[tor-commits] [tor-browser/tor-browser-60.3.0esr-8.5-1] fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides.

2018-12-05 Thread gk
commit 6eadc8186a20298ed6d0469f64586d63bec1cfd1
Author: Arthur Edelstein 
Date:   Thu Sep 6 22:50:00 2018 -0700

fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides.

In Mozilla Bug 1217290, a new WebGL mode was introduced specifically
for `privacy.resistFingerprinting` set to `true`, which is supposed to
give most machines the same WebGL profile.

Previously, `webgl.min_capability_mode` was used for this purpose,
but now that pref is intended strictly for browser testing and it
overrides the `privacy.resistFingerprinting` setting. Furthermore,
`webgl.min_capability_mode` can cause WebGL to fail unnecessarily.

So we should not be enabling `webgl.min_capability_mode` any more in
Tor Browser. This patch is the complement to a Torbutton patch which
both remove that preference setting so it reverts to Firefox's default
value (false).
---
 browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js 
b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js
index 8f74748f2072..e19dd0dd59ae 100644
--- a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js
+++ b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js
@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ pref("browser.pocket.site", "");
 pref("network.http.referer.hideOnionSource", true);
 
 // Fingerprinting
-pref("webgl.min_capability_mode", true);
 pref("webgl.disable-extensions", true);
 pref("webgl.disable-fail-if-major-performance-caveat", true);
 pref("webgl.enable-webgl2", false);

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[tor-commits] [tor-browser/tor-browser-60.3.0esr-8.5-1] fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides.

2018-12-04 Thread gk
commit c20210b1a017c4e94157c1acfbef18e878202ff4
Author: Georg Koppen 
Date:   Wed Nov 21 10:02:20 2018 +

fixup! TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides.

Bug 25794 deals with pointer events and associated fingerprinting
risks. There are patches we can backport from Mozilla, but they are not
small and we should give them some baking time. Thus, let's disable
pointer events for now.
---
 browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js 
b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js
index 38f72579760a..8f74748f2072 100644
--- a/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js
+++ b/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ pref("media.webspeech.synth.enabled", false); // Bug 10283: 
Disable SpeechSynthe
 pref("dom.webaudio.enabled", false); // Bug 13017: Disable Web Audio API
 pref("dom.maxHardwareConcurrency", 1); // Bug 21675: Spoof single-core cpu
 pref("dom.w3c_touch_events.enabled", 0); // Bug 10286: Always disable Touch API
+pref("dom.w3c_pointer_events.enabled", false);
 pref("dom.vr.enabled", false); // Bug 21607: Disable WebVR for now
 // Disable randomised Firefox HTTP cache decay user test groups (Bug: 13575)
 pref("security.webauth.webauthn", false); // Bug 26614: Disable Web 
Authentication API for now

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