Re: [tor-dev] Support for mix integration research

Katharina Kohls writes: > Hi everyone, > > we are a team of 4 PHD students in the field of IT security, working at > the Ruhr-University Bochum at the chair for systems security and the > information security group. > > Currently we work on a research project with the

Re: [tor-dev] Support for mix integration research

> > Does differentiating traffic into multiple timing classes make traffic timing > analysis easier? > (For example, while high-latency traffic is better protected from > fingerprinting, low-latency traffic is easier to identify and fingerprint.) The opposite should be the case, as the

Re: [tor-dev] Support for mix integration research

Hello Katharina, Sounds like a great project. I have a couple of suggestions: 1. Consider how to use mixing to anonymize Tor’s name resolution system. Currently, clients connect to onion service by first resolving the onion address (e.g. xyzblah.onion) to a descriptor using a distributed hash

Re: [tor-dev] Support for mix integration research

> On 23 Feb 2016, at 01:11, Katharina Kohls wrote: > > Hi everyone, > > we are a team of 4 PHD students in the field of IT security, working at > the Ruhr-University Bochum at the chair for systems security and the > information security group. > > Currently we work on

[tor-dev] Support for mix integration research

Hi everyone, we are a team of 4 PHD students in the field of IT security, working at the Ruhr-University Bochum at the chair for systems security and the information security group. Currently we work on a research project with the goal to leverage the security of Tor against timing attacks by