On 5/2/15, coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote:
...
we're soliciting feedback as part of a go / no-go decision on
continuing this effort.
in particular, the design is intended to meet the scrutiny of Nick M.,
Roger, and Mike P. as the focus on support for Tor Browser and Tor on
each client
On 5/4/15, Mike Perry mikepe...@torproject.org wrote:
...
In my opinion, the most interesting use case for these devices is where
Tor Launcher implements a peering mechanism whereby the user can click a
button at some point in the initial connection wizard that says My
Router Knows My Tor
On 5/3/15, teor teor2...@gmail.com wrote:
...
Some users will want as little logging as possible, as it can lead to
privacy leaks if the device is compromised - may I suggest you turn it off
by default?
you are correct; the default should be no logging. i have updated the
document, and noted
On Sat, May 02, 2015 at 08:37:17PM -0700, coderman wrote:
a friend and i are working on a Tor router design that doesn't
compromise anonymity for convenience. [0][1][2][3][4]
So, unlike a transparent tor router, this system is not intended to prevent
malicious software on client computers from
coderman:
On 5/3/15, intrigeri intrig...@boum.org wrote:
...
Just to clarify, the threat model explicitly doesn't include Attacker
is able to reconfigure Tor on a client system to use an arbitrary set
of bridges, right?
correct.
neither bridges nor pluggable transports are
On 5/4/15, Leif Ryge l...@synthesize.us wrote:
...
So, unlike a transparent tor router, this system is not intended to prevent
malicious software on client computers from being able to learn the client
computer's location, right?
hello Leif!
this deserves a longer answer, but you're right.
On Sat, 2 May 2015 20:37:17 -0700
coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote:
a friend and i are working on a Tor router design that doesn't
compromise anonymity for convenience. [0][1][2][3][4]
we're soliciting feedback as part of a go / no-go decision on
continuing this effort.
in particular,
On 5/3/15, warms0x warm...@riseup.net wrote:
...
I am bored so I figured I would read this big document, here are some
comments from somebody who took the time to care:
thanks! :)
1.3 Warning conditions:
Is the Client privacy leak detected meaning the software would warn
in the case of
On 5/3/15, intrigeri intrig...@boum.org wrote:
...
Just to clarify, the threat model explicitly doesn't include Attacker
is able to reconfigure Tor on a client system to use an arbitrary set
of bridges, right?
correct.
neither bridges nor pluggable transports are supported. i have added a
a friend and i are working on a Tor router design that doesn't
compromise anonymity for convenience. [0][1][2][3][4]
we're soliciting feedback as part of a go / no-go decision on
continuing this effort.
in particular, the design is intended to meet the scrutiny of Nick M.,
Roger, and Mike P. as
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