Re: [tor-dev] Onion Services and NAT Punching

> On Oct 26, 2015, at 11:34, Alec Muffett wrote: >> Of course. All the cases where you set up a hidden service >> exactly because your host is behing a NAT. >> Like the webcam raspi I'm just booting up. > > We run our tor daemons in a enclave network which can only connect

Re: [tor-dev] Onion Services and NAT Punching

> On Oct 1, 2015, at 06:15, Andreas Krey wrote: > >> Are there any use cases that: >> * need NAT punching, >> * don't need service location anonymity, and >> * would benefit from lower latency? > > Of course. All the cases where you set up a hidden service > exactly because your

Re: [tor-dev] A layered transport

wait... what? What is this front tier? Why would we want to use cryptographic protocols for bridges that violate the end to end principal? On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 8:44 AM, Da Feng wrote: > Hi: >I've discovered that the GFW normally doesn't block https > protocols. We

Re: [tor-dev] A layered transport

On Mon, 26 Oct 2015 15:44:59 +0800 Da Feng wrote: > Hi: >I've discovered that the GFW normally doesn't block https > protocols. We can use a https front tier to distribute connections to > actual bridges. The front tier encrypts an internal address identifier > with its

Re: [tor-dev] [FWD: Re: Apple developer account + codesigning]

On 27 Oct 2015, at 05:41, Conrad Kramer wrote: >> On Oct 26, 2015, at 11:22 AM, Spencer wrote: >> >> Hi, >> >>> Conrad Kramer: >>> All resources in a bundle (e.g. an app or framework) are >>> signed and the signatures are stored in a file

Re: [tor-dev] [FWD: Re: Apple developer account + codesigning]

> On Oct 26, 2015, at 11:22 AM, Spencer wrote: > > Hi, > >> Conrad Kramer: >> All resources in a bundle (e.g. an app or framework) are >> signed and the signatures are stored in a file named "CodeResources”: > > Then what is in 'CodeSignature', Apple's signing

[tor-dev] Tor browser for other Projects

Hello good people of Tor. As you know, your client side applications like Tor browser are unmatched by anything out there. They are the natural choice for other anonymous networks. Freenet is considering ways to interface with Tor browser for better privacy. Disclaimer: I am not an official

[tor-dev] [FWD: Re: Apple developer account + codesigning]

Here is some info about OSX codesigning, courtesy of Mike Tigas. It sounds like undoing the codesigning to verify build (and signing machine) integrity will be tricky. If anyone has more info on how to do that, it would be appreciated. - Forwarded message from Mike Tigas -

Re: [tor-dev] A layered transport

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 03:44:59PM +0800, Da Feng wrote: > Hi: >I've discovered that the GFW normally doesn't block https > protocols. We can use a https front tier to distribute connections to > actual bridges. This is a good idea. HTTPS is a good cover protocol. > The front tier encrypts

Re: [tor-dev] [FWD: Re: Apple developer account + codesigning]

> On Oct 26, 2015, at 10:23 AM, Ian Goldberg wrote: > > On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 06:06:36AM -0700, Mike Perry wrote: >> Essentially, codesign only touches executable binaries in the .app (see >> that second link for info on how the binary's segments get moved around) >> and

Re: [tor-dev] [FWD: Re: Apple developer account + codesigning]

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 06:06:36AM -0700, Mike Perry wrote: > Essentially, codesign only touches executable binaries in the .app (see > that second link for info on how the binary's segments get moved around) > and also adds an SC_Info directory for codesign/DRM metadata. Wait; does that mean

[tor-dev] [FWD: Re: Apple developer account + codesigning]

Hi, Conrad Kramer: All resources in a bundle (e.g. an app or framework) are signed and the signatures are stored in a file named "CodeResources”: Then what is in 'CodeSignature', Apple's signing stuff? Wordlife, Spencer ___ tor-dev mailing list