On Sun, Jan 17, 2016 at 10:24:47PM +, cacahuatl wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 17, 2016 at 01:01:03PM +0100, coderman wrote:
> > misguided because it won't work as you expect, the right way to check
> > is to build circuits and see where they exit from. you can do this
> > yourself!
>
> Tor Project
On 1/14/16, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> In our quantifications of relay diversity, knowing the IP addresses that
> traffic exits from is important. Ways to have this information correctly
> reported would be very helpful.
i want to be very clear:
asking relays to report their
On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 9:58 AM, coderman wrote:
> this is the proper situation. only question is who would have a
> compelling use for separating outbound OR connections and outbound
> Exit traffic, as per #17975?
Bandwidth peering contracts preferential to push or eyeball
On 1/13/16, grarpamp wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 9:58 AM, coderman wrote:
>> ... only question is who would have a
>> compelling use for separating outbound OR connections and outbound
>> Exit traffic, as per #17975?
>
> Bandwidth peering contracts
On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 4:27 AM, coderman wrote:
>>> ... only question is who would have a
>>> compelling use for separating outbound OR connections and outbound
>>> Exit traffic, as per #17975?
>>
>> Bandwidth peering contracts preferential to push or eyeball traffic.
>
In our quantifications of relay diversity, knowing the IP addresses that
traffic exits from is important. Ways to have this information correctly
reported would be very helpful.
-V
On Thu, 14 Jan 2016 at 03:01 grarpamp wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 4:27 AM, coderman
On 1/12/16 4:43 AM, David Fifield wrote:
> I wanted to know how many exits exit from an address that is different
> from their OR address. The answer is about 10.7%, 109/1018 exits. The
> interesting part is that of those 109 mismatches, 87 have an exit
> address that differs from the OR address
> On 12 Jan 2016, at 21:01, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) - lists
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/12/16 4:43 AM, David Fifield wrote:
>> I wanted to know how many exits exit from an address that is different
>> from their OR address. The answer is about 10.7%, 109/1018 exits. The
>>
On 1/12/16, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> ...
> The current tor implementation simply calls connect() if OutBoundBindAddress
> is not set for the destination address family.
> This means that the connection will be made from a source address based on
> the routing table
I wanted to know how many exits exit from an address that is different
from their OR address. The answer is about 10.7%, 109/1018 exits. The
interesting part is that of those 109 mismatches, 87 have an exit
address that differs from the OR address in all four octets; i.e., the
IP addresses used by
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