Re: [tor-bugs] #6623 [Core Tor/Tor]: --enable-static-tor cannot succeed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6623: --enable-static-tor cannot succeed
-+-
 Reporter:  tmpname0901  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.20-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, autotools, build, link,   |  Actual Points:
  static, 032-unreached-backport,|
  035-deferred-20190115, 041-proposed, 033   |
  -unreached-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:32 werd]:
 > I want to build tor, not download it from somewhere else. My computer is
 on wifi so that prevents me from being an acceptable relay or bridge, best
 I can tell.  But after I copy over the binaries I made, to a computer with
 ethernet to the router, and run tor I get this:
 >
 > {{{
 > dyld: Library not loaded: @rpath/libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib
 >   Referenced from: /path/to/tor/bin/tor
 >   Reason: image not found
 > Abort trap: 6
 > }}}
 >
 > So it seems tor is relying on a library burried deep in xcode.

 This is the clang address sanitizer library. We don't recommend using it
 for relays or bridges, because it makes them crash on some non-fatal
 errors.

 You can disable this library by removing --enable-expensive-hardening or
 --enable-fragile-hardening from your configure command-line.

 > I've already built zlib, libevent, and libressl/openssl as static. My
 tor configure line informs tor of this. But as soon as I add {{{--enable-
 static-tor}}} and ./configure, the checking stops (as noted above in
 comment 21) here:
 >
 > {{{
 > checking whether free(NULL) works... no
 > configure: error: Your libc implementation doesn't allow free(NULL), as
 required by C99.
 > }}}
 >
 > Based on my reading of this ticket and others, it seems there is
 something out of order, but my attempts to mimic what others said worked
 for them, has not worked for me.
 >
 > I changed the order as noted in the patch here: #27802, (lines 169 &
 222), but the same error happened.

 Does macOS ship with a static C library?

 As far as I remember, it's not possible to build a truly static binary on
 macOS, because some of the lower-level OS libraries are dynamic. But you
 can get close.

 And I think you're actually trying to solve a slightly different problem,
 which is transferring a binary from one macOS to another. That shouldn't
 require a static tor, Tor Browser compiles a single binary that works on
 multiple macOS versions.

 Have you tried passing -mmacosx-version-min=version to your C compiler?
 That will disable any features that aren't available on newer macOS.

 Have you tried building all the dynamic libraries, and then copying them
 across with the binary? You may need to set the library paths correctly in
 the binary, or set LD_LIBRARY_PATH before launching it.

 You might also be happier if you use a package manager like HomeBrew to
 build from source on the wired Mac. It should have package definitions and
 debugging output that let you modify and verify the build.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24351 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24351: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare
-+-
 Reporter:  nullius  |  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity, mitm,  |  Actual Points:
  cloudflare, TorBrowserTeamTriaged  |
Parent ID:  #18361   | Points:  1000
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ϲypherpunks):

 Because someone is regularly repeatedly abusing the community account to
 censor content on a anti censorship community, by changing original
 comment with unrelated placeholder or white spaces. Including my own
 single comment posted here and even such over two year old including
 defacement of trac wiki pages. I'm now quoting all of previous talk, from
 all people of that was their free speech hidden. To not let him again the
 possibility of his wet censor dreams and archive valuable thought
 provoking thoughts.


 == Start of Full Quotes of 76 other users comments separated by hline in
 chronological order:
 
 I'm the person who created "madness" ticket, and you, sir, well writen!
 Yes, please block Cloudflare once and for all. I'm expecting some kind of
 "Isecure connection" errorpage
 to block further connection without user consent.
 For example, when I visit "CloudflareMustDie.com",
 1. TBB will show "Insecure connection" errorpage.
 2. User will decide what to do - go back, try a cache, or ignore.
 Here's my idea of errorpage design:
 =
 Your connection is not secure
 The owner of CloudflareMustDie.com is using Cloudflare on their website.
 To protect your privacy from being attacked, Tor Browser has not connected
 to this website.
 (Learn More)
 [Go Back] [Connect anyway]
 =
 (Learn More) is a link, to Tor documentation or wiki, to explain the
 cloudflare's MITM activity.
 [Connect anyway] is a button. If the user click it, Show warning dialogue
 with 3 seconds timelock:
 =
 This connection is MITMed. Are you sure you want to do this?
 [No] [Yes(3)]
 =
 And,
 > response header should immediately terminate, with an error message
 given to the user
 Yes, the connection to CF site *should* be terminate. We should treat them
 like self-signed non-onion website
 which is completely insecure.
 > This can be done by detecting the non-standard CF-Ray: HTTP header.
 You could also look at SSL certificate's CN.
 Most of them are "^sni(.*)\.cloudflaressl\.com".
 for sample:
 https://www.unspam.com/ <--- cloudflare's before project company, ewww
 P.S.
 I use TBB everyday. I got hit by cloudflare and most of the time I go back
 and search for alternative website.
 And if can't, I'll just open up normal browser to browse cloudflare-
 infected websites 'via VPN'.
 I really hope TBB start kicking cloudflare. This will raise attention and
 the website owner MIGHT, MIGHT... add "T1" to whitelist.
 Cloudflare could add "T1" to whitelist by default. They're so mean :'(

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #33318, #33319, #33320, #33321, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #33318, #33319, #33320, #33321, #33323, #33324, #33325, 
#33326, #33327, #33328, #33438 by gaba:


Comment:
OnionPerf project will be the main metrics project for 2020.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #24041, #33507, #31947, #31950, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #24041, #33507, #31947, #31950, #32268, #33297, #33312, 
#33329, #33508, #33715, #33717, #33733, #33718, #33719, #33720, #28327, #33394 
by gaba:


Comment:
We need to review all this tickets for metrics roadmap. 

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31422 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Make BridgeDB report internal metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31422: Make BridgeDB report internal metrics
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o21a1, anti-censorship-roadmap-  |  Actual Points:
  2020Q1, metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |
Parent ID:  #31274   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:
 metrics, s30-o21a1, anti-censorship-roadmap-2020Q1, metrics-team-
 roadmap-2020April
 => s30-o21a1, anti-censorship-roadmap-2020Q1, metrics-team-
 roadmap-2020


Comment:

 Changing keyword to keep it in the metrics roadmap for when is ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33259 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Store measurements in a local database to reduce plotting time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33259: Store measurements in a local database to reduce plotting time
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33327 | Points:  5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020Q1 => metrics-team-roadmap-2020


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29370 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Measure mode with arbitrary tgen traffic models

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29370: Measure mode with arbitrary tgen traffic models
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 1
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30798 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Develop and deploy tgen model resembling ping

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30798: Develop and deploy tgen model resembling ping
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33324 | Points:  5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020April => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 5
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33260 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add option to filter graphed OnionPerf results by relay fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33260: Add option to filter graphed OnionPerf results by relay fingerprint
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33328 | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020April => metrics-team-roadmap-2020


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33421 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Track which Guard is used for experimental measurements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33421: Track which Guard is used for experimental measurements
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33419 | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 3
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29368 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add single onion service mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29368: Add single onion service mode
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 2
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33395 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add option to replace the client and server torrc files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33395: Add option to replace the client and server torrc files
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33319 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020Q1 => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33399 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Measure static guard nodes with OnionPerf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33399: Measure static guard nodes with OnionPerf
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33325 | Points:  4
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33419 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add analysis to support static guard measurements

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33419: Add analysis to support static guard measurements
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33325 | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29365 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add digests and sizes to index.xml

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29365: Add digests and sizes to index.xml
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 0.5
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28271 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Check OnionPerf instances from Nagios

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28271: Check OnionPerf instances from Nagios
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 1
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33434 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Allow users to select Onion Service version to measure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33434: Allow users to select Onion Service version to measure
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 0.5
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31278 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Chrome proxies hang with open idle connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31278: Chrome proxies hang with open idle connection
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 I'm at 5.5 hours now and it's still going.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34023 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Reduce the number of 50 KiB downloads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34023: Reduce the number of 50 KiB downloads
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 1
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34024 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Reduce timeout and stallout values

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34024: Reduce timeout and stallout values
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 1
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33392 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add new metadata fields to json output

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33392: Add new metadata fields to json output
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33323 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020Q1 => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25429 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25429: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`
+--
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2020Q1  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor28-must
+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:20 dcf]:
 > Replying to [comment:19 cohosh]:
 > > It looks like there's another value for `KeepAliveTimeout` in the
 [https://github.com/xtaci/smux/blob/v1.5.12/mux.go#L45 defaultConfig] and
 the session will close itself if it hasn't received any data during this
 timeout
 
[https://github.com/xtaci/smux/blob/c6969d8a76874342611f4b544d05b1590f1a76b1/session.go#L393
 here]. This defaults to 30 seconds (which is the same as our current check
 for staleness).
 >
 > We override `KeepAliveTimeout` to 10 minutes
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/snowflake.git/tree/client/lib/snowflake.go?id=7043a055f9fb0680281ecffd7d458a43f2ce65b5#n83
 here (client)] and [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/snowflake.git/tree/server/server.go?id=7043a055f9fb0680281ecffd7d458a43f2ce65b5#n303
 here (server)]. If 10 minutes expire, it does indeed kill your session and
 close the SOCKS connection, but it takes many proxy failures in a row for
 that to happen.
 Ah nice! Thanks. So I guess all there is to do here is decide whether we
 want to shorten this 30 second timeout to say 15 seconds or leave it. I
 don't think it matters too much.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33391 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add new metadata fields and definitions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33391: Add new metadata fields and definitions
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33323 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  karsten|Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020Q1 => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33974 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Update OnionPerf to TGen 1.0.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33974: Update OnionPerf to TGen 1.0.0
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 2
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33422 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Include more events about CBT in results

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33422: Include more events about CBT in results
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33419 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 1
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33420 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add CBT events to Onionperf result files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33420: Add CBT events to Onionperf result files
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33419 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 1
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30586 [Metrics/Onionperf]: requirements are not included in setup.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30586: requirements are not included in setup.py
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 0.5
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30362 [Metrics/Onionperf]: OnionPerf TGen parser needs reworking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30362: OnionPerf TGen parser needs reworking
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 3
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33435 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Document BASETORRC environment variable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33435: Document BASETORRC environment variable
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 0.2
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28672 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android reproducible build of Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28672: Android reproducible build of Snowflake
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201904, ex-sponsor-19   |
Parent ID:  #30318   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay here's an additional commit on the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/cohosh/tor-browser-
 build.git/log/?h=snowflake_android snowflake_android] branch that bundles
 snowflake with tor browser for android. I followed the same procedure used
 for obfs4 to enable it only for alpha and nightlies in `rbm.conf` and
 bundle it with `tor-onion-proxy-library`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26673 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Record download times of smaller file sizes from partial completion times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26673: Record download times of smaller file sizes from partial completion 
times
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  user-experience, acute-2019-q1-planned, ex-sponsor-19, ex-
 sponsor19 => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 3
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33433 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add error handling for older stem versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33433: Add error handling for older stem versions
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 0.5
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33397 [Metrics/Website]: Update metrics-web to only plot "official" data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33397: Update metrics-web to only plot "official" data
---+--
 Reporter:  acute  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33323 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor59
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020Q1 => metrics-team-roadmap-2020
 * points:   => 0.5
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor59


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Re: [tor-bugs] #6151 [TorBrowserButton]: Startpage is blocking searches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6151: Startpage is blocking searches
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  rransom
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  TorBrowserButton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I recently had a rash of "Sorry, but..." interruptions from Startpage.  In
 8 yrs since this bug was filed, I rarely had a problem with Tor network &
 Startpage or Ixquick.  I might see one interruption notice in 6 - 8 mo.
 Thousands of exits & searches.

 By sheer probability, I had to have drawn some of the same exits that gave
 others problems with Startpage.

 The interrupt page now has space to comment on what you're using, for what
 (Tor, VPN, proxy, etc.). Optional place for your email - I entered none.

 Recently, I sent a short comment explaining what I was doing & from the
 benign & uncommon search terms used, the small amount of time doing
 searches - usually well spaced, I was an unlikely candidate for page
 scraping.  I'm sure they just look at inquiries coming from the same exit
 addresses.

 Amazingly, the interruptions mostly stopped.  Coincidence or luck resumed
 of not drawing problematic exits, or they've got fingerprinting down to a
 science?

 Maybe it's because of unique device data that sites can see,
 like exact computer time (was correct). see :
 https://browserspy.dk/date.php
 They know java script versions supported
 My real OS - by several methods (not Windows NT).
 Many others I don't have time to check.  Most typically aren't available
 in TBB.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33700 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: audio- and video-conferencing considerations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33700: audio- and video-conferencing considerations
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  gaba
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gaba):

 Thanks! We will discuss it in the next week.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29200 [Webpages/Website]: Make more accessible Core Tor documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29200: Make more accessible Core Tor documentation
-+--
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation, GSoD  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24132   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  pili => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29200 [Webpages/Website]: Make more accessible Core Tor documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29200: Make more accessible Core Tor documentation
-+--
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  pili
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation, GSoD  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24132   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25429 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25429: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`
+--
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2020Q1  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor28-must
+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:19 cohosh]:
 > It looks like there's another value for `KeepAliveTimeout` in the
 [https://github.com/xtaci/smux/blob/v1.5.12/mux.go#L45 defaultConfig] and
 the session will close itself if it hasn't received any data during this
 timeout
 
[https://github.com/xtaci/smux/blob/c6969d8a76874342611f4b544d05b1590f1a76b1/session.go#L393
 here]. This defaults to 30 seconds (which is the same as our current check
 for staleness).

 We override `KeepAliveTimeout` to 10 minutes
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/snowflake.git/tree/client/lib/snowflake.go?id=7043a055f9fb0680281ecffd7d458a43f2ce65b5#n83
 here (client)] and [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/snowflake.git/tree/server/server.go?id=7043a055f9fb0680281ecffd7d458a43f2ce65b5#n303
 here (server)]. If 10 minutes expire, it does indeed kill your session and
 close the SOCKS connection, but it takes many proxy failures in a row for
 that to happen.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34043 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update snowflake to persist sessions across proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34043: Update snowflake to persist sessions across proxies
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm TorBrowserTeam202005R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)
 * status:  needs_information => needs_review
 * component:  Circumvention/Snowflake => Applications/Tor Browser
 * keywords:   => tbb-rbm TorBrowserTeam202005R


Comment:

 I'll turn this into a tbb-team ticket now. tbb-team, here is a patch for
 the new snowflake features, rebased on tbb-9.5a12-build3.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/tor-browser-build.git/commit/?h
 =snowflake-turbotunnel-merge_3=68d61e4e0787ba5d088661bce468b1d63f6949de

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34123 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Provide secrets/passwords management for Tor Browser Nightly signing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34123: Provide secrets/passwords management for Tor Browser Nightly signing
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 after a discussion about this on IRC, I am not sure we can help you on
 this. as detailed in #29677, we currently have *many* password management
 mechanisms. the one that could be exposed on servers (through Puppet)
 would be Trocla, as you correctly identified there.

 but the way that works is that Trocla holds the secret (or just the hashed
 version!) on the puppetmaster and deploys the secret (or just the hash!)
 on the nodes. so, in effect, it does not *really* solves your problem
 here: what you would need, I suspect, is either a hardware token, or
 manage those secrets on your own.

 i'm not sure I understand what you expect TPA to do in this specific case.
 i hear, from the IRC discussion, that you are worried about that knowledge
 being in only one or two person's heads, but the solution for this is
 having clear and reliable documentation, alongside training, which seems
 to me to be more a social than technical problem at this stage.

 that said, I am happy to share the burden of storing possible secrets with
 the team if you are worried about losing them. we can do that in the TPA
 password manager or, if we need automatic generation and management, in
 Trocla.

 i would definitely need more information about how all this works before
 going forward, however, so feel free to detail where I got this wrong or
 how things actually work, either here or in private (nextcloud, encrypted
 pgp email or private git repositories all work).

 thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33951 [Internal Services/Service - cache]: mtail floods its logs with garbage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33951: mtail floods its logs with garbage
---+-
 Reporter:  anarcat|  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - cache  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 anarcat]:
 > actually, this might not need a backport at all: it installs directly
 from sid on buster (because static linking and go). so maybe we'd prefer
 to do that instead?

 i have done that now. latest mtail has landed in bullseye and i've
 deployed a conditional (if not running bullseye) pin and sources.list on
 the cache servers that should cover for this.

 i'll close this for now, but it's possible those server gets flagged by
 nagios as requiring an update when that comes, but maybe that's better
 covered by #31957.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31278 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Chrome proxies hang with open idle connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31278: Chrome proxies hang with open idle connection
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:1 dcf]:
 > There's a new ticket at https://github.com/keroserene/go-
 webrtc/issues/107 that has to do with Chrome.
 > > According https://bugs.chromium.org/p/webrtc/issues/detail?id=9484 new
 versions of Chrome are sending new offer format and answer cannot be
 generated.
 > >
 > > For example, for RemoteDescription with info
 > > {{{
 > > m=application 54111 UDP/DTLS/SCTP webrtc-datachannel a=sctp-port:5000
 > > }}}
 > > pc.CreateAnswer does not produce any result - no error, no answer
 > >
 > > Similiar issue for node implementation - [https://github.com/node-
 webrtc/node-webrtc/issues/483 node-webrtc/node-webrtc#483]

 This specific cause should no longer be an issue for us, since we added
 the datachannel timeout in #31100 (it also looks like it's been fixed
 upstream in wrtc at least). I'm still seeing that Chrome takes a very long
 time to realize the datachannel has been closed by the client. I started
 running a proxy in my local set up and killed the client once the
 datachannel opened. Two hours later, my chrome proxy still hasn't detected
 that the channel has been closed.

 My guess is this is a bug upstream that should be fixed, but in the short
 term, we could use something like the check for staleness at the client
 side to close the connection after 10-30 seconds of inactivity (especially
 since the client is supposed to be sending heartbeat messages every 10
 seconds anyway).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27330 [Applications/GetTor]: @get_tor on twitter not responding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27330: @get_tor on twitter not responding
-+-
 Reporter:  steph|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap, ex-sponsor-19, ex-   |  Actual Points:
  sponsor19  |
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 This isn't done yet, but here's a start on fixes to the twitter service in
 gettor: https://gitlab.torproject.org/torproject/anti-censorship/gettor-
 project/gettor/-/merge_requests/9

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27330 [Applications/GetTor]: @get_tor on twitter not responding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27330: @get_tor on twitter not responding
-+-
 Reporter:  steph|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap, ex-sponsor-19, ex-   |  Actual Points:
  sponsor19  |
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29677 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: evaluate password management options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29677: evaluate password management options
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:10 anarcat]:
 > i'm running with the assertion that a password manager solves both the
 storage and sharing aspects of the password management problem. sharing
 and storing are, generally, tangled together in any case: when you send an
 email, for example, it gets stored in a queue. there are mechanisms to
 store passwords without sharing them (e.g. secure enclaves) but those can
 have dubious properties (e.g. being exploitable, like Intel's).

 This was my thought, as well.

 >
 > but it is true it might be useful to consider hardware tokens for
 signing things, in the case of software releases and, indeed, that is how
 Debian is deploying secureboot right now. the advantage is that even in a
 compromise, the private key cannot (in theory) be stolen, so you have a
 limit to what an attacker can do.
 >
 > is this part of your threat model?

 Yes, (almost) all of our keys are stored in hardware tokens. We have
 separate signing infrastructure where these are attached to machines.
 However, I'd like a way for sharing the passphrases that allow signing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33789 [Core Tor/Tor]: Before making changes, move router pick address functions to their own C file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33789: Before making changes, move router pick address functions to their own C
file
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop312  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33049 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Hmmm, you are probably right as the file in `app/config/` is the one doing
 the resolving.

 See top new commit: `c81c5a2646763c651a9bc17b6213bd25a480eca9`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34122 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create two Tor Browser build machines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34122: Create two Tor Browser build machines
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 >  Currently, the default Tor Browser build system (tor-browser-build)
 requires the user have (essentially) full sudo permissions (#23631) due to
 its underlying use of runc for creating deterministic build environments.

 How open are we to changing how that works? How hard is changing that
 component, in other words?

 I ask because `runc` and friends have moved quite a bit in recent years,
 and there is now the possibility of building and running containers (the
 latter is what `runc` does, essentially) as regular users (AKA "rootless
 containers"). In particular, buildah and podman are drop-in Docker
 replacements that can do that.

 Therefore, if "creating deterministic build environments" is the goal,
 maybe we can look at podman and friends first?

 I see some of those ideas were mentioned in #23631 but i figured i would
 bring them back in scope here first...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29677 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: evaluate password management options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29677: evaluate password management options
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i'm running with the assertion that a password manager solves both the
 storage and sharing aspects of the password management problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34115 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: review the impact of usrmerge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34115: review the impact of usrmerge
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 one impact of mergedusr is actually when it's *not* enabled. for example,
 with mergedusr, `/usr/sbin/ip` is a valid path, but without, it isn't. so
 someone (mistakenly, perhaps) hardcoding said path will *fail* on a non-
 merged system (including any stretch system) while working on a merged
 system.

 so that's actually an argument *for* enabling merged-usr...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29677 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: evaluate password management options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29677: evaluate password management options
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:8 anarcat]:
 > >  Currently, these are only shared in person (via military-grade post-
 quantum encrypted point-to-point subspace transmission).
 >
 > Could you clarify how subspace transmissions work? I'm actually curious
 in having a solid inventory of the different mechanisms.
 >
 > >  While this "works", I'd really appreciate having an easier and more
 fault-tolerant way of securely sharing this information (given the
 importance of keeping this information private). I don't know if such a
 system exists as a solution that Tor can deploy, but that's another wish-
 list item of mine :)
 >
 > What do you mean by "fault-tolerant" here? And I'll note that there are
 *many* password managers out there, and surely there is one that would
 fulfill your dreams.
 >
 > One question, for me, is also whether we should have "one big password
 manager" for everyone or multiple databases. And even with multiple
 databases, we should decide whether we use the same software everywhere so
 that user on team A doesn't get a bad surprise when they try to work with
 team B.

 I am not even sure sysrqb has the same problem as described in this
 ticket: it seems comment:7 is talking about the issue of *sharing* the
 password securely while this ticket is about *storing* the password
 securely. Those are different issues. Even if you store Tor Browser
 related passphrases in whatever super secure environment you have you
 still have the sharing problem unsolved-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29677 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: evaluate password management options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29677: evaluate password management options
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 >  Currently, these are only shared in person (via military-grade post-
 quantum encrypted point-to-point subspace transmission).

 Could you clarify how subspace transmissions work? I'm actually curious in
 having a solid inventory of the different mechanisms.

 >  While this "works", I'd really appreciate having an easier and more
 fault-tolerant way of securely sharing this information (given the
 importance of keeping this information private). I don't know if such a
 system exists as a solution that Tor can deploy, but that's another wish-
 list item of mine :)

 What do you mean by "fault-tolerant" here? And I'll note that there are
 *many* password managers out there, and surely there is one that would
 fulfill your dreams.

 One question, for me, is also whether we should have "one big password
 manager" for everyone or multiple databases. And even with multiple
 databases, we should decide whether we use the same software everywhere so
 that user on team A doesn't get a bad surprise when they try to work with
 team B.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29677 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: evaluate password management options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29677: evaluate password management options
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:5 anarcat]:
 > Known password managers:
 >
 >  * TPA has a `tor-passwords` repository which uses
 [https://github.com/weaselp/pwstore/ weasel's pwstore]
 >  * administration also store passwords in SVN
 >  * Puppet generates passwords on the fly using a puppet-specific token
 (this might get replaced by trocla eventually, see #30009)
 >  * each worker probably has their own individual password managers,
 brains, and post-it notes on screens (hopefully no!) which we don't
 exactly know about

  * Tor Browser-related passwords:
* passphrase-protected OpenPGP signing key (package signing)
* passphrase-protected NSSDB MAR signing key (Tor Browser updates)
* passphrase-protected Windows Authenticode signing key
* passphrase-protected MacOS code signing key
* passphrase-protected Android code signing key
* user/admin accounts on macOS/linux/windows signing machines
* Google account (for publishing Android apps)
* ...

 Currently, these are only shared in person (via military-grade post-
 quantum encrypted point-to-point subspace transmission).

 While this "works", I'd really appreciate having an easier and more fault-
 tolerant way of securely sharing this information (given the importance of
 keeping this information private). I don't know if such a system exists as
 a solution that Tor can deploy, but that's another wish-list item of mine
 :)

 #34123 is related, but currently those keys are separate from the above
 list.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33977 [Core Tor/Tor]: Lift circuit_build_times_disabled out of circuit_expire_building loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33977: Lift circuit_build_times_disabled out of circuit_expire_building loop
---+
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactoring tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33977 [Core Tor/Tor]: Lift circuit_build_times_disabled out of circuit_expire_building loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33977: Lift circuit_build_times_disabled out of circuit_expire_building loop
---+
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactoring tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Oh that is good catch!

 I took your patch and made a PR so our CI can run. It is a ACK on my part
 but we'll wait until CI passes to merge. Thanks!

 Branch: `ticket33977_044_01`
 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1881

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34121 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create a Tor Browser Nightly signing machine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34121: Create a Tor Browser Nightly signing machine
-+
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by anarcat):

 that's great! nice to hear we solved that part already at least. :) so the
 secrets (#34123) would live on tbb-nightlies-master, right?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34014 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support sqlite3 in our python project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34014: Support sqlite3 in our python project
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005   |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005, GeorgKoppen202005
 => tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 This is ready for review on my branch `fenix-toolchain`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 
build.git/commit/?h=fenix_toolchain=7a6c2b3f1f2921fa41d782a50eb6d1d313242330).

 As that is the last commit on that branch I thought here is a good place
 to explain how to test all those toolchain changes. I made a branch
 `fenix_toolchain_test` which lets anyone build

 1) a fat `geckoview` .aar by doing

 `./rbm/rbm build geckoview --step merge_aars --target nightly --target
 torbrowser-android-all`

 2) `fenix` by doing

 `./rbm/rbm build fenix --target nightly --target torbrowser-android-armv7`

 3) `android-components` by doing

 `./rbm/rbm build android-components --target nightly --target torbrowser-
 android-armv7`

 (the build succeeds but the put the .aar into the right place is still
 missing, which is not a toolchain issue, though)

 Note, that we still need to allow network during build due to #33594 for
 2) and 3) in `rbm.conf`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34013 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump node version to v10.19

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34013: Bump node version to v10.19
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005   |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005, GeorgKoppen202005
 => tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 This is ready for review on my branch `fenix_toolchain`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 
build.git/commit/?h=fenix_toolchain=e2f68244a5faca57c12510f47a1252c9a5584a50).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34012 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump cbindgen version to 0.14.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34012: Bump cbindgen version to 0.14.1
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005   |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005, GeorgKoppen202005
 => tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 This is ready for review on my branch `fenix_toolchain`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 
build.git/commit/?h=fenix_toolchain=d2167982a4eebf03af648707010937914866d552).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33833 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Rust To Use Android NDK 21

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33833: Upgrade Rust To Use Android NDK 21
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb.rbm, |  Actual Points:  .5
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005   |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-must
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android, TorBrowserTeam202005, GeorgKoppen202005
 => tbb-mobile, tbb.rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 This is ready for review on my branch `fenix_toolchain`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 
build.git/commit/?h=fenix_toolchain=c2c988bec9242fece4287dafdcf90f63cdb3b7f1).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33760 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update rbm.conf to match NDK 21

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33760: Update rbm.conf to match NDK 21
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005   |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005, GeorgKoppen202005
 => tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 This is ready for review on my branch `fenix_toolchain`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 
build.git/commit/?h=fenix_toolchain=e6279f58ddb15ae7ca255af1f138407179cd20c1).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34011 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump clang version to 9.0.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34011: Bump clang version to 9.0.1
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005   |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005, GeorgKoppen202005
 => tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 This is ready for review on my branch `fenix_toolchain`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 
build.git/commit/?h=fenix_toolchain=b0003d1e859b16d853dd68e7c3305aa24a926d6f).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33557 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Android Toolchain for Fenix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33557: Update Android Toolchain for Fenix
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005   |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-must
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005, GeorgKoppen202005
 => tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202005R, GeorgKoppen202005
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 I think this is ready for review on my branch `fenix_toolchain`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 
build.git/commit/?h=fenix_toolchain=c843a4c9b993a9fb76d82effa8aae12d23b2c022)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34088 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit_build_times_update_alpha(): Bug: Could not determine largest build time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34088: circuit_build_times_update_alpha(): Bug: Could not determine largest 
build
time
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #34082| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34087 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSv3: Bug: Non-fatal assertion in hs_client.c:981: close_or_reextend_intro_circ

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34087: HSv3: Bug: Non-fatal assertion in hs_client.c:981:
close_or_reextend_intro_circ
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #34082| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: asn, dgoulet (added)
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33789 [Core Tor/Tor]: Before making changes, move router pick address functions to their own C file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33789: Before making changes, move router pick address functions to their own C
file
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop312  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33049 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I can confirm that this is just code movement.  However it seems that
 travis is failing with `--disable-module-relay`.

 As for the file names: I think relay_resolve_addr should maybe have a name
 like relay_find_addr.c or something.  It is about finding our own address,
 not necessarily _resolving_ it.  Resolving is what we do when we call
 gethostbyname() or getaddrinfo(). Similarly, resolve_addr.c maybe ought to
 be "resolve_own_addr", since it's not about finding just any address, but
 about finding our own address?  Not totally sure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27330 [Applications/GetTor]: @get_tor on twitter not responding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27330: @get_tor on twitter not responding
-+-
 Reporter:  steph|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap, ex-sponsor-19, ex-   |  Actual Points:
  sponsor19  |
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * owner:  (none) => cohosh
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pluggable Transport Versus Bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34120: Pluggable Transport Versus Bridge
--+--
 Reporter:  TormanToo |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  transport, pluggable, bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * component:  Core Tor => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34086 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSv3: Bug Non-fatal assertion in hs_client.c:776: client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34086: HSv3: Bug Non-fatal assertion in hs_client.c:776:
client_rendezvous_circ_has_opened
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #34082| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: asn, dgoulet (added)
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34082 [Core Tor/Tor]: Master ticket for client side rendezvous circuit related bugs that cause reachability problems in HSv3 land

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34082: Master ticket for client side rendezvous circuit related bugs that cause
reachability problems in HSv3 land
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: asn, dgoulet (added)
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #6623 [Core Tor/Tor]: --enable-static-tor cannot succeed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6623: --enable-static-tor cannot succeed
-+-
 Reporter:  tmpname0901  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.20-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, autotools, build, link,   |  Actual Points:
  static, 032-unreached-backport,|
  035-deferred-20190115, 041-proposed, 033   |
  -unreached-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by werd):

 I want to build tor, not download it from somewhere else. My computer is
 on wifi so that prevents me from being an acceptable relay or bridge, best
 I can tell.  But after I copy over the binaries I made, to a computer with
 ethernet to the router, and run tor I get this:

 {{{
 dyld: Library not loaded: @rpath/libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib
   Referenced from: /path/to/tor/bin/tor
   Reason: image not found
 Abort trap: 6
 }}}

 So it seems tor is relying on a library burried deep in xcode.

 I've already built zlib, libevent, and libressl/openssl as static. My tor
 configure line informs tor of this. But as soon as I add {{{--enable-
 static-tor}}} and ./configure, the checking stops (as noted above in
 comment 21) here:

 {{{
 checking whether free(NULL) works... no
 configure: error: Your libc implementation doesn't allow free(NULL), as
 required by C99.
 }}}

 Based on my reading of this ticket and others, it seems there is something
 out of order, but my attempts to mimic what others said worked for them,
 has not worked for me.

 I changed the order as noted in the patch here: #27802, (lines 169 & 222),
 but the same error happened.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34083 [Core Tor/Tor]: Client rendezvous circuit is no longer in circuit_wait but in pending_entry_connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34083: Client rendezvous circuit is no longer in circuit_wait but in
pending_entry_connections
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.4.0-alpha-dev
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #34082| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: asn, dgoulet (added)
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19409 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Make a deb of snowflake and get into Debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19409: Make a deb of snowflake and get into Debian
-+
 Reporter:  adrelanos|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19409 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Make a deb of snowflake and get into Debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19409: Make a deb of snowflake and get into Debian
-+--
 Reporter:  adrelanos|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * priority:  High => Low
 * owner:  cohosh => (none)


Comment:

 I'm going to recommend shelving this for now. We have a lot of
 dependencies and they're quickly changing. Let's wait until snowflake is
 more stable to move forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33789 [Core Tor/Tor]: Before making changes, move router pick address functions to their own C file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33789: Before making changes, move router pick address functions to their own C
file
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop312  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33049 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-must
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 Branch: `ticket33789_044_01`
 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1880

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32597 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a2 still can't connect to Tor network through snowflake bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32597: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a2 still can't connect to Tor
network through snowflake bridge
-+---
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Marking this as duplicate since #33756 is newer and this turned out not to
 be a STUN problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32930 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor network through snowflake bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32930: Hello, currently, in China, Tor Browser 9.5a4 still can't connect to Tor
network through snowflake bridge.
-+---
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32653 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Yesterday, in China, I tried to connect to Tor network through snowflake bridge for 10 times. But all of the connections failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32653: Yesterday, in China, I tried to connect to Tor network through snowflake
bridge for 10 times. But all of the connections failed
-+---
 Reporter:  amiableclarity2011   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34123 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Provide secrets/passwords management for Tor Browser Nightly signing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34123: Provide secrets/passwords management for Tor Browser Nightly signing
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #34122 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create two Tor Browser build machines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34122: Create two Tor Browser build machines
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


Comment:

 Note that the machine we currently have (which is behind `build-
 sunet-a.torproject.net`) could be one of those machines.

 I think using the specs from the `build-sunet-a.torproject.net` is a good
 starting point. I think we don't want to have less than 4 cores and 8GiB
 memory is good, too (as a minimum). 200GiB disk might be a bit tight, so
 500 GiB would be good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28672 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android reproducible build of Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28672: Android reproducible build of Snowflake
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201904, ex-sponsor-19   |
Parent ID:  #30318   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201904, ex-sponsor-19,
 TorBrowserTeam202005R
 => tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201904, ex-sponsor-19
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 `needs_revision` as per feedback on #tor-dev.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34121 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create a Tor Browser Nightly signing machine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34121: Create a Tor Browser Nightly signing machine
-+
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by boklm):

 FYI, I have been running this in a separate VM because I did it before
 #32800, and didn't realize at the time that tbb-nightlies-master would
 exist as a separate machine/VM, but now I think it makes sense to do it on
 tbb-nightlies-master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34121 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create a Tor Browser Nightly signing machine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34121: Create a Tor Browser Nightly signing machine
-+
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 anarcat]:
 > could this be tbb-nightlies-master.torproject.org  itself? If not, how
 should it differ from it?
 >
 > keep in mind that files are served from the mirror network which
 responds to nightlies.tbb.torproject.org, not the master directly...

 Hrm! Yes, I suppose it could be. That's true. Okay, I'll think about that
 some more, but maybe tbb-nightlies-master is already sufficiently
 protected and we can reuse it for this purpose, too.

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[tor-bugs] #34123 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Provide secrets/passwords management for Tor Browser Nightly signing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34123: Provide secrets/passwords management for Tor Browser Nightly signing
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 As mentioned in #34121, the Tor Browser Nightly signing machine will host
 an OpenPGP key and an NSSDB private key. Both of these should be password-
 protected. Instead of hard-coding these passphrases in a file or script on
 the server, having a password management system from where the passwords
 can be retrieved would be very nice.

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[tor-bugs] #34122 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create two Tor Browser build machines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34122: Create two Tor Browser build machines
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Currently, Tor Browser developers have access to one external machine for
 building Tor Browser. We'd like two new build machines that are maintained
 by TPA. This will allow us to run parallel builds, and confirm
 reproducibility of the resulting builds.

 The resource requirements for the machines are quite large:
  - For storage: 200GB should be an okay starting point
  - For memory: we'll need at least 16 GB.
  - For CPUs: at least two, but more would be better

 The package requirements are documented here:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 build.git/tree/README#n20

 {{{
 apt-get install libyaml-libyaml-perl libtemplate-perl \
   libio-handle-util-perl libio-all-perl \
   libio-captureoutput-perl libjson-perl libpath-tiny-perl
 \
   libstring-shellquote-perl libsort-versions-perl \
   libdigest-sha-perl libdata-uuid-perl libdata-dump-perl \
   libfile-copy-recursive-perl libfile-slurp-perl git runc
 \
   mercurial
 }}}

 Currently, the default Tor Browser build system (tor-browser-build)
 requires the user have (essentially) full sudo permissions (#23631) due to
 its underlying use of runc for creating deterministic build environments.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25429 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25429: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`
+--
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2020Q1  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor28-must
+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:18 dcf]:
 > Replying to [ticket:25429 arlolra]:
 > > but there's no heartbeat at this level of abstraction so the
 connection is constantly being reset anytime the user pauses their
 activity (for example, to read a webpage).
 >
 > This statement is no longer true since #33745; smux sends a heartbeat
 every 10 seconds in both directions (inherited from
 [https://github.com/xtaci/smux/blob/v1.5.12/mux.go#L40 smux.DefaultConfig]
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/snowflake.git/tree/client/lib/snowflake.go?id=7043a055f9fb0680281ecffd7d458a43f2ce65b5#n81
 here] and [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/snowflake.git/tree/server/server.go?id=7043a055f9fb0680281ecffd7d458a43f2ce65b5#n300
 here]).
 >
 > The problem is also mitigated by #34042, which uses a different
 (shorter) timeout to discard a non-working proxy originally. It still
 takes 30 seconds via `checkForStaleness` to give up on a proxy that was
 once working.

 Cool.

 It looks like there's another value for `KeepAliveTimeout` in the
 [https://github.com/xtaci/smux/blob/v1.5.12/mux.go#L45 defaultConfig] and
 the session will close itself if it hasn't received any data during this
 timeout
 
[https://github.com/xtaci/smux/blob/c6969d8a76874342611f4b544d05b1590f1a76b1/session.go#L393
 here]. This defaults to 30 seconds (which is the same as our current check
 for staleness).

 Although if the session closes, it should cause the main copy loop to
 break [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/tree/client/lib/snowflake.go#n161 here]. It seems
 like we don't want this to happen if our snowflake stops working, and
 instead we want to try to get new snowflakes before our session fails.

 So now that we have keep-alive pings, we should be able to shorten this
 staleness check. Does it make sense to shorten the pings to every 5s and
 make the staleness check 10s? This would allow for 2 additional snowflake
 tries before our session breaks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34121 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create a Tor Browser Nightly signing machine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34121: Create a Tor Browser Nightly signing machine
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 could this be tbb-nightlies-master.torproject.org  itself? If not, how
 should it differ from it?

 keep in mind that files are served from the mirror network which responds
 to nightlies.tbb.torproject.org, not the master directly...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31957 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: automate upgrades

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31957: automate upgrades
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tpa-roadmap-february tpa-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  march  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 we need to add one more label here, because upgrades to packages in the
 tpo repo do not get automatically done:

 {{{
 root@scw-arm-par-01:~# dsa-check-packages
 WARNING: 1 updates, 551 ok
 1 out of date packages: tor-nagios-checks
 551 packages current.
 |obs_loc=0;1;5;0 outdated=1;1;5;0 current=551;;;0 obs_ign=0;;;0
 rm_unprg=0;;;0 hold=0;;;0 prg_conf=0;1;;0
 root@scw-arm-par-01:~# apt-cache policy tor-nagios-checks
 tor-nagios-checks:
   Installed: 31
   Candidate: 31
   Version table:
  31 500
 500 https://db.torproject.org/torproject-admin tpo-all/main armhf
 Packages
  *** 29 500
 500 https://db.torproject.org/torproject-admin tpo-all/main armhf
 Packages
 100 /var/lib/dpkg/status
  28 500
 500 https://db.torproject.org/torproject-admin tpo-all/main armhf
 Packages
  27 500
 500 https://db.torproject.org/torproject-admin tpo-all/main armhf
 Packages
 }}}

 that repository is:

 {{{
  500 https://db.torproject.org/torproject-admin tpo-all/main armhf
 Packages
  release o=torproject-ad...@torproject.org,a=stable,n=tpo-
 all,c=main,b=armhf
  origin db.torproject.org
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #34121 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create a Tor Browser Nightly signing machine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34121: Create a Tor Browser Nightly signing machine
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Recently, Tor Browser began providing automatic nightly updates (#18867),
 and those are now hosted on nightlies.tbb.torproject.org (#32800). All of
 the building and signing machines are currently hosted externally. This
 ticket is for moving the signing operation onto a TPA maintained server.

 It will need about 40 GB of disk space, memory requirement should be small
 (1 or 2 GB, should be more than enough).

 As the end result, every day this server will receive files from an
 external server (pushed or pulled, whichever makes the most sense), sign
 them, and then copy them to nightlies.tbb.torproject.org for serving.

 The server will hold a passphrase-protected OpenPGP private key and a
 passphrase-protected NSS DB containing a private signing key.

 This server should be as network-access-restricted as possible, while
 still being usable.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33835 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Gmail's quoted response confuses BridgeDB's email autoresponder

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33835: Gmail's quoted response confuses BridgeDB's email autoresponder
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  agix
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o22a2   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31279  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
+---

Comment (by agix):

 Replying to [comment:12 phw]:
 > Replying to [comment:11 agix]:
 > > There you go:
 > >
 
[https://github.com/agiix/bridgedb/commit/1fb531ed505352026223c298607554654116564e]
 > >
 > > Correction about comment:8
 > > What I meant was that all but 4 unit tests (and a few commented out
 ones) pass :)
 > [[br]]
 > Thanks! I left a bunch of comments
 
[https://github.com/agiix/bridgedb/commit/1fb531ed505352026223c298607554654116564e
 here]. The overall approach seems reasonable but we should make a handful
 of small changes – I'm happy to elaborate on any of my comments, just let
 me know. I would also suggest to not worry about the unit tests for now.
 Let's make sure that we're happy with the overall design, and then we can
 make sure that everything is properly tested.
 >
 > Finally, please don't feel discouraged by my asking for revisions. Non-
 trivial patches (and this certainly is one) typically go through at least
 one round of revisions.

 Thanks :)
 I implemented your feedback and made a commit for it
 
[https://github.com/agiix/bridgedb/commit/44f455b1eeb422e625c2b74fc59ed24ac4ca6351
 here]

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[tor-bugs] #34120 [Core Tor]: Pluggable Transport Versus Bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34120: Pluggable Transport Versus Bridge
--+--
 Reporter:  TormanToo |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Component:  Core Tor
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Trivial
 Keywords:  transport, pluggable, bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 In the Tor preferences>Tor, it states that one can select a Bridge.  If so
 done, then the first option is to "Select a built-in bridge".  However, it
 doesn't.  It actually selects a pluggable transport.

 Pluggable transports use bridges, but they are not bridges.

 Recommend rewording to be more accurate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33835 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Gmail's quoted response confuses BridgeDB's email autoresponder

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33835: Gmail's quoted response confuses BridgeDB's email autoresponder
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  agix
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o22a2   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31279  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
+---
Changes (by agix):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28672 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android reproducible build of Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28672: Android reproducible build of Snowflake
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201904, ex-sponsor-19,  |
  TorBrowserTeam202005R  |
Parent ID:  #30318   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201904, ex-sponsor-19,
 TorBrowserTeam201907
 =>
 tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201904, ex-sponsor-19,
 TorBrowserTeam202005R
 * reviewer:   => gk


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28672 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android reproducible build of Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28672: Android reproducible build of Snowflake
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201904, ex-sponsor-19,  |
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:  #30318   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * component:  Circumvention/Snowflake => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Hmm okay it seems that this ticket is just for building snowflake and
 #30318 is for integrating with Tor Browser. I'll put this in needs_review
 then since reproducible builds are now working.

 Here's the single patch needed: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/cohosh
 /tor-browser-
 
build.git/commit/?h=snowflake_android=bec6cbace3d6c5125beac926645341b0921fb792

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29367 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Port OnionPerf to Python 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29367: Port OnionPerf to Python 3
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33318 | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor58
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 I tweaked my first commit above and rebased it to master. The new commit
 is
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/onionperf.git/commit/?h=task-29367-2=e5f15ea4328e1e0588e249314d002d7dbb647d07
 e5f15ea in my task-29367-2 branch]. It passes unit tests and at least
 doesn't break in obvious ways. I just deployed a test instance and will
 let it run for a day to see if it produces useful results.

 Having a careful review by somebody who has ported Python code from 2 to 3
 before would be greatly appreciated!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34118 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onion-Location banner isn't shown when using subdomains in the onion address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34118: Onion-Location banner isn't shown when using subdomains in the onion
address
--+---
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by ahf):

 I'm passing on the info, thanks!

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[tor-bugs] #34119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hook gk's tor related gmail account to the google play account to get tor browser releases out

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34119: Hook gk's tor related gmail account to the google play account to get 
tor
browser releases out
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-sign,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202005
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We should avoid all sorts of bottlenecks and just having one person being
 able to get mobile releases pushed to Google Play is one of those. Let's
 hook gk's up resurrected gmail account to solve that issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #34118 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onion-Location banner isn't shown when using subdomains in the onion address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34118: Onion-Location banner isn't shown when using subdomains in the onion
address
--+---
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 I just tested with `http://foo..onion` and it works for me. Just
 to makes sure, is MacLemon serving the header over `https`? We have three
 requirements for the header to be processed by the browser:

 {{{
* The Onion-Location value must be a valid URL with http: or https:
 protocol
  and a .onion hostname.

* The webpage defining the Onion-Location header must be served over
 HTTPS.

* The webpage defining the Onion-Location header must not be an
 onionsite.
 }}}

 This is from https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser-
 spec.git/tree/proposals/100-onion-location-header.txt, which is probably
 the closes we have to a documentation of the header.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33924 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor beginning with 0.4.1 seems to ignore SIGNAL SHUTDOWN on iOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33924: Tor beginning with 0.4.1 seems to ignore SIGNAL SHUTDOWN on iOS
--+
 Reporter:  tla   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.7
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  backport? |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * cc: ahf (added)


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[tor-bugs] #34118 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onion-Location banner isn't shown when using subdomains in the onion address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#34118: Onion-Location banner isn't shown when using subdomains in the onion
address
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 MacLemon on Mastodon reports that we have a problem with the Onion-
 Location banner when a subdomain is added to the Onion hostname.

 The purple ".onion available" banner is shown when the server sends:
 `Onion-Location: http://.onion/`, but it is NOT shown when the
 server sends: `Onion-Location: http://subdomain..onion/`.

 For more information, see the discussion here:
 https://chaos.social/@MacLemon/104112776746450550

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31918 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase and squash mobile and desktop patches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31918: Rebase and squash mobile and desktop patches
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  acat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.5, ReleaseTrainMigration,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202005R  |
Parent ID:  #33656   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  sysrqb, gk   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-must
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:24 acat]:
 > Thanks for the review: here is the revised branch:
 https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commits/31918+1
 (4f94bc827bb8045b3c6504e8c65c5629d76c2313).
 >
 > I did what you suggested, and also squashed `Bug 29859: Disable HLS
 support for now`, with mozconfs, as I thought it might belong there.
 >
 > > 5) Squash the old.configure changes into TB3: Tor Browser's official
 .mozconfigs and just start using --enable-tor-browser-data-outside-app-dir
 in from that commit on? (Essentially similar to my TOR_BROWSER_VERSION
 idea from above)
 > Should we do this also with the other two flags that we define?
 (--disable-tor-launcher, --disable-tor-browser-update). I mean, define
 them in the mozconfig commit, and use them later.

 I think so, yes.

 > I'll use the `31918+1` branch for next #33533 rebase, as essentially the
 `33533+4..31918+1` did not change.

 Yeah, sounds good. Thanks!

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