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Oh, right - sorry, misunderstood.
In this case not using --keygen might be a workaround. I do understand
the use of --nopass, I'll include it in the ticket and maybe we can
have it along with --master-key and --out.
On 11/15/2015 5:36 PM, nusenu
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The "Enter passphrase" request when manually calling --keygen is
optional, not mandatory. If you just leave it blank and proceed it
will just create an unencrypted master identity key.
On 11/14/2015 10:18 AM, nusenu wrote:
> Hi,
>
> is there a way
s7r:
> The "Enter passphrase" request when manually calling --keygen is
> optional, not mandatory. If you just leave it blank and proceed it
> will just create an unencrypted master identity key.
I know, but that requires someone to press enter (or a dirty expect
script) if you want to run that
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On 11/13/2015 8:51 PM, nusenu wrote:
> Hi,
>
> since tor 0.2.7.5 is apparently not very far [1] from being
> released I was wondering whether there is any documentation about
> the new offline master key functionality? (or is this undocumented
>
>> The "Enter passphrase" request when manually calling --keygen is
>> optional, not mandatory. If you just leave it blank and proceed it
>> will just create an unencrypted master identity key.
>
> I know, but that requires someone to press enter (or a dirty expect
> script) if you want to run
> Maybe:
>
> echo "" | whatyouwanttodo --keygen
>
> or
>
> whatyouwanttodo --keygen < EOF
Yes I tried that already, but no it does not work.
That would require the program (tor) to read from sdtin - which it doesn't.
solution:
generate master keys non-interactively:
tor --datadir data
Maybe:
echo "" | whatyouwanttodo --keygen
or
whatyouwanttodo --keygen < EOF
~Josef
Am 15.11.2015 um 16:26 schrieb nusenu:
>
> s7r:
>> The "Enter passphrase" request when manually calling --keygen is
>> optional, not mandatory. If you just leave it blank and proceed it
>> will just create an
> On 15 Nov 2015, at 16:47, Abhiram Chintangal
> wrote:
>
> Hello,
>
> I have been planning on learning more about tors code base for sometime now.
> Luckily, I might have some freetime for the next two weeks and I am hoping to
> put it to good use.
>
> After
Hello,
There's been talk of moving to a wide block construct for cell crypto
(#5460), and for adding PQ Forward Secrecy to traffic (#17272). To
facilitate this, there needs to be a method for negotiating which
primitives a given relay supports.
To that end, here's the begining of a proposal
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On 14/10/15 12:46, Karsten Loesing wrote:
> Hello Onionoo client developers,
>
> the upcoming Onionoo version 3.0 will support searches by
> space-separated fingerprint.
>
> To give you an example, the following two searches will both
> return
On 16 Nov 2015, at 04:51, nusenu wrote:
>>> Is the offline master key limited to ed25519 keys and useless
while using ed25519 + RSA keys at the same time? (because the RSA
key is not offline?)
>> Hmmm. Probably yes. Until transition (until we remove permanently
On 16 Nov 2015, at 02:37, s7r wrote:
>> Does a tor operator has to SIGHUP a running tor instance after
>> copying the new signing keys to the appropriate folder or will tor
>> attempt to reload that file as soon as this signing key expires?
> Yes.
Yes, HUP?
Tim (teor)
> On 16 Nov 2015, at 02:36, Josef Stautner wrote:
>
> EOF is false of course.
> I mean < /dev/null of course :-)
>
>> Am 15.11.2015 um 16:28 schrieb Josef Stautner:
>> Maybe:
>>
>> echo "" | whatyouwanttodo --keygen
>>
>> or
>>
>> whatyouwanttodo --keygen < EOF
These
Hi,
roster's recommended tor version check seems broken, example:
http://tor-roster.org/family_detail/963ADC0137505151C1AFA6757DD2367EDEEC7B62
Runs Recommended Tor Version For All Relays: false
but all relays run 0.2.4.27 - which is currently a 'recommended version'
as per
>> Is the offline master key limited to ed25519 keys and useless
>> > while using ed25519 + RSA keys at the same time? (because the RSA
>> > key is not offline?)
>> >
> Hmmm. Probably yes. Until transition (until we remove permanently RSA
> identities) only the ed25519 key will be protected, RSA
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