Re: [tor-bugs] #32920 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: rebuild or replace scaleway boxes (scw-arm-*)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32920: rebuild or replace scaleway boxes (scw-arm-*)
-+
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by weasel):

 build-arm-10.torproject.org is now building arm64 jenkins stuff.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32455 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run "make doxygen" in a travis builder

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32455: Run "make doxygen" in a travis builder
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doxygen tor-ci 043-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 nickm]:
 > I wonder if we can add this to an existing builder, instead of making a
 new builder?  Using a separate builder here makes us recompile Tor
 unnecessarily, which I would expect would slow down CI.

 I suggest the coverage build, in case we ever want to do documentation
 coverage.

 We could also add a new builder, but run "make doxygen" instead of "make"
 or "make src/app/tor". Linux builders only cost us a few 10s of seconds to
 start up and clone tor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33073 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a proposal for Tor Relays to Automatically Find their IPv6 Address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33073: Write a proposal for Tor Relays to Automatically Find their IPv6 Address
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #5940| Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:   => 1


Comment:

 Here's a partial draft, I think I'm a bit more than halfway through:
 https://github.com/teor2345/torspec/blob/ticket33073/proposals/312-relay-
 auto-ipv6-addr.txt

 No review needed yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33040 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Minor Snowflake refactoring

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33040: Minor Snowflake refactoring
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 cohosh]:
 > Do we still need a check for a nil BrokerChannel that was removed in
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/snowflake.git/commit/?h=bug33040-refactor=84e9b0626c1eb3de2f97af7379c973413f6b476d
 this commit]? It looks like `NewBrokerChannel` can return `nil` on error.

 You're totally right. I misread what that function was doing.

 > In this case that seems to be if `brokerURL` isn't properly formatted.
 Perhaps an error check and log message in `client/snowflake.go` on the
 return of that function?

 I think this is a good idea so I made a small change
 
([https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/snowflake.git/log/?h=bug33040-refactor-2
 bug33040-refactor-2],
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/snowflake.git/diff/?h=bug33040-refactor-2
 diff against previous]) before pushing. It moves the URL syntax check to
 happen once at the top level, and the result of the code can assume it has
 a non-`nil` `BrokerChannel.url`.

 Merged in [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/log/?id=db1ba4791b101b7a83060261bb44769dd7db8e25
 db1ba4791b101b7a83060261bb44769dd7db8e25].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5298 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relay does not pick the right IP addr of local node when multiple interfaces are available

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5298: Relay does not pick the right IP addr of local node when multiple
interfaces are available
-+-
 Reporter:  ciaccio  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, ipv6, reachability,   |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #12377   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #5940 => #12377


Comment:

 If we implement #12377, we'll fix this issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12377 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prefer default route when checking local interface addresses (was: get_interface_address6() behaviour iff all interface addresses are internal)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12377: Prefer default route when checking local interface addresses
-+-
 Reporter:  rl1987   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, address-detection,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-34, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #5940| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33061 [Metrics/CollecTor]: archived bandwidth scanner files lack explicit source attibution

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33061: archived bandwidth scanner files lack explicit source attibution
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by starlight):

 I have conflated bandwidth scanner with bandwidth authority in my thinking
 and this ticket, but what's interesting is attribution of the bandwidth
 scanner source for each document.  These originate in the bandwidth
 scanners, and as you say generally one bandwidth scanner is associated one
 authority thus far.  Have thought of the new mechanism mainly as a
 standardized way for making the information available, in contrast to the
 previous ad-hoc web-server hosting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31246 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Alternative DirAuth specification doesn't work anymore. (was: Alternatire DirAuth specification doesn't work anymore.)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31246: Alternative DirAuth specification doesn't work anymore.
--+-
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12377 [Core Tor/Tor]: get_interface_address6() behaviour iff all interface addresses are internal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12377: get_interface_address6() behaviour iff all interface addresses are 
internal
-+-
 Reporter:  rl1987   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, address-detection,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-34, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #5940| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #5940


Comment:

 We might fix this as part of #5940.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30946 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Port BridgeDB to Python 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30946: Port BridgeDB to Python 3
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  python  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  10
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:4 atagar]:
 > Hi Philipp. It took alot of work but I've finished porting BridgeDB to
 python 3. The port is available within my python3 branch...
 >
 > https://github.com/atagar/bridgedb/commits/python3
 >
 > Tests now pass with python 3.5 but has not been exercised in a runtime
 context. Its tests provide good coverage so should be close.
 [[br]]
 Thanks a lot, Damian! I am now building on your great patch set, to make
 it work in a runtime context.
 [[br]]
 > If tor would ever care to hire a BridgeDB maintainer to replace Isis let
 me know. The codebase relies excessively on catch-alls to mask underlying
 instability so there's quite a bit of room for stabilization.
 [[br]]
 Our new anti-censorship team is responsible for BridgeDB and I'm its new
 maintainer. We will hopefully be able to do some general maintenance as
 part of our
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/sponsors/Sponsor30
 Sponsor 30 grant]. Let me know if you have any specific suggestions on
 what kind of BridgeDB improvements you would like to see.

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[tor-bugs] #33073 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a proposal for Tor Relays to Automatically Find their IPv6 Address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33073: Write a proposal for Tor Relays to Automatically Find their IPv6 Address
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:  #5940
   Points:  2   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must  |
+
 For Sponsor 55, I need to write a proposal for IPv6 address detection on
 relays.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31180 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove deprecated options in 0.4.3.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31180: Remove deprecated options in 0.4.3.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-can   |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 see branch `ticket31180` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1688

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32980 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: set cpu_type in the ganeti cluster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32980: set cpu_type in the ganeti cluster
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 i'm worried about `-cpu host` breaking stuff now and since our focus is
 currently stability, i'll consider that fixed for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31180 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove deprecated options in 0.4.3.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31180: Remove deprecated options in 0.4.3.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-can   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I think we should remove ReachableDirAddresses, HTTPProxy, and
 HTTPProxyAuthenticator in 0.4.3, and leave other options for later.

 In particular, we should leave ClientPreferIPv6DirPort alone, since it
 will probably get removed anyway during our IPv6 work for Sponsor 55.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32753 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should lower-case its BridgeDistribution string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32753: Tor should lower-case its BridgeDistribution string
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-0432,|  Actual Points:
  035-backport 041-backport 042-backport easy|
  anticensorship-wants fast-fix 043-should   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Is there some minimal version of this patch that we could backport?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32791 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check all of Tor's python scripts run under python 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32791: Check all of Tor's python scripts run under python 3
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, tor-python-3  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Here's a partial fix PR from a new contributor:
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1687

 We should review and merge this fix, and then do more testing, to make
 sure we haven't missed anything.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32791 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check all of Tor's python scripts run under python 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32791: Check all of Tor's python scripts run under python 3
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, tor-python-3  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  043-can, tor-python-3 => 043-should, tor-python-3


Comment:

 This PR generates a list of python 3 print function errors:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1686

 Now that we have a list of errors, we should fix them in 0.4.3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24607 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: CAPTCHAs on BridgeDB seem to be getting more difficult

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24607: CAPTCHAs on BridgeDB seem to be getting more difficult
-+-
 Reporter:  alison   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-november,|  Actual Points:
  s30-o22a2  |
Parent ID:  #31279   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: cohosh (added)


Comment:

 Cecylia had a chat with isis, who helpfully pointed out that BridgeDB
 serves a static set of pre-compiled CAPTCHAs. This set currently contains
 10,000 CAPTCHAs, which were last updated in February 2014. (On an
 unrelated note, there's a good chance that the GFW isn't in fact using a
 classifier to break our CAPTCHAs (see #32117) – it may have just solved
 these CAPTCHAs and then continued to recycle them.)

 The tool [https://github.com/isislovecruft/gimp-captcha gimp-captcha] was
 last used to generate CAPTCHAs for BridgeDB. I made the code work on
 Debian buster and GIMP 2.10, and then experimented with making the
 CAPTCHAs easier to solve. In particular, I did the following:
 * Increase the spacing between letters.
 * Reduce the maximum angle tilt of letters.
 * Made the letters darker.

 Here are three examples:
 [[Image(AeuJxyNG.jpg)]]
 [[Image(N9f7J4js.jpg)]]
 [[Image(NZP9gfAJ.jpg)]]

 And here are two CAPTCHAs as they are currently used by BridgeDB:

 [[Image(Screenshot from 2017-12-12 17-41-53.png​)]]
 [[Image(Screenshot from 2017-12-12 17-41-23.png)]]

 In the long term, we should be moving away from CAPTCHAs but in the short
 term we can re-generate a new set that's easier for users to solve. Our
 BridgeDB metrics reveal (an approximation of) the success rate at which
 our users solve CAPTCHAs. We should deploy a new batch and then refine the
 CAPTCHAs if the success rate doesn't improve significantly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28704 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28704: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:16 boklm]:
 > Does running ldd on libTor.so says that it is linked to libssl.so?

 Running ldd I get message

 {{{
 not a dynamic executable
 }}}

 The elf header type

 {{{
   Type:DYN (Shared object file)
 }}}

 Reading elf dependencies

 {{{
  0x0001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libz.so]
  0x0001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libm.so]
  0x0001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libssl.so]
  0x0001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libcrypto.so]
  0x0001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [liblog.so]
  0x0001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libdl.so]
  0x0001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libc.so]
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24607 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: CAPTCHAs on BridgeDB seem to be getting more difficult

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24607: CAPTCHAs on BridgeDB seem to be getting more difficult
-+-
 Reporter:  alison   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-november,|  Actual Points:
  s30-o22a2  |
Parent ID:  #31279   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * Attachment "N9f7J4js.jpg" added.

 New CAPTCHA 2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24607 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: CAPTCHAs on BridgeDB seem to be getting more difficult

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24607: CAPTCHAs on BridgeDB seem to be getting more difficult
-+-
 Reporter:  alison   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-november,|  Actual Points:
  s30-o22a2  |
Parent ID:  #31279   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * Attachment "AeuJxyNG.jpg" added.

 New CAPTCHA 1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24607 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: CAPTCHAs on BridgeDB seem to be getting more difficult

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24607: CAPTCHAs on BridgeDB seem to be getting more difficult
-+-
 Reporter:  alison   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-november,|  Actual Points:
  s30-o22a2  |
Parent ID:  #31279   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * Attachment "NZP9gfAJ.jpg" added.

 New CAPTCHA 3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29437 [Core Tor/Tor]: test-stem times out intermittently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29437: test-stem times out intermittently
-+-
 Reporter:  rl1987   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes stem-wants |  Actual Points:  0.4
  043-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Stem could be hanging due to a tor crash or stderr output, for a similar
 issue, see:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33006#comment:10

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31159 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Monitor anti-censorship www services with prometheus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31159: Monitor anti-censorship www services with prometheus
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30152   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => tpa-roadmap-february


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31957 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: automate upgrades

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31957: automate upgrades
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => tpa-roadmap-february


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32198 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: upgrade CRM* machines to buster

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32198: upgrade CRM* machines to buster
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => tpa-roadmap-february


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32949 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Migrate dip from gitlab-01 to gitlab-02

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32949: Migrate dip from gitlab-01 to gitlab-02
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gitlab tpa-roadmap-february  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32730   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  gitlab => gitlab tpa-roadmap-february


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33006 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix test-stem `test_take_ownership_via_controller` failure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33006: Fix test-stem `test_take_ownership_via_controller` failure
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33039| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I think that's it, except for:
 > We should find some way to make it so that when stem is running its
 tests, it does not close Tor's stderr, but rather reports stderr output as
 a test failure. This will make it likelier that we will notice
 LeakSanitizer failures in the future.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32914 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: review the puppet bootstrapping process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32914: review the puppet bootstrapping process
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31239   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => tpa-roadmap-february


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32901 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: puppetize Nagios

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32901: puppetize Nagios
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31239   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => tpa-roadmap-february


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32390 [Internal Services/Service - sandstorm]: decomission storm / bracteata on February 4, 2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32390: decomission storm / bracteata on February 4, 2020
---+--
 Reporter:  gaba   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - sandstorm  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32267 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  gaba => tpa-roadmap-february


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30971 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Rebuild the fallback list in late 2019 or early 2020

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30971: Rebuild the fallback list in late 2019 or early 2020
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 044-should   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  fallback, 043-can => fallback, 044-should
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final


Comment:

 We currently still have most of the fallbacks working, I don't think we'll
 need to do this task in 0.4.3, but we should check again in 0.4.4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dir auths using an unsustainable 400+ mbit/s, need to diagnose and fix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33018: Dir auths using an unsustainable 400+ mbit/s, need to diagnose and fix
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health 043-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:12 Sebastian]:
 > Replying to [comment:8 teor]:
 > > Replying to [comment:2 Sebastian]:
 > > > I am not concerned about relays connecting from a wrong IP address.
 I basically feel like that shouldn't even be possible configuration-wise
 > >
 > > Relays can set different addresses in the Address and
 OutboundBindAddress options, and their inbound and outbound traffic will
 be on different addresses. Some operators use these options, others put
 their Address on a non-default route.
 > >
 > > So we do need to consider this case, particularly when relays are
 trying to discover their own IP address from an authority. But relays
 should fall back to discovering their address and getting a consensus from
 other relays, if all the authorities fail.
 > >
 > > So maybe it will work anyway? We should do a test to make sure.
 >
 > I know these kinds of configurations are possible, but why is that and
 why are we OK with it. That's my point here, we should IMO change your
 stance to this being not supported behaviour.

 At the moment, relays (and directory authorities) use the system default
 route for outbound traffic, rather than the advertised address.

 If you want to change OutboundBindAddress, here's what we could do:
 1. make OutboundBindAddress default to the advertised addresses (IPv4 and
 IPv6), but fall back to unbound if binding to a specific address doesn't
 work - fixes most relays
 2. deprecate OutboundBindAddress - needs proposal (or consultation with
 relay operators), fixes some of the rest

 We can't fix all the relays, because operators can still use firewalls
 (and other weird network configs) to change the outbound address.

 I'll put step 1 in my upcoming IPv6 address discovery proposal as optional
 work. I think it's best we do step 2 separately. Because it's likely to be
 controversial.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17202 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Shut down SVN and decomission the host (gayi)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17202: Shut down SVN and decomission the host (gayi)
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * parent:  #31686 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31686 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: retire textile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31686: retire textile
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i've disconnected the SVN and chiwui shutdown from this procedure because
 I don't want to wait for those projects to complete before
 decommissionning textile.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29399 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Retire host and services for tordnsel and check (chiwui)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29399: Retire host and services for tordnsel and check (chiwui)
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * parent:  #31686 =>


Comment:

 disconnecting from the textile shutdown (#31686) because i want to turn
 off that box sooner.

 i'm still waiting on a plan here - the hard deadline remains.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17202 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Shut down SVN and decomission the host (gayi)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17202: Shut down SVN and decomission the host (gayi)
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31686   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i've disconnected this ticket from the textile decom (#31686) because I
 don't want to wait for this project to complete before i turn off this
 machine. this and chiwui/check.tpo are the only two VMs left on the box...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29695 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The captcha displayed while authenticating connecting to a tor bridge is unreadable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29695: The captcha displayed while authenticating connecting to a tor bridge is
unreadable
--+---
 Reporter:  csk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  ux-team, s30-o22a2|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31268| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
--+---
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 I'm closing this because it's a duplicate of #24607.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33007 [Community/Relays]: Bridge campaign retrospective

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33007: Bridge campaign retrospective
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o24a1 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31281| Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
--+---

Comment (by phw):

 I just checked how many of our campaign bridges (#30777) are still online:
 Among the 93 bridges I checked, 57 (61%) are still online. I also sent an
 email to all campaign bridge operators and thanked the ones whose bridges
 are still running, and asked the ones with offline bridges what happened,
 and what we can do to make bridge operations more pleasant.

 I'll leave this ticket open for now and report back once most bridge
 operators replied to my email.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33035 [Applications/Tor Browser]: create strings for onion service error pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33035: create strings for onion service error pages
--+
 Reporter:  brade |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19251| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+

Comment (by brade):

 Another useful resource is this email from asn:
   https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2019-September/014046.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32588: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.9-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, ipv6, memory-safety, |  Actual Points:  0.8
  security-low, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32588: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.9-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, ipv6, memory-safety, |  Actual Points:  0.8
  security-low, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * owner:  (none) => ahf
 * status:  needs_revision => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33072 [Core Tor/Tor]: When under load, give 503 aggressively for dirport requests without compression

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33072: When under load, give 503 aggressively for dirport requests without
compression
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health 043-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33018 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet


Comment:

 (The right way to see whether the request will be compressed is to look at
 the value of `compression_methods_supported` in
 `directory_handle_command_get()`.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32455 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run "make doxygen" in a travis builder

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32455: Run "make doxygen" in a travis builder
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doxygen tor-ci 043-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32455 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run "make doxygen" in a travis builder

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32455: Run "make doxygen" in a travis builder
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doxygen tor-ci 043-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => rl1987


Comment:

 Setting owner.

 Rl1987, please let us know if you won't be revising this in the next month
 or so?  I'd like to get it into 0.4.3 if possible.

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[tor-bugs] #33072 [Core Tor/Tor]: When under load, give 503 aggressively for dirport requests without compression

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33072: When under load, give 503 aggressively for dirport requests without
compression
--+---
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  network-health 043-should
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #33018
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Preliminary analysis of the parent ticket suggests that most of the
 problematic requests are coming from an aggressively non-tor sources.  One
 reasonable thing we could do to disfavor them is to give a 503 to
 directory requests that don't request compression, either with a ".z"
 suffix or an Accept-Encoding list.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-edge circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32706: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-edge circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  computer_freak   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-log, tor-relay, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  043-should, BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:  #15618   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31686 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: retire textile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31686: retire textile
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 starting work on this, will document a migration procedure as i go along.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32729 [Core Tor/Tor]: "hs_circuitmap_init: Assertion !the_hs_circuitmap failed" when repeating failed tests on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32729: "hs_circuitmap_init: Assertion !the_hs_circuitmap failed" when repeating
failed tests on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  eighthave|  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Android backport? crash? 043-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * owner:  (none) => ahf
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24404 [Core Tor/Tor]: Propose a relay protover that allows IPv6 extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24404: Propose a relay protover that allows IPv6 extends
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, ipv6, tor-relay, |  Actual Points:  3
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 FWIW it is okay IMO to merge a proposal as sent to tor-dev, and then to
 update it as we edit that proposal.  Let's go with whatever Teor prefers
 there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dir auths using an unsustainable 400+ mbit/s, need to diagnose and fix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33018: Dir auths using an unsustainable 400+ mbit/s, need to diagnose and fix
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health 043-should  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by nickm):

 I agree that #33029 is a defense that we should have on tap to handle this
 kind of problem going forward.  It's not perfect, so maybe there should be
 an option to enable or disable it.

 Sebastian has also offered to run a patch for me that will record a sample
 of HTTP GET headers.  I'm hoping to find a pattern that we can detect.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31901 [Metrics/Website]: webstats-tb.html graph too eager to include today's stats

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31901: webstats-tb.html graph too eager to include today's stats
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I think this is solved as a positive side effect of resolving #32747. I
 set up a cronjob to fetch that graph once per hour for about a week, and I
 didn't see any changes to the last data point during that time. Closing as
 (probably-)fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33071 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser tab crashing after opening.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33071: Tor Browser tab crashing after opening.
--+---
 Reporter:  ambi  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:   => tbb-crash
 * version:  Tor: 0.4.3.1-alpha =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33029 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir-auth: Dir auths should resume sending 503's but never to relays or other dir auths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33029: dir-auth: Dir auths should resume sending 503's but never to relays or
other dir auths
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth 043-should?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33018   | Points:  0.4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:11 dgoulet]:
 > >  And then the minor worry in dgoulet's code about "if this shows up in
 the profile, we can move to have an address set instead" gets resolved too
 because it is just one thing we are checking.
 >
 > The reason I did _not_ go with the dirauth + bloomfilter idea is because
 when we ask "is this address a dirauth?", we should NOT get a
 probabilistic answer which is what the `address_set` does unfortunately.

 Are you sure here?  We never get false negatives; only false positives.
 When we're asking "is address a dirauth" it's not so bad if we
 accidentally allow a tiny fraction of non-dirauths; only if we
 accidentally block a dirauth.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33071 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser tab crashing after opening.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33071: Tor Browser tab crashing after opening.
--+
 Reporter:  ambi  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by boklm):

 * priority:  High => Medium
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * severity:  Major => Normal


Comment:

 #32454 looks similar. Are you using the 32bit or 64bit version of Tor
 Browser?

 I am also wondering if it could be #30976. Did you try installing Tor
 Browser to a directory that is not the Desktop (the default) to see if
 that solves this issue?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28005 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Officially support onions in HTTPS-Everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28005: Officially support onions in HTTPS-Everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, https-everywhere, tor-ux,|  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-november, |
  TorBrowserTeam202001, network-team-roadmap-|
  2020Q1 |
Parent ID:  #30029   | Points:  20
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * owner:  legind => tbb-team
 * component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere => Applications/Tor
 Browser


Comment:

 I think the changes here belong more to Tor Browser than to HTTPS
 Everywhere component.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32948 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make referer behavior consistent regardless of private browing mode status

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32948: Make referer behavior consistent regardless of private browing mode 
status
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  acat |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * reviewer:   => acat


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[tor-bugs] #33071 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser tab crashing after opening.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33071: Tor Browser tab crashing after opening.
+--
 Reporter:  ambi|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.3.1-alpha  |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Tor browser not working after connecting. After tor page comes tab
 crashes. countless restores dont work.
 Few infos.
 Tor was working on windows 7 with same ISP and firewall and antivirus
 yesterday.
 After clean installing OS windows 10, tor not working now.
 Process followed:
 -> Installed latest tor from official site.
 -> Restarted PC.
 -> opened tor.
 -> Tor connect and configure option comes.
 -> after connecting browser opens with duckduckgo search panel, purple
 page.
 -> after 1-2 seconds, tab crashes with message "Gah. Your tab just
 crashed."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32768 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a build-infos.json file containing firefox platform_version and buildid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32768: Create a build-infos.json file containing firefox platform_version and
buildid
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:  .2
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:  #25102   | Points:
 Reviewer:  pospeselr|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * reviewer:   => pospeselr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32767 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Disconnect search as it is discontinued

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32767: Remove Disconnect search as it is discontinued
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001R |  Actual Points:  0.25
Parent ID:| Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:  boklm |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * reviewer:   => boklm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32470 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport fix for bug 1590538

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32470: Backport fix for bug 1590538
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001R,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  GeorgKoppen202001  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  mcs  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * reviewer:   => mcs


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32437 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include wasi-libc project into tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32437: Include wasi-libc project into tor-browser-build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202001, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:  #32434   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * reviewer:   => boklm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32700 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No need to disable GeckoDriver in Windows mozconfig files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32700: No need to disable GeckoDriver in Windows mozconfig files
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201912  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * reviewer:   => boklm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28005 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Officially support onions in HTTPS-Everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28005: Officially support onions in HTTPS-Everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, https-everywhere, tor-ux,|  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-november, |
  TorBrowserTeam202001, network-team-roadmap-|
  2020Q1 |
Parent ID:  #30029   | Points:  20
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Replying to [comment:16 antonela]:
 > Replying to [comment:14 acat]:
 > > 4. Via "some UX solution", show the human-memorable .tor.onion in the
 urlbar even though the actual location is a "long" .onion.
 > >
 > Yes. We should show the memorable .tor.onion in the url bar and we
 should rely on the circuit display for showing the long onion. I made some
 props [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/30024/30024%20-%20TB9%20-%20onions.png, here]. Look at
 the image 4.0.

 What if the user wants to copy-paste or inspect the real address (the
 .onion one)? Or is this not a use case we would need to support?

 Besides, I was thinking that perhaps we should make it more noticeable
 that we are displaying (just) a short `.tor.onion` local "alias" instead
 of the actual `.onion` in the urlbar. In the current design, unless I'm
 missing something, we would show it exactly as if the `.tor.onion` was the
 real page address. I think that might lead to surprises for some users,
 especially the more technical ones. For example, I would expect that the
 hostname displayed in the urlbar is the actual origin of the page (e.g.
 the one that is sent as `Host:` header in the page HTTP requests, etc.).
 But that would not be the case here, since we would show `.tor.onion` in
 the urlbar the but the true origin of the page would be `.onion` (the
 `.tor.onion` urlbar replacement would be just "cosmetic").

 I'm not completely sure how this could be done in terms of UI. Note that
 now we already show the domain in a highlighted color in the urlbar
 (Firefox change). Perhaps in these cases we could show the `.tor.onion`
 domain in a different color, and when user clicks on the urlbar show the
 real .onion so that it can be copy-pasted if needed? I'm not sure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32436 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include lucetc project into tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32436: Include lucetc project into tor-browser-build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202001, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:  #32434   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * reviewer:   => boklm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32891 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Set up default bridge in Denmark

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32891: Set up default bridge in Denmark
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:
|  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam202001R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  boklm   |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * reviewer:   => boklm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32414 [Applications/Tor Browser]: window.external.AddSearchProvider request goes through catch-all-circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32414: window.external.AddSearchProvider request goes through catch-all-circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  acat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  pospeselr|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * reviewer:   => pospeselr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31988 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Generate a mar signing key for nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31988: Generate a mar signing key for nightly builds
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201910, tbb-update,|  Actual Points:  1
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:  #18867   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  mcs  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 The script was made using instructions from https://gitweb.torproject.org
 /tor-browser-spec.git/tree/processes/KeyGeneration

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31988 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Generate a mar signing key for nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31988: Generate a mar signing key for nightly builds
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201910, tbb-update,|  Actual Points:  1
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:  #18867   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  mcs  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * reviewer:   => mcs


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32870 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump version of pion webrtc in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32870: Bump version of pion webrtc in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cohosh|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001R |  Actual Points:  .7
Parent ID:  #31971| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  boklm |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * reviewer:   => boklm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31395 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove inline

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31395: Remove inline 

Re: [tor-bugs] #32434 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get build changes needed for RLBox into tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32434: Get build changes needed for RLBox into tor-browser-build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen202001, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:  #32379   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * reviewer:   => boklm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27268 [Applications/Tor Browser]: preferences cleanup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27268: preferences cleanup
-+-
 Reporter:  rzb  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam202001R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  acat |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * reviewer:   => acat


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19757 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19757: Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB
-+-
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-usability, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:  6.3
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:  #3   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  pospeselr, acat  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * reviewer:   => pospeselr, acat


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28704 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28704: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Does running ldd on libTor.so says that it is linked to libssl.so?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29437 [Core Tor/Tor]: test-stem times out intermittently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29437: test-stem times out intermittently
-+-
 Reporter:  rl1987   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes stem-wants |  Actual Points:  0.4
  043-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (Please let me know if you see a test-stem timeout in the wild on current
 versions?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28704 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28704: Compile Tor and dependencies on our own for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I've made progress to getting libraries running as shared libraries but
 have hit a blocker that I need help with

 The problem occurs when I try to run tor browser. I get a missing symbol
 where libTor can't find a symbol from openssl


 {{{
   10744 10744 F linker  : CANNOT LINK EXECUTABLE "/data/app/org.torproject
 .torbrowser-o2cGxqnhQbWOPhFKKcOFiA==/lib/arm/libTor.so": cannot locate
 symbol "SSL_CTX_set_security_level" referenced by
 "/data/app/org.torproject.torbrowser-
 o2cGxqnhQbWOPhFKKcOFiA==/lib/arm/libTor.so"...
 }}}

 Looking at the libraries, we see the function undefined in libTor. So I'm
 wondering what flag I need to set to make sure these are included. I'm
 building with clang.

 {{{
 $ readelf -Ws libTor.so | grep set_security
   3819:  0 FUNCGLOBAL DEFAULT  UND
 SSL_CTX_set_security_level@OPENSSL_1_1_0 (5)
 110559:  0 FUNCGLOBAL DEFAULT  UND
 SSL_CTX_set_security_level
 }}}


 {{{
 $ readelf -Ws libssl.so | grep set_security
537: 000328bc12 FUNCGLOBAL DEFAULT   11
 SSL_CTX_set_security_level@@OPENSSL_1_1_0
543: 000328d412 FUNCGLOBAL DEFAULT   11
 SSL_CTX_set_security_callback@@OPENSSL_1_1_0
679: 0003288c12 FUNCGLOBAL DEFAULT   11
 SSL_set_security_callback@@OPENSSL_1_1_0
681: 0003287412 FUNCGLOBAL DEFAULT   11
 SSL_set_security_level@@OPENSSL_1_1_0
   2743: 000328bc12 FUNCGLOBAL DEFAULT   11
 SSL_CTX_set_security_level
   2749: 000328d412 FUNCGLOBAL DEFAULT   11
 SSL_CTX_set_security_callback
   2885: 0003288c12 FUNCGLOBAL DEFAULT   11
 SSL_set_security_callback
   2887: 0003287412 FUNCGLOBAL DEFAULT   11 SSL_set_security_level
 }}}

 I have the changes here
 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-build/commits/bug-28766e

 The tor specific changes are here
 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-
 build/commit/b6d9c2edf8cb46e484413554ba76dce9560eef5d

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32992 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android Project for LZMA

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32992: Android Project for LZMA
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by sisbell:

Old description:

> Source code: !https://git.tukaani.org/xz.git

New description:

 Create a tbb project to build source code targeting the android platform.

 Source code: https://git.tukaani.org/xz.git

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32991 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android Project For ZSTD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32991: Android Project For ZSTD
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by sisbell:

Old description:

> Source code is at
>
> !https://github.com/facebook/zstd

New description:

 Create a tbb project to build source code targeting the android platform.

 Source is at

 !https://github.com/facebook/zstd

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30719 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out why 90% of sbws measurements fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30719: Work out why 90% of sbws measurements fail
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-roadmap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29710 | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  sbws-roadmap-october, sbws-roadmap => sbws-roadmap


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #30733, #30067

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #30733, #30067 by gaba:


Comment:
remove august keyword

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #30733, #30735, #30067, #30196, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #30733, #30735, #30067, #30196, #30719, #30726 by gaba:


Comment:
Changing keyword of roadmapped open sbws tickets to a general sbws-roadmap one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30727 [Core Tor/sbws]: Make sbws vote for all measured relays, even if they are not Running / not in the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30727: Make sbws vote for all measured relays, even if they are not Running / 
not
in the consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  must-keep-3-torflow-blocker, sbws-   |  Actual Points:
  majority-blocker   |
Parent ID:  #29710   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31814 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Moving Tor Browser onto SD Card breaks app on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31814: Moving Tor Browser onto SD Card breaks app on Android
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 I suspect that this problem is caused since Android platform is moving the
 libraries to a protected area as part of app install. In the past, we were
 manually copying the native libraries around from within the app.

 I'll need to do a little more research.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24404 [Core Tor/Tor]: Propose a relay protover that allows IPv6 extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24404: Propose a relay protover that allows IPv6 extends
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, ipv6, tor-relay, |  Actual Points:  3
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Comments by nickm on tor-dev@. Moving this to needs_info until that part
 is resolved or not so we can then proceed to upstream merge and make
 prop311 official.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32303 [Applications/Tor Browser]: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32303: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201911R, tbb- |
  backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: uhdv (added)


Comment:

 #33026 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33026 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Problem using obfs4 on Android arm64: executable's TLS segment is underaligned

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33026: Problem using obfs4 on Android arm64: executable's TLS segment is
underaligned
--+---
 Reporter:  uhdv  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 @uhdv: so this should be fixed in the alpha version.

 Closing this as duplicate of #32303.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21922 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add our reasoning for dealing with the XPI signing to our design document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21922: Add our reasoning for dealing with the XPI signing to our design 
document
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25021| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:   => #25021


Comment:

 Should be straightforward to add this under "Other Security Measures".
 Nowadays this only affects HTTPS Everywhere. We should point out why we
 want to use EFF's signature here and could generally point out our efforts
 trying to just ship the extensions via our own in-browser update mechanism
 and not via AMO/external auto-updating.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #31483, #10416, #25140, #14389, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #31483, #10416, #25140, #14389, #26294, #29211, #29212, 
#29213, #29217, #29226, #29227, #29427, #31062, #31238, #31632, #31653, #31820, 
#31829, #31851, #31882, #31908, #31912, #32040, #32139, #32162, #32395, #32488, 
#32489, #32490, #32522, #32655, #32784, #32798, #32809, #32810, #32812, #32813, 
#32814, #32850, #32907, #28280, #32059 by nickm:
milestone to Tor: 0.4.4.x-final

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33026 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Problem using obfs4 on Android arm64: executable's TLS segment is underaligned

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33026: Problem using obfs4 on Android arm64: executable's TLS segment is
underaligned
--+---
 Reporter:  uhdv  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sisbell):

 Seems similar to

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32303

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #7164, #32195, #5915, #19327, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #7164, #32195, #5915, #19327, #29209, #29224, #29225, 
#29228, #29698, #31122, #31182, #31223, #31638, #32048, #32178, #32335, #32349, 
#32373, #32374, #32388, #32396, #32408, #32447, #32604, #32610, #32611, #32880, 
#32888 by nickm:
milestone to Tor: unspecified

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32971 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document OwningControllerProcess time interval

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32971: Document OwningControllerProcess time interval
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, 043-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  easy, doc, 043-deferred => easy, doc, 043-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32830 [Core Tor]: Relay_extended - hash and padding - specs are wrong or unclear

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32830: Relay_extended - hash and padding - specs are wrong or unclear
--+
 Reporter:  Aymeric   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-can   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  043-deferred => 043-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32776 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove 0.2.9 from the jenkins builders

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32776: Remove 0.2.9 from the jenkins builders
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1, |  Actual Points:
  043-can|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1, 043-deferred => network-team-
 roadmap-2020Q1, 043-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31940 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fail unit tests that hang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31940: Fail unit tests that hang
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unit-tests, 043-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-unit-tests, 043-deferred => tor-unit-tests, 043-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31940 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fail unit tests that hang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31940: Fail unit tests that hang
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unit-tests, 043-deferred  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31507 [Core Tor/Tor]: Change the client default to AvoidDiskWrites 1, or otherwise make disk writes less frequent. (was: Change the client default to AvoidDiskWrites 1)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31507: Change the client default to AvoidDiskWrites 1, or otherwise make disk
writes less frequent.
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security-low, 043-deferred  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31507 [Core Tor/Tor]: Change the client default to AvoidDiskWrites 1, or otherwise make disk writes less frequent.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31507: Change the client default to AvoidDiskWrites 1, or otherwise make disk
writes less frequent.
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security-low, 043-deferred  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31181 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deprecate more options in 0.4.3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31181: Deprecate more options in 0.4.3
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-can   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  043-deferred => 043-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31180 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove deprecated options in 0.4.3.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31180: Remove deprecated options in 0.4.3.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-can   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  043-deferred => 043-can
 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  assigned => accepted


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