Re: [tor-dev] The case for Tor-over-QUIC

Rob Jansen: > Thanks for the detailed write-up Mike! Theoretically, moving to QUIC > seems great; it seems to solve a lot of problems and has enough > advantages that we could just run with it. > > I'll reiterate some of my primary concerns that I gave in Rome: > > - I think it would be a

Re: [tor-dev] Connections failed to default obfs4 bridges

On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 10:57:13AM -0400, Rob Jansen wrote: > Is this a feature, like some of them only respond to users in certain parts > of the world? Or is this a bug, like the default list of bridges refers to > old bridges that are no longer available? Or am I misunderstanding >

Re: [tor-dev] Connections failed to default obfs4 bridges

> On Mar 28, 2018, at 12:23 PM, David Fifield wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 10:57:13AM -0400, Rob Jansen wrote: >> In a recent connectivity test to the default obfs4 bridges [0], we found >> that we are unable to connect to 10 or so of them (from open networks,

Re: [tor-dev] Connections failed to default obfs4 bridges

On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 10:57:13AM -0400, Rob Jansen wrote: > In a recent connectivity test to the default obfs4 bridges [0], we found that > we are unable to connect to 10 or so of them (from open networks, i.e., no > local filtering). > > Is this a feature, like some of them only respond to

[tor-dev] Connections failed to default obfs4 bridges

Hi, In a recent connectivity test to the default obfs4 bridges [0], we found that we are unable to connect to 10 or so of them (from open networks, i.e., no local filtering). Is this a feature, like some of them only respond to users in certain parts of the world? Or is this a bug, like the

Re: [tor-dev] Setting NumEntryGuards=2

On 2018-03-26 20:34, Mike Perry wrote: Florentin Rochet: On 2018-03-20 04:57, Mike Perry wrote: Arguments for staying with just one guard: 1. One guard means less observability. As Roger put it in the above blog post: "I think the analysis of the network-level adversary in Aaron's paper is