Re: [tor-dev] prop224: Ditching key blinding for shorter onion addresses

In order to have an effective system of blinded identities, you need to have an out of band channel to transmit 128-256 bits from the server to the client. This is essential for blinding the in-band adversary to the long term shared identity between the client and server. A naming system will move

Re: [tor-dev] Onioncat and Prop224

Hi Jeremy. In regard your post 'Tor and Namecoin' here... https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-July/011245.html In this thread prefixed 'Onioncat and Prop224' started and spanning from here through now... https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-April/010847.html

Re: [tor-dev] prop224: Ditching key blinding for shorter onion addresses

I agree with this, I don't really see the point of making .onion names easy to remember. If it's a service you access often, you can bookmark it or alias it locally to something like "myserver.onion" (maybe we should make it easier for users to do just that - an alias file for .onion lookups,

Re: [tor-dev] Tor and Namecoin

Jeremy Rand writes: > [ text/plain ] > Hello Tor devs, > > Namecoin is interested in collaboration with Tor in relation to > human-readable .onion names; I'm reaching out to see how open the Tor > community would be to this, and to get feedback on how exactly the >

[tor-dev] Tor and Namecoin

Hello Tor devs, Namecoin is interested in collaboration with Tor in relation to human-readable .onion names; I'm reaching out to see how open the Tor community would be to this, and to get feedback on how exactly the integration might work. The new hidden service spec is going to substantially

Re: [tor-dev] prop224: Ditching key blinding for shorter onion addresses

Hi, Lunar: the size of the address Size *does* matter XD 128 bits long Oh my. IPv6. It's not a usability problem because .. .. no one outside of computer networking knows what it is, or that it exists (: a naming system [vs] random[ness] [regarding] the size of onion