> On 31 May 2019, at 02:26, Nick Mathewson wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 5:13 AM teor wrote:
>> When does 0.4.0 stop being mainline?
>>
>> It looks like people aren't merging backports to 0.4.0 any more.
>> That's probably a good idea: we should minimise release candidate changes.
>>
Nice to try to stop this DoS vulnerability at network design level.
Can we have an estimation of when will be released this antiDoS
features? 0.4.1.x or 0.4.2.x ?
And just came to my mind reading this, that to stop these attacks we
could implement some authentication based on Proof of Work
y.)
Update: I have removed all the tickets that were not 041-should or
041-must from the 0.4.1.x-final milestone. Before doing this, I gave
them all the keyword "041-deferred-20190530" so that everybody can
look them over and see if I messed up. Some of them are now in
0.4.2.x-final and
On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 5:13 AM teor wrote:
> When does 0.4.0 stop being mainline?
>
> It looks like people aren't merging backports to 0.4.0 any more.
> That's probably a good idea: we should minimise release candidate changes.
>
> When should I start doing 0.4.0 merges as part of the backports?
Hi,
> On 30 May 2019, at 23:49, David Goulet wrote:
>
> Over the normal 3 intro points a service has, it means 150 introduction
> per-second are allowed with a burst of 600 in total. Or in other words, 150
> clients can reach the service every second up to a burst of 600 at once. This
>
Greetings!
As some of you know, a bunch of onion services were or are still under heavy
DDoS on the network. More specifically, they are bombarded with introduction
requests (INTRODUCE2 cells) which forces them to rendezvous for each of them
by creating a ton of circuits.
This basically leads to
