, that didn't work because importing the certificate via
 `keytool` failed. When keytool "stored" the key, it gave key type as an
 ASCII string instead of the binary number. This resulted in:
 {{{
 0x70d49bdbc700 19:54:34.511 [opensc-pkcs11] card-
 openpgp.c:2827:pgp_store_key: Unknown key type 49.
 0x70d49bdbc700 19:54:34.511 [opensc-pkcs11] card-
 openpgp.c:2828:pgp_store_key: returning with: -1300 (Invalid arguments)
 0x70d49bdbc700 19:54:34.511 [opensc-pkcs11] card-
 openpgp.c:3009:pgp_card_ctl: returning with: -1300 (Invalid arguments)
 0x70d49bdbc700 19:54:34.511 [opensc-pkcs11] card.c:961:sc_card_ctl:
 returning with: -1300 (Invalid arguments)
 0x70d49bdbc700 19:54:34.511 [opensc-pkcs11]
 pkcs15-openpgp.c:142:openpgp_store_key: returning with: -1300 (Invalid
 arguments)
 0x70d49bdbc700 19:54:34.511 [opensc-pkcs11]
 pkcs15-lib.c:1683:sc_pkcs15init_store_private_key: Card specific 'store
 key' failed: -1300 (Invalid arguments)
 }}}

 Eventually, I found the documentation on the OpenSC
 [https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/wiki/OpenPGP-card#6-import-key-resp-
 certificate wiki page], and I successfully imported the certificate and
 key:
 {{{
 pkcs15-init --delete-objects privkey,pubkey,chain --id 3 --store-private-
 key secret_and_certificate.p12 --format pkcs12 --auth-id 3 --verify-pin
 }}}

 And reading the stored public key and certificate information works
 {{{
 $ pkcs15-tool --read-public-key 3
 Using reader with a card: Nitrokey Nitrokey Pro (3961)
 00 00
 -BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-
 MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEA8+4jHWnOQ18yStSqOYrv
 MTGHaudFY0KLYfatjGXFIv3fbtzCT25hWtl4WY+MWVxjLy1R34Il7CZ0KvdHnYtF
 7qN5rHwh6GZb37KsjwAIwLR6K6icqjnFgcCCfTVZnaPW4P1ARd1Ove7eOXkL5t1j
 C2unkIvrOeIOqpxC28xbt7T3pD8OL53ZHgduLHzcwvj5tiZijzZoMeuRfS5U3vhZ
 3wQghEYKrcsdU/+BFPjWZklJkrJgryt/TN2At3MylreeiDHLyLpUsCjPMgLf2oSF
 VUBWfGKu2BPzK67hN84/wUmhCbCjbjL8sooqjS58L2fZsYn/0uU//47drenQXT4z
 Vg5z7L8fjFggdycq57Xp0W4DdqCrOWBrIInnjLxKN9pNhfWWXbQgy213cXNIohtJ
 NY8MNHQtp0tp9nRqKYjrgV4pEKf0kvUuFNzBdBS+c1WU5ratYr8KcB06PdJ0VwUB
 AeVozzJTak5/0GmQi6zPIZe7nEwlhURt8r2iPE7dpnHPGogYA5WZUQcfjQOsjf84
 qwCr+IyHzTeDgVAy+SiBaRlOrY6goopRjNjsCgzVxggA3haDoENrCaAmUkq+3/lO
 DXrG7z4G+IZceAvBgYxkE0OJ/zDUMxBT6iWR1lgIIVxoeNH7Pk/nYnuSb7nBAxp3
 j2/+h7v+NRQbNvJxsFB1518CAwEAAQ==
 -END PUBLIC KEY-
 $ keytool -providerClass sun.security.pkcs11.SunPKCS11 -providerArg
 ~/pkcs11_java.cfg -providerName SunPKCS11-OpenSC-PKCS11 -keystore NONE
 -storetype PKCS11 -list
 Enter keystore password:
 Keystore type: PKCS11
 Keystore provider: SunPKCS11-OpenSC-PKCS11

 Your keystore contains 1 entry

 Cardholder certificate, PrivateKeyEntry,
 Certificate fingerprint (SHA-256):
 
EE:82:97:2E:1E:30:2F:67:9B:C7:0F:45:A4:EE:24:E0:80:80:05:BB:28:00:A1:E1:6F:68:3D:93:FC:79:C4:EF
 }}}

 However, signing with `apksigner` does not:
 {{{
 $ apksigner sign --provider-class sun.security.pkcs11.SunPKCS11
 --provider-arg pkcs11_java.cfg --ks NONE --ks-type SunPKCS11-OpenSC-PKCS11
 tor-browser-8.5a11-android-x86-multi-qa.apk
 Exception in thread "main" java.lang.NoSuchMethodException:
 sun.security.pkcs11.SunPKCS11.(java.lang.String)
 at java.base/java.lang.Class.getConstructor0(Class.java:3350)
 at java.base/java.lang.Class.getConstructor(Class.java:2152)
 at
 
com.android.apksigner.ApkSignerTool$ProviderInstallSpec.installProvider(ApkSignerTool.java:600)
 at
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #15516 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider rate-limiting INTRODUCE2 cells when under load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15516: Consider rate-limiting INTRODUCE2 cells when under load
-+-
 Reporter:  special  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorU-deferred, tor-dos, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Implementing comment:28 proposal: `ticket15516_042_01`. Unfortunately,
 this can't work without #30440...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26348 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Guard against large reads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26348: Guard against large reads
---+---
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:6 cohosh]:
 > >An alternative, since `MaxBytesReader` is always called before a call
 to `io.ReadAll`, is to provide a separate `limitedReadAll` function that
 enforces the limit--it could be an `io.ReadAll` followed by a `Read` that
 expects to find EOF.
 > I'm not sure what you mean by this exactly. Do you mean call
 `limitedReadAll` instead of `io.ReadAll`? And then I'm not sure why we'd
 make a call to both `io.ReadAll` and `Read`...

 Sorry, I mean like this. Actually the second call should be to
 `io.ReadFull` to avoid needing to handle the case where the underlying
 `Reader` returns `(0, nil)`.
 {{{
 func limitedReadAll(r io.Reader, limit int64) ([]byte, error) {
 p, err := ioutil.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r, limit))
 if err != nil {
 return p, err
 }
 // Another read to see whether the LimitedReader hit EOF or not.
 var tmp [1]byte
 _, err = io.ReadFull(r, tmp[:])
 if err == io.EOF {
 err = nil
 } else if err == nil {
 err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
 }
 return p, err
 }
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30440 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Service introduction circuit ignore flow control

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30440: sendme: Service introduction circuit ignore flow control
+
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, sendme  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15516  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 There is a world where we might want to advocate for backport on this.
 Else, any HS defenses based on flow control (like package window) will
 take a long time to be usable in the network...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27540 [Webpages/Website]: download: anchors do not work with enabled javascript

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27540: download: anchors do not work with enabled javascript
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14686| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27584 [Webpages/Website]: Update documentation section

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27584: Update documentation section
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23266| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27582 [Webpages/Website]: add page for Tor controllers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27582: add page for Tor controllers
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  faq   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22842| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27595 [Webpages/Website]: Link HowToReportBugFeedback on contact and volunteer pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27595: Link HowToReportBugFeedback on contact and volunteer pages
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27293 [Webpages/Website]: Expired core people's gpg keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27293: Expired core people's gpg keys
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27131 [Webpages/Website]: Tor download link links to TBB download page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27131: Tor download link links to TBB download page
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14686| Points:
 Reviewer:  hiro  |Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28832 [Webpages/Website]: Change website to better reflect recommended versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28832: Change website to better reflect recommended versions
--+
 Reporter:  spanish   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30441 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30441: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 BridgeDB currently hands out plenty of bridges (in all flavours) that are
 offline. We need to understand why this is the case, and stop it from
 doing that.

 For example, I just got the obfs4 bridge
 `4C480695650EDB6BAB006DB9FD81F6173122E973` over HTTPS.  Nothing responds
 on its obfs4 port and
 
[https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/86EBB09CE8FF1B467CBC38A7658618775692AABC
 Metrics] says that it's currently offline -- or used to be, a few hours
 ago, to be precise. The bridge's IP address is part of Serge's most recent
 networkstatus-bridges file, but the bridge does not have the `Running`
 flag and should not have been given out. Also, the bridge's fingerprint
 isn't part of BridgeDB's latest assignments.log file. According to all of
 this, I should not have been given that bridge.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27673 [Webpages/Website]: We should have more about ARM on our download page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27673: We should have more about ARM on our download page
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-arm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14686| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27700 [Webpages/Website]: Please sign keys.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27700: Please sign keys.txt
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22637| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28292 [Webpages/Website]: Windows Tor Browser install screenshots should be updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28292: Windows Tor Browser install screenshots should be updated
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28828 [Webpages/Website]: Change website to better handle multi-locale Android .apk

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28828: Change website to better handle multi-locale Android .apk
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28302 [Webpages/Website]: Update nickm's signing key on signing-keys page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28302: Update nickm's signing key on signing-keys page
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27699| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30434 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Log sanitization scrubs HH:MM:SS timestamps as if they were IPv6 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30434: Log sanitization scrubs HH:MM:SS timestamps as if they were IPv6 
addresses
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30434 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Log sanitization scrubs HH:MM:SS timestamps as if they were IPv6 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30434: Log sanitization scrubs HH:MM:SS timestamps as if they were IPv6 
addresses
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by cohosh):

 Here's a suggested fix:
 https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/tree/ticket30434

 I went off of [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4291#section-2.2 RFC4291].
 There's no MUST in there, but a "::" indicates a compressed IPv6 address,
 so I added the restriction that if there are more than 2 fields compressed
 it needs "::" somewhere in the address.

 I also added some additional test cases for the timestamps and more
 compressed addresses to make sure we don't miss anything.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28030 [Webpages/Website]: Remove mentions of TBB 3.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28030: Remove mentions of TBB 3.0
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  faq   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28161 [Webpages/Website]: removing text from website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28161: removing text from website
--+
 Reporter:  bekeela   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #30440 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Service introduction circuit ignore flow control

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30440: sendme: Service introduction circuit ignore flow control
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-hs, sendme
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #15516
   Points:  2  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can  |
---+
 As preamble, circuit level SENDMEs are end-to-end which means they go from
 client to exit and vice versa. In other words, they can be described to be
 from edge connection to edge connection.

 Which is exactly where it goes wrong for hidden service cells. First of
 all, they are not DATA cells so the SENDME logic is entirely ignored for
 all of them. They are all "circuit establishment" cells (see the list
 below)...

 {{{
 case RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
 case RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS:
 case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1:
 case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2:
 case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK:
 case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1:
 case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2:
 case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED:
 case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED:
 }}}

 ... *except* one single cell which is the `INTRODUCE2` cell. A large
 number of these cells can be put on the same introduction service circuit,
 basically for each client introducing.

 Which means that the intropoint can send as much cell as it wants on the
 service circuit without being bound by the SENDME flow control logic.
 Plainly speaking, intro points do not wait for an acknowledgement of the
 service to send more data, they just shove it all on the circuit.

 This most likely render the introduction DoS (#29607) worst because the
 service actually constantly receives introduction requests as they queue
 up massively due to the intro point sending them non stop.

 If there would be flow control on that circuit, a heavily loaded service
 (in CPU) would take a while to handle all introduction requests and then
 the SENDME cell towards the intro point would be only sent when the last
 request is actually handled and likely have CPU for new ones.

 This also prevents us basically from implementing armadev's proposal in
 #15516 (https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15516#comment:28).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27878 [Webpages/Website]: docs/en/update_signing-keys.pl should not use default ~/.gnupg

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27878: docs/en/update_signing-keys.pl should not use default ~/.gnupg
--+-
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22637| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27809 [Webpages/Website]: Old experimental version 0.3.4.x in https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27809: Old experimental version 0.3.4.x in
https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en
--+
 Reporter:  Guinness  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14686| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26298 [Webpages/Website]: link more than one stable and one unstable from download page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26298: link more than one stable and one unstable from download page
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  035-removed-20180711  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14686| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25941 [Webpages/Website]: formatting on "Download Tor" www page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25941: formatting on "Download Tor" www page
--+-
 Reporter:  gman999   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  formatting css|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26781 [Webpages/Website]: onion version should link onion addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26781: onion version should link onion addresses
--+-
 Reporter:  modikonark|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28162 [Webpages/Website]: delete and replace text on FAQ page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28162: delete and replace text on FAQ page
--+
 Reporter:  bekeela   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28288 [Webpages/Website]: Add Win 64bit bundles to es download-easy page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28288: Add Win 64bit bundles to es download-easy page
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29030 [Webpages/Website]: Ubuntu 18.10 tor repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29030: Ubuntu 18.10 tor repo
--+--
 Reporter:  fik   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29030 [Webpages/Website]: Ubuntu 18.10 tor repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29030: Ubuntu 18.10 tor repo
--+--
 Reporter:  fik   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by hiro):

 Yes that was probably a missed update.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29076 [Webpages/Website]: Remove experimental branch from js dropdown in debian install guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29076: Remove experimental branch from js dropdown in debian install guide
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29931 [Webpages/Website]: The About US text on https://www.torproject.org/ seems to be way too large

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29931: The About US text on https://www.torproject.org/ seems to be way too 
large
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29901| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Moved: https://dip.torproject.org/web/tpo/issues/10

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29932 [Webpages/Website]: Images are not loaded with the security slider set to "Safest"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29932: Images are not loaded with the security slider set to "Safest"
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25489| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29152 [Webpages/Website]: Websites know you IP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29152: Websites know you IP
--+-
 Reporter:  LethiaNGames  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29934 [Webpages/Website]: CSS media rule mixes all types of screens together

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29934: CSS media rule mixes all types of screens together
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29968 [Webpages/Website]: new www.tpo has no favicon file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29968: new www.tpo has no favicon file
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29901| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Moved: https://dip.torproject.org/web/tpo/issues/9

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30019 [Webpages/Website]: Write content for the onion services section in the community portal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30019: Write content for the onion services section in the community portal
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14389| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * owner:  hiro => asn
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30052 [Webpages/Website]: fix broken URLs in tor-exit-notice.html

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30052: fix broken URLs in tor-exit-notice.html
--+---
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29901| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Moved: https://dip.torproject.org/web/tpo/issues/8

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30103 [Webpages/Website]: Make email address for bridges consistent

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30103: Make email address for bridges consistent
--+---
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  bridges, email|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Moved: https://dip.torproject.org/web/tpo/issues/7

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30295 [Webpages/Website]: "Verify Tor Browser Signature" link on torproject.org is difficult to find and should be moved

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30295: "Verify Tor Browser Signature" link on torproject.org is difficult to 
find
and should be moved
--+---
 Reporter:  wayward   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30259| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Moved: https://dip.torproject.org/web/tpo/issues/6

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23888 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23888: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon
---+---
 Reporter:  oarel  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team tor-pt |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---

Comment (by arlolra):

 Replying to [comment:17 dcf]:
 > It looks good so far. I like the refactoring changes. If it makes things
 easier re #27385, I'm fine with merging what's been changed so far.

 Ok, I merged the changes so far, ending in https://gitweb.torproject.org
 /pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=e7f3ade06827f6501333f986661ed7aa4277946e

 > Of course, if you're planning to refactor the opt-in so that the
 WebExtension doesn't even need a cookie to work, that's better.

 Yes, that will be the next thing I do.  Split up the initialization so
 that the badge/node/webextension build their own.  The`tmp.js` was just a
 hack to get things started.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30158 [Webpages/Website]: the navigation bar items are not getting translated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30158: the navigation bar items are not getting translated
--+---
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  localization  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Moved: https://dip.torproject.org/web/tpo/issues/5

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30159 [Webpages/Website]: Improve ltr support in new website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30159: Improve ltr support in new website
--+---
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Moved: https://dip.torproject.org/web/tpo/issues/4

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30093 [Webpages/Website]: Add press clips to website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30093: Add press clips to website
--+---
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Moved here: https://dip.torproject.org/web/tpo/issues/3

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30439 [Webpages/Website]: Testing import to gitlab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30439: Testing import to gitlab
--+-
 Reporter:  hiro  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30008 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Remove unused FIFO copy paste code from snowflake client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30008: Remove unused FIFO copy paste code from snowflake client
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  snowflake  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30008 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Remove unused FIFO copy paste code from snowflake client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30008: Remove unused FIFO copy paste code from snowflake client
---+-
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 Merged as https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=622005c79ed2e9f444d75dba90b3ee52fdc82a37

 Replying to [comment:2 cohosh]:
 >  I suppose this is now the only option as opposed to recommended
 default. We might want to say it's customizable via the flags in torrc.

 I just removed the entire parenthetical, since flags are part of the
 binary and this is in the client library.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30284 [Applications/Tor Browser]: start fails with "Control port file not created"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30284: start fails with "Control port file not created"
+--
 Reporter:  belm0   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by echaskaris):

 Thank ''you''! I'm doing this correctly right?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30284 [Applications/Tor Browser]: start fails with "Control port file not created"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30284: start fails with "Control port file not created"
+--
 Reporter:  belm0   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by echaskaris):

 * Attachment "logcat (1).txt" added.

 Logcat from nightly build

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10760 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  Rezonansowy  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-parity,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904, GeorgKoppen201904|
Parent ID:  #24855   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:30 gk]:
 > I think the reason Tor Launcher is in the `browser` dir is that we don't
 have a Tor Launcher on Android (and won't have one), thus it is desktop-
 specific. While that's not the case for Torbutton (even though we don't
 use the tor-browser version for desktop yet).

 I don't remember all of the reasons, but one reason we put the Tor
 Launcher code under browser/extensions is because we were following the
 example of other built-in "extensions" such as pdfjs.

 > > There is this `GetOverrideStringBundle` function in
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp?h=tor-
 browser-60.6.1esr-8.5-1=178fcbbe24f543a15b165bdc680a5083247e87a3#n1823
 that would need to be fixed, since the XPI would not be there. But I
 wonder if this code is still needed since `general.useragent.locale` pref
 is not there anymore (was moved to `intl.locale.requested`).
 >
 > Good question and I don't know the answer to it right now...

 I think it is a bug that that code still uses `general.useragent.locale`.
 When we integrate Torbutton or its code into the tor-browser repo, we need
 to decide what to do for localization. The code in nsAppRunner.cpp can
 probably be simplified if we can assume that Torbutton's locale files are
 always present.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30284 [Applications/Tor Browser]: start fails with "Control port file not created"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30284: start fails with "Control port file not created"
+--
 Reporter:  belm0   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 Okay, I move forward here and created a testbuild with more log output:

 Could you attach the logcat output of that one again? Thanks!

 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuild/tor-browser-tbb-nightly-
 30284_android-armv7-multi-qa.apk
 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuild/tor-browser-tbb-nightly-
 30284_android-armv7-multi-qa.apk.asc

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29627 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29627: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29430 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905 => TorBrowserTeam201905R
 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:8 gk]:
 > > Okay, I gave it another look. Just one final bit: You write
 > > {{{
 > > +//  If the encoded argument list is less than 255 bytes in
 > > }}}
 > > which seems correct to me, but then you do
 > > {{{
 > > +  if (this.mMeekClientEscapedArgs.length <= 255)
 > > }}}
 > > I guess you want `if (this.mMeekClientEscapedArgs.length < 255)`
 instead?
 >
 > That is a good question.  We think the code is correct but the spec is
 wrong.  SOCKS5 supports up to 255 bytes in each auth field.  The
 obfs4proxy code reads a byte to get the length and does not have any other
 limitations, so up to and including 255 is supported.  Kathy and I wanted
 to maximize the space available for args, so we used <=.  Do you think
 this is OK?  Should we file a bug against the PT spec?

 Yes, please file a spec bug.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29627 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29627: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29430 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:8 gk]:
 > Okay, I gave it another look. Just one final bit: You write
 > {{{
 > +//  If the encoded argument list is less than 255 bytes in
 > }}}
 > which seems correct to me, but then you do
 > {{{
 > +  if (this.mMeekClientEscapedArgs.length <= 255)
 > }}}
 > I guess you want `if (this.mMeekClientEscapedArgs.length < 255)`
 instead?

 That is a good question.  We think the code is correct but the spec is
 wrong.  SOCKS5 supports up to 255 bytes in each auth field.  The
 obfs4proxy code reads a byte to get the length and does not have any other
 limitations, so up to and including 255 is supported.  Kathy and I wanted
 to maximize the space available for args, so we used <=.  Do you think
 this is OK?  Should we file a bug against the PT spec?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs