Re: [tor-bugs] #30498 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Proxy-go is receiving a lot of client timeouts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30498: Proxy-go is receiving a lot of client timeouts
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---

Comment (by arma):

 {{{
 2019/05/14 03:22:11 broker returns: 504
 INFO: configuration.go:256: Converting Config:
 &{[{[stun:stun.l.google.com:19302]  }] All Balanced }
 INFO: peerconnection.go:168: Created PeerConnection:  &{  false
 
 {[{[stun:stun.l.google.com:19302]  }] 3 0 } 0x7f7444001270 3}
 0x7f7444001270
 INFO: peerconnection.go:436: fired OnSignalingStateChange:  3
 HaveRemoteOffer
 2019/05/14 03:22:13 sdp offer successfully received.
 2019/05/14 03:22:13 Generating answer...
 INFO: peerconnection.go:436: fired OnSignalingStateChange:  3 Stable
 INFO: peerconnection.go:504: fired OnIceConnectionStateChange:  3
 INFO: peerconnection.go:495: fired OnConnectionStateChange:  3
 INFO: peerconnection.go:513: fired OnIceGatheringStateChange: 3
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  3 candidate:503462688
 1 udp 2122260223 192.168.1.187 58484 typ host generation 0 ufrag ajv5
 network-id 3 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  3 candidate:2672442772
 1 udp 1686052607 108.27.53.144 58484 typ srflx raddr 192.168.1.187 rport
 58484 generation 0 ufrag ajv5 network-id 3 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  3 candidate:1350682576
 1 tcp 1518280447 192.168.1.187 49181 typ host tcptype passive generation 0
 ufrag ajv5 network-id 3 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:513: fired OnIceGatheringStateChange: 3
 2019/05/14 03:22:24 broker returns: 504
 2019/05/14 03:22:33 Timed out waiting for client to open data channel.
 INFO: peerconnection.go:504: fired OnIceConnectionStateChange:  3
 INFO: peerconnection.go:436: fired OnSignalingStateChange:  3 Closed
 INFO: configuration.go:256: Converting Config:
 &{[{[stun:stun.l.google.com:19302]  }] All Balanced }
 INFO: peerconnection.go:168: Created PeerConnection:  &{  false
 
 {[{[stun:stun.l.google.com:19302]  }] 3 0 } 0x7f7450001280 4}
 0x7f7450001280
 INFO: peerconnection.go:436: fired OnSignalingStateChange:  4
 HaveRemoteOffer
 2019/05/14 03:22:33 sdp offer successfully received.
 2019/05/14 03:22:33 Generating answer...
 INFO: peerconnection.go:436: fired OnSignalingStateChange:  4 Stable
 INFO: peerconnection.go:504: fired OnIceConnectionStateChange:  4
 INFO: peerconnection.go:495: fired OnConnectionStateChange:  4
 INFO: peerconnection.go:513: fired OnIceGatheringStateChange: 4
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  4 candidate:503462688
 1 udp 2122260223 192.168.1.187 37235 typ host generation 0 ufrag GjON
 network-id 3 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  4 candidate:2672442772
 1 udp 1686052607 108.27.53.144 37235 typ srflx raddr 192.168.1.187 rport
 37235 generation 0 ufrag GjON network-id 3 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  4 candidate:1350682576
 1 tcp 1518280447 192.168.1.187 43431 typ host tcptype passive generation 0
 ufrag GjON network-id 3 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:513: fired OnIceGatheringStateChange: 4
 2019/05/14 03:22:44 broker returns: 504
 INFO: peerconnection.go:468: fired OnIceCandidateError:  4
 2019/05/14 03:22:53 Timed out waiting for client to open data channel.
 INFO: peerconnection.go:504: fired OnIceConnectionStateChange:  4
 INFO: peerconnection.go:436: fired OnSignalingStateChange:  4 Closed
 2019/05/14 03:22:54 broker returns: 504
 2019/05/14 03:23:04 broker returns: 504
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30350 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to Tor network through Snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30350: Hello, in China, currently, Tor Browser 8.5a11 version can't connect to 
Tor
network through Snowflake bridge.
-+---
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by amiableclarity2011):

 Today, in China, I still can't connect to Tor network through snowflake
 bridge.
 Below are Tor log messages.


 5/14/19, 05:15:54.132 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/14/19, 05:15:54.132 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/14/19, 05:15:54.132 [NOTICE] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/14/19, 05:15:54.942 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 1% (conn_pt): Connecting to
 pluggable transport
 5/14/19, 05:15:54.943 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 2% (conn_done_pt): Connected
 to pluggable transport
 5/14/19, 05:16:37.541 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to
 a relay
 5/14/19, 05:17:07.600 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 10%
 (conn_done): Connected to a relay. (DONE; DONE; count 1; recommendation
 warn; host 2B280B23E1107BB62ABFC40DDCC8824814F80A72 at 0.0.3.0:1)
 5/14/19, 05:17:07.600 [WARN] 1 connections have failed:
 5/14/19, 05:17:07.601 [WARN]  1 connections died in state handshaking
 (TLS) with SSL state SSLv2/v3 read server hello A in HANDSHAKE
 5/14/19, 05:17:07.622 [NOTICE] Closing no-longer-configured Socks listener
 on 127.0.0.1:9150
 5/14/19, 05:17:07.622 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 5/14/19, 05:17:07.622 [NOTICE] Delaying directory fetches: DisableNetwork
 is set.
 5/14/19, 05:17:07.622 [WARN] Pluggable Transport process terminated with
 status code 0

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30502 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: make finance-admin role alias for jon, sue, sarah

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30502: make finance-admin role alias for jon, sue, sarah
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 It is done. (It will take effect in 0-4 hours.)

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[tor-bugs] #30502 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: make finance-admin role alias for jon, sue, sarah

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30502: make finance-admin role alias for jon, sue, sarah
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 This is so there is a single long term address they can use when making
 accounts on various third parties, like Fidelity Charitable and the like.

 The alternative is that Jon uses jon@tpo when making the accounts, and
 then later when we want to shift responsibilities around, he's stuck being
 the contact for those external accounts.

 Jon originally suggested adminfinance@tpo, I guess on the theory that it's
 more about the admin of the finance. I countered with finance-admin, which
 better matches the pattern of e.g. torproject-admin.

 And I'm going to make the role alias now, since the email thread has been
 around for a week and nobody else said anything on it. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: BridgesList Preferences is an overloaded field

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30501: BridgesList Preferences is an overloaded field
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sisbell):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201905 => tbb-mobile,
 TorBrowserTeam201905


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[tor-bugs] #30501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: BridgesList Preferences is an overloaded field

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30501: BridgesList Preferences is an overloaded field
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201905
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 BridgesList is an overloaded field, which can cause some confusion. The
 list can be:

  1. a filter like obfs4 or meek OR
  1. can be a custom bridge

 For (1), we just pass back all bridges, the filter will occur elsewhere in
 the library. For (2) we return the bridge list as a raw stream. If length
 is greater than 5, then we know this is a custom bridge

 We should fix this so that we have separate preferences for 1 and 2. We
 also shouldn't be looking at string length to determine field type.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12802 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB needs Nagios checks for the Email Distributor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12802: BridgeDB needs Nagios checks for the Email Distributor
+---
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-email, nagios  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30152  | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---

Comment (by phw):

 For what it's worth, we're now monitoring BridgeDB's SMTP port with
 sysmon. We will get notified if the SMTP server disappears but we are
 unable to detect more subtle, application-layer breakage.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22210 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit_is_acceptable is slow due to IP and fingerprint parsing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22210: circuit_is_acceptable is slow due to IP and fingerprint parsing
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.12
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 032-unreached  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30221 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry  |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Simple code relocation. Looks good to me. Thanks, neel!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30348 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update padding negotiation with preference menu, response delays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30348: Update padding negotiation with preference menu, response delays
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor2-can
--+--

Comment (by mikeperry):

 This will be useful if we have different sets of machines across different
 Padding protover versions.

 So long as each Padding protover value contains a fixed set of machines
 that is well known, we can negotiate, though. Toss up.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29083 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Specify exit policy for machine conditions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29083: WTF-PAD: Specify exit policy for machine conditions
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding|
Parent ID:   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2-can
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor2 => Sponsor2-can


Comment:

 FYI: we are not planning on doing this unless a research machine needs a
 way to specify that padding should only apply to connections to specific
 ports.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29098 [Core Tor/Tor]: Load balance properly in the presence of padding overhead

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29098: Load balance properly in the presence of padding overhead
-+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad,tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #8453| Points:  13
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30092 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a probability-to-apply field for circuitpadidng machines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30092: Add a probability-to-apply field for circuitpadidng machines
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  0.5
  padding|
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2-can
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell, padding, 041-proposed => wtf-
 pad, tor-relay, tor-cell, padding
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final =>


Comment:

 I agree with asn in comment:7. This may or may not help, and it seems like
 we'll need a probability_to_launch_new_circ option as well, somehow, if we
 do need this.

 Please let me know if this seems useful for padding research.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29098 [Core Tor/Tor]: Load balance properly in the presence of padding overhead (was: Implement Proposal #265)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29098: Load balance properly in the presence of padding overhead
-+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad,tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #8453| Points:  13
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * keywords:  wtf-pad, 041-proposed, tor-dirauth => wtf-pad,tor-dirauth
 * sponsor:  Sponsor2 =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Right now our #28634 padding machines do not need this. However, almost
 any other machine that sends more than a handful of padding packets will.

 Also, these changes to the load balancing equations will improve overall
 network utilization, and we can use this same equations for load balancing
 onion service traffic, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30031 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test circuitpadding with zero monotonic time deltas, and fix any bugs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30031: Test circuitpadding with zero monotonic time deltas, and fix any bugs
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor2-can
--+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * priority:  Medium => Low


Comment:

 #28634 doesn't even use monotime. This analysis is not needed until a
 research machine that needs token removal or RTT estimate.

 However, in either case I still think the risk of any serious bugs coming
 from this problem are low.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29840 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Log padding counters into the heartbeat

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29840: WTF-PAD: Log padding counters into the heartbeat
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 If any researcher would find this useful, let me know.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29840 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Log padding counters into the heartbeat

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29840: WTF-PAD: Log padding counters into the heartbeat
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29821 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make circuit/channel padding correctly respect dormant mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29821: Make circuit/channel padding correctly respect dormant mode
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad padding dormant dormant- |  Actual Points:
  mode   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * priority:  Medium => Low


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29821 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make circuit/channel padding correctly respect dormant mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29821: Make circuit/channel padding correctly respect dormant mode
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad padding dormant dormant- |  Actual Points:
  mode   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor2 =>


Comment:

 Is there a sponsor that is funding dormant mode work here? We're looking
 to wrap up Sponsor2 work and this is not going to make the cut otherwise.
 And nothing is currently funding similar updates to channelpadding to
 cancel its pending timers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29102 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Serialize padding state machine in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29102: Serialize padding state machine in consensus
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  15
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor2
--+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * priority:  Medium => Low


Comment:

 Lowering priority: while I think there will be lots of research interest
 in different types of padding machines, I don't think the actual machine
 updates will require update via consensus until we start producing many
 different types of machines for different quantities of spare consensus
 overhead, which is a long way off.

 I think #29203 plus #29098 plus the existing global consensus padding rate
 limits are way more immediately useful for reacting to different amounts
 of network load than swapping machines in and out entirely on the fly, at
 least until we learn more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29269 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Evaluation of bridge statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29269: Evaluation of bridge statistics
+---
 Reporter:  cohosh  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridges, statistics |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---
Changes (by phw):

 * owner:  nickm => phw
 * status:  accepted => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29269 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Evaluation of bridge statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29269: Evaluation of bridge statistics
+---
 Reporter:  cohosh  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridges, statistics |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---

Comment (by phw):

 To add a bit more context to this ticket: At the
 [http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2019/tor-
 meeting.2019-04-04-20.00.log.html April 4 anti-censorship meeting] we
 discussed how to move forward with this:
 * We should ask the metrics team what information is available for
 bridges.
 * The anti-censorship team should then decide if we need more information.
 * If we decide that more information is needed, we'll create core Tor
 tickets to collect this information.
 * Nick also suggested that we defer this task until PrivCount is even
 farther along.

 For the lazy, here's an example of the type of information reported in
 extra-info bridge descriptors:
 {{{
 @type bridge-extra-info 1.3
 extra-info devurandom D4E10C95CBBD656AAA76BDB800F89BF9929A7098
 master-key-ed25519 iAx4u+//mpfxNN3e33g5CXcRaEB/RClpC9xhCjjkxr0
 published 2019-05-10 21:05:51
 write-history 2019-05-10 05:00:33 (86400 s)
 6764741632,8144902144,8341011456,10113909760,6633532416
 read-history 2019-05-10 05:00:33 (86400 s)
 7024661504,8455880704,8617527296,10398723072,6861299712
 dirreq-write-history 2019-05-10 05:00:33 (86400 s)
 9319424,14578688,17586176,15299584,17875968
 dirreq-read-history 2019-05-10 05:00:33 (86400 s)
 845824,339968,445440,543744,914432
 geoip-db-digest 2B8A70B399CF8B471289A4DB52947DE965D8DE5F
 geoip6-db-digest FEA33E6F398DF67252F41DDD3D010E69B33D544E
 dirreq-stats-end 2019-05-10 14:41:37 (86400 s)
 dirreq-v3-ips ir=24,ae=8,in=8,pt=8,ru=8,us=8
 dirreq-v3-reqs ir=56,ae=8,in=8,pt=8,ru=8,us=8
 dirreq-v3-resp ok=72,not-enough-sigs=0,unavailable=0,not-found=0,not-
 modified=8,busy=0
 dirreq-v3-direct-dl complete=0,timeout=0,running=0
 dirreq-v3-tunneled-dl
 
complete=64,timeout=8,running=0,min=52389,d1=69403,d2=159777,q1=182912,d3=274472,d4=442298,md=1285413,d6=1999000,d7=3273166,q3=3598200,d8=3798727,d9=5035333,max=8373045
 hidserv-stats-end 2019-05-10 14:41:37 (86400 s)
 hidserv-rend-relayed-cells -3774 delta_f=2048 epsilon=0.30 bin_size=1024
 hidserv-dir-onions-seen -10 delta_f=8 epsilon=0.30 bin_size=8
 padding-counts 2019-05-10 14:42:06 (86400 s) bin-size=1 write-drop=0
 write-pad=3 write-total=4 read-drop=0 read-pad=40 read-
 total=1216 enabled-read-pad=2 enabled-read-total=398 enabled-
 write-pad=2 enabled-write-total=2 max-chanpad-timers=145
 transport obfs3
 transport obfs4
 bridge-stats-end 2019-05-10 14:42:06 (86400 s)
 bridge-ips ir=32,ae=8,in=8,pt=8,ru=8,us=8
 bridge-ip-versions v4=40,v6=0
 bridge-ip-transports =16,obfs3=16,obfs4=24
 router-digest-sha256 S7IFV/+5By6iX2CgnzV7kN5DkTaKRT9ZA5QOB7rQMLU
 router-digest BD7D78EBC25B23B513B868E6722E45226E43EC48
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29084 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ensure circuit padding RTT estimate handes var cells/wide creates (was: WTF-PAD: Test and improve circuit RTT measurement)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29084: Ensure circuit padding RTT estimate handes var cells/wide creates
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding|
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Description changed by mikeperry:

Old description:

> From TODO file:
> {{{
>   - Circuit RTT measurement will break on var_cell/EXTEND2 cells
> - Are there any heuristics we can use here?
>   - If RELAY_EARLY is only for the first cell of an EXTEND2 series,
> we can use that. But the proposal currently says MAY, but not
> MUST
> for this behavior.
> }}}

New description:

 The use_rtt_estimate field in the circuit padding machines lets machines
 offset the inter-packet delays by a middle-node estimated RTT value of
 packets that go from the middle to the exit/website.

 We abort this measurement if we get two or more cells back-to-back in
 either direction, as this indicates that the half-duplex request/response
 circuit setup and RELAY_BEGIN sequence has finished.

 However, if we switch to a multi-cell circuit handshake, then we will need
 to take that into account when measuring RTT.

 If RELAY_EARLY is used only for the first cell of a multi-cell EXTEND2
 payload,
 then we can just count time between RELAY_EARLIES. But the proposal
 currently says MAY, but not MUST for this behavior.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28638 [Core Tor/Tor]: Serialize state machines in the torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28638: Serialize state machines in the torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding|
Parent ID:  #29102   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * priority:  Medium => Low


Comment:

 I'm lowering the priority of this based on engineering cost. I think
 researchers will likely need to recompile their relays' tors for some time
 still, while working on this stuff.

 If anyone external to Tor will find this useful, let me know.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28777 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split circuitpadding.c code into multiple modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28777: Split circuitpadding.c code into multiple modules
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, refactor, technical-debt  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * priority:  Medium => Low


Comment:

 We did some of this separation in #28634 and with the probdist stuff
 Riastradh did. I don't think the rest of it is that terribly crucial..

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28632 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the original WTF-PAD branch actually useful for us (submaster ticket)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28632: Make the original WTF-PAD branch actually useful for us (submaster 
ticket)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  worksforme
  padding, 041-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Parent/child tickets make for poor milestone/category/goal management in
 trac for vague-goal stuff like this IMO. Tags and actual milestones are
 better. Also this ticket title is annoying me. It *is* useful for us, and
 that's what #28634 is about. But this one is just taking up space in
 queries.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30500 [Circumvention/Censorship analysis]: Can the GFW still do DPI for "new" vanilla Tor?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30500: Can the GFW still do DPI for "new" vanilla Tor?
---+--
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gfw, china |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by phw):

 Indeed, it looks like newer versions of Tor use a cipher list that is
 different from the one from several years ago.

 tcis used 29 cipher suites in its TLS client hello:
 {{{
 "\xc0\x0a\xc0\x14\x00\x39\x00\x38\xc0\x0f\xc0\x05\x00\x35\xc0\x07" \
 "\xc0\x09\xc0\x11\xc0\x13\x00\x33\x00\x32\xc0\x0c\xc0\x0e\xc0\x02" \
 "\xc0\x04\x00\x04\x00\x05\x00\x2f\xc0\x08\xc0\x12\x00\x16\x00\x13" \
 "\xc0\x0d\xc0\x03\xfe\xff\x00\x0a\x00\xff"
 }}}

 Tor 0.3.2.10 used 15 cipher suites:
 {{{
 "\xc0\x2b\xc0\x2f\xcc\xa9\xcc\xa8\xc0\x2c\xc0\x30\xc0\x0a\xc0\x09" \
 "\xc0\x13\xc0\x14\x00\x33\x00\x39\x00\x2f\x00\x35\x00\xff"
 }}}

 The active prober that showed up right after the tcis "connection" used a
 whopping 65 suites:
 {{{
 "\xc0\x30\xc0\x2c\xc0\x28\xc0\x24\xc0\x14\xc0\x0a\x00\xa3\x00\x9f" \
 "\x00\x6b\x00\x6a\x00\x39\x00\x38\x00\x88\x00\x87\xc0\x32\xc0\x2e" \
 "\xc0\x2a\xc0\x26\xc0\x0f\xc0\x05\x00\x9d\x00\x3d\x00\x35\x00\x84" \
 "\xc0\x12\xc0\x08\x00\x16\x00\x13\xc0\x0d\xc0\x03\x00\x0a\xc0\x2f" \
 "\xc0\x2b\xc0\x27\xc0\x23\xc0\x13\xc0\x09\x00\xa2\x00\x9e\x00\x67" \
 "\x00\x40\x00\x33\x00\x32\x00\x9a\x00\x99\x00\x45\x00\x44\xc0\x31" \
 "\xc0\x2d\xc0\x29\xc0\x25\xc0\x0e\xc0\x04\x00\x9c\x00\x3c\x00\x2f" \
 "\x00\x96\x00\x41\xc0\x11\xc0\x07\xc0\x0c\xc0\x02\x00\x05\x00\x04" \
 "\x00\xff"
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29084 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Test and improve circuit RTT measurement

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29084: WTF-PAD: Test and improve circuit RTT measurement
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding|
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * parent:  #28632 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28694 [Core Tor/sbws]: When CircuitPadding is implemented in Tor, set it to 0 in sbws

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28694: When CircuitPadding is implemented in Tor, set it to 0 in sbws
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, changes-version-patch, sbws-11x-  |
  final-removed-20190312, scanner, 041-must  |
Parent ID:  #29954   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 The CircuitPadding torrc option has been merged to master, FYI (#28693).
 This can be implemented once swbs start using 0.4.1.

 The actual padding machines we're implementing (#28634) only pad HS
 circuits, though, which sbws does not use. So this is not essential yet,
 even when 0.4.1 is stable.

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[tor-bugs] #30500 [Circumvention/Censorship analysis]: Can the GFW still do DPI for "new" vanilla Tor?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30500: Can the GFW still do DPI for "new" vanilla Tor?
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Censorship |Version:
  analysis   |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  gfw, china
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I heard from a team of researchers that they failed to get their vanilla
 bridge probed by the GFW, despite connections from several vantage points
 in China. I set out to test this myself. Here are the results:

 1. I repeatedly established a vanilla Tor connection from a VPS in China
 (running 0.3.2.10) to a bridge in the U.S. (running 0.2.9.16, and later
 0.4.1.0-alpha-dev).
 2. All bridge connections bootstrapped to 100%. There was neither active
 probing nor blocking.
 3. I then used the tool [https://github.com/nullhypothesis/tcis tcis] on
 the China VPS to simulate a Tor handshake. The tool creates a TLS client
 hello as sent by a rather old Tor version -- I don't remember how old,
 exactly.
 4. After running tcis, I immediately got my bridge probed and blocked.

 The above makes me wonder if newer Tor versions changed their TLS
 handshake in a way that the GFW's DPI rules haven't caught up yet. It
 would be interesting to test this hypothesis and, if it's true, to find
 out what Tor changed in its TLS handshake.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28631 [Core Tor/Tor]: Release a useful WTF-PAD to the world (master ticket)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28631: Release a useful WTF-PAD to the world (master ticket)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  implemented
  padding|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 We're an open source project. It's already released. (Also parent tickets
 make for bad milestone management in trac: you can't batch modify them.
 Let's please use tags from now on).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28878 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Improve deterministic randomness in tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28878: WTF-PAD: Improve deterministic randomness in tests
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, tor-tests |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * parent:  #28631 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28821 [Core Tor/Tor]: Introduce timer_is_scheduled() method and replace padding_scheduled_at_us

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28821: Introduce timer_is_scheduled() method and replace 
padding_scheduled_at_us
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, refactoring   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * parent:  #28631 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28804 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add circuit padding to padding-spec.txt and write a doc for researchers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28804: Add circuit padding to padding-spec.txt and write a doc for researchers
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, tor-spec, 041-proposed|
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * parent:  #28631 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28634 [Core Tor/Tor]: Design a first useful padding machine (hiding client-side intro/rend circuits)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28634: Design a first useful padding machine (hiding client-side intro/rend
circuits)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * parent:  #28632 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28777 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split circuitpadding.c code into multiple modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28777: Split circuitpadding.c code into multiple modules
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, refactor, technical-debt  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * parent:  #28631 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28632 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the original WTF-PAD branch actually useful for us (submaster ticket)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28632: Make the original WTF-PAD branch actually useful for us (submaster 
ticket)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * parent:  #28631 =>


Comment:

 This is not a useful ticket. Removing parent/child relationships.

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[tor-bugs] #30499 [Metrics/Relay Search]: In Tor Metrics / Relay Search, users are able to enter the digital fingerprint of a bridge to run a successful search and display the data about that bridge,

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30499: In Tor Metrics / Relay Search, users are able to enter the digital
fingerprint of a bridge to run a successful search and display the data
about that bridge, but the Relay Search page states, "If you are searching
for a bridge, you will need to search by the hashed fingerprint. This
prevents leaking the fingerprint of the bridge when searching."
-+-
 Reporter:  monmire  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Component:  Metrics/Relay
 |  Search
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  Relay-Search-accepts-|  Actual Points:
  bridge-digital-signature issue |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 At https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html, the page contains the caveat,
 "If you are searching for a bridge, you will need to search by the hashed
 fingerprint. This prevents leaking the fingerprint of the bridge when
 searching."

 However, when users enter the //digital fingerprint// (not the //hashed
 fingerprint//) of the bridge in the Relay Search / Query bar, the search
 successfully will display data about the bridge.

 If Relay Search leaks bridge fingerprints when users use digital
 fingerprints (not hashed fingerprints) to run successful searches, we need
 to reconfigure Relay Search so that it will be restricted to using only
 hashed fingerprints to search for bridge data.

 Furthermore, the hashed fingerprint of a bridge must be made visible to
 the user by appearing in the //torrc// file, i.e., the //hashed
 fingerprint// is not visible and does not appear in the torrc file when
 using Tor Browser 8.0.8 on macOS Yosemite 10.10.5. Only the //digital
 fingerprint// is visible, appearing in the torrc file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30451 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: snowflake-client has executable stack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30451: snowflake-client has executable stack
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 I created a pull request for go-webrtc: https://github.com/keroserene/go-
 webrtc/pull/105

 I've also attached a patch to this ticket, we'll have to wait until the
 above pull request is accepted before we can test if it works so I'll
 leave this as assigned until then.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30451 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: snowflake-client has executable stack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30451: snowflake-client has executable stack
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * Attachment "0001-Allow-cgo-nonexecstack-flags.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30493 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Release CollecTor 1.9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30493: Release CollecTor 1.9.0
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl|Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 [x] sane changelog
 [x] tar is built from git
 [x] all deps present
 [x] checks pass
 [x] tests pass

 Signed git tag pushed to my repository.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/irl/collector.git/tag/?h=collector-1.9.0-irl

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[tor-bugs] #30498 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Proxy-go is receiving a lot of client timeouts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30498: Proxy-go is receiving a lot of client timeouts
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  snowflake
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor19|
-+---
 Some proxy-go instances are experiencing what seems like an unusually high
 number of client timeout errors.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28152 [Applications/GetTor]: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28152: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted
-+--
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:8 hiro]:
 > Current branch:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/hiro/gettor.git/tree/?h=refactoring
 > Also we should review the list of people currently able to contribute to
 gettor. At the moment this list includes:
 > arma ilv sukhbir

 I am happy to be removed from this list if it makes roles clearer.

 I also support some new people being added to the list.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10760 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  Rezonansowy  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-parity,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905, GeorgKoppen201905|
Parent ID:  #24855   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 One more thought: does Tails need a way to disable Torbutton functionality
 (as they require for Tor Launcher)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor- |  Actual Points:
  change,sponsor19-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by ahf):

 But it's not just for binding it is also for being used as source address
 for outgoing connections. Maybe `TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_ADDRESS` ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor- |  Actual Points:
  change,sponsor19-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Sounds like it could be the same option for both clients and server side,
 but we would want to pick a more general name than FOO_SERVER_BAR.

 For example, something like TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_BIND_ADDRESS would be an ok
 color for the bike shed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor- |  Actual Points:
  change,sponsor19-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by ahf):

 There should also be an option for clients, since clients are also used
 for HS operators (which are more server-like).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor- |  Actual Points:
  change,sponsor19-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor-change => needs-spec-change needs-
 tor-change,sponsor19-can
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30468 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship macedonian Tor Browser in alpha series

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30468: Ship macedonian Tor Browser in alpha series
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905, localization  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29935  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * cc: emmapeel (added)
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905 => TorBrowserTeam201905, localization


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Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
+
 Reporter:  korobkov|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4 |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor-change  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by arma):

 * component:  Archived/Obfsproxy => Circumvention/Obfs4


Comment:

 rescuing a ticket that still matters.

 we would also need a way for the parent (tor) to tell the child
 (obfsproxy) about this request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30452 [Core Tor/Tor]: List which compile-time modules are enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30452: List which compile-time modules are enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport? 035-backport?  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good! I commented on a minor style thing on the pull request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28152 [Applications/GetTor]: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28152: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted
-+--
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--

Comment (by phw):

 Thanks, hiro! The commit history looks much better now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30468 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship macedonian Tor Browser in alpha series

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30468: Ship macedonian Tor Browser in alpha series
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29935| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Old description:

> The macedonian translation is in good shape it seems. Let's ship a
> makedonian Tor Browser in our alpha series.

New description:

 The macedonian translation is in good shape it seems. Let's ship a
 macedonian Tor Browser in our alpha series.

--

Comment (by arma):

 (one more typo fix)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10760 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  Rezonansowy  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-parity,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905, GeorgKoppen201905|
Parent ID:  #24855   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:35 acat]:
 > I made a draft proposal here:
 
https://storm.torproject.org/shared/epDa1tjvv4tocwoK_PW_YijaZm5gbYeKjcriE28jSvY.

 It is exciting to see this moving forward. A few comments on the proposal:
 * In the section 3.2 title, please replace `Tor Launcher` with
 `Torbutton`.
 * (related to comment:29 and following) Although the Torbutton code in its
 current form may not be around for too much longer, it seems strange to me
 that the Tor Launcher and Torbutton code won't be located near each other
 in the source tree or in the final package.  I think other people will be
 surprised too. Should we relocate the Torbutton or Tor Launcher code, or
 not worry about this? I will leave the final decision to Georg.
 * Can you explain what the issues are r.e. new identity (mentioned near
 the end of section 3.5.3)? Probably that deserves its own ticket
 eventually.
 * For localization (section 4) we should think about how to support
 language packs.  With Tor Launcher, we chose to continue to package all of
 the locales so that installing a language pack would continue to work.  If
 we are only going to ship one locale, then we need to also create a plan
 for shipping modified language packs (to include the Torbutton strings).
 * Regarding ideas like moving to Fluent or enforcing Mozilla's coding
 style, we should have separate tickets for those things (especially since
 doing either at the same time as other work will make reviewing the
 integration changes much more difficult).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28152 [Applications/GetTor]: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28152: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted
-+--
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--

Comment (by hiro):

 Hi phw,
 I have condensed the git history into fewer comments and cleaned up some
 of the files generated by the coverage script (like the HUGE TAGS file).
 Also I think this would help you to visualise it:
 https://dip.torproject.org/hiro/gettor/merge_requests/1/commits

 Also fixed the print bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30456 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Provide bridges with a magic link

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30456: TBA - Provide bridges with a magic link
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: phw (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29085 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Reduce monotime usage because of performance issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29085: WTF-PAD: Reduce monotime usage because of performance issues
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29203 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a way to specify machines as reduced circuit padding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29203: Add a way to specify machines as reduced circuit padding
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  wtf-pad   |  Actual Points:  0.33
Parent ID:  #28634| Points:  4
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:  Sponsor2
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28693 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option to disable circuit padding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28693: Add an option to disable circuit padding
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  0.33
  padding, 041-must  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30173 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ensure circuit padding can be safely disabled from consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30173: Ensure circuit padding can be safely disabled from consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  0.33
  padding, 041-proposed  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28693 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option to disable circuit padding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28693: Add an option to disable circuit padding
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  0.33
  padding, 041-must  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Ah, there is one. NM.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28693 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option to disable circuit padding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28693: Add an option to disable circuit padding
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:  0.33
  padding, 041-must  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Can I please have a torspec branch for the consensus parameters?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29231 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays vastly underreport write-total in padding-counts line in extrainfo descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29231: Relays vastly underreport write-total in padding-counts line in 
extrainfo
descriptor
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-relay padding wtf-pad  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28634 | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30467 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Fix coverity CID 1444999

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30467: sendme: Fix coverity CID 1444999
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  sendme, tor-relay, 041-must, |  Actual Points:
  coverity   |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30440 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Service introduction circuit ignore flow control

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30440: sendme: Service introduction circuit ignore flow control
-+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, sendme, prop289  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15516   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30451 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: snowflake-client has executable stack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30451: snowflake-client has executable stack
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Yep, it's a cgo thing.

 The solution here is to add the `noexecstack` cgo LD flag to go-webrtc:
 {{{ #cgo LDFLAGS: -L${SRCDIR}/lib -z noexecstack }}}

 However, this will currently throw an error because of golang's
 [https://github.com/golang/go/issues/23937 whitelist] on linker and
 compiler options. This can be solved by setting the environment variable
 `CGO_LDFLAGS_ALLOW` to a regex that recognizes the `-z noexecstack`
 option.

 I'll work on a patch for this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30166 [Applications/Tor Browser]: If custom bridges are specified, only use those bridges for connecting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30166: If custom bridges are specified, only use those bridges for connecting
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:19 sisbell]:
 > Replying to [comment:17 gk]:
 > > I tested a resulting build using `sisbell/0506` + pointing `tor-
 android-service` tor your `0512` and this solves this bug, great! The
 changes in commit 5df4fd213ceda8320fc9e46b12d3bec3024e5c64 seem reasonable
 to me. A small nit: s/confusion../confusion./
 > >
 > > It seems to me we should open a follow-up ticket cleaning up the
 overloading of the bridges list. That's pretty confusing and makes it hard
 to follow the code. We should come up with a simpler way of
 setting/getting bridges in that regard.
 > Not overloading the preference is preferable. I think this change may
 have UI impact, since the UI field we are reading from is also overloaded.
 This will require some looking into to see if this is the case.

 Yes, which we should do it in a new ticket (could you open that one?) and
 not for 8.5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30474 [Core Tor/Tor]: RFC: Tor should warn about expiring keys much earlier (and leass annoying)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30474: RFC: Tor should warn about expiring keys much earlier (and leass 
annoying)
--+--
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => easy


Comment:

 I would be fine with something like that, and fine with making the
 intervals configurable.

 We might want to be a little more clever: If a key only has a one-month
 lifetime, we probably don't want to log constantly for its whole lifetime.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30497 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Donate link in about:tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30497: Add Donate link in about:tor
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30497 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Donate link in about:tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30497: Add Donate link in about:tor
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * cc: ux-team (removed)
 * keywords:   => ux-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30497 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Donate link in about:tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30497: Add Donate link in about:tor
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by antonela):

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/30497/TB8.5%20-%20Bottom%20-%20Link.png, 700px)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30497 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Donate link in about:tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30497: Add Donate link in about:tor
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * cc: ux-team, steph, sstevenson (added)
 * owner:  antonela => (none)


Old description:



New description:

 The Fundraising Team suggested to include a Donate link in `about:tor`.
 This ticket aims to track also its implementation.

--

Comment:

 Since the release is about to happen, i'd recommend to include it as a
 link. Steph suggested this copy line and emmapeel confirmed that we have a
 string for it in our translation memory.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30497 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Donate link in about:tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30497: Add Donate link in about:tor
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "TB8.5 - Bottom - Link.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #30497 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Donate link in about:tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30497: Add Donate link in about:tor
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30311 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe add HeaderLine to the bandwidth file specification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30311: Maybe add HeaderLine to the bandwidth file specification
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bandwidth-file-spec, tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 LGTM, squashed and merged.

 (My question about RelayLine was wrong -- I didn't understand that this
 only applied to the headers :/ )

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30428 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Failure to validate authenticated SENDMEs client side

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30428: sendme: Failure to validate authenticated SENDMEs client side
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, sendme, 041-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26288 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  SponsorV
---+---

Comment (by nickm):

 The seems good to me but before we merge, let's talk about integration
 testing.

 How do we know that it actually works on a live network?  What integration
 tests did we _not_ do last time that would have helped us catch this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30472 [Circumvention/Pluggable transport]: Implement a mechanism for PT reachability testing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30472: Implement a mechanism for PT reachability testing
---+---
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  project| Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  reachability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30471 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 I built a small golang service that lets bridge operators test their obfs4
 port. For now, the code is available at
 https://github.com/NullHypothesis/obfs4PortScan.

 I set up a demo at https://nymity.ch:8081. After entering your bridge's IP
 address and port, the service tells you if the port is reachable or not.
 If the port is unreachable, the service tells you the error message it
 got. The tool also has a simple rate limiter that limits requests to an
 average of one per second, with bursts of up to five per second.

 What can we improve?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30166 [Applications/Tor Browser]: If custom bridges are specified, only use those bridges for connecting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30166: If custom bridges are specified, only use those bridges for connecting
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:17 gk]:
 > I tested a resulting build using `sisbell/0506` + pointing `tor-android-
 service` tor your `0512` and this solves this bug, great! The changes in
 commit 5df4fd213ceda8320fc9e46b12d3bec3024e5c64 seem reasonable to me. A
 small nit: s/confusion../confusion./
 >
 > It seems to me we should open a follow-up ticket cleaning up the
 overloading of the bridges list. That's pretty confusing and makes it hard
 to follow the code. We should come up with a simpler way of
 setting/getting bridges in that regard.
 Not overloading the preference is preferable. I think this change may have
 UI impact, since the UI field we are reading from is also overloaded. This
 will require some looking into to see if this is the case.

 >
 > Setting into `needs_revision` for the nit and for redoing the `tor-
 browser-build` patches taking other review comments into account (http://
 -> https://).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28849 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle dormant mode in process library and for PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28849: Handle dormant mode in process library and for PT's
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dcf   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * keywords:   => 042-proposed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28849 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle dormant mode in process library and for PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28849: Handle dormant mode in process library and for PT's
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dcf   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * keywords:  041-proposed =>
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30166 [Applications/Tor Browser]: If custom bridges are specified, only use those bridges for connecting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30166: If custom bridges are specified, only use those bridges for connecting
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Oh, and it just came to my mind that we'll probably have a snowflake
 transport in Tor Browser for Android, soon (at least in the alpha). Thus,
 {{{
 +byte bridgeType = (byte) (userDefinedBridgeList.length() > 5 ? 1
 : 0);
 }}}
 might not work as expected anymore then. I guess we take the length of
 "snowflake" into account until we've redone the bridges list part.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30484 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade To Android Plugin 3.4.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30484: Upgrade To Android Plugin 3.4.0
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tor-android-service, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:


 > What's the reason for suddenly including times like
 > {{{
 > +#Sat Apr 27 12:57:35 PDT 2019
 > }}}
 > ?
 When we generate a new wrapper through the command line, it will put in
 the date the wrapper was generated.

 {{{
 ./gradlew wrapper --gradle-version=5.1.1 --distribution-type=bin
 }}}

 >
 > Otherwise this looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30451 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: snowflake-client has executable stack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30451: snowflake-client has executable stack
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * owner:  (none) => cohosh
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 Hmm, looking at the go linker it seems like PT_GNU_STACK should be set:
 https://golang.org/src/cmd/link/internal/ld/elf.go#L240

 The proxy-go instances have the same problem, but the broker does not:
 {{{
 $ readelf -W -l broker
 Program Headers:
   Type   Offset   VirtAddr   PhysAddr   FileSiz
 MemSiz   Flg Align
   GNU_STACK  0x00 0x 0x 0x00
 0x00 RW  0x8
 }}}

 I wonder if this has something to do with CGO

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28930 [Core Tor/Tor]: consider reordering PT/proxy phases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28930: consider reordering PT/proxy phases
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sponsor19-also, s8-bootstrap, pt,|  Actual Points:
  proxy, 040-deferred-20190220   |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 The change would be to reorder the phases so the proxy phases are "inside"
 the PT phases. Last I checked, tor doesn't know about whether or not the
 PT client itself uses a proxy, so the PT would have to explicitly tell
 tor.

 We can do the reordering now, or wait until we have a PT client interface
 that can report intermediate progress when using a PT tunneled through a
 proxy. ahf, which do you think is better?

 There might be reasons to have these phases in any number of slightly
 different orderings, including the current ordering. I would have to
 refresh my memory about the current behavior to be sure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29955 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Final Orfox update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29955: Final Orfox update
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #27399   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by n8fr8):

 Actually, I think there is a link format that can open either Play or
 F-Droid for the same package id. We can autodetect if they have F-Droid
 installed, and only show that if they do... something to talk to _hc
 about.

 Will get on irc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29263 [Core Tor/Chutney]: prop289: add bidirectional data transfers to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29263: prop289: add bidirectional data transfers to chutney
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, network-team-   |  Actual Points:  2
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 If I am diagnosing this right, it might be because of our evdns code on
 0.3.5.x and earlier not having a fix for #21900.  I have NO IDEA why this
 is not affecting chutney without this patch though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10760 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  Rezonansowy  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-parity,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905, GeorgKoppen201905|
Parent ID:  #24855   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 I made a draft proposal here:
 
https://storm.torproject.org/shared/epDa1tjvv4tocwoK_PW_YijaZm5gbYeKjcriE28jSvY.
 I tried not to do too many changes for the migration and left refactoring
 work for torbutton.js and other chrome/content scripts out of the
 proposal. If you think this is needed, I guess the proposal could be
 extended to include those too.

 I have tested the approach by partially integrating torbutton into firefox
 central according to the document. Working:

 * Circuit display and circuit isolation.
 * New identity/new circuit in burger menu (new identity with some
 suspicious error messages on "restart").
 * NoScript integration for security levels.
 * about:tor

 Still some things missing, like `About Tor Browser` dialog, `torbutton-
 extensions.xul` and others. Can finish it if the proposal is ok.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29955 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Final Orfox update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29955: Final Orfox update
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #27399   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:22 n8fr8]:
 > @sysrqb can you provide all the official links I should use?
 >

 The Android section has the link for Google Play -
 https://www.torproject.org/download/#android

 https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha

 I'll pick up deploying it on f-droid again - I dropped it for a bit.
 Currently, we're still using your f-droid repo, but it'd be awesome if we
 can include an official f-droid.org link in this release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29955 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Final Orfox update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29955: Final Orfox update
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #27399   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:21 n8fr8]:
 > Sure. I guess I will be implement this here:
 https://github.com/guardianproject/orfox
 >

 Thanks! I tried pinging you on irc, i didn't realize you'd be able to
 implement this (I assumed it would be on us) - but I'd love the help if
 you have the cycles for it! So, thank you (really really)!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30495 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Release ExoneraTor 4.1.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30495: Release ExoneraTor 4.1.0
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch:
 ​​https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/exonerator.git/log/?h=task-30495

 Tarball:
 ​​https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/exonerator-4.1.0.tar.gz

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29955 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Final Orfox update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29955: Final Orfox update
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #27399   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by n8fr8):

 @sysrqb can you provide all the official links I should use?

 @antonela I think after you click, maybe we should show a screen that says
 "You can/should uninstall Orfox as you don't need it anymore", and then
 after a few seconds open the link to TBA.

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[tor-bugs] #30496 [- Select a component]: CCIE Data Center Professional

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30496: CCIE Data Center Professional
-+--
 Reporter:  sushanthp2019@…  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 A Cisco Certified Internetwork Expert Data Center (CCIE Data Center)
 professional is responsible for planning, design, implementation and
 management of the complex modern IT data center infrastructure. The
 certified expert will have a good understanding of the requirements of
 data centers and device configurations. The professional should have in-
 depth knowledge of Layer 2 and Layer 3 connectivity, fabric
 infrastructure, storage networking, planning network services, automation,
 and orchestration.

 The CCIE Data Center professional will analyze the evolving technologies
 and their impact on the architectural framework, deployment models,
 implementation, and operations. This certified expert must be well-versed
 with the fiber channel protocol and the SAN environment. They will
 implement LAN and SAN connectivity in the computing environment. It is the
 Cisco Certified Internetwork Expert Data Center professional who is
 responsible for all computer server resources and management tasks. The
 professional must maintain and monitor high availability in a unified
 computing environment. They have to identify and resolve unified computing
 issues and maintenance tasks. The CCIE Data Center professional maintains
 the data center virtualization with the Cisco Nexus 1000V/implement
 security system. They should have a good understanding of the Fiber
 Channel protocol and the SAN environment.

 know more: https://www.fieldengineer.com/skills/ccie-data-center-
 professional

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[tor-bugs] #30495 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Release ExoneraTor 4.1.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30495: Release ExoneraTor 4.1.0
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:  irl
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 We'll have to put out a new release for #30415. Creating branch and
 tarball now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30415 [Metrics/Website]: broken url in metrics.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30415: broken url in metrics.tpo
-+---
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_information


Comment:

 Merged to ExoneraTor master. Opening a new ticket for the ExoneraTor
 release and leaving this one open (in needs_information) for the necessary
 metrics-web patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30493 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Release CollecTor 1.9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30493: Release CollecTor 1.9.0
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl|Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Sounds good!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30467 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Fix coverity CID 1444999

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30467: sendme: Fix coverity CID 1444999
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sendme, tor-relay, 041-must, |  Actual Points:
  coverity   |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Seems reasonable as far as I can tell.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30467 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme: Fix coverity CID 1444999

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30467: sendme: Fix coverity CID 1444999
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sendme, tor-relay, 041-must, |  Actual Points:
  coverity   |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => ahf


Comment:

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1017
 Branch: `ticket30467_041_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30464 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update text for safer security level to include WebGL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30464: Update text for safer security level to include WebGL
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-8.5-must, TorBrowserTeam201905R, GeorgKoppen201905 =>
 TorBrowserTeam201905R, GeorgKoppen201905


Comment:

 Actually, I think we should have this for 9.0a1 to not mess with the
 localization and then backport the localized strings to stable.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30493 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Release CollecTor 1.9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30493: Release CollecTor 1.9.0
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl|Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by irl):

 Planning to review this evening, deploy tomorrow afternoon?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30415 [Metrics/Website]: broken url in metrics.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30415: broken url in metrics.tpo
-+--
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30493 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Release CollecTor 1.9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30493: Release CollecTor 1.9.0
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl|Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch:
 ​https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/collector.git/log/?h=task-30493

 Tarball:
 ​https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/collector-1.9.0.tar.gz

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