Re: [tor-dev] Implications of openssl bug on directory authorities

2014-04-14 Thread Nick Mathewson
On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 8:36 AM, Nick Mathewson ni...@alum.mit.edu wrote: On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 5:49 AM, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote: [...] Anybody have a plan 3? Update the client and server code to explicitly blacklist the old signing keys, and design a better key revocation

Re: [tor-dev] Implications of openssl bug on directory authorities

2014-04-14 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Mon, Apr 14, 2014 at 03:02:39PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote: I've got a draft patch for this up at https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11464 , but I need a list of bad authority signing keys and/or certs. Who can get me that?

[tor-dev] Implications of openssl bug on directory authorities

2014-04-09 Thread Roger Dingledine
Part one: Facts as I understand them There are 9 directory authorities, and clients only believe a consensus networkstatus if it's signed by a majority (5) of them. Two (moria1 and urras) of the directory authorities were unaffected by the openssl bug, and

Re: [tor-dev] Implications of openssl bug on directory authorities

2014-04-09 Thread Nick Mathewson
On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 5:49 AM, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote: [...] Anybody have a plan 3? Update the client and server code to explicitly blacklist the old signing keys, and design a better key revocation mechanism for the next time, in case there is a next time? -- Nick