Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:40 alexcrichton]:
 > I think Eli from LLVM found a fix at https://reviews.llvm.org/D70103, or
 at least that fixes the test cases for me locally. Can y'all patch LLVM
 locally to test out on your end?

 Yeah, I am on it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:39 alexcrichton]:
 > Oh so for just `-jump-threading` to work you'll need to do:
 >
 > 1. Start with `foo.bc`
 > 2. Figure out smallest N where `opt -O3 foo.bc -opt-bisect-limit` is
 non-deterministic
 > 3. Run `opt -O3 -o input.bc -opt-bisect-limit=N-1 foo.bc`
 > 4. Use `llvm-extract` on `input.bc` to extract the function
 > 5. Run `opt -jump-threading` over the extracted `*.bc` file
 >
 > You won't be able to run `-jump-threading` over the original module,
 you'll need to run it over the module just before the output becomes
 nondeterministic.

 Yeah, that's what I did. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32451 [Core Tor/Tor]: test/parseconf: Add support for required log messages on success

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32451: test/parseconf: Add support for required log messages on success
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  #29211 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision
 * actualpoints:   => 0.3


Comment:

 Here's my draft pull request, I discovered #32468 while writing it.

 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1531

 I still need to:
 * refactor the script to remove duplicate code
 * make most tests use expected_log
 * write a changes file

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32468 [Core Tor/Tor]: test/parseconf: Actually detect --dump-config errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32468: test/parseconf: Actually detect --dump-config errors
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november, no-   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  backport   |
Parent ID:  #32451   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 We'll deal with this in #32451.

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[tor-bugs] #32468 [Core Tor/Tor]: test/parseconf: Actually detect --dump-config errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32468: test/parseconf: Actually detect --dump-config errors
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.1-alpha
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november, no-
 Severity:  Normal   |  backport
Actual Points:  0.2  |  Parent ID:  #32451
   Points:  0.2  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor31-must |
-+-
 When we added $FILTER for Windows, we made the pipeline exit successfully,
 even when tor exits with an error.

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[tor-bugs] #32467 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document tor's --dump-config command in the man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32467: Document tor's --dump-config command in the man page
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november, 042
 Severity:  Normal   |  -backport-maybe, consider-backport-immediately
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor31-can  |
-+-
 I went to find the documentation for `tor --dump-config` today, but
 there's nothing in the man page.

 Nick, can you do a quick man page update?
 I think you wrote `tor --dump-config` in 0.3.2 ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by alexcrichton):

 I think Eli from LLVM found a fix at https://reviews.llvm.org/D70103, or
 at least that fixes the test cases for me locally. Can y'all patch LLVM
 locally to test out on your end?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32415 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32415: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * actualpoints:  .1 => .2


Comment:

 Here are some missed structs, excluding those structs that are defined by
 libraries:

 {{{
 $ git grep 'struct *[a-zA-Z0-9_]*[^t ] *{' \
 src/{app,core,feature,lib,test,tools} \
   | grep -v ': *static '
 src/lib/cc/compat_compiler.h: *   struct a { int foo; int bar; } x;
 src/lib/cc/compat_compiler.h: *   struct base { ... };
 src/lib/cc/compat_compiler.h: *   struct subtype { int x; struct base b; }
 x;
 src/lib/container/handles.h: * struct walrus {
 src/lib/container/map.c:  struct maptype {
 \
 src/lib/math/prob_distr.h:* struct foo {
 ... (spurious matches) ...
 }}}

 {{{
 $ git grep 'struct  *[a-zA-Z0-9_]*[^t ] \**[a-zA-Z0-9_]*[,)]' \
 src/{app,core,feature,lib,test,tools} \
   | grep -v -e time -e addr -e sipkey -e tm -e SEC -e PR -e passwd -e
 event
 src/core/or/channel.c:channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness(struct
 channel_list_s *lst, int force)
 src/lib/cc/compat_compiler.h: *   ptrdiff_t bar_offset = offsetof(struct
 a, bar);
 src/lib/cc/compat_compiler.h: *   struct *sp = SUBTYPE_P(bp, struct
 subtype, b);
 src/lib/container/handles.h: * struct wlr_handle_t
 *wlr_handle_new(struct walrus *);
 src/lib/container/handles.h: * void wlr_handles_clear(struct walrus
 *);
 src/lib/container/handles.h:  linkage  name ## _handle_t *name ##
 _handle_new(struct structname *object); \
 src/lib/container/handles.h:  linkage void name ## _handles_clear(struct
 structname *object);
 src/lib/container/handles.h:  name ## _handle_new(struct structname
 *object)\
 src/lib/container/handles.h:  name ## _handles_clear(struct structname
 *object) \
 ... (spurious matches) ...
 }}}


 Most of these are comments, which should be manually fixed to match our
 style.

 `struct maptype` is a macro argument, we should go a global rename, just
 like we did for the probability dist functions:
 * `struct map_t` - too short?
 * `struct maptype_t` - seems repetitive?
 * `struct map_value_t` ?

 `struct channel_list_s` is defined by TOR_LIST_HEAD(), I'm not sure if it
 will work if we pass channel_t twice. If not, we should pass something
 ending in `_t`.

 `struct structname` should probably become `struct handle_value_t`, using
 the same pattern we use for map.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32295 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Skipping obsolete configuration option." doesn't say which one

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32295: "Skipping obsolete configuration option." doesn't say which one
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged the code changes to 0.4.2, and then merged forward with an "ours"
 merge to master, to prefer the changes in #32404.

 Cherry-picked the new tests to 0.4.2, fixed the commit message, and then
 did a standard merge forward to master.

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[tor-bugs] #32466 [Core Tor]: ! tor users deanonymization !

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32466: ! tor users deanonymization !
-+--
 Reporter:  yandex   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Component:  Core Tor
  Version:   |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:  deanonymization  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 My Tor Browser version is 9.0.1

 The page https://yandex.ru/internet/  could tack you! It could track your
 activity! yandex show same IPv4 IPv6 on eache of the opened tabs in Tor
 Browser!
 Even if you launch anothe instance of Tor Browser and torify it throw
 SocksPort of first one.

 F5 - does not works!
 Ctrl + R - does not works!
 New Identity - does not works!
 New Tor Circuit for this site - does not works!

 Every Tab on eache of two Tor Browsers show you same IPv4 IPv6.

 How it could be?

 Matrix has you!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by alexcrichton):

 Oh so for just `-jump-threading` to work you'll need to do:

 1. Start with `foo.bc`
 2. Figure out smallest N where `opt -O3 foo.bc -opt-bisect-limit` is non-
 deterministic
 3. Run `opt -O3 -o input.bc -opt-bisect-limit=N-1 foo.bc`
 4. Use `llvm-extract` on `input.bc` to extract the function
 5. Run `opt -jump-threading` over the extracted `*.bc` file

 You won't be able to run `-jump-threading` over the original module,
 you'll need to run it over the module just before the output becomes
 nondeterministic.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19859 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose stream isolation information to controllers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19859: Expose stream isolation information to controllers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-control dns isolation |  Actual Points:
  needs-spec needs-design term-project   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 If you want to test for this bug yourself, you can run configure with
 "--enable-fragile-hardening", and the resulting binaries will have
 sanitizers enabled.  Using "--enable-fragile-hardening CC=clang" will
 generally give nicer-looking results.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29125 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Make websocket server tolerant of HTTP/2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29125: Make websocket server tolerant of HTTP/2
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31028   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Resolved in #31028

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28726 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Loosen restrictions on message sizes in WebSocket server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28726: Loosen restrictions on message sizes in WebSocket server
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31028   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Resolved in #31028

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31028 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Migrate away from the custom websocket library

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31028: Migrate away from the custom websocket library
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 dcf]:
 > I had a look at this and my observations are the same as cohosh's in
 comment:5. Sending a CloseMessage before closing seems prudent as that's
 what the old code did.

 Right, sorry for the omission.  I merged a patch for that in,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=abefae158716b9f56692ea16336c1f8185eda27e

 and the bulk of this in,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=c417fd5599c5d39951c606856c69a9f05941afd3


 > > Should we move to the Gorilla websocket library for the proxy-go
 instances as well?
 >
 > Sure, IMO it's not as important because proxy-go only connects to a
 known server (not receiving connections from anywhere as the server does),
 and only needs to be compatible with the server's WebSocket implementation
 (unlike the server which has to be compatible with many browsers). It's a
 good idea anyway. I'd say let's get this ticket closed out first.

 I opened #32465 for that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19859 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose stream isolation information to controllers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19859: Expose stream isolation information to controllers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-control dns isolation |  Actual Points:
  needs-spec needs-design term-project   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Interesting, thanks for the catch.  I'll look into it tomorrow.

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[tor-bugs] #32465 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Use gorilla websocket instead of x/net websocket in proxy-go

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32465: Use gorilla websocket instead of x/net websocket in proxy-go
-+
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 See ticket:31028#comment:5

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31781 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: ping on new VMs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31781: ping on new VMs
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 filed [https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=944538 bug
 944538] in the debian bts to get stable updated...

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[tor-bugs] #32464 [Webpages/Webtools]: Block non .onion requests in TOR Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32464: Block non .onion requests in TOR Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  simonfrey |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Webpages/Webtools
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
 During visiting the onion service of the New York Times
 (https://www.nytimes3xbfgragh.onion) I experienced, that there is still
 clear net traffic going on.
 In the certain example of the NYTimes it is different forms of trackers.

 As I consider clear net traffic on a onion service as bug by the website,
 I thought about why not to block all non onion traffic on .onion sites.

 For playing around and checking if that idea breaks the websites I
 developed a small webextension implementing the described request-
 blocking: https://github.com/simonfrey/onion-only CC0

 The sites I tested work all as expected and are not influenced in a bad UX
 way. I tried:
 - https://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion (DuckDuckGo)
 - https://www.nytimes3xbfgragh.onion (NYTimes)
 - https://www.bbcnewsv2vjtpsuy.onion (BBC News)
 - https://jcw5q6uyjioupxcc.onion/ (Washington Post Secure Drop)

 Looking forward to hear thoughts on the idea and if that could be an
 enhancement landing in the TOR Browser at some point.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32427 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor options_act_reversible into manageable chunks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32427: Refactor options_act_reversible into manageable chunks
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:  #32408| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Those renamings sound reasonable. I hope that in the long run they'll be
 irrelavant as this function becomes subsystem-driven (see parent), but for
 now they seem okay to me.

 I've made the easier changes on the ticket, and added a
 ControlSocketsGroupWritable test.  Here's my current plan:

 1. add tests for creating directories
 2. try unit tests for logs and sockets, assuming I can do that in no more
 than a couple of hours each.
 3. rename the functions.
 4. Back in needs review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32090 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Blog status and where to go

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32090: Blog status and where to go
-+-
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 problem 2 should be solved:

 [[Image(snap-2019.11.11-10.45.54.png, 700px)]]

 we're taking about 88% of the traffic out of the blog, which should
 drastically reduce the costs. a 88% reduction should bump us from the peak
 435000 visits (the 300k visits per month package, 1000$/mth or more), down
 to around 52k visits per month, which is about the metric for "medium"
 package (300$) or, worst case, the "large" package (150k, 600$).

 we'll see the actual result at the end of november, i guess!

 next up is the design issues and deeper underlying issue with the blog
 maintenance.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32463 [Core Tor/Tor]: TypeError in practracker "includes.py" script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32463: TypeError in practracker "includes.py" script
--+
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32090 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Blog status and where to go

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32090: Blog status and where to go
-+-
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "snap-2019.11.11-10.45.54.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a cache frontend for the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32239: setup a cache frontend for the blog
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32090   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Old description:

> design docs in https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/cache/
>
> launch checklist:
>
>  1. alternatives listing and comparison (done)
>  2. deploy a test virtual machine by hand, say `cache-01.tpo` (done)
>  3. benchmark the different alternatives (done, ATS and nginx comparable)
>  4. setup secondary node with Puppet, say `cache-02.tpo` (done)
>  4. validation benchmark against both nodes (done)
>  5. lower DNS to 10 minutes wait an hour (done)
>  6. open firewall (done)
>  7. lower DNS to 3 minutes (done, around 2019-11-05 16:00:00)
>  8. point DNS to caches (done)
>  11. raise DNS back to 1h if all goes well. (done!)
>
> Post launch tasks:
>
>  1. update documentation to fill in information from template
>  2. hit ratio stats in to Prometheus, separate ticket?
>  3. convert existing varnish setups into Nginx (probably requires Puppet
> refactoring), separate ticket?
>
> Disaster recovery:
>
>  1. flip DNS back to backend

New description:

 design docs in https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/cache/

 launch checklist:

  1. alternatives listing and comparison (done)
  2. deploy a test virtual machine by hand, say `cache-01.tpo` (done)
  3. benchmark the different alternatives (done, ATS and nginx comparable)
  4. setup secondary node with Puppet, say `cache-02.tpo` (done)
  4. validation benchmark against both nodes (done)
  5. lower DNS to 10 minutes wait an hour (done)
  6. open firewall (done)
  7. lower DNS to 3 minutes (done, around 2019-11-05 16:00:00)
  8. point DNS to caches (done)
  11. raise DNS back to 1h if all goes well. (done!)

 Post launch tasks:

  1. update documentation to fill in information from template (done)
  2. hit ratio stats in to Prometheus, separate ticket? (done, although
 missing syslog buffer, see #32461)
  3. convert existing varnish setups into Nginx (probably requires Puppet
 refactoring, see #32462)

 Disaster recovery:

  1. flip DNS back to backend

--

Comment:

 i think this is done. i split the remaining work in separate tickets:

  * syslog buffer for hit stats, see #32461
  * convert existing varnish setups into Nginx, see #32462

 the docs have been updated as best I could, which about wraps it out:

 https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/cache/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19859 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose stream isolation information to controllers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19859: Expose stream isolation information to controllers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-control dns isolation |  Actual Points:
  needs-spec needs-design term-project   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 CI isn't passing; the unit test seems to be failing with a use-after-free
 problem:
 {{{
 control/event/format_stream: [forking]
 =

 ==35695==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address
 0x602000627e90 at pc 0x00010a99e059 bp 0x7ffee6cd4160 sp 0x7ffee6cd3900

 WRITE of size 6 at 0x602000627e90 thread T0

 #0 0x10a99e058 in wrap_memset
 (libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib:x86_64+0x1b058)
 #1 0x7fff7f5fbb0c in memset_s (libsystem_c.dylib:x86_64+0x6db0c)
 #2 0x1096d6c99 in memwipe crypto_util.c:82
 #3 0x1094d695c in socks_request_free_ proto_socks.c:99
 #4 0x1093de8da in connection_free_minimal connection.c:685
 #5 0x10939d3d3 in testcase_run_one tinytest.c:107
 #6 0x10939dca2 in tinytest_main tinytest.c:454
 #7 0x10939b8e7 in main testing_common.c:350
 #8 0x7fff7f5443d4 in start (libdyld.dylib:x86_64+0x163d4)

 0x602000627e90 is located 0 bytes inside of 7-byte region
 [0x602000627e90,0x602000627e97)

 freed by thread T0 here:

 #0 0x10a9e1bed in wrap_free
 (libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib:x86_64+0x5ebed)
 #1 0x1090a3e5e in test_cntev_format_stream
 test_controller_events.c:666
 #2 0x10939d3d3 in testcase_run_one tinytest.c:107
 #3 0x10939dca2 in tinytest_main tinytest.c:454
 #4 0x10939b8e7 in main testing_common.c:350
 #5 0x7fff7f5443d4 in start (libdyld.dylib:x86_64+0x163d4)

 previously allocated by thread T0 here:

 #0 0x10a9dbbbf in wrap_strdup
 (libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib:x86_64+0x58bbf)
 #1 0x109778e3f in tor_strdup_ malloc.c:165
 #2 0x1090a3316 in test_cntev_format_stream
 test_controller_events.c:552
 #3 0x10939d3d3 in testcase_run_one tinytest.c:107
 #4 0x10939dca2 in tinytest_main tinytest.c:454
 #5 0x10939b8e7 in main testing_common.c:350
 #6 0x7fff7f5443d4 in start (libdyld.dylib:x86_64+0x163d4)
 }}}

 To me, this looks like you're setting something up in a fake connection
 objecct that is getting double-freed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32461 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: do not write logs on caching servers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32461: do not write logs on caching servers
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 a/i sends logs from syslog into mtail using a rsyslog
 
[https://git.autistici.org/ai3/float/blob/master/roles/base/templates/rsyslog.conf.j2#L23
 rule like this]:

 {{{
 ruleset(name="incoming") {
   # [...]
   action(type="ompipe" Pipe="/run/mtail.fifo")
   # [...]
 }
 }}}

 Then mtail gets
 [https://git.autistici.org/ai3/float/blob/master/roles/base/files/mtail.socket
 started by systemd using socket activation], with something like this:

 {{{
 [Unit]
 Description=MTail input FIFO

 [Socket]
 ListenFIFO=/run/mtail.fifo
 SocketMode=700
 SocketUser=mtail
 SocketGroup=mtail
 PipeSize=1M
 RemoveOnStop=on
 }}}

 Finally, there's a
 
[https://git.autistici.org/ai3/float/blob/master/roles/base/files/mtail.service.buster
 service file] which has some magic bits to deal with memory leaks that
 mtail apparently suffers from (at least in stretch):

 {{{
 [Unit]
 Description=MTail
 Requires=mtail.socket

 [Service]
 Type=simple
 # Systemd will pass mtail.socket as FD 3.
 ExecStart=/usr/bin/mtail --progs /etc/mtail --logtostderr --port 3903
 --logs /dev/fd/3
 Restart=on-failure
 User=mtail

 # Limit memory leaks
 MemoryMax=1G
 ExecStartPost=+/bin/sh -c "echo 0 >
 /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/system.slice/%n/memory.swappiness"

 [Install]
 WantedBy=multi-user.target
 }}}

 That should about cover it. We need to figure out how that would translate
 into a newsyslog config.

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[tor-bugs] #32463 [Core Tor/Tor]: TypeError in practracker "includes.py" script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32463: TypeError in practracker "includes.py" script
+--
 Reporter:  opara   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  |   Severity:  Minor
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 When practracker finds a forbidden include, it causes a Python TypeError.
 Example:


 {{{
 user@computer:~/tor$ make check-includes
 python3 ./scripts/maint/practracker/includes.py .
 Unusual pattern permitted.h in ./scripts/maint/practracker/testdata
 Forbidden include of lib/lock/compat_mutex.h at
 ./src/lib/evloop/eventqueue.h:8
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "./scripts/maint/practracker/includes.py", line 285, in 
 main(sys.argv)
   File "./scripts/maint/practracker/includes.py", line 282, in main
 list_advisories=args.list_advisories)
   File "./scripts/maint/practracker/includes.py", line 240, in
 run_check_includes
 files in its enclosing directory.""".format(RULES_FNAME))
 TypeError: 'Error' object is not callable
 make: *** [check-includes] Error 1
 }}}

 This seems to be caused by an err() function being removed from the code
 sometime in the past, but the call to err() was never also removed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32427 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor options_act_reversible into manageable chunks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32427: Refactor options_act_reversible into manageable chunks
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:  #32408| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Teor's comment was:
 > The design looks good.
 >
 > How about naming things by what they *are*:
 > * options_act_pre_port()
 > * options_act_port()
 > * options_act_pre_log()
 > * options_act_log()
 > * options_act...()
 >
 > And then if someone wants to know the order, they can read the comments
 or the code?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19859 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose stream isolation information to controllers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19859: Expose stream isolation information to controllers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-control dns isolation |  Actual Points:
  needs-spec needs-design term-project   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 The code changes and tests are looking pretty good.  When I merge the spec
 changes, I'll want to add a note to the spec explaining which version
 added them, since that's something developers like to see.

 I've made a PR on github so that CI can run on the code changes:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1530

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19859 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose stream isolation information to controllers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19859: Expose stream isolation information to controllers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-control dns isolation |  Actual Points:
  needs-spec needs-design term-project   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (If CI passes on this, I think it's good to merge.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32259 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to start on some Linux systems without libatomic being installed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32259: Tor Browser fails to start on some Linux systems without libatomic being
installed
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: sectua1 (added)


Comment:

 #32345 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32345 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser Bundle 9.0 Linux 32-bit won't launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32345: Tor Browser Bundle 9.0 Linux 32-bit won't launch
+--
 Reporter:  sectua1 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
|  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issue, tbb-9.0-regression => tbb-9.0-issues,
 tbb-9.0-regression
 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 sectua1]:
 > ./start-tor-browser.desktop --debug
 > Launching './Browser/start-tor-browser --detach --debug'...
 > ./firefox.real: error while loading shared libraries: libatomic.so.1:
 cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory

 You need to install that one for now on your Linux system. Duplicate of
 #32259.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:37 alexcrichton]:
 > Oh for `llvm-extract` I used the `-rfunc` argument which is a regex
 instead of an exact name,  like so: `llvm-extract before.bc
 -rfunc=17h5949677e2a2fd343E -o before-extract.bc`

 Thanks, that helped. However, I've tried to repro just doing the `-jump-
 threading` pass thousands of times on the same machine (kernel, glibc
 etc.), with the same clang version, essentially with the same script, as I
 reproduce the bug when running *all* the passes up to and including the
 problematic `-jump-threading` one: but I don't hit the bug that way, which
 seems to reproduce my results from comment:30. I wonder what we are
 missing here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201911R
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28745 [Applications/Tor Browser]: THE Torbutton clean-up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28745: THE Torbutton clean-up
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30506   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201911R => tbb-torbutton,
 TorBrowserTeam201911


Comment:

 Commit 46b550c5550d3ad4a7d526a402a33bbb40dce5e2 on your `torbutton` branch
 has
 {{{
 -  // Disable the External App Blocker on Android
 -  if ((aPrefName === "extensions.torbutton.launch_warning") &&
 -  (Services.appinfo.OS === "Android")) {
 -defaultPrefBranch.setBoolPref(aPrefName, false);
 -  }
 }}}
 It seems we want to keep that part, though, and I don't see a matching
 counterpart in any of your related `tor-browser` commits.

 Commit f797d8ba19c5838032abff6da3c4b5e8cabc518f on your `tor-browser`
 branch:
 {{{
 +pref("extensions.torbutton.cookie_protections",true);
 +pref("extensions.torbutton.cookie_auto_protect",false);
 }}}
 That's already gone, I think.
 {{{
 +pref("extensions.torbutton.prompt_torbrowser", true);
 }}}
 No need to add this anymore, see my previous comment.
 {{{
 +// TODO: This is just part of a stopgap until #14429 gets properly
 implemented.
 +// See #7255 for details. We display the warning three times to make sure
 the
 +// user did not click on it by accident.
 }}}
 I think we should update the comment at least. We still have this
 mechanism for users that disable letterboxing, I think.

 Have you tested that moving `browser.startup.homepage` is fine now and
 that we can ditch `non-localized.properties` in `torbutton`? The code
 mentioned in the comment is still there. But I guess we don't hit the
 codepath as we are not setting any default prefs in the extension anymore?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32345 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser Bundle 9.0 Linux 32-bit won't launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32345: Tor Browser Bundle 9.0 Linux 32-bit won't launch
---+---
 Reporter:  sectua1|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issue, tbb-9.0-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by sectua1):

 ./start-tor-browser.desktop --debug
 Launching './Browser/start-tor-browser --detach --debug'...
 ./firefox.real: error while loading shared libraries: libatomic.so.1:
 cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32293 [Community/Outreach]: Make slides@tpo team, to collect and organize presentations and slides

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32293: Make slides@tpo team, to collect and organize presentations and slides
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  project | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by arma):

 Looking forward to it! Having some format-neutral way to write the
 metadata for the talks, so we can format it into whatever markup approach
 we choose, would seem like a smart and important step.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Updated branch at https://notabug.org/JeremyRand/tor-browser-
 build/src/namecoin (commit hash
 `20c7d142948cad98193b50ec6ad75fc272421f1a`).  Here's the summary of the
 current status:

 1. Namecoin is enabled only in Nightly.
 2. Namecoin is enabled only if the environment variable
 `TOR_ENABLE_NAMECOIN=1` is set when Tor Browser is executed.  (At Georg's
 suggestion, I intend to transition this to using a Firefox pref in the
 future.)
 3. Namecoin is enabled only on GNU/Linux targets.  (I intend to add
 Windows, macOS, and Android/Linux support later.)
 4. Namecoin will only work if Python 3.6 or higher is installed.  Python
 3.6 is pretty common nowadays, so this shouldn't be a huge barrier to
 testing it, although it's not ideal.  (In the future, we could look at
 including a Python interpreter binary in the Tor Browser package, thus
 removing this requirement.  Doing so would presumably be needed on Windows
 anyway.)
 5. Stream isolation is supported in this patch, but is dependent on
 #19859.  Until #19859 is merged, this patch will still connect without
 errors, but stream isolation will not be functional, which has two
 implications: degraded privacy and degraded performance.  It should be
 possible to review both patches in parallel, and it should be easy to
 build this patch before #19859 is merged by manually setting the `tor`
 project's Git repo/commit to use the one provided in #19859.  However,
 while I encourage review of this patch, I do not recommend merging this
 patch until #19859 is merged.
 6. 2 of the public ElectrumX Namecoin servers are currently down for
 maintenance.  Since Namecoin connects to multiple servers simultaneously
 to improve performance, the performance of this patch will be degraded
 until those servers come back online.  It still works fine and isn't
 particularly annoying, but there *will* be some higher-than-typical
 latency while we're waiting for those servers to come back online.  (It
 would be awesome if the Tor community decides to set up some additional
 ElectrumX Namecoin servers.)
 7. The 4 domain names that I demoed in Stockholm are
 http://federalistpapers.bit, http://onionshare.bit,
 http://riseuptools.bit, and http://submit.theintercept.bit.  You can use
 either `.bit` or `.bit.onion` eTLD.  (The difference between the two
 eTLD's was covered in the Namecoin session in Stockholm.)
 8. Currently `.bit` domains can only point to a `.onion` domain.  `.bit`
 domains that point to an A, , CNAME, or other DNS record will not
 resolve.  Adding support for other record types can be done later.
 9. Currently, the `.bit` eTLD is not considered a secure origin like
 `.onion`.  So visiting a `.bit` domain will not be recognized by Firefox
 as secure, nor will it show the onion icon.  Visiting a `.bit.onion`
 domain will work fine though.  I will fix this later.
 10. The circuit display panel will show the `.onion` domain that a
 Namecoin domain points to.  Kudos to Arthur for that patch.
 11. This patch includes an implementation of Prop279.  My implementation
 differs from the spec by adding a "stream isolation ID" field to the
 `RESOLVE` command.  If desired, I could submit a spec patch for Prop279
 that makes it match this implementation.  Let me know if you'd like me to
 do that.
 12. I've probably forgotten some potentially relevant notes; if anything
 doesn't make sense or you otherwise have some questions for me, please
 don't hesitate to ask.
 13. As far as I can tell, this patch is ready for review.

 Cheers!

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[tor-bugs] #32462 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: convert existing varnish caches into nginx

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32462: convert existing varnish caches into nginx
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 in #32239 we have setup nginx as a caching frontend for the blog. but we
 also use varnish elsewhere in our infrastructure, specifically on the
 onionoo services. those are currently being rebuilt (#31659) so maybe it
 would be better to wait for that to complete to finish that transition.

 this will require some refactoring of the "cache" role as it currently
 hardcodes the blog as a service. one idea i had was to have a "name =>
 backends" hash, but maybe that would be too blunt of an instrument and
 we'd just need to split the roles.

 in any case, there's some puppet refactoring involved.

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[tor-bugs] #32461 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: do not write logs on caching servers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32461: do not write logs on caching servers
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In #32239, a caching system was deployed with nginx. To get hit rate
 ratios, log files are written to disk, with IP address and user agents
 anonymized. That's okay-ish: it's not as well anonymized as our apache log
 files because it's not possible to have a per-day granularity in
 timestamps.

 From there, mtail wakes up once in a while and parses those logfiles and
 counts things, which are exposed as metrics picked up by prometheus. That
 in turn gives us pretty Prometheus graphs and makes us feel better about
 ourselves.

 But ideally, we wouldn't have log files at all and pipe things directly
 into mtail. But we don't want to hang the webserver while waiting for
 mtail (which can be a little flaky), so the typical way to deal with this
 is to pipe logs first in syslog.

 I couldn't immediately figure out how to do this during deployment so I'm
 opening this ticket to make sure we eventually operate that conversion.

 One problem I had is the syslog-ng config sends all logs to the central
 logging server. If we start pushing web hits into syslog, this could
 become unwieldy, to say the least, in terms of performance mostly, but
 also privacy.

 It's also not clear to me how to send logs from syslog into mtail without
 hitting the disk in the first place.

 So the checklist is:

  1. how to send logs from nginx to syslog (`access_log
 syslog:server=unix:/dev/log,facility=local3,tag=nginx_access extended;`
 seems to be the magic config in nginx)
  2. how to avoid sending those logs to the central server
  3. how to send those logs (and only those) into mtail

 All of this should be automatically configured in Puppet as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32457 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Give cohosh and phw access to gettor-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32457: Give cohosh and phw access to gettor-01
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * owner:  tpa => hiro
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28745 [Applications/Tor Browser]: THE Torbutton clean-up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28745: THE Torbutton clean-up
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:  #30506   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Could you remove the `extensions.torbutton.prompt_torbrowser` pref in the
 commit where you are removing all the `m_tb_tbb` parts? It seems that pref
 removal belongs there.

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[tor-bugs] #32459 [Applications]: Enhance TBB GUI Torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32459: Enhance TBB GUI Torrc
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Component:  Applications
  Version:   |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Ability to edit torrc TBB. Add custom section in configure with text to
 configure every availible value in torrc in TORRC Documentation.

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[tor-bugs] #32458 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: https://www.google.co.in/m?q=latest+movie+cine+vood=ms-opera-mobile=new=1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32458: https://www.google.co.in/m?q=latest+movie+cine+vood=ms-opera-
mobile=new=1
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:  qbi
  Raviswami740   |
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Internal Services/Service -
 |  trac
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19000   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
-+-
 https://www.google.co.in/m?q=latest+movie+cine+vood=ms-opera-
 mobile=new=1

 == Install ==

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32448 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Videos player crashes in Tor Browser when it's asked to play many videos at a time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32448: Videos player crashes in Tor Browser when it's asked to play many 
videos at
a time
-+-
 Reporter:  b0ax0c   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  torbrowser, AffectsTails,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-crash, |
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by baxc):

 I submitted this to tor bug bounty

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32458 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: https://www.google.co.in/m?q=latest+movie+cine+vood=ms-opera-mobile=new=1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32458: https://www.google.co.in/m?q=latest+movie+cine+vood=ms-opera-
mobile=new=1
--+--
 Reporter:  Raviswami740  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19000| Points:  8
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--

Comment (by Raviswami740):

 https://www.google.co.in/m?q=latest+movie+cine+vood=ms-opera-
 mobile=new=1

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[tor-bugs] #32457 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Give cohosh and phw access to gettor-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32457: Give cohosh and phw access to gettor-01
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  gettor
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 For debugging, updates, and maintenance it would be good for a few of us
 to have access to the machine that gettor is deployed on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30920 [Core Tor/Tor]: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30920: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy overflow extra-review  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor, nickm |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Sorry for the delay!  This looks good now. I've merged, with some light
 grammar edits in 3d1a7d7dd7e10b.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32393 [Applications/GetTor]: GetTor's GitHub links are broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32393: GetTor's GitHub links are broken
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  github   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 Looks like the gettorbrowser github repo mirrors the gitlab version up to
 
[https://gitlab.com/thetorproject/gettorbrowser/commit/d3b2871c6b92db792e169cfb146cae358729ee30
 this commit]

 But then is missing the rest of the dist ci commits.

 The reason for a partial set is because the release files are added
 [https://dip.torproject.org/hiro/gettor/blob/master/scripts/update_files#L39
 one commit at a time]. So it looks like something went wrong part way
 through the github update (the update was reset with
 
[https://github.com/TheTorProject/gettorbrowser/commit/02fb5ee83dd83f98fc93cbda1758caf07162d528
 this commit]), and then wasn't started or re-run for the github remote.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30920 [Core Tor/Tor]: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30920: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy overflow extra-review  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor, nickm |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by alexcrichton):

 Oh for `llvm-extract` I used the `-rfunc` argument which is a regex
 instead of an exact name,  like so: `llvm-extract before.bc
 -rfunc=17h5949677e2a2fd343E -o before-extract.bc`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32295 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Skipping obsolete configuration option." doesn't say which one

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32295: "Skipping obsolete configuration option." doesn't say which one
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks correct.  #32404 is already merged to master.  Please merge as
 appropriate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32450 [Core Tor/Tor]: test/parseconf: Document include behaviour, and add basic parsing tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32450: test/parseconf: Document include behaviour, and add basic parsing tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-config, network-team-roadmap-|  implemented
  november   |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Looks fine; merged it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32404 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a CFLG_OBSOLETE flag, and handle it at the confvar layer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32404: Add a CFLG_OBSOLETE flag, and handle it at the confvar layer
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #29211 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor31-must
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Fixed comments and merged

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32315: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address
-+-
 Reporter:  liberat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, dns, BugSmashFund, consider-   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  backport-after-0425, 035-backport, |
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport   |
Parent ID:  #26664   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by liberat):

 Thanks! I've submitted this as pull request #1529.

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[tor-bugs] #32456 [Community/Tor Support]: Add a question about anti-virus reporting a virus in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32456: Add a question about anti-virus reporting a virus in Tor Browser
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 With each new Tor Browser release, some users are complaining that Tor
 Browser is reported as a possible virus by their antivirus. It seems that
 some anti-virus are reporting any program that has not yet been seen by
 many of their users as suspicious. Maybe also that some malwares include a
 copy of tor, leading some antivirus to claim that any program including a
 copy of tor is a malware.

 I think we should add a question about this on support.tpo, to explain
 that those warnings can be ignored if Tor Browser has been downloaded from
 the official website.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32385 [Core Tor/Tor]: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32385: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  doxygen   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Thank you for the reviews! I've fixed the typo and merged, after fixing a
 couple of doxygen errors that had slipped in since the last time I
 checked.

 I've opened #32455 to add a doxygen CI item.  I think we can do that even
 before we have full documentation: with this branch merged, --enable-
 fatal-warnings will turn off missing documentation warnings, since there
 are thousands of them right now.

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[tor-bugs] #32455 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run "make doxygen" in a travis builder

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32455: Run "make doxygen" in a travis builder
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  doxygen tor-ci
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  .3 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 With #32385, we now have --enable-fatal-warnings behave sensibly with
 doxygen warnings.  We can prevent ourselves from introducing new doxygen
 warnings by having a travis builder that does "make doxygen".

 This won't apply to warnings about missing documentation: those are off by
 default, since we have a few thousand of them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with about:blank and NoScript on .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32429: Issues with about:blank and NoScript on .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  pf.team   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  about:blank noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by ma1):

 Thank you for your report.
 I cannot reproduce with NoScript 11.0.8. Can you?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25601 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Multiplex - one snowflake proxy should be able to support multiple clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25601: Multiplex - one snowflake proxy should be able to support multiple 
clients
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  snowflake, tor-pt, anti-censorship-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-september  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged in `300a23c6a0`: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=300a23c6a0071a910ee3b56f7bf14e4f9529ee3f

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32440 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to November GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32440: Update to November GeoIP2 database
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged to 0.2.9 and forward!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19327 [Core Tor/Tor]: controller: expose fine-grained circuit detail.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19327: controller: expose fine-grained circuit detail.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control isolation test-support   |  Actual Points:
  intro  |
Parent ID:  #17284   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31971 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake is *consistently* extremely slow when using the Windows build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31971: Snowflake is *consistently* extremely slow when using the Windows build
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:  .5
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > Could it be that this is a result of the recent change regarding handing
 proxy-go instances more often than browser snowflakes? I will retest and
 keep you informed about whether I'm seeing any improvement on Windows, but
 I'm curious how this could have fixed itself and whether browser proxies
 work as fast as proxy-go instances.

 I don't think this is just due to getting more proxy-go instances. Even
 with the change, it's still more likely to get a browser snowflake than a
 proxy-go instance. I should definitely have gotten a browser proxy in one
 of the 5 bootstraps and I got well over 20kbps for each one. I am also
 puzzled as to why I wasn't able to reproduce this. Perhaps something in a
 recent Windows update? Or a firewall setting? It would be really helpful
 if you could check on your setup again and confirm. Thanks cypherpunks!

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[tor-bugs] #32454 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor crash on Windows 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32454: about:tor crash on Windows 10
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-crash
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Some Windows users are reporting on the blog that `about:tor` is crashing:
 `Gah. Your tab just crashed. We can help! Choose Restore This Tab to
 reload the page.`

 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/285313#comment-285313
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/285349#comment-285349

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32425 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SVG icons are blocked in the video player in Safest security setting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32425: SVG icons are blocked in the video player in Safest security setting
--+--
 Reporter:  nDe15o|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-security-slider


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32438 [Core Tor/Tor]: Inconsistent failure-then-success bootstrap behavior with clock set 24h in the past

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32438: Inconsistent failure-then-success bootstrap behavior with clock set 24h 
in
the past
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap, clock-skew, usability,|  Actual Points:
  ux, s8-errors, AffectsTails|
Parent ID:  #23508   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by intrigeri):

 * status:  needs_information => new
 * component:  Applications/Tor Launcher => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 mcs]:
 > Shouldn't this be a Core Tor ticket? Tor Launcher simply reports errors
 or accepts "success" as reported by Tor.

 Yeah, that's what I thought, but I was not self-confident enough to trust
 my hunch, so I've reported this bug against the piece of software where
 the user-visible behavior seems wrong. You're the expert here so I've
 tried to adjust the ticket metadata accordingly. Dear network team, please
 bear with my lack of familiarity with your Trac workflow!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28314 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Alleged Family Members never disappear

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28314: Alleged Family Members never disappear
-+--
 Reporter:  Quake|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged, will be included in the next release. Closing. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with about:blank and NoScript on .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32429: Issues with about:blank and NoScript on .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  pf.team   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  about:blank noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * cc: ma1 (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32238: Some websites not loading pictures after upgrade to Tor Browser 9.0
--+--
 Reporter:  AxBnO3|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pili):

 #32430 is a duplicate

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32430 [Applications/Tor Browser]: website not working properly since update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32430: website not working properly since update
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Images for videos not loading|  duplicate
  porndig|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Duplicate of #32238

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32438 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Inconsistent failure-then-success bootstrap behavior with clock set 24h in the past

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32438: Inconsistent failure-then-success bootstrap behavior with clock set 24h 
in
the past
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap, clock-skew, usability,|  Actual Points:
  ux, s8-errors, AffectsTails|
Parent ID:  #23508   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Shouldn't this be a Core Tor ticket? Tor Launcher simply reports errors or
 accepts "success" as reported by Tor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30920 [Core Tor/Tor]: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30920: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy overflow extra-review  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor, nickm |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #32453 [- Select a component]: connection no longer available

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32453: connection no longer available
-+--
 Reporter:  aldo341  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Hello
 My Tor browser (‎downloaded 28 ‎october ‎2018) does not accept connections
 since today. Nothing changed in configurations.
 "The proxy server is refusing connections. Firefox is configured to use a
 proxy server that is refusing connections. Check the proxy settings to
 make sure that they are correct. Contact your network administrator to
 make sure the proxy server is working."

 I tried to download the current version. Opening is blocked (lack of api-
 ms-win-crt-convert-l1-1-0.dll). Download this file and add in Sytem32,
 SysWOW64 and tor browser file  (advice on internet) does not work. Opening
 is blocked : error 0xc0007b.
 Reinstall DirectX, Framework and C++ redistributable, SFC scan (advices on
 internet) don't change anything. Still error 0xc0007b.

 My computer is an asus of october 2013, with windows 8, x64.

 What should I do to be able to use again Tor browser ?

 Thanks for your help

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28314 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Alleged Family Members never disappear

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28314: Alleged Family Members never disappear
-+--
 Reporter:  Quake|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19909 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Think about switching to Balrog for our server side Tor Browser update components

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19909: Think about switching to Balrog for our server side Tor Browser update
components
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by gk:

Old description:

> While discussing #19890 with Mozilla engineers we came across the topic
> on how we handle our server-sde update part. It turns out that they
> basically did back then what we are doing now. They recommended to look
> at Balrog once we believe our needs do not scale anymore/or the system
> feels like being messed up etc. See: http://wiki.mozilla.org/Balrog for
> details.

New description:

 While discussing #19890 with Mozilla engineers we came across the topic on
 how we handle our server-side update part. It turns out that they
 basically did back then what we are doing now. They recommended to look at
 Balrog once we believe our needs do not scale anymore/or the system feels
 like being messed up etc. See: http://wiki.mozilla.org/Balrog for details.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32440 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to November GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32440: Update to November GeoIP2 database
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32415 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32415: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => teor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32211 [Core Tor/Tor]: write description of subsystem initialization/shutdown architecture

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32211: write description of subsystem initialization/shutdown architecture
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-september,  |  Actual Points:  .2
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29215   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32020 [Core Tor/Tor]: hsv3: Client do not report failing circuit back into HS subsystem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32020: hsv3: Client do not report failing circuit back into HS subsystem
+
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #30200  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replied!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32387 [Core Tor/Tor]: Doxygen: enable source code browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32387: Doxygen: enable source code browser
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 LGTM! Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30920 [Core Tor/Tor]: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30920: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy overflow extra-review  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor, nickm |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by guigom):

 Hi! I haven't received any update for two weeks and just wanted to check
 on this, knowing its low priority.

 Thanks Teor and Nick for your time and suggestions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32014 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Fix fpcentral after update to buster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32014: Fix fpcentral after update to buster
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fpcentral, TorBrowserTeam201910, |  Actual Points:
  boklm201910|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 boklm]:
 > In `requirements.txt` we have the line `ua-parser==0.7.1`, which means
 that this version of the module is installed in the virtualenv. However
 the `python3-ua-parser` Debian package is also installed on the system,
 with version 0.8.0, which is what gets used.
 >
 > To fix the issue we should make fpcentral compatible with ua-parser
 version 0.8.0.

 After investigating this I found that I was wrong and it didn't seem to be
 the issue.

 However, it seems that fpcentral is working again now, although I didn't
 do anything to fix it. I am not sure but it could be have been an issue
 caused by old wsgi processes, which got fixed by a reboot.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reduced webpage display area

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32431: Reduced webpage display area
--+---
 Reporter:  secureyourself|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Yes, this is not a bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reduced webpage display area

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32431: Reduced webpage display area
--+--
 Reporter:  secureyourself|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 This sounds like you are describing the letterboxing feature:
 https://support.torproject.org/tbb/maximized-torbrowser-window/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30570 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Implement per-site security settings support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30570: Implement per-site security settings support
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201911,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.5|
Parent ID:  #25658   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor9
-+-

Comment (by pili):

 #32433 is a duplicate

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32433 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [Suggestion] Per-page security

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32433: [Suggestion] Per-page security
--+--
 Reporter:  iqwerwas  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Seems like a duplicate of #30570

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32448 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Videos player crashes in Tor Browser when it's asked to play many videos at a time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32448: Videos player crashes in Tor Browser when it's asked to play many 
videos at
a time
-+-
 Reporter:  b0ax0c   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  torbrowser, AffectsTails,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-crash, |
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:10 baxc]:
 > Replying to [comment:9 gk]:
 >
 > > Thanks. Could you add me to that bug (with address
 `gk[@]torproject[.]org` (without the brackets))?
 >
 > done, please check and confirm

 Looks good, thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32448 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Videos player crashes in Tor Browser when it's asked to play many videos at a time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32448: Videos player crashes in Tor Browser when it's asked to play many 
videos at
a time
-+-
 Reporter:  b0ax0c   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  torbrowser, AffectsTails,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-crash, |
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by baxc):

 Replying to [comment:9 gk]:

 > Thanks. Could you add me to that bug (with address
 `gk[@]torproject[.]org` (without the brackets))?

 done, please check and confirm

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32448 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Videos player crashes in Tor Browser when it's asked to play many videos at a time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32448: Videos player crashes in Tor Browser when it's asked to play many 
videos at
a time
-+-
 Reporter:  b0ax0c   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  torbrowser, AffectsTails,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-crash, |
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:8 baxc]:
 > I lost access to b0ax0c user on tor but I can confirm that baxc on tor
 is mine and also https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/user_profile?user_id=650909
 on mozilla
 >
 > check: https://redmine.tails.boum.org/code/issues/17175#note-12
 >
 > I created a ticket for this on mozilla bug tracker as well
 >
 > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1595462

 Thanks. Could you add me to that bug (with address gk[@]torproject[.]org
 (without the brackets))?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32448 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Videos player crashes in Tor Browser when it's asked to play many videos at a time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32448: Videos player crashes in Tor Browser when it's asked to play many 
videos at
a time
-+-
 Reporter:  b0ax0c   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  torbrowser, AffectsTails,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-crash, |
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by baxc):

 I lost access to b0ax0c user on tor but I can confirm that baxc on tor is
 mine and also https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/user_profile?user_id=650909 on
 mozilla

 check: https://redmine.tails.boum.org/code/issues/17175#note-12

 I created a ticket for this on mozilla bug tracker as well

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1595462

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32418 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newest

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32418: Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is 
newest
--+---
 Reporter:  Yeti  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-update|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Yeti):

 Thanks, now I see, that Torbrowser misses write access for the program
 directory. I guess, this check should be done, when updates exist, not
 before.

 I install Torbrowser into %programfiles%, where users don't have write-
 access. Virtualization is disabled. Datadir I made writable (but not
 executable), because I didn't find a setting for relocating it. I handle
 updates manually as administrator. That's the safest way to avoid
 compromizing program files.

 update_messages.log:
 Logging current UpdateService status:
 UpdateService.canCheckForUpdates - able to check for updates
 getCanApplyUpdates - unable to apply updates without write access to the
 update directory. Exception: [Exception... "Component returned failure
 code: 0x80520015 (NS_ERROR_FILE_ACCESS_DENIED) [nsIFile.create]"
 nsresult: "0x80520015 (NS_ERROR_FILE_ACCESS_DENIED)"  location: "JS frame
 :: resource://gre/modules/FileUtils.jsm :: FileUtils_getDir :: line 76"
 data: no]
 getCanStageUpdates - staging updates is disabled by preference
 app.update.staging.enabled
 Elevation required: false
 Update being handled by other instance: false
 Downloading: false
 End of UpdateService status

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28314 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Alleged Family Members never disappear

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28314: Alleged Family Members never disappear
-+--
 Reporter:  Quake|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => irl


Comment:

 Yup, it was an Onionoo bug. irl, please review
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/onionoo.git/commit/?h=task-28314=941ffd691b7ddaa7d4ae692746f056bcabdfc1d7
 commit 941ffd6 in my task-28314 branch].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32452 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Release CollecTor 1.13.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32452: Release CollecTor 1.13.1
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Release: https://dist.torproject.org/collector/1.13.1/

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[tor-bugs] #32452 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Release CollecTor 1.13.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32452: Release CollecTor 1.13.1
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 I'll put out a new CollecTor release that comes with the latest metrics-
 lib version 2.9.1. Otherwise, CollecTor will not be able to synchronize
 descriptors from another CollecTor instance running the latest released
 version 1.13.0. Who would have thought.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:31 gk]:
 > Okay, so before I speculate further I double-check your results using
 `-opt-bisect-limit` at least figuring out which optimization is the
 culprit for the tests I am currently running.

 Yeah, I can confirm that this is the `-jump-threading` operation here,
 too, good. Then let's get the LLVM bisecting going.

 Alex: So, I tried to extract the problematic function name with `llvm-
 extract` but I failed so far due to my lack of knowledge of LLVM tools.
 How do I properly demangle the function name so that `llvm-extract` likes
 it? I tried `llvm-cxxfilt` but no dice. The `opt` output for the
 problematic function I get is:
 {{{
 BISECT: running pass (1208271) Jump Threading on function
 
(_ZN83_$LT$style..values..specified..box_..Appearance$u20$as$u20$style..parser..Parse$GT$5parse17ha60227de7ee101e5E)
 }}}

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