Re: [tor-dev] Defending against guard discovery attacks by pinning middle nodes

2014-09-13 Thread George Kadianakis
Paul Syverson paul.syver...@nrl.navy.mil writes: On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 08:31:05AM -0400, Ian Goldberg wrote: On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 01:44:36PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote: Hey Nick, this mail is about the schemes we were discussing during the dev meeting on how to protect HSes

Re: [tor-dev] Defending against guard discovery attacks by pinning middle nodes

2014-09-13 Thread Michael Rogers
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 13/09/14 14:07, George Kadianakis wrote: a) To reduce the ownage probabilities we could pick a single middle node instead of 6. That will greatly improve guard discovery probabilities, and make us look like this: HS - guard - middle - exit

Re: [tor-dev] Defending against guard discovery attacks by pinning middle nodes

2014-09-13 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 04:07:13PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote: So let's say that along with our guard, we also pick 6 second-tier guards (middle nodes) that also get pinned for 2-3 months. This makes us look like this: - middle1 - middle2 HS - guard - middle3 -

[tor-dev] Debian popcon as a vulnerability?

2014-09-13 Thread Griffin Boyce
Hello all! I am wondering whether to force-uninstall Debian's popularity-contest package as part of Stormy's installation process. It would be good to have an idea how popular Stormy is, but on the other hand, I'm not sure how anonymous the reporting is on Debian's end. This is also