Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2020-05-21 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression?   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Great to hear! Closing for now, but please reopen if we're wrong.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2020-05-21 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by toralf):

 It is fixed IMO.

 It works fine here with recent Tor versions both at a client and for 2
 relays.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2020-05-21 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 (Is this still an issue with more recent tors?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2019-01-11 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by toralf):

 This is at my hardened Gentoo relay:
 {{{
 mr-fox ~ # gcc test.c -o test -l seccomp
 test.c: In function ‘main’:
 test.c:92:14: warning: format ‘%llu’ expects argument of type ‘long long
 unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘int’ [-Wformat=]
printf("%llu %llu\n", AT_FDCWD, (unsigned int)AT_FDCWD);
~~~^
%u
 test.c:92:19: warning: format ‘%llu’ expects argument of type ‘long long
 unsigned int’, but argument 3 has type ‘unsigned int’ [-Wformat=]
printf("%llu %llu\n", AT_FDCWD, (unsigned int)AT_FDCWD);
 ~~~^
 %u
 mr-fox ~ # ./test
 Testing rule before fix.
 #
 # pseudo filter code start
 #
 # filter for arch x86_64 (3221225534)
 if ($arch == 3221225534)
   # filter for syscall "fstat64" (-10010) [priority: 65535]
   if ($syscall == -10010)
 action ALLOW;
   # filter for syscall "exit_group" (231) [priority: 65535]
   if ($syscall == 231)
 action ALLOW;
   # filter for syscall "rt_sigreturn" (15) [priority: 65535]
   if ($syscall == 15)
 action ALLOW;
   # filter for syscall "fstat" (5) [priority: 65535]
   if ($syscall == 5)
 action ALLOW;
   # filter for syscall "write" (1) [priority: 65535]
   if ($syscall == 1)
 action ALLOW;
   # filter for syscall "read" (0) [priority: 65535]
   if ($syscall == 0)
 action ALLOW;
   # filter for syscall "openat" (257) [priority: 65531]
   if ($syscall == 257)
 if ($a0.hi32 == 4294967295)
   if ($a0.lo32 == 4294967196)
 if ($a1.hi32 == 22044)
   if ($a1.lo32 == 1279610616)
 action ALLOW;
   # default action
   action KILL;
 # invalid architecture action
 action KILL;
 #
 # pseudo filter code end
 #
 GNU libc version: 2.27
 GNU libc release: stable
 libseccomp 2.3.3
 18446744073709551516 4294967196
 4294967196 4294967196
 Before openat
 Bad system call
 mr-fox ~ # ./test foo
 Testing rule before fix.
 #
 # pseudo filter code start
 #
 # filter for arch x86_64 (3221225534)
 if ($arch == 3221225534)
   # filter for syscall "fstat64" (-10010) [priority: 65535]
   if ($syscall == -10010)
 action ALLOW;
   # filter for syscall "exit_group" (231) [priority: 65535]
   if ($syscall == 231)
 action ALLOW;
   # filter for syscall "rt_sigreturn" (15) [priority: 65535]
   if ($syscall == 15)
 action ALLOW;
   # filter for syscall "fstat" (5) [priority: 65535]
   if ($syscall == 5)
 action ALLOW;
   # filter for syscall "write" (1) [priority: 65535]
   if ($syscall == 1)
 action ALLOW;
   # filter for syscall "read" (0) [priority: 65535]
   if ($syscall == 0)
 action ALLOW;
   # filter for syscall "openat" (257) [priority: 65531]
   if ($syscall == 257)
 if ($a0.hi32 == 4294967295)
   if ($a0.lo32 == 4294967196)
 if ($a1.hi32 == 22046)
   if ($a1.lo32 == 1081806584)
 action ALLOW;
   # default action
   action KILL;
 # invalid architecture action
 action KILL;
 #
 # pseudo filter code end
 #
 GNU libc version: 2.27
 GNU libc release: stable
 libseccomp 2.3.3
 18446744073709551516 4294967196
 4294967196 4294967196
 Before openat
 Bad system call
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-12-17 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by Jigsaw52):

 * cc: danielpinto52@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-12-17 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by Jigsaw52):

 I made a small program which uses the same code as tor to setup seccomp
 rules and then opens a file and I get the same behavior as I do with tor
 (crash before the #25440 fix, success after). It also prints the pseudo-
 code for the rules generated by libseccomp.

 The code is here: https://pastebin.com/zQz1sf22

 Compile with: gcc test.c -o test -l seccomp
 Run without arguments to use the rule after the #25440 fix: ./test
 Run with any arguments to use the rule before the #25440 fix: ./test foo

 If someone affected by this, could run the program with and without
 arguments and post both outputs maybe that could help finding out whats
 different between our systems.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-11-21 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by Jigsaw52):

 Replying to [comment:12 ahf]:
 >
 > Do we think we are able to eliminate the additional rule so it's either
 one of the rules? How do we know which users are impacted by this?

 Ideally each rule should only be applied to the systems that need it. The
 tricky part is figuring out why some systems need each rule. I have tried
 to identify some difference between toralf system (which is affected) and
 mine (which isn't) but failed to to so. I could try further but I need the
 collaboration of someone affected.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-11-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 We are bit concerned about adding an additional rule for each openat call
 because we only have limited amount of rules to place with seccomp.

 Do we think we are able to eliminate the additional rule so it's either
 one of the rules? How do we know which users are impacted by this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-09-17 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by toralf):

 FWIW - applied cleaanly against 0.3.84 - and works at a stable hardened
 Gentoo.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-09-17 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by toralf):

 You mean commit 7eb6458b61499d9042214a34c2b790ed8a1b229f of
 https://github.com/Jigsaw52/tor.git ?
 No, I didn'tz applied that.
 I assumed that that patch was already pulled in 0.3.4.8 - but seems to be
 not - so sry for the noise, then I'll patch it myself.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-09-17 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by ahf):

 @toralf, is this with the patch from comment #6?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-09-11 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  regression? => regression?, 034-backport
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-09-11 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by toralf):

 Bad news: With 0.3.4.8 at a stable hardened Gentoo Desktop I do run into
 this again:
 {{{
 t44 tmp # cat info.log
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [notice] Tor 0.3.4.8 (git-da95b91355248ad8) opening
 new log file.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [warn] Your log may contain sensitive information -
 you're logging more than "notice". Don't log unless it serves an important
 reason. Overwrite the log afterwards.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] options_act_reversible(): Recomputed OOS
 thresholds: ConnLimit 1000, ConnLimit_ 29968, ConnLimit_high_thresh 29904,
 ConnLimit_low_thresh 22476
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] tor_lockfile_lock(): Locking
 "/var/lib/tor/data/lock"
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] or_state_load(): Loaded state from
 "/var/lib/tor/data/state"
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(): Not
 updating the sample guard set; we have no live consensus.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards():
 Trying to sample a reachable guard: We know of 0 in the USABLE_FILTERED
 set.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards():
 (That isn't enough. Trying to expand the sample.)
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] entry_guards_expand_sample(): Not expanding the
 sample guard set; we have no live consensus.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards():
 (After filters [b], we have 0 guards to consider.)
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] circuit_build_times_parse_state(): Adding 145
 timeouts.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] circuit_build_times_parse_state(): Loaded
 1000/1000 values from 122 lines in circuit time histogram
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] circuit_build_times_get_xm(): Xm mode #0: 225
 135
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] circuit_build_times_get_xm(): Xm mode #1: 275
 113
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] circuit_build_times_get_xm(): Xm mode #2: 225
 135
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] circuit_build_times_set_timeout(): Based on
 1000 circuit times, it looks like we don't need to wait so long for
 circuits to finish. We will now assume a circuit is too slow to use after
 waiting 4 seconds.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] circuit_build_times_set_timeout(): Circuit
 timeout data: 4126.277304ms, 6.00ms, Xm: 239, a: 0.564979, r:
 0.21
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] read_file_to_str(): Could not open
 "/var/lib/tor/data/router-stability": No such file or directory
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] init_cookie_authentication(): Generated auth
 cookie file in '"/var/lib/tor/data/control_auth_cookie"'.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] scheduler_kist_set_full_mode(): Setting KIST
 scheduler with kernel support (KIST mode)
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] cmux_ewma_set_options(): Enabled cell_ewma
 algorithm because of value in CircuitPriorityHalflifeMsec in consensus;
 scale factor is 0.793701 per 10 seconds
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file
 /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] add_predicted_port(): New port prediction
 added. Will continue predictive circ building for 2494 more seconds.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] crypto_global_init(): NOT using OpenSSL engine
 support.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [info] evaluate_evp_for_aes(): This version of OpenSSL
 has a known-good EVP counter-mode implementation. Using it.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [notice] We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with
 OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later, but with a version of OpenSSL that apparently
 lacks accelerated support for the NIST P-224 and P-256 groups. Building
 openssl with such support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option
 when configuring it) would make ECDH much faster.
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [warn] Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/cached-
 certs": Permission denied
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [warn] Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/cached-
 consensus": Permission denied
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [warn] Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/unverified-
 consensus": Permission denied
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [warn] Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/cached-
 microdesc-consensus": Permission denied
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [warn] Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/unverified-
 microdesc-consensus": Permission denied
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [warn] Could not open "/var/lib/tor/data/cached-
 microdescs" for mmap(): Permission denied
 Sep 11 19:33:56.000 [warn] Could not open "/var/lib/tor/

Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-09-06 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Jigsaw52):

 The rule with the cast fixes #25440 on systems affected by it. The #25440
 fix replaced the old version of the rule (without the cast) with the cast
 version. However, we now discovered that, on toralf system (which was not
 affected by #25440), removing the old rule breaks tor.

 In attempt to identify why toralf system behaves different than mine
 (which was affected by #25440), I asked toralf run a small program to
 check check the value of AT_FDCWD and size of several relevant types but
 all the results were equal to my system. As I was unable to find a way to
 identify which systems need which rule, my solution was to enable both
 rules.

 I have added the changes file and improved the commit message.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-09-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I have some questions here:

 - Should we really add both rules where `AT_FDCWD` is casted and where it
 isn't?

 Additionally, the following needs to change before we can accept it:

 - We need a changes file explaining the issue.
 - I think the commit message needs to contain some more information about
 what the issue is here since it's quite subtle for someone just reading
 the commit on its own.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-09-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-08-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-08-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Jigsaw52):

 I've talked to toralf on IRC and confirmed this was caused by the fix for
 #25440. My fix consists in using both the sandbox rule for openat before
 the #25440 fix and the rule after the fix. toralf tested on his system and
 it worked and I tested on mine (which was previously affected by #25440)
 and it worked too.

 Here is the branch for 0.3.4.7-rc:
 https://github.com/Jigsaw52/tor/commits/fix-27314

 And here is the fix on the current master:
 https://github.com/Jigsaw52/tor/commits/fix-27314-master

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

2018-08-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => regression?
 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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