Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

Yawning Angel wrote: Hi Yawning, Thanks for the more detailed description; I think I understand now what you're saying. I also agree that the cost is small (only some extra symmetric stuff happening). I don't like the use of AES-GCM as an authenticated-encryption

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

On Thu, 12 May 2016 11:58:56 +0200 Jeff Burdges wrote: > On Thu, 2016-05-12 at 05:29 +, Yawning Angel wrote: > > and move the handshake > > identifier into the encrypted envelope) so that only the recipient > > can see which algorithm we're using as well (So: Bad guys must

[tor-dev] RFC-ish: basket2 (aka obfs5)

Hello, So I've been somewhat productive as of late and have been working on the successor to obfs4. I have a "oh my god, you wrote how much code, with no documentation" minimum-viable-product-ish release that appears to work, though ABSOLUTELY NO ONE SHOULD USE IT YET, because I will break

Re: [tor-dev] [proposal] Post-Quantum Secure Hybrid Handshake Based on NewHope

On Thu, 2016-05-12 at 05:29 +, Yawning Angel wrote: > and move the handshake > identifier into the encrypted envelope) so that only the recipient > can see which algorithm we're using as well (So: Bad guys must have > a quantum computer and calculate `z` to figure out which post quantum >