On Sun, 18 Mar 2012 15:42:33 +0200
Linas Valiukas wrote:
> I was thinking about a GSoC 2012 project I could propose, and I came
> to the question of why there's no Tor iOS (iPhone / iPad / iPod
> touch) application distributed on the official iTunes App Store?
People have tried in the past and be
On 3/18/12 2:40 PM, Jeroen Massar wrote:
> On 2012-03-18 13:57 , Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
>> On 3/18/12 1:09 PM, Jeroen Massar wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Mar 2012, at 12:46, "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)"
>>> wrote:
>>>
- Security issue
Looking at the server seizure threat scenari
On 3/18/12 3:17 PM, Nathan Freitas wrote:
> Afaik, there are no long running background processes available to run a
> standalone tor process. Covert Browser works because it is integrated in
> one app/process.
That's also another nice option, that generally would mean more hacking
on Tor to make
Afaik, there are no long running background processes available to run a
standalone tor process. Covert Browser works because it is integrated in one
app/process. Maybe the VPN service model would work though.
Otherwise, I agree something should be done, even if it is only an open-source
versio
On 3/18/12 2:42 PM, Linas Valiukas wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I was thinking about a GSoC 2012 project I could propose, and I came to the
> question of why there's no Tor iOS (iPhone / iPad / iPod touch) application
> distributed on the official iTunes App Store?
>
> There's this "test package" of To
Hello,
I was thinking about a GSoC 2012 project I could propose, and I came to the
question of why there's no Tor iOS (iPhone / iPad / iPod touch) application
distributed on the official iTunes App Store?
There's this "test package" of Tor for iOS available [1], but it has to be
installed via
On 2012-03-18 13:57 , Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
> On 3/18/12 1:09 PM, Jeroen Massar wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Mar 2012, at 12:46, "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)"
>> wrote:
>>
>>> - Security issue
>>>
>>> Looking at the server seizure threat scenario, who seize the computer
>>> running TorHS will be
On 3/18/12 1:09 PM, Jeroen Massar wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Mar 2012, at 12:46, "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)"
> wrote:
>
>> - Security issue
>>
>> Looking at the server seizure threat scenario, who seize the computer
>> running TorHS will be able to know the identity of the TorHS itself by
>> looking at
On 18 Mar 2012, at 12:46, "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)"
wrote:
> - Security issue
>
> Looking at the server seizure threat scenario, who seize the computer
> running TorHS will be able to know the identity of the TorHS itself by
> looking at the "hostname" file
Why not simply use Full Disk Encr
While thinking about TorHS key protection, it would be also nice to
think about "re-organizing" the way the TorHS describe store it's data.
One of the example issue i see is that currently the hostname of a TorHS
is written to a text file.
This provide two major drawbacks:
- Application integrati
On 3/18/12 3:34 AM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
>> That way even in case of seizure of the server running the Tor HS
>> it would not be possible to who seized the Tor HS Server to do actively
>> Impersonation attacks of the Tor HS.
>
> I think that's a great idea but also a UI nightmare; for servers, I
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