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Hi,
In the obfs4 spec I couldn't find a description of how the secretbox
nonces for the frames are constructed. A 16-byte nonce prefix comes
from the KDF, but what about the remaining 8 (presumably
frame-specific) bytes?
If an attacker changes the
Hey all,
Sorry for the delay in responding -- comments inline.
Fabio Pietrosanti - lists wrote:
I would suggest to add a Tor2web policy that, looking at X-Tor2web:
HTTP
header, enable or disable access to the Blog trough he internet:
What is your reasoning for disabling access via
On Fri, 28 Nov 2014 13:08:04 +
Michael Rogers mich...@briarproject.org wrote:
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Hi,
In the obfs4 spec I couldn't find a description of how the secretbox
nonces for the frames are constructed. A 16-byte nonce prefix comes
from the KDF,
On Fri, 28 Nov 2014 14:47:29 +
Michael Rogers mich...@briarproject.org wrote:
I believe so too, but is it stated anywhere that this is a guaranteed
property of crypto_secretbox?
The Poly1305 authenticator is calculated based on the payload and the
nonce. In the case of the NaCL secretbox
So I am thinking that an other way to do it could be to write a few
ansible modules (or modules for your favorite configuration management
tool) for the various tasks currently done by the script (installing
nginx, installing a blog software, setup a hidden service, configure
the firewall,
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On 28/11/14 15:50, Yawning Angel wrote:
A one time poly1305 key is calculated for each box, based on 32
bytes of zeroes encrypted with a one time Salsa20 key/counter
derived from the nonce and the box key. You can view the use of
Salsa20 there
On Fri, 28 Nov 2014 17:57:26 +
Michael Rogers mich...@briarproject.org wrote:
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On 28/11/14 15:50, Yawning Angel wrote:
A one time poly1305 key is calculated for each box, based on 32
bytes of zeroes encrypted with a one time Salsa20
