Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor

The first step should be replacing the long-term keys with quantum-safe crypto. ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor

On Fri, 1 Jan 2016 19:33:31 -0800 Ryan Carboni wrote: > The first step should be replacing the long-term keys with > quantum-safe crypto. Wrong. There are NO usable PQ signature primitives that are suitable for deployment. Adding 1408+ bytes to every single microdescriptor

Re: [tor-dev] Quantum-safe Hybrid handshake for Tor

Hello, On Thu, 31 Dec 2015 20:51:43 + isis wrote: [snip] > I feel like there needs to be some new terminology here. It's > certainly not post-quantum secure, but "quantum-safe" doesn't seem > right either, because it's exactly the point at which the adversary > gains