Re: [tor-bugs] #24037 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Use syscall blacklist rather than whitelist for torsocks

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24037: Use syscall blacklist rather than whitelist for torsocks
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Is there anything blocking the first solution from being used? We have a
 patch already.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30656 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for Android missing search options like images in DuckDuckGo

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30656: Tor Browser for Android missing search options like images in DuckDuckGo
--+--
 Reporter:  echaskaris|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by www.artiraj.in):

 Arti

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[tor-bugs] #30717 [Community]: Consider exempting Matrix.org users from OFTC registered nick requirement

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30717: Consider exempting Matrix.org users from OFTC registered nick 
requirement
-+---
 Reporter:  JeremyRand   |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Community
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
 The Matrix.org relay is the most straightforward way to access OFTC over
 Tor.  Users who are accessing OFTC via the Matrix.org relay are not
 considered by OFTC to be "registered" by default, since their registration
 is with Matrix.org infrastructure rather than OFTC infrastructure.  This
 produces a problem because Tor's OFTC channels are configured to disallow
 any user from joining if they are not registered on OFTC infrastructure.
 (I tested #tor-dev; I assume the others are similar.)

 Usually, this kind of policy is intended to mitigate spam attacks.
 However, historically none of the spam attacks against IRC networks have
 been routed via Matrix.org infrastructure.  This may be because Matrix.org
 has its own rate-limiting mechanisms for account registration (e.g. a
 reCAPTCHA test for each new registration), and it may also be because
 Matrix.org is new enough that spammers haven't paid attention to it.  In
 any event, I think it's highly unlikely that you'll see spam from
 Matrix.org infrastructure if you permit Matrix.org users to access your
 OFTC channels.

 Documentation on exempting Matrix.org users from the registered nick
 requirement is at https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-irc/wiki
 /End-user-FAQ#user-content-i-am-a-chanop-and-have-a-spam-problem-how-can-i
 -fix-it-without-affecting-matrix-users .  Any chance you could do this?

 PS: I'm not sure if Community is the right component for this ticket; feel
 free to reassign to another component if you like.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30716 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Improve the obfs4 obfuscation protocol

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30716: Improve the obfs4 obfuscation protocol
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4 |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sponsor28, anti-censorship-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  20
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor28-must
+--

Comment (by yawning):

 One of the design deficiencies of the obfs4 protocol is that it doesn't
 easily/efficiently support backward incompatible protocol alterations.

 There are ways around this, but at that point, people are better off
 writing a new different/backwards incompatible protocol entirely, that
 fixes a number of the design flaws in the underlying protocol.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30471 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Improve UX for obfs4 bridge operation

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30471: Improve UX for obfs4 bridge operation
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by phw):

 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30441#comment:10 Over
 here], I emailed several bridge operators whose obfs4 port was not
 reachable. The ones who got back to me all had one of the following two
 issues:

 * Several people thought that only the ORPort must be reachable. They
 didn't know that obfs4 needs a separate port. We need to make this clear
 in our documentation.
 * Some people have obfs4 listen on a locally-scoped address.
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/pt-spec.txt#n305 Our spec]
 says that this is fine but it doesn't seem to work in practice because Tor
 ends up writing the locally-scoped address into its descriptor, e.g.:
 `transport obfs4 10.0.0.5:PORT`. This looks like a bug. I don't think a
 locally-scoped address should ever end up in a descriptor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30693 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Delete old unsanitized logs

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30693: Delete old unsanitized logs
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I have prepared a candidate sanitized CSV file extracted from the
 sanitized logs. I've placed it in /var/log/snowflake-broker/broker.csv.xz
 for evaluation. It's 6 MB compressed but 1.8 GB uncompressed.

 The sanitized CSV looks like this:
 {{{
 timestamp,event,proxyid,clientid,additional
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,proxy-gets-none,157,,no-clients
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,proxy-polls,157,,
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,proxy-gets-none,149,,no-clients
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,proxy-polls,149,,
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,client-offers,,,
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,proxy-gets-offer,,,
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,proxy-answers,,,
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,client-gets-answer,,,
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,proxy-polls,160,,
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,proxy-gets-none,159,,no-clients
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,proxy-polls,159,,
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,proxy-gets-none,157,,no-clients
 2017-07-21 23:40:00,proxy-polls,157,,
 }}}

 Timestamps are truncated to multiples of 10 minutes. Client and proxy IDs
 are replaced by sequential integers.

 The `event` column can take on these values:
  * `start` the broker was restarted.
  * `client-offers` a client connects, sends an offer, and awaits an
 answer.
  * `client-gets-answer` a client receives a proxy's answer (successful
 broker match).
  * `client-gets-none` a client disconnects without receiving an answer,
 whether because of a timeout or because there were no proxies.
  * `proxy-polls` a proxy connects in order to receive an offer.
  * `proxy-gets-none` a proxy disconnects without receiving a client offer
 (no clients).
  * `proxy-gets-offer` a proxy receives a client offer.
  * `proxy-answers` a proxy sends an answer to the broker.
  * `error` an error; the most common is "http: TLS handshake error". Other
 possibilities are "http2: server: error", "http2: received GOAWAY", or a
 bad HTTP request. The `additional` column distinguishes these cases.

 Some of these have relations to each other. For example `proxy-polls` ≈
 `proxy-gets-none` + `proxy-gets-answer`.

 Using the sanitized CSV, I made a couple of graphs. The first shows shows
 the number of broker outcomes per day, where an outcome is one of the four
 possibilities:
  * A client and proxy are successfully linked up.
  * A proxy connects but doesn't get a client.
  * A client connects but doesn't get a proxy.
  * Some other error occurred.

 Click to embiggen.
 [[Image(broker-interactions.png,100%)]]

 The second graph shows the estimated number of proxies. This is just 10 ×
 `proxy-polls` / s. It's based on the assumption that each proxy polls
 every 10 s. The assumption doesn't hold when there are actually clients,
 but as you can see the estimate is pretty close to 3, which is the number
 of fallback proxy-go instances.

 Click to embiggen.
 [[Image(broker-estimated-proxies.png,100%)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30513 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Add {arlolra, cohosh, dcf, phw} to default Cc of Circumvention/Snowflake tickets (was: Add {arlolra, cohosh, dcf} to default Cc of Circumventi

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30513: Add {arlolra, cohosh, dcf, phw} to default Cc of Circumvention/Snowflake
tickets
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Description changed by dcf:

Old description:

> Recently the Obfuscation/Snowflake component was renamed to
> Circumention/Snowflake. The change seems to have lost the default Cc that
> was set up in #23860. See comment:1:ticket:30510 for example. Is it
> possible to have these users Cced by default in new
> Circumvention/Snowflake tickets?
> {{{
> arlolra cohosh dcf
> }}}
> I could be wrong about what users were configured before, this is from
> memory.

New description:

 Recently the Obfuscation/Snowflake component was renamed to
 Circumention/Snowflake. The change seems to have lost the default Cc that
 was set up in #23860. See comment:1:ticket:30510 for example. Is it
 possible to have these users Cced by default in new
 Circumvention/Snowflake tickets?
 {{{
 arlolra cohosh dcf phw
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30513 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Add {arlolra, cohosh, dcf} to default Cc of Circumvention/Snowflake tickets

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30513: Add {arlolra, cohosh, dcf} to default Cc of Circumvention/Snowflake 
tickets
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: phw (added)


Comment:

 Can you please also add the user "phw" to the Cc list?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30693 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Delete old unsanitized logs

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30693: Delete old unsanitized logs
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "broker-estimated-proxies.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30693 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Delete old unsanitized logs

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30693: Delete old unsanitized logs
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "broker-interactions.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30693 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Delete old unsanitized logs

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30693: Delete old unsanitized logs
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "broker-logs.zip" added.

 Programs to process and visualize broker logs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30472 [Circumvention/Pluggable transport]: Implement a mechanism for PT reachability testing

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30472: Implement a mechanism for PT reachability testing
---+---
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  project| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  reachability   |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #30471 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 2


Comment:

 I'm closing this because our short-term solution is now in place. Here's a
 summary:

 * The service is now deployed at https://bridges.torproject.org/scan/.
 * The code is available at https://github.com/NullHypothesis/obfs4PortScan
 (and, once #30715 is done, on our gitweb).
 * We're using polyanthum's Apache reverse proxy as front for the service
 (see #30703), so we only need to listen on localhost.
 * The service runs as user `bridgescan` (see #30714) and we're using a
 [https://help.torproject.org/tsa/doc/services/ local systemd script] to
 have it start at boot.
 *
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/AntiCensorshipTeam/InfrastructureMonitoring
 Our sysmon deployment] is monitoring the service.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30471| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+--
Changes (by phw):

 * parent:  #30472 => #30471


Comment:

 Updating the parent to #30471 because our past parent, #30472, turned into
 a short-term solution that is now deployed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve accuracy and usefulness of information reported to controllers about bootstrap status

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28018: Improve accuracy and usefulness of information reported to controllers
about bootstrap status
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2,  |  Actual Points:
  bootstrap  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 => network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, bootstrap


Comment:

 Not sure why this didn't previously have the "bootstrap" keyword.

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[tor-bugs] #30716 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Improve the obfs4 obfuscation protocol

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30716: Improve the obfs4 obfuscation protocol
--+
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:|Version:
  Circumvention/Obfs4 |
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  sponsor28, anti-censorship-roadmap
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  20|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
  Sponsor28-must  |
--+
 As part of our work for Sponsor 28, we will evaluate and improve the obfs4
 obfuscation protocol.

 Roger started the discussion [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/anti-
 censorship-team/2019-May/15.html on our anti-censorship-team mailing
 list]. Relevant reading is the CCS'15 paper
 [https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Wang2015a Seeing through Network-Protocol
 Obfuscation] and the S'16 paper
 [https://censorbib.nymity.ch/#Tschantz2016a SoK: Towards Grounding
 CensorshipCircumvention in Empiricism].

 Let's use this ticket to keep track of this effort.

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[tor-bugs] #30715 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Create obfs4portscan.git repository for phw

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30715: Create obfs4portscan.git repository for phw
-+
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Please create a user/phw/obfs4portscan repository.
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQGzBAEBCAAdFiEEvWUVvXkFpAp3gtRWD9lfHTpZekgFAlzxpZ4ACgkQD9lfHTpZ
 ekjrvAv/Zluo3gBYehToVvihttelWu4+pj1vghV8li9Wu2N2UkVF7XWXJwnR3U6J
 atd0InTxi1SII/P9WcYaY28c1xymaN9GXPxP6wvjQKSeTpm8GSsQNqUuTTDgTKrU
 CdODjfDFUsewD3LkEEkn2bE8cq+YnbZcwzfzOvV+vvwqnVn5Is8reqQK7FHJPwUI
 OzpYS+TgwBXVeVQsD7hCSdCkSz3zVSkb6S0szS4/RREntePVe7OxDc+fg1xx+fX8
 d2iPwSmIYqEFQXE3p2BuW747N1D9NyzwJut1UyKWYmBpA0ui+3KwTMkY9MaoWg1Z
 CKctkA4+0+ypv9VZuCRaDlzWyWTNCwResp28B64s4I4hbMfWqUni1d+u6Z5pJwE3
 h9AoSFR4OQHcuzlJaqC/NRT4GmIoUKICfr49YYLQwX0Xgi1nXXF9bHyZfgAwbuwF
 PUaPLy17IZ0ZEw8nKKLL/XB1TVmFkldg1oRM9M56VX+ctZ7oJV70ZPqDQUUKLxW2
 Fse/bEaE
 =gWsV
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30472 [Circumvention/Pluggable transport]: Implement a mechanism for PT reachability testing

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30472: Implement a mechanism for PT reachability testing
---+---
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  project| Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  reachability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30471 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---

Comment (by anarcat):

 i've document how to start services with systemd in
 https://help.torproject.org/tsa/doc/services/

 i prefer this to cron as it allows much more flexibility and i can restart
 services when there are security upgrades.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30714 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create user "bridgescan" on polyanthum

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30714: Create user "bridgescan" on polyanthum
-+
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 oops, the file hadn't been propagated through puppet. try again?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30714 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create user "bridgescan" on polyanthum

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30714: Create user "bridgescan" on polyanthum
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:1 anarcat]:
 > the bridgescan user has been created on polyanthum. i made it so the
 bridgedb group can `sudo -u bridgescan` so I hope that's alright.

 Hmm, my user account phw is in the bridgedb group but I don't seem to be
 allowed to run commands as bridgescan:

 {{{
 phw@polyanthum:~$ id
 uid=2040(phw) gid=2040(phw)
 groups=2040(phw),1501(torproject),1531(bridgedb),2060(globe)
 phw@polyanthum:~$ sudo -u bridgescan id
 Sorry, user phw is not allowed to execute '/usr/bin/id' as bridgescan on
 polyanthum.torproject.org.
 }}}

 > i would like to try with you folks another way to start the service, but
 i'll discuss that in that other ticket.
 >
 > so just a heads up: don't start the thing with a `@reboot` cronjob yet
 please. :)

 Ok, gotcha.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30714 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create user "bridgescan" on polyanthum

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30714: Create user "bridgescan" on polyanthum
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 the bridgescan user has been created on polyanthum. i made it so the
 bridgedb group can `sudo -u bridgescan` so I hope that's alright.

 i would like to try with you folks another way to start the service, but
 i'll discuss that in that other ticket.

 so just a heads up: don't start the thing with a `@reboot` cronjob yet
 please. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29607: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
-+-
 Reporter:  pidgin   |  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, security, 041-longterm, |
  041-deferred-20190530  |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 A plausible plan forward: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2019-May/013849.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29206 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: New design for client -- proxy protocol for Snowflake

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29206: New design for client -- proxy protocol for Snowflake
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * cc: phw, dcf, arlolra (added)


Comment:

 Here's a first stab at a very simple sequencing layer for snowflake:
 https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/compare/sequencing

 There is still a lot to do such as:
 - send acknowledement packets when data has been received
 - implement a timeout feature (which I will probably do by making
 `SnowflakeReadWriter` an actual `net.Conn`.
 - resend data chunks that have not been acknowledged
 - implement a fixed sized window to avoid sending too much data

 But I thought I'd put this out there sooner to get feedback since this is
 a big change

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25429 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25429: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`
-+---
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 I'm going to move the discussion of the sequencing and reliability layer
 over to #29206.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30599 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Cloudflare alt-svc onions cause a different exit to be used at each request

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30599: Cloudflare alt-svc onions cause a different exit to be used at each 
request
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks2  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30024| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27-can => Sponsor27-must


Comment:

 So, I just tried to send something via a contact form for literally 30min
 and I failed due to various Cloudflare issues going on. I finally resorted
 to disable Alt-Svc in a different Tor Browser and that solved the problem
 for me. Further bumping prio.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  implemented
  -triaged-in-20180711, prop289-assigned-|  Actual Points:
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec, postfreeze-  |
  ok, 041-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 All child tickets are closed; authenticated sendmes are now a real thing.
 :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30365 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Update tor-spec.txt with authenticated SENDME spec

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30365: prop289: Update tor-spec.txt with authenticated SENDME spec
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, prop289, sendme,   |  implemented
  041-should |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  arma |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Squashed and merged!

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[tor-bugs] #30714 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create user "bridgescan" on polyanthum

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30714: Create user "bridgescan" on polyanthum
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Please create a new user, "bridgescan", on polyanthum.

 We will run the golang service that we developed
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30472#comment:4 over
 here] from this user account.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30365 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Update tor-spec.txt with authenticated SENDME spec

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30365: prop289: Update tor-spec.txt with authenticated SENDME spec
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, prop289, sendme,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  arma |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 looks good to me!

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[tor-bugs] #30713 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable or allow_fail test_rebind.py in macOS Travis

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30713: Disable or allow_fail test_rebind.py in macOS Travis
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:  (none)
  catalyst   |
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport,
 Severity:  Normal   |  040-backport, tor-ci-fail-sometimes, 041-should
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #28229
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor31-can  |
-+-
 test_rebind.py is having spurious failures often on macOS. We should
 either allow_fail the macOS builds, or disable test_rebind.py.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28229 [Core Tor/Tor]: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28229: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, tor-ci-fail-sometimes,   |
  041-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * priority:  Low => Medium


Comment:

 Bumping priority because it's making Travis fail somewhat often.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28496 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Consider dropping yahoo from the bridgedb email domains

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28496: Consider dropping yahoo from the bridgedb email domains
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB|Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---

Comment (by arma):

 I say we drop it then.

 Would have been nice to have some measurements of how much each email
 domain is actually used, first, but, better to drop it than to leave it in
 place and wait more on those measurements.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28496 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Consider dropping yahoo from the bridgedb email domains

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28496: Consider dropping yahoo from the bridgedb email domains
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB|Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---

Comment (by phw):

 I learned from a researcher that Yahoo lets you create up to 500
 disposable email addresses, which are intended for third-party
 newsletters:

 [[Image(yahoo.png)]]

 BridgeDB interprets these disposable addresses as unique users, which
 makes it easy for an attacker to get a disproportionately large number of
 bridges. We could teach BridgeDB to recognise disposable Yahoo addresses
 but at this point the better way forward may be to just disable Yahoo
 altogether.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28496 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Consider dropping yahoo from the bridgedb email domains

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28496: Consider dropping yahoo from the bridgedb email domains
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB|Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2019  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by phw):

 * Attachment "yahoo.png" added.

 Yahoo disposable email addresses

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24367 [Core Tor/Tor]: Changing pluggable transports (during start-up) in Tor Browser is broken

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24367: Changing pluggable transports (during start-up) in Tor Browser is broken
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, tor-bridge-client,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320, |
  031-unreached-backport, tbb-needs, |
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-should, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:  #29875   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24367 [Core Tor/Tor]: Changing pluggable transports (during start-up) in Tor Browser is broken

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24367: Changing pluggable transports (during start-up) in Tor Browser is broken
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, tor-bridge-client,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320, |
  031-unreached-backport, tbb-needs, |
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-should, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:  #29875   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 I have managed to reproduce this as well; I believe that my fix for #29875
 should also fix this. (At least, it does for me.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29875 [Core Tor/Tor]: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the Torbutton doesn't work

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29875: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the
Torbutton doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:  .5
  040-backport, 041-should, network-team-|
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => .5


Comment:

 This branch WFM when merged into master: `bug29875_035`.  0.3.5 PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1066
 Here it is merged into master, with a practracker update:
 `bug29875_master`. master PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1067

 In my testing, I had to wait a couple of minutes after changing the
 configuration for snowflake to work; I don't know whether that's typical.

 It is possible that this will fix some cases of #24367 as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30647 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Letterboxing and Scrollbars Dimensions

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30647: Letterboxing and Scrollbars Dimensions
---+---
 Reporter:  edgewall   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by tom):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 I agree with Thorin. While in some situations, it would be nice to have
 the scrollbar outside the letterbox and regain those pixels; that doesn't
 work in many other situations.

 I think the correct fix for this is #22137

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28786 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow to disable Tor in Tor Browser on mobile (was: Allow to disable Orbot in Tor Browser)

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28786: Allow to disable Tor in Tor Browser on mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  dimqua   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  user-feedback, blog|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Let's call it "Tor" in the ticket's description, even if people are
 calling it "Orbot" (I'll leave the original summary).

 Orbot is an independent app the Guardian Project created. We copied and
 integrating that app into Tor Browser on Android during the initial
 development process, but we don't include "Orbot" anymore.

 We can add an option for power users for using another tor instance (and
 not launching our own).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29875 [Core Tor/Tor]: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the Torbutton doesn't work

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29875: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the
Torbutton doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 041-should, network-team-|
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Ah, there was a second problem: num_usable_bridges() was counting bridges
 that were not actually configured any more.

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[tor-bugs] #30712 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport patch for Mozilla's 1552993 to Tor Browser

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30712: Backport patch for Mozilla's 1552993 to Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201906
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We should backport the patch for Mozilla's bug 1552993 to Tor Browser.
 It's small and won't get backported to ESR 60 as Mozilla does not deem
 that one to be important enough.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30429: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 acat]:

 [snip]

 Okay, let me start by replying to the ToDos:

 > Some TODOs:

 [snip]

 > * Integrate in tor-browser-build: is the toolchain ready? would it "just
 work" to change the firefox repo to point to this one?

 No, it is not yet. The current branch is `linux_esr68_v3` in my repo (with
 probably a bunch of `linux_esr68_v$` to follow) but there are still build
 requirements missing (`nodejs` is the next one to add)

 [snip]

 > * Updater: will mcs/brade work on these?

 Yes.

 > * Onboarding: as described in #28822, this needs to be ported, since
 onboarding (bootstrapped) extension is not there anymore. I could take a
 look at this one.

 Sounds good.

 > * Onion security expectations: a couple of patches, depending on
 availability, perhaps pospeselr could work on these?

 What are the issues here? Could you file a new bug to track that work?

 > * Decide what to do with patches from #28711.

 Ideally we could backport them and have some knowledgeable Mozilla person
 looking over the result.

 [snip]

 > * Backport https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1330467 or wait
 if it's included in 68.

 It seems we need to backport them, alas. :( They got a minus for beta
 (that is esr68) inclusion.

 > * Android: should we do this after desktop patches? here or in a
 separate ticket?

 We should do it in parallel or better: not blocking the rebasing work on
 desktop patches. sysrqb will pick this up and probably decide whether to
 use a child bug or have the rebase in this ticket.

 [snip]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24926 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Should Tor Browser for Android support the PanicKit Panic Trigger Intent?

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24926: Should Tor Browser for Android support the PanicKit Panic Trigger 
Intent?
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:6 eighthave]:
 > Any chance of the exit functionality being brought back from Orfox?  I'm
 currently in the process of a maintenance round for the panic stuff, and
 saw that TBA reports itself as supporting a panic trigger, but does not do
 anything in response.  It should either stop claiming that it supports a
 panic trigger, or it should do something.  To stop claiming, the panic
 stuff just needs to be removed from the AndroidManifest.xml.

 Huh. I agree, but it should work. We specifically decided we'd include it
 at the beginning and we could reconsider it later. The same functionality
 was ported from Orfox into Tor Browser - but admittedly it wasn't tested.

 We did tweak the impementation a bit, so maybe that broke it. I'll need to
 dig into this a bit more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30656 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for Android missing search options like images in DuckDuckGo

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30656: Tor Browser for Android missing search options like images in DuckDuckGo
--+--
 Reporter:  echaskaris|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Okay, a quick glance seems to indicate that this is caused by us on
 mobile using the /html version of DuckDuckGo for some reason.

 I believe this came over from Orfox. I don't know the history of this
 decision, but I assumed it was for reducing javascript usage (for
 performance and privacy) -but I don't know if I'm right about this. I
 don't have a strong opinion on using `/html`. Or, people can petition DDG
 to support these search options on `/html`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29875 [Core Tor/Tor]: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the Torbutton doesn't work

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29875: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the
Torbutton doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 041-should, network-team-|
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 That seems to be _part_ of the right solution, but not sufficient.  The
 failure mode has changed here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29875 [Core Tor/Tor]: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the Torbutton doesn't work

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29875: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the
Torbutton doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 041-should, network-team-|
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 tbb-needs, 034-backport, 034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,
 041-should, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 =>
 tbb-needs, 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-should, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


Comment:

 034 is EOL in 10 days; no backport for this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29875 [Core Tor/Tor]: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the Torbutton doesn't work

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29875: Going from obfs4 to snowflake using the Tor Network Settings from the
Torbutton doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 034-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-should, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 Okay, this is indeed reproducible.  The problem appears to be that we
 don't realize we are missing a descriptor for our bridge and need to fetch
 it -- possibly because router_dir_info_changed() isn't getting called.

 I think the right solution may be to call router_dir_info_changed() when
 the list of bridges changes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
---+---
 Reporter:  emmapeel   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 After this branch lands on `8.5` branch, I'll forward port it to `9.0`,
 and that should land on top of the patch for #24920.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24920 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA has tabs and private tabs, we only want private tabs

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24920: TBA has tabs and private tabs, we only want private tabs
---+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201905R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 (It's almost June, but I'll be optimistic with the keyword :) )

 Setting this for review, this is only for alpha - it's in my repo
 `bug24920_01`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30711 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30711: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.
--+
 Reporter:  denucaa   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor,bug   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Thanks, just to confirm: would you mind posting here the place that is
 broken for you and the one that works (with sanitized paths so you don't
 leak usernames etc.)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24926 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Should Tor Browser for Android support the PanicKit Panic Trigger Intent?

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24926: Should Tor Browser for Android support the PanicKit Panic Trigger 
Intent?
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by eighthave):

 I think that "app hiding" would be a great feature for Tor Browser to have
 here, and probably not too much work to support.  Here you can see how it
 was implemented in F-Droid:
 https://gitlab.com/fdroid/fdroidclient/merge_requests/629

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30687 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement a generic counter token bucket

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30687: Implement a generic counter token bucket
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  asn-merge |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15516| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => asn-merge


Comment:

 Reminder: 042 merge window not open yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30711 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30711: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.
--+---
 Reporter:  denucaa   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor,bug   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by denucaa):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > Which operating system are you using and what version? What does
 "Everything is installed correctly. As before." mean? Did you try a clean,
 new bundle from our website, installed to a different location? Does the
 issue show up there as well?


 Fixed the problem! Installed tor on different disk which resolved it.

 Thank you.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30711 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30711: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.
--+---
 Reporter:  denucaa   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor,bug   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by denucaa):

 Replying to [comment:3 denucaa]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > > Which operating system are you using and what version? What does
 "Everything is installed correctly. As before." mean? Did you try a clean,
 new bundle from our website, installed to a different location? Does the
 issue show up there as well?
 >
 >
 > Its installed on desktop as default destination. I did  try installing
 in different destination on C drive, however, it did not help either.
 >
 > Operating system is Windows 10 Home.
 >
 > This issue appeared only after i decided to delete the browser and
 reinstall it as i had an issue with saving bookmarks. Once reinstalled the
 problem occured which i describe above.

 Also what do you mean by a new clear bundle?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, 041-should  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Unit test pushed. CI is running on the 035 branch only.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30711 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30711: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.
--+---
 Reporter:  denucaa   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor,bug   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by denucaa):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > Which operating system are you using and what version? What does
 "Everything is installed correctly. As before." mean? Did you try a clean,
 new bundle from our website, installed to a different location? Does the
 issue show up there as well?


 Its installed on desktop as default destination. I did  try installing in
 different destination on C drive, however, it did not help either.

 Operating system is Windows 10 Home.

 This issue appeared only after i decided to delete the browser and
 reinstall it as i had an issue saving bookmarks. Which i describe above.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28513 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change SessionStore so it doesn't violate disk avoidence goal

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28513: Change SessionStore so it doesn't violate disk avoidence goal
---+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-disk-leak  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Closing this because #24920 is a better solution. SessionStore does not
 save information about private tabs on disk. It does rely on Android for
 saving some state, and there is an assumption Android only retains this
 information in memory as long as it's needed. I don't know if this
 assumption is correct (that it is only kept in memory, and not written to
 a cache on disk).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30711 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30711: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.
--+---
 Reporter:  denucaa   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor,bug   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * severity:  Critical => Normal


Comment:

 What operating system are you using and what version? What does
 "Everything is installed correctly. As before." mean? Did you try a clean,
 new bundle from our website, installed to a different location? Does the
 issue show up there as well?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
---+---
 Reporter:  emmapeel   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201905R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I have a branch ready for review in my repo, `bug30573_8.5_01`. This
 simply delays loading the requested page until after all tabs are
 "sanitized" (closed) and tor finishes bootstrapping. I have another branch
 for the alpha, I'll post that soon.

 This branch creates an event dispatch listener for events
 `Sanitize:Finished` and `Tor:Ready`. It begins by checking the current
 status (if sanitizing tabs is enabled and if tor is not started). These
 values are used for initializing the event listener. The listener listens
 for a "fake" event (`Tor:CheckIfReady`) as well, which is emitted
 immediately after creation, in case tor is running already and tabs won't
 be sanitized.

 After the necessary events are received, then the tab is loaded. This
 prevents both the tab loading before all tabs are closed during the
 sanitization (therefore closing this new tab, as well), and this prevents
 loading the tab before tor is ready and showing a proxy network error page
 while the tab is reloading (which we force after tor bootstrap completes).
 Overall, this seems like a better experience.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28634 [Core Tor/Tor]: Design a first useful padding machine (hiding client-side intro/rend circuits)

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28634: Design a first useful padding machine (hiding client-side intro/rend
circuits)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, 041-should, nickm-merge,|
  dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:
 wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell, padding, 041-proposed, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, 041-should
 =>
 wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell, padding, 041-proposed, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, 041-should, nickm-merge, dgoulet-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30711 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30711: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.
--+--
 Reporter:  denucaa   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor,bug   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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[tor-bugs] #30711 [- Select a component]: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30711: Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity.
-+--
 Reporter:  denucaa  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:  tor,bug  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Hey guys,

 Have been experiencing this after latest update. Everything worked fine
 before . Also i cannot open menu tool bar at all. Seems like an empty
 click when clicking it.

 Everything is installed correctly. As before.

 Here is the error i get for new identity.

 Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity: [Exception... "Component
 returned failure code: 0x80570016 (NS_ERROR_XPC_GS_RETURNED_FAILURE)
 [nsIJSCID.getService]"  nsresult: "0x80570016
 (NS_ERROR_XPC_GS_RETURNED_FAILURE)"  location: "JS frame ::
 chrome://torbutton/content/torbutton.js :: torbutton_do_new_identity ::
 line 1126"  data: no]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30549 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add script to remove expired sub-keys from a keyring file

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30549: Add script to remove expired sub-keys from a keyring file
---+---
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30548 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R, tbb-rbm => TorBrowserTeam201905, tbb-
   rbm


Comment:

 The `list-all-keyrings` scripts looks good to me. However, it does
 sometimes weird things in that it only lists the `binutils` key and then
 stops + it modifies it as well and I am left with a `binutils.gpg~` file.
 I am still hunting for steps to repro that reliably... That's with GnuPG
 2.2.13 ona Debian testing/unstable box in case it matters.

 Regarding the `drop-expired-sub-keys` script:

 1) The script does not differentiate between subkeys that are expired in
 our `tor-browser-build` repo but are not expired in reality: there are
 folks that just extend the expiration date from time to time instead of/in
 addition to renewing keys.

 2) The script should not touch keys that have no expired subkeys. When I
 currently do something like `tools/keyring/drop-expired-sub-keys
 keyring/zlib.gpg` then I get a modified `zlib.gpg` afterwards which I
 should not get.

 3) I should not get any keyring/$.gpg~ files in my `keyring` dir after
 running the script

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30659 [Metrics/CollecTor]: op-ab torperf files are not cleaned up in recent

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30659: op-ab torperf files are not cleaned up in recent
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Everything looks good. Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30560 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30560: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. Merged to `tor-browser-60.7.0esr-9.0-1` (commit
 79286b37dd0d3711a5ef029e15286cf37339cba6) and cherry-picked to `tor-
 browser-60.7.0esr-8.5-1` (commit
 70d0b16f9f23c81040b6648a813c0991315afdb8).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24926 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Should Tor Browser for Android support the PanicKit Panic Trigger Intent?

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24926: Should Tor Browser for Android support the PanicKit Panic Trigger 
Intent?
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by eighthave):

 Any chance of the exit functionality being brought back from Orfox?  I'm
 currently in the process of a maintenance round for the panic stuff, and
 saw that TBA reports itself as supporting a panic trigger, but does not do
 anything in response.  It should either stop claiming that it supports a
 panic trigger, or it should do something.  To stop claiming, the panic
 stuff just needs to be removed from the AndroidManifest.xml.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30538 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to comment on The Independent Newspaper

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30538: Unable to comment on The Independent Newspaper
--+--
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30710 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for Android is crashing on Replicant 6.0 phones

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30710: Tor Browser for Android is crashing on Replicant 6.0 phones
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > https://redmine.replicant.us/boards/9/topics/15211

 Thanks! I guess there is not much we can do then apart from mentioning
 this on our known issues section somewhere?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30710 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for Android is crashing on Replicant 6.0 phones

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30710: Tor Browser for Android is crashing on Replicant 6.0 phones
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://redmine.replicant.us/boards/9/topics/15211

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23840 [Community/Tor Support]: Google's reCAPTCHA fails 100%

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#23840: Google's reCAPTCHA fails 100%
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support   |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker | Resolution:
 Keywords:  cloudflare,google,captcha,noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18361  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Still does this, unable to solve most CAPTCHA's for the last few months.

 There's a patent from 2013 which describes this behavior:
 >US9407661B2 - Blocking via an unsolvable CAPTCHA - Google Patents
 https://patents.google.com/patent/US9407661

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30665 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get Firefox 68 ESR Working with latest android toolchain

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30665: Get Firefox 68 ESR Working with latest android toolchain
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW we need to slightly change the x86 target: https://hg.mozilla.org
 /mozilla-central/rev/2b2bd723ebc8.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30630 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put CI URLs in ReleasingTor.md

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30630: Put CI URLs in ReleasingTor.md
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, 041-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  easy, doc => easy, doc, 041-can
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22619 [Core Tor/Tor]: SessionGroup = Reading config failed

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22619: SessionGroup = Reading config failed
-+-
 Reporter:  acceleraTor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SessionGroup configuration   |  Actual Points:  0
  SocksPort option 032-unreached 035-backport|
  040-backport 041-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  SessionGroup configuration SocksPort option 032-unreached =>
 SessionGroup configuration SocksPort option 032-unreached 035-backport
 040-backport 041-can
 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 See branch `bug22619_035` with PR as
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1065 .

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22619 [Core Tor/Tor]: SessionGroup = Reading config failed

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22619: SessionGroup = Reading config failed
-+-
 Reporter:  acceleraTor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SessionGroup configuration   |  Actual Points:  0
  SocksPort option 032-unreached |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  catalyst => nickm
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Thanks for the reminder! I'll give it a shot.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30538 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to comment on The Independent Newspaper

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30538: Unable to comment on The Independent Newspaper
--+---
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mwolfe):

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > Gocomics works for me if I switch the circuits for a bit. It does indeed
 seem to be the case that they don't like some exit nodes.
 >
 > What do I have to do to reproduce the comment issue?
 This isn't about gocomics, it's about The Independent newspaper, www dot
 independent dot co dot uk
 If one has an account and tries to comment, one cannot. Before, there was
 a 'Join the discussion' button, but now it's disabled (and so greyed and
 hard to see). If I log in, I can upvote other comments, but cannot comment
 or reply. Disabling NoScript does not allow comments.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30639 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor tries to connect over IPv6 in IPv4 networks with ClientAutoIPv6ORPort set

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30639: Tor tries to connect over IPv6 in IPv4 networks with 
ClientAutoIPv6ORPort
set
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants, network-team-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  maybe 041-should, bootstrap|
Parent ID:  #29641   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:   => #29641


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29641 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to bootstrap on IPv6-only access networks

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29641: Tor Browser fails to bootstrap on IPv6-only access networks
-+-
 Reporter:  jeremyvisser |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905R, GeorgKoppen201905 =>
 TorBrowserTeam201905, GeorgKoppen201905
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 This got backed out in commit 5e8a92b225e3f67a4df6ce9e47e62eee59ed90fb.
 See: #30369 for further work that is needed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29787 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Enumerate possible failure cases and include failure information in .tpf output

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29787: Enumerate possible failure cases and include failure information in .tpf
output
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl|Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by acute):

 Ah - it is very easy to allow for the SOURCE to be given on the command
 line as a parameter - will make sure to add this to the branch and include
 it in the docs. You are correct, this now just needs merging - Thanks for
 bumping the priority!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30710 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for Android is crashing on Replicant 6.0 phones

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30710: Tor Browser for Android is crashing on Replicant 6.0 phones
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash => tbb-mobile, tbb-crash,
 TorBrowserTeam201905


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[tor-bugs] #30710 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for Android is crashing on Replicant 6.0 phones

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30710: Tor Browser for Android is crashing on Replicant 6.0 phones
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-
  |  crash
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 From our blog (https://blog.torproject.org/comment/282203#comment-282203):
 {{{
 This stable version for android crashes on replicant os 6.0 (latest) just
 by clicking it

 ROMs here https://www.replicant.us/supported-devices.php

 Havent tried tor browser earlier (alpha) versions yet, but I tested the
 stable version and its not working
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30560 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30560: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30621 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: remove abuse attachment

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30621: remove abuse attachment
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for the report. I deleted the file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30560 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30560: Onboarding toolbar graphic doesn't match actual toolbar after upgrade
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5-issues => tbb-onboarding,
 tbb-8.5-issues, TorBrowserTeam201905R
 * cc: acat (added)
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_30560_v2` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_30560_v2=79286b37dd0d3711a5ef029e15286cf37339cba6)
 in my public `tor-browser` repo has a fix for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25642 [Webpages/Website]: translation of torproject.org

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25642: translation of torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  project   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, l10n |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30612 [Metrics/Website]: Replace timeouts-and-failures graph with errorcodes graph

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30612: Replace timeouts-and-failures graph with errorcodes graph
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29507   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => irl


Comment:

 Here are two samples of the new graph containing error codes rather than
 generic failures and timeouts:

 [[Image(onionperf-errorcodes-public.png, 600px)]]

 [[Image(onionperf-errorcodes-onion.png​, 600px)]]

 These are based on graphs I made for #29787 where we discussed how to
 extract error codes from logs. The graphs above are tailored for the Tor
 Metrics website.

 Setting needs_review for the graphs. The code will have to wait until
 #29787, #30602, and #30610 are resolved.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30612 [Metrics/Website]: Replace timeouts-and-failures graph with errorcodes graph

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30612: Replace timeouts-and-failures graph with errorcodes graph
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29507   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "onionperf-errorcodes-onion.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30612 [Metrics/Website]: Replace timeouts-and-failures graph with errorcodes graph

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30612: Replace timeouts-and-failures graph with errorcodes graph
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29507   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "onionperf-errorcodes-public.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29787 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Enumerate possible failure cases and include failure information in .tpf output

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29787: Enumerate possible failure cases and include failure information in .tpf
output
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl|Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * reviewer:   => irl


Comment:

 Thanks for writing those instructions! I was able to reprocess three
 months worth of logs from op-ab, op-hk, op-nl, and op-us. Yay!

 One thing I noticed was that the script uses the hostname for the `SOURCE`
 field and for the file name. This doesn't matter if reprocessing is done
 on the same host as measurements, but this might not be the case with
 months/years of logs. Maybe it's worth pointing this out, so that whoever
 reprocesses past logs needs to change the hostname before reprocessing
 logs.

 Next step is to wait for the GitHub branch to be reviewed and merged?
 Setting reviewer to irl and priority to high, so that we can ideally start
 reprocessing logs early next week. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30647 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Letterboxing and Scrollbars Dimensions

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30647: Letterboxing and Scrollbars Dimensions
---+--
 Reporter:  edgewall   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-fingerprinting-resolution
 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24527 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Inform users in Tor Launcher of which settings are best for them based on their country

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24527: Inform users in Tor Launcher of which settings are best for them based 
on
their country
---+---
 Reporter:  hellais|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by pili):

 * cc: phw (added)


Comment:

 Might be interesting for anti-censorship team

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24918 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Help users finding the new circuit display

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24918: Help users finding the new circuit display
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
---+--
Changes (by pili):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor9


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25640 [Webpages/Website]: coding torproject.org

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25640: coding torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  project   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor9


Comment:

 New website is live.

 Any updates/changes are now tracked in gitlab.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25641 [Webpages/Website]: content for torproject.org

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25641: content for torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor9


Comment:

 New website went live already

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25642 [Webpages/Website]: translation of torproject.org

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25642: translation of torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, l10n |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor9


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding: user not taught *how* to open the security-slider dialog

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27485: Onboarding: user not taught *how* to open the security-slider dialog
-+-
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-onboarding, ux-  |  Actual Points:
  team, tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201903|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor9
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor9


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27511 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add New identity button to toolbar

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27511: Add New identity button to toolbar
--+--
 Reporter:  isnaiter  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-newnym   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #10760| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor9


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29969 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29969: Drag-and-drop search causes NoScript XSS warning
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201905R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. Cherry-picked to `master` (commit
 db1ff5cb84595c0b9299d8326bc565517f926511) and `maint-8.5` (commit
 d2c1d1718bbaf892536c5fad371b46ef7acc2555).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28800 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Implement New Identity functionality for Tor Browser on Android

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28800: Implement New Identity functionality for Tor Browser on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-newnym, ux-team, |  Actual Points:
  TBA-a3, tbb-8.5, tbb-parity,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor9
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor9


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29590 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Smarter bootstrapping for Tor Browser on Android taking censorship into account

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29590: Smarter bootstrapping for Tor Browser on Android taking censorship into
account
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * cc: phw (added)


Comment:

 Might be of interest to anti-censorship team

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30570 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Implement per-site security settings support

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30570: Implement per-site security settings support
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor9


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21222 [Webpages/Website]: Main ticket for website redesign project

2019-05-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21222: Main ticket for website redesign project
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor9


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