Re: [tor-bugs] #25223 [Core Tor/Tor]: dos: dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25223: dos: dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor-relay, 033-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24902| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged into #24902.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25223 [Core Tor/Tor]: dos: dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25223: dos: dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor-relay, 033-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24902| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25223 [Core Tor/Tor]: dos: dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25223: dos: dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor-relay, 033-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24902| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * parent:   => #24902


Comment:

 Branch: `bug25223_029_01`

 Based on ticket24902_029_05 branch. Once ACK, I'll merge this into that
 parent branch for the 029 backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25223 [Core Tor/Tor]: dos: dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25223: dos: dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed
+
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Ok I figure it out I think.

 Bridge aren't suppose to have DoS mitigation on because of this in
 `config.c`:

 {{{
   if (public_server_mode(options)) {
 /* If we are configured as a relay, initialize the subsystem. Even on
 HUP,
  * this is safe to call as it will load data from the current options
  * or/and the consensus. */
 dos_init();
 }}}

 So we don't init the DoS mitigation when reading the options. However,
 when we get a new consensus, we do `set_dos_parameters()` which can
 enable/disable it. See `dos_consensus_has_changed()`.

 Basically, we need to gate the `set_dos_parameters()` for public relays.
 We call that in `dos_init()` and when the consensus changes.

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[tor-bugs] #25223 [Core Tor/Tor]: dos: dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25223: dos: dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-dos, tor-relay
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I just got this report from a relay operator who got this on
 tor-0.3.3.2-alpha but that relay is an obfs4 bridge! DoS mitigation is not
 suppose to be running on bridges for now...

 {{{
 Feb 12 18:14:55.000 [notice] Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha (git-7b1d356bdb76607d)
 opening log file.
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/dos.c:679:
 dos_new_client_conn: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL) failed. (on Tor
 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(entry == NULL)
 failed in dos_new_client_conn at ../src/or/dos.c:679. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x44)
 [0x55e0314a7de4] (on Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb9)
 [0x55e0314c3479] (on Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(channel_do_open_actions+0x1de) [0x55e0313e933e] (on Tor
 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(channel_change_state_open+0x2a) [0x55e0313e93ba] (on Tor
 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn+0x102)
 [0x55e0313ee2f2] (on Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(connection_or_set_state_open+0x22) [0x55e031437872] (on Tor
 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(channel_tls_handle_cell+0x185) [0x55e0313ee535] (on Tor
 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x115a01)
 [0x55e031434a01] (on Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x10c52e)
 [0x55e03142b52e] (on Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x537ae)
 [0x55e0313727ae] (on Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x6a0) [0x7f6f4e6c55a0] (on Tor
 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x2bc)
 [0x55e03137381c] (on Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x275)
 [0x55e031374f25] (on Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x3a)
 [0x55e03136e36a] (on Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19)
 [0x55e03136e0d9] (on Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf1) [0x7f6f4cc9f2b1] (on Tor
 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:47:09.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x2a)
 [0x55e03136e12a] (on Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha )
 Feb 12 18:59:37.000 [warn] Onion service connection to [scrubbed] failed
 (connection refused)
 }}}

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