Re: [tor-bugs] #31408 [Core Tor/Tor]: torrc : ClientOnionAuthDir after include directives breaks client to v2 services

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31408: torrc : ClientOnionAuthDir after include directives breaks client to v2
services
+--
 Reporter:  xaho|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs regression 042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by xaho):

 In torrc, the above two lines are the only non-commented lines, appended
 to the maintainer's version.

 In torrc.d, there are twelve files containing one or more commented or
 empty lines, and only one non-commented HidServAuth statement each, all in
 the format :

   HidServAuth name.onion stealthkey # client : hostname

 Yet another file is named 'wip' and contains only commented lines. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31408 [Core Tor/Tor]: torrc : ClientOnionAuthDir after include directives breaks client to v2 services

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31408: torrc : ClientOnionAuthDir after include directives breaks client to v2
services
+--
 Reporter:  xaho|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs regression 042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 (We have a new option testing framework in #31637, we could try using it
 to replicate this issue. And to ensure it doesn't happen again.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31637 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across defaults, torrc, command line

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31637: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across
defaults, torrc, command line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  1.5
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 This looks great - I'm really happy with this level of testing.

 It looks like we're testing a lot of non-default options.
 Did we try to test them all?

 Should we open a ticket for the tricky ones that we couldn't test?
 HardwareAccel
 ControlSocket
 ControlSocketWriteable
 Or are we just trying for a decent level of coverage right now?

 I'm happy to merge, if these tests also pass on 0.4.1.
 (Or if there is a good explanation for why they don't pass, like a new
 option.)
 That way, we can be sure that we aren't just testing the post-refactor
 behaviour.

 Feel free to flip to merge_ready once 0.4.1 passes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31698 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reconsider HAVE_XXX_H usage in the Tor code

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31698: Reconsider HAVE_XXX_H usage in the Tor code
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [ticket:31698 ahf]:
 > But we don't expect to work on systems that do not have, for example,
 string.h available. We should not do these check in every .c and .h file,
 but instead just have our configure script fail if these headers are not
 available.

 How will we know which headers have substitutes, and which headers are
 actually required?

 For example, if a file is only using strlcat/strlcpy from string.h, and
 the platform doesn't have string.h, we should just use our implementations
 in compat_string.h. Just like we would for a platform that has string.h,
 but no strlcat/strlcpy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31637 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across defaults, torrc, command line

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31637: Make sure we have test coverage for Option, +Option and /Option across
defaults, torrc, command line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  1.5
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 As an aside, I wonder if we can implement a test for #31408 using this
 framework?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Change handling of relative paths in %include directives?

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31737: Change handling of relative paths in %include directives?
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [ticket:31737 nickm]:
 > Right now, relative paths in %include directives are handled relative to
 Tor's working directory, which doesn't make a lot of sense.  Handling them
 relative to the configuration file might make more sense?
 >
 > We'd want to figure out a way to handle this that won't break existing
 users.

 Try relative to the cwd first, and then try relative to the config file
 containing the %include directive?

 We could also deprecate cwd-relative paths, and warn when they are used.
 And then eventually remove them.

 If we wanted a simpler change, we could just deprecate and warn on any
 relative path.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31408 [Core Tor/Tor]: torrc : ClientOnionAuthDir after include directives breaks client to v2 services

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31408: torrc : ClientOnionAuthDir after include directives breaks client to v2
services
+--
 Reporter:  xaho|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs regression 042-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 What's in the rest of your torrc file?
 How many files are in torrc.d, and what's in them?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31742 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a script or makefile target to install git hooks

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31742: Write a script or makefile target to install git hooks
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Here are some things we should be aware of:
 * it should be a script, which can optionally be called by a Makefile
 target
   * some people have (upstream merging) git directories with hooks, but no
 builds
 * We need a manual step: it's not safe to have executable scripts update
 themselves
 * The manual step should take its paths from:
   * environmental variables, to allow users to update all their git
 repositories at the same time
   * the current git working directory, according to the git command
 * if the user is in a worktree, the scripts should be copied into the
 working directory, not the worktree

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31538 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31538: Windows bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909R,  |
  GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 We seem to use a different technique for merging libraries than Martin:
 https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 central/rev/d1e33e3e11f559952d7d80e722d26a6cf5dd80ac/taskcluster/scripts/misc
 /build-clang-8-mingw.sh#125

 I don't know if ours is reproducible.  But Martin can probably upstream
 that clang change fairly easily. And I should - if not copy your approach
 - add a comment about it in our build.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31741 [Community/Tor Support]: Tor2Web blocks access

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31741: Tor2Web blocks access
---+---
 Reporter:  TheCurve   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * component:  Webpages/Website => Community/Tor Support


Comment:

 Or are you trying to access an onion site?
 If you want to access an onion site, the safest and most reliable way is
 using Tor Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31746 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Ticket application keeps hanging

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31746: Ticket application keeps hanging
--+-
 Reporter:  Magik |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  support, ticket   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: ggus (removed)
 * keywords:  Website, support, ticket => support, ticket
 * component:  Webpages/Support => Internal Services/Service - trac
 * owner:  hiro => qbi
 * parent:  #31745 =>


Comment:

 Thanks, we're working on a transition to a more modern system.
 Hopefully it will be faster.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31552 [Core Tor/Tor]: --disable-module-dirauth broken (missing symbols)

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31552: --disable-module-dirauth broken (missing symbols)
-+-
 Reporter:  LarryBitcoin |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.5
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  build, configure, features,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  modules, regression, 041-should, dgoulet-  |
  merge, 041-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 build, configure, features, modules, regression, 041-should, dgoulet-
 merge
 =>
 build, configure, features, modules, regression, 041-should, dgoulet-
 merge, 041-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31673 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deprecated use of

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31673: Deprecated use of 
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport, 035-backport   |  Actual Points:
  040-backport 041-backport 042-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  035-backport 040-backport 041-backport 042-must =>
 029-backport, 035-backport 040-backport 041-backport 042-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31696 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion failure in map-anon.c:218

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31696: Assertion failure in map-anon.c:218
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.5
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression crash 041-regression  |  Actual Points:  .1
  BugSmashFund 042-must dgoulet-merge,   |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  regression crash 041-regression BugSmashFund 042-must dgoulet-
 merge =>
 regression crash 041-regression BugSmashFund 042-must dgoulet-merge,
 041-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #31746 [Webpages/Support]: Ticket application keeps hanging

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31746: Ticket application keeps hanging
--+--
 Reporter:  Magik |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Component:  Webpages/Support
  Version:|   Severity:  Minor
 Keywords:  Website, support, ticket  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31745| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 I submitted two tickets for the same issue because it said that my ticket
 was not submitted so I apologize for the redundancy

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[tor-bugs] #31745 [Applications/Orbot]: Orbot for Android opens tcp ports for good

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31745: Orbot for Android opens tcp ports for good
-+
 Reporter:  Magik|  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Orbot
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.4-rc  |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
 I have installed orbot on my Moto E5 play and every time it connects to
 the VPN it opens a new TCP port however when it exits it does not close
 that TCP port. It uses a new connection every time I open the application
 and uses a new TCP port each time so now I have seven open TCP ports with
 unknown users and no connections.

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[tor-bugs] #31744 [Applications/Orbot]: Orbot for Android opens tcp ports for good

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31744: Orbot for Android opens tcp ports for good
-+
 Reporter:  Magik|  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Component:  Applications/Orbot
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.4-rc  |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:  TCP ports|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
 I have installed orbot on my Android Moto E5 play and every time I start
 the application it opens a new TCP port qconnect however when I exit it
 doesn't close the TCP port. this is an issue because now I have seven open
 TCP ports and it keeps opening new ones every time I start the VPN.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31733 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Add gus@tpo as moderator for community team mailing list

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31733: Add gus@tpo as moderator for community team mailing list
---+-
 Reporter:  ggus   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by arma):

 * cc: alison (added)


Comment:

 I just changed
 https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/admin/tor-community-team/
 so gus is the list admin, and set a new password and send it to Gus.

 I am cc'ing Alison here so she knows it happened -- Gus, feel free to
 share the new password with Alison, and Alison, feel free to say that you
 want to be put back on the list of admins and I'll change it so it lists
 both of you.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31576 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix shellcheck errors in contrib/dist/rc.subr, and add to test-shellcheck

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31576: Fix shellcheck errors in contrib/dist/rc.subr, and add to 
test-shellcheck
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  shellcheck|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: nickm (added)


Comment:

 Good question: I don't know if anyone is still using it.

 Cc'ing nickm, who has done similar removals recently.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Line unexpectedly reached at channel_tls_handle_cell at ../src/core/or/channeltls.c:1111

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31221: Line unexpectedly reached at channel_tls_handle_cell at
../src/core/or/channeltls.c:
---+---
 Reporter:  weasel |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security crash 042-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31107 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #31107


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31738 [Community/Tor Support]: issue with tor 8.5.4

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31738: issue with tor 8.5.4
---+---
 Reporter:  torqq  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by ggus):

 * component:  - Select a component => Community/Tor Support


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31738 [- Select a component]: issue with tor 8.5.4

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31738: issue with tor 8.5.4
--+---
 Reporter:  torqq |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Hi, these files are used by Pluggable Transports.

 If you're concerned that you have downloaded a compromised Tor Browser, we
 recommend you to download again and verify the files:
 https://support.torproject.org/tbb/how-to-verify-signature/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31741 [Webpages/Website]: Tor2Web blocks access

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31741: Tor2Web blocks access
--+---
 Reporter:  TheCurve  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Hi, are you trying to block Tor2web to index (or access to) your Onion
 Service?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31743 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: SMTP on carinatum

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31743: SMTP on carinatum
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: juga (added)


Comment:

 The issue that was sent to the mailing list:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-consensus-
 health/2019-September/009845.html

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[tor-bugs] #31743 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: SMTP on carinatum

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31743: SMTP on carinatum
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Hi lovely sysadmins. DocTor's last [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail
 /tor-consensus-health/ successfully sent notification] was on July 8th.

 Iirc we performed server upgrades of some sort around this time, and it
 seems we no longer have an SMTP daemon listening on localhost port 25...

 {{{
 09/07/2019 20:52:32 [ERROR] consensus_health_checker.py failed with:

 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/srv/doctor.torproject.org/doctor/consensus_health_checker.py",
 line 995, in 
 main()
   File "/srv/doctor.torproject.org/doctor/consensus_health_checker.py",
 line 292, in main
 util.send(EMAIL_SUBJECT, body = body, cc = cc, bcc = bcc)
   File "/srv/doctor.torproject.org/doctor/util.py", line 145, in send
 server = smtplib.SMTP('localhost')
   File "/usr/lib/python2.7/smtplib.py", line 256, in __init__
 (code, msg) = self.connect(host, port)
   File "/usr/lib/python2.7/smtplib.py", line 318, in connect
 (code, msg) = self.getreply()
   File "/usr/lib/python2.7/smtplib.py", line 366, in getreply
 + str(e))
 SMTPServerDisconnected: Connection unexpectedly closed: [Errno 104]
 Connection reset by peer
 }}}

 Mind if we re-enable that daemon?

 Thanks! -Damian

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[tor-bugs] #31742 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a script or makefile target to install git hooks

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31742: Write a script or makefile target to install git hooks
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 At this point we have to manually copy git hook scripts into .git/hooks
 directory and make them executable. Having a scripted way to do this would
 be more convenient.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31576 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix shellcheck errors in contrib/dist/rc.subr, and add to test-shellcheck

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31576: Fix shellcheck errors in contrib/dist/rc.subr, and add to 
test-shellcheck
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  shellcheck|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by rl1987):

 Should we perhaps remove it instead? It was added in #256 back in 2006,
 and seems to be last updated in 2008.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #31091, #31107, #31408, #31483

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #31091, #31107, #31408, #31483 by nickm:
priority to Very High

Comment:
Make all 042-must objects "Very High" priority.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31725 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Macedonian 9.0a6 bundles are missing localized strings

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31725: Macedonian 9.0a6 bundles are missing localized strings
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909R, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  -must-alpha|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-alpha =>
 TorBrowserTeam201909R, tbb-9.0-must-alpha
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 It seems we forgot to adapt the `jar.mn` file after we directly included
 Torbutton into `tor-browser`. `bug_31725`
 
(https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug_31725=7e6b62a61a0d26b79dd14f14e4d8d36bff7bf1c8)
 in my `torbutton` repo has the fix for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 > ncprop279 isn't built locally, but instead is pulled from a binary
 release on namecoin.org.

 Updated branch at https://notabug.org/JeremyRand/tor-browser-
 build/src/namecoin (commit hash
 `accff2aff645c7dac487e9acd0cbd43fa8372b12`).  ncprop279 is now built
 locally.

 The updated branch also disables `--detach` if Namecoin is enabled, which
 allows Namecoin to be used when double-clicking the Tor Browser launcher
 icon.  (I noticed that this was broken in the previous branch during the
 Stockholm meeting.)

 More updates should be coming fairly soon.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20915 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Web developer network tab breaks first-party isolation in some cases

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20915: Web developer network tab breaks first-party isolation in some cases
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-linkability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 9.0a6:
 {{{
 [09-15 07:30:53] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.torproject.org/static/css/bootstrap.css.map via--
 unknown--:878a267349f5b487247d0a0175ae27f2
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #31741 [Webpages/Website]: Tor2Web blocks access

2019-09-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#31741: Tor2Web blocks access
--+--
 Reporter:  TheCurve  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Component:  Webpages/Website
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 I looked everywhere on how to avoid Tor2Web; I use Tor; but the darned
 thing blocks access to the site I want to go to every time.

 Is there a way to avoid Tor2Web?

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