Re: [tor-bugs] #30777 [Community/Outreach]: Run a "set up new bridges" campaign

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30777: Run a "set up new bridges" campaign
-+
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
-+

Comment (by ggus):

 > We should point people to our obfs4 setup guide.

 About this, we will include obfs4 guide to the new Community Portal
 section "Relay Operations", so we can translate and it will be easier to
 find and share this resource. The new portal is going to be publicly
 released till the end of June.

 Also, should we have a goal in numbers? How many more bridges we are
 looking for? We can discuss this during a community team meeting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cache outdated fetched descriptors on directory authorities

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30782: Cache outdated fetched descriptors on directory authorities
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, intro, tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #16564| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I just opened this ticket for the ticket number, it can close when the
 parent closes.

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[tor-bugs] #30782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cache outdated fetched descriptors on directory authorities

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30782: Cache outdated fetched descriptors on directory authorities
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy, intro, tor-dirauth
Actual Points:  0.2   |  Parent ID:  #16564
   Points:  0.2   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When tor starts fetching a descriptor due to a consensus, then replaces
 its consensus before the descriptor arrives, the descriptor is
 unrecognised.

 Directory caches keep the descriptor in the old descriptor cache, but
 clients and authorities drop it.

 But I think authorities should keep the descriptor, in case it is used in
 a future vote or consensus.

 This is a bug on tor 0.1.1.13-alpha.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30730 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can't access right click menu for noscript w/o readding icon

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30730: Can't access right click menu for noscript w/o readding icon
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 >Yes, the NoScript icon in the context menu is a bug which we did not get
 fixed for 8.5. Removing it is tracked in #30730.

 For clarity: Same cypherpunk as op here

 I'm not sure I follow, isn't #30730 this this thread?

 I understand that JS is a complex thing and maybe we should make it an
 expert setting one must opt into bringing up in the menu. I agree hiding
 complexity but allowing experts to customize is a good design pattern.

 Based on what you say, I'd agree it's not a huge deal if ppl add the icon
 in short term. (I'd love to see some kind of "factory reset" option, since
 at least in macOS it's a bit hard and takes some terminal doings to
 completely reset tor's appearance to default but that's a separate issue
 sorry to wander)

 In long term, I'd prefer to be able to use the context menu rather than
 modify my browser.

 (Right click -> NoScript -> whitelist specifics)

 Not only for the admittedly niche issue of screenshots if custom icon
 added, but at higher level I think it's good to train users not to modify
 tor. I've seen troubling numbers of people post on places like Reddit they
 want to install extensions to "increase" their privacy and need to be
 talked out of it. Since not everyone understands diff between adding
 buttons and adding add ons might be a simple way to reinforce safe
 behavior.

 Anyways apologies if not being clear, English not first language: I think
 that if no icon present, enabling the right click menu should be allowed.
 I recognize it is advanced, but for a site like Reddit (admittedly an edge
 case), you need some JS to run the site, but you don't want everything you
 visit out of Reddit to run JS.

 Anyways, thanks for listening, have a good day

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I don't have time to review the changes this week, but maybe asn does.

 We will need to implement a lot of the child tickets before we merge this
 code: #30644, #30677, #30691, and #30692.

 I would also be useful to have #29828 and #30642.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30753 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Think about using DNS over HTTPS for Tor Browser 9

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30753: Think about using DNS over HTTPS for Tor Browser 9
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Using DoH would NOT longer give EXIT Nodes the Ability to passively learn
 clear-text domain names of target. Of users using Clients TLS1.3 with ESNI
 !
 DNSPort currently is sadly unreliable and unpredictable and limited to
 tiny query type set.  lookups randomly fails.

 Replying to [comment:3 arma]:
 > What would "using DoH" look like here?
 >
 > If Tor clients are doing it themselves, then two more cons include:
 > * Several more round-trips across the Tor network for each web request,
 which would seem to be a huge performance penalty.

 Example:
 [[Image(https://blog.cloudflare.com/content/images/2018/06/tor.gif)]]

 uses Hops reduced Single Onion Services. This way, it is no more hops
 compared to than using DNSPort. From a Client perspective.

 >  "encourage Tor exit relay operators to change their local dns resolver
 to use a DoH option."
 This is another step forward. Shouldn't this be the default requirement
 nowadays?

 Replying to [comment:5 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 arma]:
 >...
 > > If the exit relays are doing DoH on their own in order to resolve
 addresses that the clients ask for on the exit circuits, that seems much
 more workable to me, because it would let the exit relay cache and reuse
 answers for a while across all requestors, 
 > We could also build a DoH library into tor, and use it by default on tor
 exits.
 > But I don't know if the ecosystem is there yet. At this time, I'd be
 worried about single points of failure.


 This would be awesome, making exit traffic less passively watchable for
 targets and good reasons mentioned.

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > > If doing so, please think about using onion services for this. Else
 you will have a cock and egg problem for resolving the DoH domain first.
 >
 > But DNS over HTTPS uses an IP address for its server?
 Well, for example, fireox uses network.trr.uri=https://mozilla.cloudflare-
 dns.com/dns-query but not the follwing:
 {{{
 network.trr.bootstrapAddress

 (default: none) by setting this field to the IP address of the host name
 used in "network.trr.uri", you can bypass using the system native resolver
 for it.
 }}}

 This means, the system resolver for mozilla.cloudflare-dns.com is a single
 point of failure.


 For exit servers, someone wants open new ticket as described by teor an
 arma?
 For client, Tor browser already have it builtin. Just set
 {{{
 
network.trr.uri=https://dns4torpnlfs2ifuz2s2yf3fc7rdmsbhm6rw75euj35pac6ap25zgqad.onion:443
 /dns-query
 network.trr.mode=3
 }}}







 Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > Just set up DNS MiTM detectors (also with parallel DoH requests) on exit
 nodes...

 Hello from another cypherpunks, Would be nice to have to discover more
 BadExit Nodes too!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30780 [Core Tor/Tor]: Return a distinct was_router_added_t when formatting annotations fails

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30780: Return a distinct was_router_added_t when formatting annotations fails
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, intro, technical-debt, tor-|  Actual Points:  0.3
  bridge, 041-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  easy, intro, technical-debt, tor-bridge => easy, intro,
 technical-debt, tor-bridge, 041-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30223 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Noscript "Disable restrictions for this tab" no longer working as expected

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30223: Noscript "Disable restrictions for this tab" no longer working as 
expected
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 Any news on this? Not fixed in 10.6.2.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30781 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop crashing when encountering an unknown router annotation

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30781: Stop crashing when encountering an unknown router annotation
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  local-file-crash, tor-bridge,|  Actual Points:  0.2
  029-backport, 034-backport, 035-backport,  |
  040-backport, 041-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  local-file-crash, tor-bridge =>
 local-file-crash, tor-bridge, 029-backport, 034-backport,
 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #6676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Nuke ‘MyFamily’

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#6676: Nuke ‘MyFamily’
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-relay, needs-proposal maybe- |  Actual Points:
  bad-idea path-selection research-program   |
Parent ID:  #15060   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We implemented proposal 242, which obsoletes this ticket.

 Future MyFamily improvements (or removals) should be proposed using the
 tor proposals process.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18101 [Applications/Tor Browser]: IP leak from Windows/macOS UI dialog with URI

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18101: IP leak from Windows/macOS UI dialog with URI
-+-
 Reporter:  uileak   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-proxy-bypass, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201906R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 comment:13 sounds promising

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30499 [Metrics/Relay Search]: In Tor Metrics / Relay Search, users are able to enter the digital fingerprint of a bridge to run a successful search and display the data about that brid

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30499: In Tor Metrics / Relay Search, users are able to enter the digital
fingerprint of a bridge to run a successful search and display the data
about that bridge, but the Relay Search page states, "If you are searching
for a bridge, you will need to search by the hashed fingerprint. This
prevents leaking the fingerprint of the bridge when searching."
--+--
 Reporter:  monmire   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 wait, the bridge configline in torrc does not include the hashed
 fingerprint ? I only provide ip port combination, tor bridge client would
 accept any bridge (hashed fingerprint) at this destination..

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 I have done so. Sorry if I took long to respond.

 Could you please review this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29267 [Circumvention]: CI for pluggable transports

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29267: CI for pluggable transports
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  CI, PTs, anti-censorship-roadmap,|  Actual Points:
  ex-sponsor19   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  13
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor28-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30368 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30368: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28-can
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor28-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30471 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Improve UX for obfs4 bridge operation

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30471: Improve UX for obfs4 bridge operation
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28-must
-+
Changes (by phw):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor28-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #9316 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB should export statistics

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#9316: BridgeDB should export statistics
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics, bridgedb, prometheus, ex-   |  Actual Points:
  sponsor-19, anti-censorship-roadmap|
Parent ID:  #19332   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  metrics, bridgedb, prometheus, ex-sponsor-19 => metrics,
 bridgedb, prometheus, ex-sponsor-19, anti-censorship-roadmap


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16564 [Core Tor/Tor]: WIP: Reject bridge descriptors posted to non-bridge authorities (was: Reject bridge descriptors posted to non-bridge authorities)

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16564: WIP: Reject bridge descriptors posted to non-bridge authorities
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  work-in-progress, tor-bridge, easy,  |  Actual Points:  0.6
  intro, ex-sponsor-19   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-bridge, easy, intro, ex-sponsor-19 => work-in-progress,
 tor-bridge, easy, intro, ex-sponsor-19
 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:  0.5 => 0.6


Comment:

 I would like an initial review of the design of this change:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1084

 This pull request:
 * changes the purpose of general-purpose descriptors with bridge-
 distribution-request line to the bridge purpose
 * rejects:
   * bridge descriptors uploaded to a non-bridge authority from relays
   * downloaded bridge descriptors, when expecting relay descriptors
   * controller requests that try to add a bridge descriptor to the list of
 relay descriptors

 I wonder if I am missing some rejection cases, and if those cases are all
 covered by changing the descriptor purpose.

 I still need to write some unit tests, see:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16564#comment:21

 This branch is based on #30780, because the was_router_added_t changes
 conflict. If #30780 merges to master, I can rebase on master to remove
 those commits from the pull request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30780 [Core Tor/Tor]: Return a distinct was_router_added_t when formatting annotations fails

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30780: Return a distinct was_router_added_t when formatting annotations fails
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, intro, technical-debt, tor-|  Actual Points:  0.3
  bridge |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  easy, intro, technical-debt => easy, intro, technical-debt,
 tor-bridge
 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:  0.2 => 0.3
 * parent:  #16564 =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 We should try to get this fix in 0.4.1 if we can, it's pretty low-risk.

 See my pull request https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1083

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30334 [Applications/Tor Browser]: build_go_lib for executables?

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30334: build_go_lib for executables?
--+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Patch at https://notabug.org/JeremyRand/tor-browser-build/src/build-go-
 lib-exe (commit hash 690a8334a7c7c3e7db40f09783da7096d5ab4c56).  There was
 indeed a lot of boilerplate / duplicated code present in
 meek/obfs4/snowflake, and I think this patch does a reasonably good job of
 improving the situation.  I definitely find the code easier to read with
 this patch applied, though admittedly this is subjective and I'm probably
 biased toward finding code that I wrote easy to read.

 Feel free to review.  I've tested all of the build targets that I could
 think of to make sure that it builds without errors and that the outputs
 of meek/obfs4/snowflake look sane when untarred, but I haven't tested the
 resulting Tor Browser binaries.

 As a side note, this patch would make my life easier with regards to
 #30558, since solving that ticket involves adding another Go executable,
 which exacerbates the code duplication issues unless this patch is
 applied.  (I'm not familiar enough with Trac culture to know how to tag
 that relationship, or whether I even have the needed privs to do so.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30781 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop crashing when encountering an unknown router annotation

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30781: Stop crashing when encountering an unknown router annotation
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  local-file-crash, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  local-file-crash => local-file-crash, tor-bridge
 * parent:  #16564 =>
 * actualpoints:  0.1 => 0.2


Comment:

 We can handle this fix separately from #16564.

 See my pull requests:
 * 0.2.9: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1078
 * 0.3.4: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1079
   * clean merge, testing only
 * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1080
   * file movement merge
 * 0.4.0: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1081
  * clean merge, testing only
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1082
  * clean merge, testing only

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Nuke ‘MyFamily’

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#6676: Nuke ‘MyFamily’
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, needs-proposal maybe- |  Actual Points:
  bad-idea path-selection research-program   |
Parent ID:  #15060   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: phw (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29098 [Core Tor/Tor]: Load balance properly in the presence of padding overhead

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29098: Load balance properly in the presence of padding overhead
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-dirauth, network-team-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #8453| Points:  13
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21864: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  intro, 15min, tor-relay, tor-|  Actual Points:
  bridge, is-this-safe   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: phw (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28804 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add circuit padding to padding-spec.txt and write a doc for researchers

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28804: Add circuit padding to padding-spec.txt and write a doc for researchers
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, tor-spec, 041-proposed, network-  |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  (none) => mikeperry
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28234 [Applications/GetTor]: Update GetTor documentation

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28234: Update GetTor documentation
-+-
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28232   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It has been incorporated in new code: !https://dip.torproject.org/anti-
 censorship/gettor

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30731 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Publish post-sanitization broker logs

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30731: Publish post-sanitization broker logs
-+---
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information
 * reviewer:   => phw


Comment:

 The `clientid` column appears to be empty:
 {{{
 $ cut -d , -f 4 broker.csv | sort -n | uniq

 clientid
 }}}
 Do we need it if it doesn't contain any information?

 The only problem I can think of is somebody using the data set to confirm
 if a given computer was a client or a proxy. Given the low resolution of
 the timestamps, the absence of client IDs, and the pseudonymous proxy IDs,
 I consider the risk low.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #10692, #27330, #28679, #30247, ...

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #10692, #27330, #28679, #30247, #3781, #3980, #9036, 
#12030, #12506, #12627, #12807, #16670, #17214, #17425, #20116, #20770, #21314, 
#21814, #22664, #23521, #23565, #25061, #25528, #25713, #26425, #26673, #27308, 
#27984, #28231, #28232, #28233, #28284, #28339, #28391, #28529, #29269, #29274, 
#29282, #29490, #29491, #29689, #29690, #29956, #30048, #30060, #30066, #30070, 
#30071, #30153, #30183, #30208, #30477, #30498, #12507, #15457, #29114, #29741, 
#19774 by gaba:
sponsor to 

Comment:
Remove sponsor 19 and add a keyword ex-sponsor19 to mark all the tickets that 
could have been in the scope of the sponsor. 

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[tor-bugs] #30781 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop crashing when encountering an unknown router annotation

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30781: Stop crashing when encountering an unknown router annotation
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  local-file-crash
Actual Points:  0.1|  Parent ID:  #16564
   Points:  0.1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can  |
---+
 I think this bug can only be triggered by modifying a local file.

 This bug was introduced in commit b5c8a8ae53 in 0.2.0.8-alpha.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30780 [Core Tor/Tor]: Return a distinct was_router_added_t when formatting annotations fails

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30780: Return a distinct was_router_added_t when formatting annotations fails
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, intro, technical-debt  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #16564   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  easy, intro => easy, intro, technical-debt
 * version:   => Tor: unspecified
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor30-can
 * points:   => 0.2


Comment:

 This is a bug introduced by commit b5c8a8ae53c in 0.2.0.8-alpha.

 I'll put the fix in a commit in #16564.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29267 [Circumvention]: CI for pluggable transports

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29267: CI for pluggable transports
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  CI, PTs, anti-censorship-roadmap,|  Actual Points:
  ex-sponsor19   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  13
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  CI, PTs, anti-censorship-roadmap => CI, PTs, anti-censorship-
 roadmap, ex-sponsor19
 * sponsor:  Sponsor19 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28930 [Core Tor/Tor]: consider reordering PT/proxy phases

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28930: consider reordering PT/proxy phases
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  pt, proxy, 040-deferred-20190220,|  Actual Points:
  ex-sponsor-19, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  pt, proxy, 040-deferred-20190220, ex-sponsor-19 =>
 pt, proxy, 040-deferred-20190220, ex-sponsor-19, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28930 [Core Tor/Tor]: consider reordering PT/proxy phases

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28930: consider reordering PT/proxy phases
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  pt, proxy, 040-deferred-20190220,|  Actual Points:
  ex-sponsor-19  |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:
 sponsor19-also, s8-bootstrap, pt, proxy, 040-deferred-20190220, ex-
 sponsor-19
 => pt, proxy, 040-deferred-20190220, ex-sponsor-19
 * sponsor:  Sponsor19 =>


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[tor-bugs] #30780 [Core Tor/Tor]: Return a distinct was_router_added_t when formatting annotations fails

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30780: Return a distinct was_router_added_t when formatting annotations fails
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy, intro
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #16564
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 There's a note in dirserv_add_multiple_descriptors() that this is bad.

 But no-one ever fixed it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30732 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Your Firefox is critically out of date" banner

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30732: "Your Firefox is critically out of date" banner
--+---
 Reporter:  hellomebois   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by hellomebois):

 regarding comment:2, I have the following add-ons: HTTPS Everywhere and
 Privacy Badger (both by EFF)

 I have not made any other modifications as far as I am aware.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30746 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor relay bootstrap hangs: missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry guards (was: Tor bootstrap hangs: missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry gua

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30746: Tor relay bootstrap hangs: missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary 
entry
guards
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #27104, #27691, #30049, #30154, ...

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #27104, #27691, #30049, #30154, #30155, #30212 by gaba:
sponsor to 

Comment:
Moving all new, assigned, accepted, reopened, need_information tickets from 
sponsor 19 into the unsponsor land. Added keyword ex-sponsor19 to track and 
check later if we had something that can be added to new sponsors.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22755 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Use stem to create test descriptors

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22755: Use stem to create test descriptors
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  python, stem, bridgedb-parsers,  |  Actual Points:
  bridgedb-ci|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * owner:  (none) => phw
 * sponsor:  Sponsor19 => Sponsor30-can


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #5211, #7144, #11330, #12089, ...

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #5211, #7144, #11330, #12089, #12505, #16564, #29249, 
#10831, #15967, #17548, #19693, #19997, #23251, #28496, #28555, #28556, #29286, 
#29484, #29686, #29863, #30152, #30310, #30579, #9332, #12537, #29096 by phw:
sponsor to Sponsor30-can

Comment:
Moving from Sponsor 19 to Sponsor 30.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #10802, #12802, #12957, #15404, ...

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #10802, #12802, #12957, #15404, #26542, #9316, #13727, 
#14453, #17626, #19332, #23839, #24607, #26543, #28015, #28526, #28531, #29184, 
#29275, #29277, #29288, #29296, #19839 by phw:
sponsor to Sponsor30-must

Comment:
Moving from Sponsor 19 to Sponsor 30.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30675 [Core Tor/Stem]: Add an argument that makes stem TRACE output log to a file

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30675: Add an argument that makes stem TRACE output log to a file
-+---
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes, stem  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30591   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Thanks teor! Added this argument, to use it supply '--log-file
 /path/to/log' among the test arguments.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=d92936c

 Feel free to reopen if ya need anything else.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30721 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_addr_port_lookup() is overly permissive

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30721: tor_addr_port_lookup() is overly permissive
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-addr, refactor,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  practracker-improvement|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > This bug was introduced in in 0.2.1.5-alpha, when tor_addr_lookup() was
 called tor_addr_port_parse().
 >
 > The first commit fixes the bug, the next two commits refactor the code
 so the logic is clearer. I split tor_addr_lookup() into 3 separate
 functions as part of the refactor, the split gets rid of a practracker
 exception.
 >
 > See my pull request https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1068
 >
 > This change will break some rare, invalid tor configs, so we can't
 backport it.
 Thanks! This looks good by visual inspection. The commit structure is
 helpful. The first commit could use a few minor changes:
 * Add a changes file
 * Maybe add unit tests to ensure that IPv4 addresses with square brackets
 get rejected?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30779 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL 1.1.1c is not built reproducibly

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30779: OpenSSL 1.1.1c is not built reproducibly
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 In 1.0.2* we had
 {{{
 #ifdef DATE
 # ifdef OPENSSL_USE_BUILD_DATE
 return (DATE);
 # else
 return ("built on: reproducible build, date unspecified");
 # endif
 }}}
 with
 {{{
 #define DATE "built on: $date"
 }}}
 and
 {{{
 $date = localtime();
 }}}
 but `OPENSSL_USE_BUILD_DATE` was undefined. It seems they changed the mode
 to opt into reproducible builds now while it was previously opt-out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30779 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL 1.1.1c is not built reproducibly

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30779: OpenSSL 1.1.1c is not built reproducibly
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 Previously we would get "built on: reproducible build, date unspecified".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30779 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL 1.1.1c is not built reproducibly

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30779: OpenSSL 1.1.1c is not built reproducibly
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by boklm):

 It looks like we can solve this by defining `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH`:
 
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blob;f=util/mkbuildinf.pl;h=c9324a9ded76a1e2412476e5073b9b10ed706bcd;hb=50eaac9f3337667259de725451f201e784599687#l15

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "MTProto Post Reach.png" added.

 https://www.dropbox.com/s/ggin9dmkobowkve/MTProto%20Post%20Reach.png?dl=0

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #7349, #19001, #25483, #28018, ...

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #7349, #19001, #25483, #28018, #28533, #28803, #21315, 
#25429, #25593, #25595, #25601, #25681, #26920, #26923, #28672, #28942, #29112, 
#29245, #29287 by phw:
sponsor to Sponsor28-can

Comment:
Moving from Sponsor 19 to Sponsor 28.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #29207, #29279, #20813, #27385, ...

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #29207, #29279, #20813, #27385, #28849, #29293, #5304, 
#23888, #29205, #29206, #29258, #29259, #29260, #29262, #29283, #29734, #29736, 
#29111, #29272 by phw:
sponsor to Sponsor28-must

Comment:
Moving from Sponsor 19 to Sponsor 28.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30777 [Community/Outreach]: Run a "set up new bridges" campaign

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30777: Run a "set up new bridges" campaign
-+
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
-+
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: stephw (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30745 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document disabled CI

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30745: Document disabled CI
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-can process  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)
 * keywords:  041-can => 041-can process


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30718 [Applications]: Tor is inconsistent on virtual disk drives

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30718: Tor is inconsistent on virtual disk drives
--+
 Reporter:  mackey|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mackey):

 * Attachment "Untitled.jpg" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30316 [Core Tor/Tor]: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30316: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0
  dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Backported to 0.4.0

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30759 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create (or edit) the wiki page for the CI role

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30759: Create (or edit) the wiki page for the CI role
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  process roles  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => process roles
 * cc: gaba (added)


Comment:

 It would makes sense for people to comment in this ticket so there is
 progress on the discussion but we can do a finally decision in the monthly
 retrospective.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30213 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove sudo: false from Travis

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30213: Remove sudo: false from Travis
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-ci 040-backport  |  Actual Points:
  035-backport 034-backport 029-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Backported to 0.4.0

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30189 [Core Tor/Tor]: ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL build failures in 0.3.4 and later.

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30189: ALL_BUGS_ARE_FATAL build failures in 0.3.4 and later.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Backported to 0.4.0

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29612 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update the documentation for ExitRelay

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29612: Update the documentation for ExitRelay
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, doc, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:  0.1
  040-backport, consider-backport-after-0404 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Backported to 0.4.0

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30454 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30454: hs-v3: INTRODUCE1 trunnel code doensn't handle
HS_INTRO_ACK_STATUS_CANT_RELAY
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 034-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, nickm-merge, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, 0411-alpha  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Backported to 0.4.0, marking for 0.3.5

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30234 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get a stacktrace from tor processes launched by stem

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30234: Get a stacktrace from tor processes launched by stem
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  035-backport, 040-backport |
Parent ID:  #29437   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Backported for 0.4.0. Marking for possible backport to 0.3.5

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30452 [Core Tor/Tor]: List which compile-time modules are enabled

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30452: List which compile-time modules are enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport? 035-backport?  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Backported to 0.4.0, marking for possible 0.3.5 backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is the new backport branch for 0.3.5+:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1077

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  dgoulet => mikeperry
 * status:  merge_ready => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30779 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL 1.1.1c is not built reproducibly

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30779: OpenSSL 1.1.1c is not built reproducibly
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 It seems we get a timestamp related diff now, weird.
 {{{
 --- /dev/fd/63  2019-06-05 19:58:46.221296266 +
 +++ /dev/fd/62  2019-06-05 19:58:46.221296266 +
 @@ -122793,8 +122793,8 @@
  001dfa80: 722f 746d 702f 6469 7374 2f6f 7065 6e73  r/tmp/dist/opens
  001dfa90: 736c 2f6c 6962 2f65 6e67 696e 6573 2d31  sl/lib/engines-1
  001dfaa0: 2e31 2200   6275 696c 7420 6f6e  .1".built on
 -001dfab0: 3a20 5475 6520 4a75 6e20 2034 2031 313a  : Tue Jun  4 11:
 -001dfac0: 3032 3a35 3120 3230 3139 2055 5443   02:51 2019 UTC..
 +001dfab0: 3a20 5765 6420 4a75 6e20 2035 2031 393a  : Wed Jun  5 19:
 +001dfac0: 3531 3a31 3220 3230 3139 2055 5443   51:12 2019 UTC..
  001dfad0:          
  001dfae0: 3045 efff 4045 efff 8045 efff 5045 efff  0...@e...e..pe..
  001dfaf0: 6045 efff 7045 efff      `E..pE..
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30773 [Core Tor/Tor]: New bug class: Accessing rend_data/hs_ident after marking for close a circuit

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30773: New bug class:  Accessing rend_data/hs_ident after marking for close a
circuit
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs bug 041-must stability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 The replacment for #29034 should take care of this class of bug.

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[tor-bugs] #30779 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL 1.1.1c is not built reproducibly

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30779: OpenSSL 1.1.1c is not built reproducibly
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 While preparing Tor Browser 9.0a2 we realized that we get OpenSSL related
 differences on our build machines across all platforms we use it on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 We should not backport this; instead we should backport
 c525135dac354892a45ad3d2f6de9450d393f09f combined with the changes file
 for this branch.

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[tor-bugs] #30778 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: Not able to remove projects in dip.torproject.org

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30778: Not able to remove projects in dip.torproject.org
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services   |Version:
  Admin Team |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  gitlab
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Each time I try to remove a repository in !https://dip.torproject.org I
 get this message:

 "This project was scheduled for deletion, but failed with the following
 message: Neither PUB key nor PRIV key: not enough data"

 thanks

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28972 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: gitlab instance at Tor

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28972: gitlab instance at Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30649 [Core Tor/Tor]: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for unknown machine.

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30649: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for
unknown machine.
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, circuitpadding, wtf-pad,  |  Actual Points:
  041-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I pushed more log protocol warn updates to the PR: now when padding
 negotiation fails due to either corrupt cell or "valid" refusal, we
 LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN. Those should not happen, but one of them was at info,
 so it was already quiet.

 I will file a new ticket for evaluating if the origin-side
 LOG_PROTOCOL_WARNs here should be LOG_WARNs or not.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30498 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Proxy-go is receiving a lot of client timeouts

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30498: Proxy-go is receiving a lot of client timeouts
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---

Comment (by phw):

 Here's another data point. It's from a proxy-go instance that I run on my
 laptop, behind a NAT.

 {{{
 INFO: configuration.go:256: Converting Config:
 &{[{[stun:stun.l.google.com:19302]  }] All Balanced }
 INFO: peerconnection.go:168: Created PeerConnection:  &{  false
 
 {[{[stun:stun.l.google.com:19302]  }] 3 0 } 0x7f0568c0 77}
 0x7f0568c0
 INFO: peerconnection.go:436: fired OnSignalingStateChange:  77
 HaveRemoteOffer
 2019/06/05 15:57:03 sdp offer successfully received.
 2019/06/05 15:57:03 Generating answer...
 INFO: peerconnection.go:436: fired OnSignalingStateChange:  77 Stable
 INFO: peerconnection.go:504: fired OnIceConnectionStateChange:  77
 INFO: peerconnection.go:495: fired OnConnectionStateChange:  77
 INFO: peerconnection.go:513: fired OnIceGatheringStateChange: 77
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77
 candidate:4184645392 1 udp 2122262783 2600:1700:2ec0:6430::710 33908 typ
 host generation 0 ufrag 25g6network-id 3 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77
 candidate:2723859191 1 udp 2122197247
 2600:1700:2ec0:6430:66aa:6bd9:61bb:2d40 46469 typ host generation 0 ufrag
 25g6 network-id 7 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77
 candidate:3287535956 1 udp 2122131711 2600:1700:2ec0:6430::68e 39170 typ
 host generation 0 ufrag 25g6network-id 8 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77
 candidate:3885250869 1 udp 2122063615 172.17.0.1 35276 typ host generation
 0 ufrag 25g6 network-id 1 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77
 candidate:1995739850 1 udp 2121998079 192.168.1.65 36136 typ host
 generation 0 ufrag 25g6 network-id 2 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77
 candidate:3707591233 1 udp 2121932543 192.168.1.67 59569 typ host
 generation 0 ufrag 25g6 network-id 6 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77
 candidate:2162486046 1 udp 1685790463 108.208.27.175 36136 typ srflx raddr
 192.168.1.65 rport 36136 generation 0 ufrag 25g6 network-id 2 network-cost
 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77 candidate:79019993
 1 udp 1685855999 108.208.27.175 35276 typ srflx raddr 172.17.0.1 rport
 35276 generation 0 ufrag 25g6 network-id 1 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77
 candidate:3085919200 1 tcp 1518283007 2600:1700:2ec0:6430::710 34815 typ
 host tcptype passive generation 0 ufrag 25g6 network-id 3 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77
 candidate:3973658119 1 tcp 1518217471
 2600:1700:2ec0:6430:66aa:6bd9:61bb:2d40 50359 typ host tcptype passive
 generation 0 ufrag 25g6 network-id 7 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77
 candidate:2372939172 1 tcp 1518151935 2600:1700:2ec0:6430::68e 35785 typ
 host tcptype passive generation 0 ufrag 25g6 network-id 8 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77
 candidate:2836907461 1 tcp 1518083839 172.17.0.1 33511 typ host tcptype
 passive generation 0 ufrag 25g6 network-id 1 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77 candidate:947351098
 1 tcp 1518018303 192.168.1.65 43871 typ host tcptype passive generation 0
 ufrag 25g6 network-id 2 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77
 candidate:2457773745 1 tcp 1517952767 192.168.1.67 47947 typ host tcptype
 passive generation 0 ufrag 25g6 network-id 6 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:459: fired OnIceCandidate:  77 candidate:720184213
 1 udp 1685724927 108.208.27.175 59569 typ srflx raddr 192.168.1.67 rport
 59569 generation 0 ufrag 25g6 network-id 6 network-cost 50
 INFO: peerconnection.go:513: fired OnIceGatheringStateChange: 77
 2019/06/05 15:57:23 Timed out waiting for client to open data channel.
 INFO: peerconnection.go:504: fired OnIceConnectionStateChange:  77
 INFO: peerconnection.go:436: fired OnSignalingStateChange:  77 Closed
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30775 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30775: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs bug 041-must stability|  Actual Points:
  041-regression |
Parent ID:  #30773   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged.

 If you think that c525135dac354892a45ad3d2f6de9450d393f09f should be
 backported, please make a separate commit for that?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30744 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow failures in the Travis test-stem job

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30744: Allow failures in the Travis test-stem job
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes,   |  Actual Points:
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,  |
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #29437   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes, 035-backport, 040-backport,
 041-backport =>
 tor-ci-fail-sometimes, 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,
 041-should


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30745 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document disabled CI

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30745: Document disabled CI
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-can   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => 041-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30775 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30775: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs bug 041-must stability|  Actual Points:
  041-regression |
Parent ID:  #30773   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => merge_ready
 * cc: asn, nickm, mikeperry (added)
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 Mike's branch has the appropriate fix:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1076

 I agree the fix is correct. Reverting #29034 and simply cleaning up the
 circuit from the HS map (which is what the mark for close is doing thus
 expected) and let the removal of the `hs_ident`/`rend_data` to the circuit
 free function.

 ACK.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30775 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30775: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs bug 041-must stability|  Actual Points:
  041-regression |
Parent ID:  #30773   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I think we should also consider

 d) Audit all the code that calls circuit_mark_for_close() with a reason
 that implies that the circuit might stay alive.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30774 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add missing newline after decode_intro_points() closing bracket

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30774: Add missing newline after decode_intro_points() closing bracket
--+
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Merged as trivially correct.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30776 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circpad circuits do not expire as intended

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30776: Circpad circuits do not expire as intended
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must wtf-pad  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30775 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30775: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs bug 041-must stability|  Actual Points:
  041-regression |
Parent ID:  #30773   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs bug 041-must stability => tor-hs bug 041-must stability
 041-regression


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905, user-feedback, blog  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by rollback-question):

 thanks for your help mcs and sorry for not answering earlier. there was no
 Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo/updates/last-update.log and i tried moving
 away the directories Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo and
 Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default/startupCache and launched
 the (broken) tor browser with the --log option, output attached. as you
 can see the log file doesn't contain any useful information and that is
 why i didn't post here until now, i was wondering if there is a way to
 increase the logging level before coming back with empty hands..

 but today everything changed, the working TBB got updated and i had again
 hope that it could force the broken one to update again, this time
 successfully. but it didn't, i got the same "about" window with the button
 to restart but without changing anything when pressed. but then i renamed
 again the directories Browser/TorBrowser/UpdateInfo and
 Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default/startupCache and launched
 the tor browser and there it was, downloading a 77MB file. btw clicking on
 the tor icon and selecting "Check for Tor Browser Update" did nothing. but
 after it finished the download the broken TBB restarted and everything is
 back to normal now, with the exception of the lost tabs that were never
 recovered. but it's functional, new tabs are now restored, there is no
 longer an icon to restart the browser in the "about" window, it shows now
 it's running version 8.5.1 (based on Mozilla Firefox 60.7.0esr) (64-bit)
 and everything looks good now! btw it was also running with the --log
 argument when the upgrade was successful but the log file is as useless as
 the one i just posted

 thanks again mcs, gk, acat and everyone else for the help, and please let
 me know if i should post anything else (logs, etc) now that it is fixed.
 and also thanks for resolving the problem with the saved passwords (i see
 it in the change notice of the new build) and your great work that makes
 the tor browser possible! i can't thank you enough. but if you ever attend
 the CCC congress in germany (i know some tor developers do) please
 bring/put a donations box with you like other groups do (FSF, EFF, etc). i
 miss every year the opportunity to make an anonymous donation in cash to
 the project

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30577 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Fundraising Banner with next TBB security update

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30577: Add Fundraising Banner with next TBB security update
--+--
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pili):

 We've tentatively decided to promote monthly giving and include the patch
 image for this banner

 The banner should be removed on the following security update around 09/03

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[tor-bugs] #30777 [Community/Outreach]: Run a "set up new bridges" campaign

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30777: Run a "set up new bridges" campaign
+-
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  project | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  3   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must  |
+-
 We currently have around 500 obfs4 bridges. That's not a lot and some of
 them don't work properly, so the effective number is even lower. It's time
 to ask volunteers to set up more bridges.

 One way to do that is by writing a blog post and doing outreach on
 Twitter. We should point people to our
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/PluggableTransports/obfs4proxy
 obfs4 setup guide]. Ideally, we would start with a small group of people
 (e.g., by posting to tor-relays@), fix any issues that we discover in our
 guide, and then repeat the outreach campaign for a larger set of people.

 Another thing worth considering is what kind of bridges we want:
 * We certainly need more obfs4 bridges even though the protocol still has
 some UX issues for operators (see #30471).
 * More vanilla bridges would be useful too but, since #28655, only if the
 bridge doesn't also run an obfs4 protocol. Otherwise BridgeDB won't hand
 out the vanilla bridge line. As an added bonus, modern tor bridges may
 currently be resistant to the GFW's active probing as discussed over in
 #30500.
 * Once #23888 is done, we should also encourage people to install the
 snowflake webextension.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905, user-feedback, blog  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by rollback-question):

 * Attachment "tb.log" added.

 output of ./start-tor-browser.desktop --log tb.log (obfuscated)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30776 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circpad circuits do not expire as intended

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30776: Circpad circuits do not expire as intended
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must wtf-pad  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by asn:

Old description:

> **Still investigating this bug. Might be caused by an outdated version of
> #28634 on the relay-side and might actually not be a bug.**
>
> I saw the following logs in my logs of Tor master (includes #28780,
> #28634 and #29034):
> {{{
> Jun 05 16:44:59.442 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
> Circuit 6 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
> for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
> 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
> Jun 05 16:49:07.888 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
> Circuit 10 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
> for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
> 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
> Jun 05 16:51:42.130 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
> Circuit 16 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
> for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
> 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
> }}}
>
> Seems like the logic that is supposed to expire circuits does not work.
> In particular I see the following pattern per-circuit:
> {{{
> Jun 05 15:37:03.318 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> ... 10 minutes pass...
> Jun 05 15:47:07.862 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> Jun 05 15:47:38.896 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> Jun 05 15:48:09.921 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> Jun 05 15:48:40.958 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> Jun 05 15:49:11.998 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> Jun 05 15:49:42.041 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> ... 
> Jun 05 16:49:07.888 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
> Circuit 10 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
> for over an hour. Circu
> it is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor 0.4.1.2-alpha
> 7f341d64828d48eb)
> }}}
>
> so it seems like the machine is still alive, or something thinks it still
> is.
>
> The good thing is that the circuit does not stay up for ever and it does
> get closed after an hour, but our logic is still failing.
>
> I think this is a definite 041-must but perhaps we don't need to stall
> the alpha for it.

New description:

 **Still investigating this issue. Might be caused by an outdated version
 of #28634 on the relay-side and might actually not be a bug.**

 I saw the following logs in my logs of Tor master (includes #28780, #28634
 and #29034):
 {{{
 Jun 05 16:44:59.442 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
 Circuit 6 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
 for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
 Jun 05 16:49:07.888 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
 Circuit 10 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
 for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
 Jun 05 16:51:42.130 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
 Circuit 16 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
 for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
 }}}

 Seems like the logic that is supposed to expire circuits does not work. In
 particular I see the following pattern per-circuit:
 {{{
 Jun 05 15:37:03.318 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 ... 10 minutes pass...
 Jun 05 15:47:07.862 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 Jun 05 15:47:38.896 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding 

Re: [tor-bugs] #30776 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circpad circuits do not expire as intended

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30776: Circpad circuits do not expire as intended
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must wtf-pad  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by asn):

 Seems like we never receive a `PADDING_NEGOTIATED` `STOP` cell from the
 relay. This might be because I'm using Alex's relay who is running an
 outdated version of #28634. Will investigate more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30776 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circpad circuits do not expire as intended

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30776: Circpad circuits do not expire as intended
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must wtf-pad  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by asn:

Old description:

> I saw the following logs in my logs of Tor master (includes #28780,
> #28634 and #29034):
> {{{
> Jun 05 16:44:59.442 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
> Circuit 6 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
> for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
> 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
> Jun 05 16:49:07.888 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
> Circuit 10 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
> for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
> 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
> Jun 05 16:51:42.130 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
> Circuit 16 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
> for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
> 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
> }}}
>
> Seems like the logic that is supposed to expire circuits does not work.
> In particular I see the following pattern per-circuit:
> {{{
> Jun 05 15:37:03.318 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> ... 10 minutes pass...
> Jun 05 15:47:07.862 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> Jun 05 15:47:38.896 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> Jun 05 15:48:09.921 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> Jun 05 15:48:40.958 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> Jun 05 15:49:11.998 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> Jun 05 15:49:42.041 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
> 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
> ... 
> Jun 05 16:49:07.888 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
> Circuit 10 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
> for over an hour. Circu
> it is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor 0.4.1.2-alpha
> 7f341d64828d48eb)
> }}}
>
> so it seems like the machine is still alive, or something thinks it still
> is.
>
> The good thing is that the circuit does not stay up for ever and it does
> get closed after an hour, but our logic is still failing.
>
> I think this is a definite 041-must but perhaps we don't need to stall
> the alpha for it.

New description:

 **Still investigating this bug. Might be caused by an outdated version of
 #28634 on the relay-side and might actually not be a bug.**

 I saw the following logs in my logs of Tor master (includes #28780, #28634
 and #29034):
 {{{
 Jun 05 16:44:59.442 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
 Circuit 6 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
 for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
 Jun 05 16:49:07.888 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
 Circuit 10 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
 for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
 Jun 05 16:51:42.130 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
 Circuit 16 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
 for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
 }}}

 Seems like the logic that is supposed to expire circuits does not work. In
 particular I see the following pattern per-circuit:
 {{{
 Jun 05 15:37:03.318 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 ... 10 minutes pass...
 Jun 05 15:47:07.862 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 Jun 05 15:47:38.896 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 Jun 05 15:48:09.921 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding 

[tor-bugs] #30776 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circpad circuits do not expire as intended

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30776: Circpad circuits do not expire as intended
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  041-must wtf-pad
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I saw the following logs in my logs of Tor master (includes #28780, #28634
 and #29034):
 {{{
 Jun 05 16:44:59.442 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
 Circuit 6 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
 for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
 Jun 05 16:49:07.888 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
 Circuit 10 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
 for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
 Jun 05 16:51:42.130 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
 Circuit 16 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
 for over an hour. Circuit is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor
 0.4.1.2-alpha 7f341d64828d48eb)
 }}}

 Seems like the logic that is supposed to expire circuits does not work. In
 particular I see the following pattern per-circuit:
 {{{
 Jun 05 15:37:03.318 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 ... 10 minutes pass...
 Jun 05 15:47:07.862 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 Jun 05 15:47:38.896 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 Jun 05 15:48:09.921 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 Jun 05 15:48:40.958 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 Jun 05 15:49:11.998 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 Jun 05 15:49:42.041 [info] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Circuit
 10 is not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine.
 ... 
 Jun 05 16:49:07.888 [notice] circpad_marked_circuit_for_padding(): Bug:
 Circuit 10 was not marked for close because of a  pending padding machine
 for over an hour. Circu
 it is a Circuit kept open for padding (on Tor 0.4.1.2-alpha
 7f341d64828d48eb)
 }}}

 so it seems like the machine is still alive, or something thinks it still
 is.

 The good thing is that the circuit does not stay up for ever and it does
 get closed after an hour, but our logic is still failing.

 I think this is a definite 041-must but perhaps we don't need to stall the
 alpha for it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25483 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Windows reproducible build of snowflake

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25483: Windows reproducible build of snowflake
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201805, ex-sponsor-19  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Okay I've been trying to use libc++ with mingw-w6 as described
 [https://libcxx.llvm.org/docs/UsingLibcxx.html#using-libc-on-linux here]
 but I can't get it to work. I'm not even sure it will solve all of the
 linking problems.

 It looks like there are two main paths forward from here:
 1. Write C wrappers as described in comment:39, or
 2. Find a different webrtc library

 Both of these look like a significant amount of work. For (1) we'd have to
 write a wrapper for webrtc and for (2) it's possible that we'd have to
 rewrite a lot of go-webrtc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30775 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30775: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs bug 041-must stability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30773 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * priority:  Medium => Very High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Give TBA alpha users a link to stable

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30540: Give TBA alpha users a link to stable
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, ux-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30775 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30775: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs bug 041-must stability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30773 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by asn):

 So it's obvious that this needs the same fix as #30771, but I don't think
 we should whack-a-mole this code pattern because it seems to be quite
 frequent and also there is nothing actually disallowing it.

 I think we need some sort of other fix for this bug class. Here is some
 possible avenues since this is blocking the upcoming alpha release:

 a) Change the approach of #29034 to not free hs_ident/rend_data upon
 repurpose, and just remove from circuitmap. Then hs_ident/rend_data will
 be freed upon final circuit free. The danger here might be that some part
 of the code might be using hs_ident/rend_data instead of the circuitmap
 (e.g. look at circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data() where we are
 saved by the purpose check). Me and David took a look at the code and we
 didnt find anything obvious but this doesn't mean too much.

 b) Revert parts (or the entirety) of #29034 and #28780 (and/or #28634).

 c) Continue whack-a-moling but this does not seem like a stress-free thing
 to do, since these bugs can get pretty nasty.

 Feedback is very much appreciated.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29285 [Circumvention/Pluggable transport]: Improve the PT spec and how PTs interface with Tor

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29285: Improve the PT spec and how PTs interface with Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Pluggable transport|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2,  |  Actual Points:
  anti-censorship-roadmap|
Parent ID:   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * cc: arma, gaba (added)
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 => network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, anti-censorship-roadmap
 * points:   => 15
 * sponsor:  Sponsor19 => Sponsor28-must
 * owner:  (none) => phw


Comment:

 Here's an incomplete list of issues with our current spec:
 * The PT should be able to communicate its bootstrap status to the
 invoking process.
 * The spec should incorporate the proposed dormant mode (see #28849).
 * Some PTs such as meek and snowflake don't rely on an IP address. The
 current workaround is to use awkward pseudo IP addresses.
 * Other transports may want to rely on multiple IP address. We need to
 reconsider the outdated notion of a bridge line. The PT should be able to
 communicate its bootstrap status to the invoking process.
 * The spec should incorporate the proposed dormant mode (see #28849).
 * Some PTs such as meek and snowflake don't rely on an IP address. The
 current workaround is to use awkward pseudo IP addresses.
 * Other transports may want to rely on multiple IP address. We need to
 reconsider the outdated notion of a bridge line.

 And here's an incomplete list of existing library implementations:
 * [https://github.com/operatorfoundation/transport A seemingly unnamed
 Swift implementation] of the v2.1 specification, maintained by the
 Operator Foundation.
 * [https://github.com/guardianproject/AndroidPluggableTransports PLUTO2]
 is a Java implementation of the v2.x specification, maintained by the
 Guardian Project.
 * [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/goptlib.git/
 goptlib] is a Go implementation of the v1.0 specification, maintained by
 the Tor Project.
 * [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/pyptlib.git/
 pyptlib] is a Python implementation of the v1.0 specification, (formerly)
 maintained by the Tor Project.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30707 [Circumvention/Pluggable transport]: Revise our pluggable transport specification

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30707: Revise our pluggable transport specification
---+---
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  sponsor28  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  10
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor28-must
---+---
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Closing this because it's a duplicate of #29285.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29876 [Core Tor/Tor]: get_proxy_type() may be wrong when unused PT configured

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29876: get_proxy_type() may be wrong when unused PT configured
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-pt, ex-  |  Actual Points:
  sponsor-19 |
Parent ID:  #29670   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Code is in parent ticket, which is merged and pending backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30750 [Core Tor/Nyx]: Cosmetic looks label alpha dev ico metrics terminal NYX

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30750: Cosmetic looks label alpha dev ico metrics terminal NYX
-+-
 Reporter:  agnox|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics NYX terminal testers |  worksforme
  researchers|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Hi agnox. Closing as per your request.

 Nyx dynamically decides what information it has room to display based on
 your screen size. In this case '(new)' is shorter than '(unrecommended)',
 and Nyx didn't have room to show the later when displaying information in
 a side-by-side fashion so it dropped it. If you widened your screen it
 would become visible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30775 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30775: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs bug 041-must stability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30773 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Description changed by asn:

Old description:

> There is a UAF in:
>

> {{{
>   if (!TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->marked_for_close) {
> circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ),
>CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED);
> circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ),
> END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
>   }
>   /* Close the related rendezvous circuit. */
>   rend_circ = hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side(
> intro_circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie);
> }}}

New description:

 There is a UAF in:


 {{{
   if (!TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->marked_for_close) {
 circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ),
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED);
 circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ),
 END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
   }
   /* Close the related rendezvous circuit. */
   rend_circ = hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side(
 intro_circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie);
 }}}

 exact same bug class as #30773.

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[tor-bugs] #30775 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30775: Crash in close_or_reextend_intro_circ() (not released)
--+---
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs bug 041-must stability
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #30773
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 There is a UAF in:


 {{{
   if (!TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)->marked_for_close) {
 circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ),
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED);
 circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ),
 END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
   }
   /* Close the related rendezvous circuit. */
   rend_circ = hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side(
 intro_circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie);
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30771 [Core Tor/Tor]: rend_data_get_pk_digest: Assertion rend_data failed; aborting.

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30771: rend_data_get_pk_digest: Assertion rend_data failed; aborting.
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  041-regression crash 041-must  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #30773 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * parent:   => #30773


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30774 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add missing newline after decode_intro_points() closing bracket

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30774: Add missing newline after decode_intro_points() closing bracket
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by neel):

 GitHub PR is here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1075

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[tor-bugs] #30774 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add missing newline after decode_intro_points() closing bracket

2019-06-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30774: Add missing newline after decode_intro_points() closing bracket
--+--
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--


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