On 5/3/15, teor teor2...@gmail.com wrote:
...
Some users will want as little logging as possible, as it can lead to
privacy leaks if the device is compromised - may I suggest you turn it off
by default?
you are correct; the default should be no logging. i have updated the
document, and noted
On Sat, May 02, 2015 at 08:37:17PM -0700, coderman wrote:
a friend and i are working on a Tor router design that doesn't
compromise anonymity for convenience. [0][1][2][3][4]
So, unlike a transparent tor router, this system is not intended to prevent
malicious software on client computers from
coderman:
On 5/3/15, intrigeri intrig...@boum.org wrote:
...
Just to clarify, the threat model explicitly doesn't include Attacker
is able to reconfigure Tor on a client system to use an arbitrary set
of bridges, right?
correct.
neither bridges nor pluggable transports are
Thanks for going into so much detail, you've given me a lot to think about.
The real solution is probably the one that nobody wants to take on - having
an application HTTP port that could take direct input from HTTP aware stuff
and utilize a richer set of information then SOCKS allows for. I've
On 5/4/15, Leif Ryge l...@synthesize.us wrote:
...
So, unlike a transparent tor router, this system is not intended to prevent
malicious software on client computers from being able to learn the client
computer's location, right?
hello Leif!
this deserves a longer answer, but you're right.
