Re: [tor-dev] Hidden service policies

2014-07-23 Thread Mike Hearn
(Aside: I think this thread is unrelated enough to tor-dev at this point that I'm going to make this my last reply.) That's too bad - I was only answering questions you posed yourself. Happy to continue debating off list. Still, I think discussion of features that could increase usage are on

Re: [tor-dev] Hidden service policies

2014-07-21 Thread Mike Hearn
One of my first concerns would be that this would build in a very easy way for a government (probably the US government) to compel Tor to add in a line of code that says If it's this hidden service key, block access. And people who run Tor could easily take it out again, what with it being

Re: [tor-dev] Hidden service policies

2014-07-21 Thread Mike Hearn
This isn't about 'acceptable usage of Tor', this is necessary compromise to limit exit operators' exposure to ISP harrassment. Even if we accept your premise that no exit operator cares about internet abuse, it's still the same thing. ISP's define what is acceptable usage of their internet

Re: [tor-dev] [tor-relays] Hidden service policies

2014-07-21 Thread Mike Hearn
As I recall, you are also the person who raised the idea of coin tinting or a similar concept in the bitcoin community to identify suspect coins and that backfired spectacularly on you. Yes, that is the person. Though the term is known as 'taint'. One of many discussions from that

[tor-dev] Hidden service policies

2014-07-20 Thread Mike Hearn
Hello, As we know, hidden services can be useful for all kinds of legitimate things (Pond's usage is particularly interesting), however they do also sometimes get used by botnets and other problematic things. Tor provides exit policies to let exit relay operators restrict traffic they consider