>> As I was saying above, a fixed exit would allow compromise in the time
>> it takes to begin surveillance (times three). We can likely do better
>> than that.
>
> Ok, this was my assumption behind arguing for staggering these rotation
> periods, too. I don't think that having a fixed exit is a g
A. Johnson:
>
> > HS -> Guard_1 -> Guard_2 -> Guard_3 -> RP.
> >
> > The idea is that Guard_1 is a single node that you choose and keep
> > for O(6 months, or as long as possible), but Guard_2 actually comes
> > from a set of 3-6 or so nodes that you keep for O(weeks), and
> > Guard_3 you rotate
> It's interesting to reduce the HS path length, but that would reduce
> the length of the chain that the adversary has to walk, which is bad :/
Yeah, security in this attack model pushes towards a long path.
> The rendezvous model is a bit restricting isn't it :(
Agreed, modifying path selectio
By the way, I actually can think of a good reason to include multiple rotation
speeds: to deal with both your uncertainty about surveillance speed and its
randomness. Suppose that you think it takes somewhere between 3 hours and 1
month, but don’t have a much better guess than that. Then a good
George Kadianakis writes:
> Mike Perry writes:
>
>> A. Johnson:
>>> >> The idea would be that Guard_3 would rotate on the order of hours,
>>> >> Guard_2 would come from a set that is rotated on the order of days
>>> >> (based on the expected duration for the adversary to become
>>> >> Guard_3),
Mike Perry writes:
> A. Johnson:
>> >> The idea would be that Guard_3 would rotate on the order of hours,
>> >> Guard_2 would come from a set that is rotated on the order of days
>> >> (based on the expected duration for the adversary to become
>> >> Guard_3), and Guard_1 would rotate on the orde
On Wed, Nov 12, 2014 at 09:30:47AM +0100, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> Hi George,
>
> I found this in my IRC backlog from November 7, 2014:
>
> 20:34 #tor-dev: < asn> karsten: how should one read these graphs
> https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html#bandwidth-flags ?
> 20:34 #tor-dev: < asn> k
On Tue, 11 Nov 2014 15:07:38 +, Mohiuddin Ebna Kawsar wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I want to develop extension(intrusion detection) for tor. for that i have
> to extract TCP and IP header from packet.
> I need to know where and how tor handle packet(TCP/IP).
Nowhere. tor works with tcp connections provid
Hi George,
I found this in my IRC backlog from November 7, 2014:
20:34 #tor-dev: < asn> karsten: how should one read these graphs
https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html#bandwidth-flags ?
20:34 #tor-dev: < asn> karsten: can the gap between two lines be
interpreted as
