Re: [tor-dev] [Proposal] Obfuscating the Tor Browser Bundle initial download

On Mon, 9 May 2016 15:09:37 -0400 Blake Hadley wrote: > Hey everyone, > > [How it's currently done] > > Distributed by get...@torproject.com, the URL makes it pretty clear > what you're downloading. > Dropbox: >

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

eik...@sigaint.org transcribed 0.6K bytes: > isis wrote: > > eik...@sigaint.org transcribed 1.1K bytes: > >> Typos: > > > > Thanks! Fixed: > > > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/torspec.git/commit/?h=draft/newhope=5c115905 > > You skipped 2: > > - public keys already being in included

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

Tim Wilson-Brown - teor transcribed 3.7K bytes: > > > On 7 May 2016, at 05:17, isis wrote: > > > > ... > > > > Let `ID` be a router's identity key taken from the router microdescriptor. > > In the case for relays possessing Ed25519 identity keys (c.f. Tor proposal > >

[tor-dev] [Proposal] A simple way to make Tor-Browser-Bundle more portable and secure

Hello. How it's currently done - The Tor Browser Bundle is dynamically linked against glibc. Security problem - The Tor Browser Bundle has the risk of information about the host system's library ecosystem leaking out onto the network. Portability problem - The Tor Browser Bundle can't be run on