wasn't
thought to be quantum resistant in anyway shape or form, and providing
quantum resistance wasn't part of the design goals of the primitive, or
really why it was being considered at one point for use in Tor.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpKHB9bVRRUJ.pgp
Description: OpenPGP di
261 is dead in the
water. Assuming people want the new cell crypto to be both fragile and
to resist tagging attacks, Farfalle may be a better choice, assuming
there's a Keccak-p parameterization such that it gives adequate
performance.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgp8RMxKugm9s.pgp
Description:
ity.
I still don't understand what was so hard about implementing the old
API, on anything but iOS.
The "2.0" spec still doesn't have any provisions for using AF_LOCAL
instead of the loopback interface, go figure. It's not as if I bring
it up every time this topic comes up or anything
maybe the other people who
drafted the original document don't care as much as I do. I find
the attribution in the acknowledgments section entirely inadequate. I
explicitly credited all previous authors when I last rewrote the
specification for a reason.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpgdLflv6ASe.
/cB8ymDZreINJhk7BI
> Qk6UM3PcutB7neTH3FR7DkVtSi23AOfOmlf0kNTSRZuMMB4gZO3KfZXGRWq1+FJ3
> [snip]
Why are you sending PGP encrypted e-mail to a public mailing list.
--
Yawning Angel
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https://
; is
> because only clients and exits do the SHA1 step.)
I wonder how many of the relays have support for hardware assisted
SHA. (nb: I don't have access to ARMv8, Ryzen or a sufficiently new
Intel system, so I don't know how good the implementations are)
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
[0]: And
On Tue, 22 Aug 2017 20:47:06 +0200
Peter Schwabe <pe...@cryptojedi.org> wrote:
> Yawning Angel <yawn...@schwanenlied.me> wrote:
>
> Hi Yawning, hi all,
>
> > Ultimately none of this matters because Prop. 261 is dead in the
> > water. Assuming people want th
uld need
to tear down/respawn PTs, or someone needs to design an out of band IPC
mechanism between tor and PTs that can signal hibernation status.
The current approach to this problem involves toggling `DisableNetwork`.
See: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13213
Regard
ld be something like:
>
> $ tail -c+33 hs_ed25519_secret_key | base64 -w 0
>
> Considering the current situation with the encoded file on disk of
> the key, I think this is kind of the simplest approach?
Yeah. Just the Base64ed private key (excluding that header
on such things, rather than being forced to
re-implement large parts of Tor Browser.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
[0]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tbb-dev/2018-January/000743.html
pgp4CNrRmOJJf.pgp
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
a to allow LEA/governments to exploit Tor
> Browser users easily? Because I don't think maintaining the sandboxed
> version is that much work and it is a great protection for many users.
LOL.
> So please, make Sandboxed Tor Browser an official thing.
Fuck you, pay me.
Regards,
--
ify files elsewhere on the system.
>
> Example:
>
> TOR_PT_STATE_LOCATION=/var/lib/tor/pt_state/
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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at kind of allows development.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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I
still recommend a bit of a wait for tor to open the AF_UNIX socket.
While it usually is nearly instantaneous on modern systems, I had
intermittent problems with "the socket isn't there" related to trying
too fast.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpQp7PSFkF
: Pitfalls of
Covert Channel Censorship Circumvention".
https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/ccs13-cya.pdf
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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On Mon, 1 Jan 2018 08:45:57 +
nullius <null...@nym.zone> wrote:
> On 2017-12-31 at 10:48:52 +, Yawning Angel
> <yawn...@schwanenlied.me> wrote:
> >This is pointless because internationalized domain names are
> >standardized around Punycode encoding (Unicode&l
AGPL3
network interaction requirement, though there is an exception for
bridges distributed via BridgeDB and those shipped with Tor Browser.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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t
eal with
this is via using `ControlPortWriteToFile` since the file gets
created after the control port listener is created. You could also use
something like inotify on Linux, but that's non-portable.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpbZpZhxZdpl.pgp
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
__
to gitlab.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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tag.
Questions, comments, feedback appreciated,
--
Yawning Angel
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ompatibility a good amount.
That said HelloChrome_Auto and HelloIOS_Auto both work fine against the
Azure bridge, so it might not be worth the effort.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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ader (depending on how you want to treat TLS).
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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see much
reason to over engineer it.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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arantee that the connection used to
create the inner `http.RoundTripper` instance will be passed to the
correct thread.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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(meek_lite).
- More fixes to HTTP Basic auth.
- (meek_lite) Pin the certificate chain public keys for the default
Tor Browser Azure bridge (meek_lite).
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
[0]: obfs4proxy WILL NOT build with the upstream version of the library,
and the Firefox fingerprint will not function
/obfs4proxy/obfs4proxy-0.0.10.tar.xz
https://people.torproject.org/~yawning/releases/obfs4proxy/obfs4proxy-0.0.10.tar.xz.asc
Changes in version 0.0.10 - 2019-04-12:
- Disable behavior distinctive to crypto/tls when using utls.
- Bump the version of the utls fork.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
.
- Bump the version of the utls fork.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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too. As of 0.0.10 it no longer does.
Odd. None of that code, both in obfs4proxy and goptlib, has changed for
years. I'll look at it when I have a moment.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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