So Griffin Boyce is canvasing for some input to improve Tor, specifially
for Journalists.
https://twitter.com/abditum/status/479052228138119168
1. It is known that various actors are trying to compromise Tor comms by
establishing
own exit nodes. With enough nodes, they can break Tor (see slides).
If your goal is to choose an exit specially to minimize risk of it being
run by a malicious actor, it seems choosing exits run by orgs you trust
would be better than choosing based on where someone is hosting a server.
But yes, you can choose exits by country. I'm not saying it's a good idea
or
Hi Steven, Nikita, I was told that you two are interested in the idea of
composing multiple PTs together. Here are our ideas on it. We have a GSoC
student, Quinn also at Illinois, working on turning this into reality.
## Concepts
On the most abstract level, pt-spec.txt defines an input
On 06/18/2014 04:38 AM, JP Wulf wrote:
This geolocation could perhaps be used to validate the integrity of the
nodes (how I dont know, maybe by establishing TOR honeypots that can only
be compromised through traffic through a compromised (owned) exit node).
The Tor client does not trust the
Hi,
Here's more info on how the server side currently works. When the
ServerPTCombiner starts, it opens up a port to listen for incoming
connections and reports it to tor like a normal PT. It then builds the
chains of PTs by having each PT forward its output to the next PT with the
final PT
