On Mon, 28 Dec 2015 17:43:57 -0500
Nick Mathewson wrote:
> 2. RELAY_REKEY cell operation
>
>To rekey, the circuit initiator ("client") can send a new
> RELAY_REKEY cell type:
>
> struct relay_rekey {
> u16 rekey_method IN [0, 1];
> u8 rekey_data[];
> }
>
[snipping liberally]
On Mon, 28 Dec 2015 17:43:14 -0500
Nick Mathewson wrote:
> 3.3. Why _not_ AEZ?
>
>There are also some reasons to consider avoiding AEZ, even if we do
>decide to use a wide-block cipher.
>
>FIRST it is complicated to implement. As the specification says,
>"
> On 23 Dec 2015, at 03:59, Nick Mathewson wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 2:12 AM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor
> wrote:
>> Hi Nick,
>>
>> The AEZ paper says:
>>
>> "We impose a limit that AEZ be used for at most 2^48 bytes of data (about
>> 280 TB); by that time, the user should rekey. This u
[Proposal 261 probably needs this.]
Filename: 262-rekey-circuits.txt
Title: Re-keying live circuits with new cryptographic material
Author: Nick Mathewson
Created: 28 Dec 2015
Status: Open
1. Summary and Motivation
Cryptographic primitives have an upper limit of how much data should
be enc
[Okay, I'm pulling this out of draft stage. Still not sure this is the
right primitive, but I'm pretty sure this would be about the right way
to do it.]
Filename: 261-aez-crypto.txt
Title: AEZ for relay cryptography
Author: Nick Mathewson
Created: 28 Oct 2015
Status: Open
0. History
I wrote t
On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 5:34 PM, Zhenfei Zhang
wrote:
> Hi list,
>
> This is a proposal to use quantum-safe hybrid handshake for Tor
> communications.
> Given NSA's recent announcement on moving towards quantum-safe cryptography,
> it would be nice to have a quantum-safe feature for Tor.
>
> The i
Hi list,
This is a proposal to use quantum-safe hybrid handshake for Tor
communications.
Given NSA's recent announcement on moving towards quantum-safe cryptography,
it would be nice to have a quantum-safe feature for Tor.
The idea of the quantum-safe hybrid handshake is to combine both classical
Hi,
Karsten Loesing:
Ah, I wasn't referring to anyone specifically. I'm also a fan of
David McCandless' work and have his book on the shelf here :)
There are two; a new one as of last year.
(Next to the wonderful books of Edward Tufte and the great ggplot2
book of Hadley Wickham.)
The
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Hash: SHA1
Hello devs,
I just released metrics-lib 1.1.0:
https://dist.torproject.org/descriptor/1.1.0/
- From the change log:
# Changes in version 1.1.0 - 2015-12-28
* Medium changes
- Parse flag thresholds in bridge network statuses, and parse the
